



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

November 20, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply with the 20-day statutory time limit.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located records pertaining to your request on Thailand Intelligence Services, ZF400117W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized from the records as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 1.5(b), 1.5(c) and 1.5(d) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the file series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. The records are enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.5(b) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to foreign government information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.5(c) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.5(d) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources shall be considered for classification protection.

Since the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individual concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

In addition, we have sanitized information that would reveal the identity of confidential sources. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of another government agency. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that five pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. Information has been sanitized from the records that is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. To aid you in identifying the CIA exempted information, we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information & Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Cite CIA #F-1998-02311 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.


In addition, coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized and eight pages are denied in their entirety pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) and (b)(6) of the FOIA. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. To aid you in identifying the DIA exempted information, we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ATTN: SVI-1-FOIA, Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA #0929-97 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The amount for professional review and reproduction of the first one hundred pages had been waived. The reproduction cost of \$46.05 remains due and a check should be forwarded by postal money order or certified check made payable to the Treasurer of the United States.

If you have any questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact Mrs. Query at (301) 677-4060. Refer to case #868F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "for Russell A. Nichols".

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: THAILAND

2. SUBJECT: (U) Appointment of Thai Intelligence Officers to National Assembly

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 16 Dec 72

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BANGKOK, TH, 17 Dec 72

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE 1 INFORMATION 2

7. SOURCE: US intelligence officer

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 730 0250 72 (5330-06-K)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 27 DEC 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP (DIRM 6C, 7A2, 7A6)

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY: TOSHIO AOYAGI, COL, MI (10/72)

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Alfred W. Bagot, Colonel, MI Commander

15. SUMMARY: **COMPLETE TEXT**

(U) The National Executive Council, under the leadership of Field Marshal THANOM KITTIKACHORN, ended its control of the Government of Thailand. The National Assembly, which is also under the leadership of Field Marshal THANOM, was designated to draft Thailand's permanent constitution. The National Assembly is composed of 299 members, of which 99 are civilians, and the rest army, navy, air force, or police officers. Included among the officers appointed to the National Assembly are the following Thai intelligence officers:

MG. HUNNAG DESABUTR, Director of Central Intelligence.
 LTG CHAROEN PONGPANICH, Director of Joint Intelligence, Supreme Command.
 LTG MALLOP ROJANAWISUT, Director of Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC), Supreme Command.
 Spec COL KOBBOON PATANATABUTR, Chief, Operations Division, AFIOC, Supreme Command.

(This report is marked NO FOREIGN DISSEM to protect the source and his access.)

Field Comments:

1. (U) The above information was obtained from an official Thai government announcement published in newspapers and through liaison with an AFIOC officer appointed to the National Assembly.

2. (U) This report was dispatched for review by the appropriate US agencies prior to publication outside TH.

Comment of Preparing Officer: (U) The above information was forwarded by Special Activities Bangkok message BTG 190045Z Dec 72, same subject (NOTAL).

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA 1

ACSI, DA 1

CINCPAC 1

USARPAC 1

548 BTG (CINKPS) 1

PACFLT 1

USASUPTHAI, Sattahip 1

FEINTSA 1

7th Psy Ops Gp 1

USDAO, Bangkok 1

USATWTC 1

USAIRR 1

500th MI Gp (K-3) 1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2)

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 3

DECLASSIFY ON: N/A

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

PROCESSED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 330197

EXC 33 USAINSCOM FOI/PO

AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.11

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 35

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evaluated or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: THAILAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) Personnel Changes Within Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center.
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Oct 72
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BANGKOK, Thailand 3 Oct 72
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B, C INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 730 0199 72 (5330-06-K)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 31 OCT 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP (DIRM 1G1I, 6A2c, 6C)
12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp
13. PREPARED BY: TOSHIO AOYAGI, COL, MI (7/72)
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Alfred W. Bagot*
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commander

15. SUMMARY:

COMPLETE TEXT

(U) (C-NFD) On 1 Oct 72, the following personnel changes were in effect at the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC), Supreme Command, Royal Thai Government, located in BANGKOK, TH:

a. COL TERDPONG SKOONWAT replaced COL AREE KANCHANAKUNCHORN as deputy chief of Division 3, AFIOC. COL TERDPONG was previously assigned as deputy chief of Division 2, AFIOC. COL TERDPONG's former position remains vacant.

b. COL AREE KANCHANAKUNCHORN was reassigned as head of Operational Data Section of Division 4, the Source Control/Security Office, AFIOC. COL AREE's reassignment will be detrimental to his career. His disfavor and reassignment reportedly is due to an inability to handle his duties while he served as temporary chief of Division 3 during the recent absence of SPECIAL COL KOBBOON PATANATABUTR.

(Report is marked NO FOREIGN DISSEM to protect source and his access.)

Field Comments:

1. (C-NFD) [REDACTED]

2. (U) Names are transliterations from Thai.

3. (U) This report was dispatched for review by the appropriate US agencies prior to publications outside TH.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA	1
ACSI, DA	1
CINCPAC	1
USARPAC	5
PACFLT	1
FEDTSA	1
USDAO, Bangkok	1
USAJNTC	1
USAIRR	1
500th MI Gp	11

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 3
DECLASSIFY ON: N/A

6

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

Field Distribution:

[REDACTED]
USMACTHAI, J22
USARSUPTHAI
OSI, Dist 51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

BUSC 552 (b)(7)(D) (EX)

BUSC 552 (b)(7)(D) (EX)

(U) (C) 552 (b)(7)(D) (EX)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be based on or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: THAILAND

2. SUBJECT: (U) Reorganization of the Armed Forces Security Center, Royal Thai Government

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 18 Sep 72

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BANGKOK, Thailand
19 Sep 72

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B, C INFORMATION 3

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 222 0366 72
(0710-10-E)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 26 OCT 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 4

11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP (DIRM 1G2e, 1G3gg, 1J35, 6A2a-f, 6C, 6D1)

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY: TOSHIO AOYAGI, COL, MI
(4/72)

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Alfred W. Bagot*
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commander

15. SUMMARY:

Report provides information on a planned reorganization of the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) of the Royal Thai Government (RTG).

MAP REFERENCES: N/A

(This report is marked NO FOREIGN DISSEM to protect source and his access.)

1. (C) In conversation with a US Army officer, [REDACTED] Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC), Royal Thai Government, related the following:

a. Prime Minister THANOM had given approval in principle to a plan proposed by [REDACTED] that significantly altered the AFSC organization and broadened its operational charter. Further, PM THANOM has informed [REDACTED] that he need not worry about the AFSC budget as the RTG would make good the additional funds required to support the broadened AFSC mission. No date for actual accomplishment of the new AFSC organizational and operational changes was specified.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA (w/Encl) 1
ACSI, DA (w/Encl) 1
CINCPAC (w/Encl) 1
USARPAC (w/Encl) 5
548 RTG (INXPS) (w/Encl) 2
PACFLT (w/Encl) 1
USARSUPHAI (w/Encl) 1
FEDTSA (w/Encl) 1
USDAO, Bangkok (w/Encl) 1
USAINTC (w/Encl) 1
USAIRR (w/Encl) 1
500th MI Gp (w/Encl) 11

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 3
DECLASSIFY ON: N/A

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

1 Enclosure:
(U) Chart of Revised AFSC Organization, 1 cy, 1 pg

Field Distribution:

USMACV, J22
OSI, Dist 51

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (D)

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (D)

(b)(1)

EUSC 552 (b) (7) (D)
for CIA

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 222 0366 72
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

EUSC 562 (b)(7)(D) (b)(1)

Organization Chart of reorganized AFSC. (See enclosure)

2. ~~(b)(7)(D)~~ Control of Revised AFSC Organization:

a. [REDACTED] has not yet completed selection of officers to be assigned to key leadership positions, therefore, only a partial listing can be made at this time.

- (1) [REDACTED]
- (2) Dep CG: Administration - MG PANAT
Dep CG: Operations - MG PRASERT
- (3) Chief of Staff: Sp Col JITRAPOL
- (4) Chief Signal Div: Sp Col PANYA
- (5) Chief, VIP Security Div: Sp Col PREECHA
- (6) Chief Domestic Security Div: Sp Col SANAN
- (7) Director Institute for Strategic Intelligence and Studies:
Sp Col SAMRAN
- (8) Chief Countersubversion Div: Navy Cpt PRASERT
- (9) Chief Bangkok Metropolitan Operations Branch, Countersubversion
Division: LTC SURINDR

b. The general staff officer positions (G1-G4) will be filled by officers in the grade of Colonel. All division chiefs will be Special Colonels. The present Chief of Staff, Sp Col JITRAPOL, is expected to be promoted to Major General in October 1972. He will continue to occupy his post even if promoted according to Sp Col SOMCHIT, Chief of Research Division in the current AFSC organization. Should this occur, AFSC would be headed by four general officers i.e. [REDACTED] CG; MG PANAT, Dep CG Administration; MG PRASERT, Dept CG Operations, and MG JITRAPOL, Chief of Staff.

3. ~~(b)(7)(D)~~ Operations Under the New AFSC Charter:

a. The new AFSC operational charter, in effect, lifts the organization one step above its present position as the principal counterintelligence and security arm of Supreme Command RTAF. Under the new charter AFSC would work directly under the National Security Council (NSC). It would perform all missions currently performed plus any other missions deemed necessary by the NSC.

4. ~~(b)(7)(D)~~ Functional Innovations:

a. Field Detachments: Under the current organization AFSC field detachments are assigned to provide direct support to the various Army military circle and equivalent headquarters. These detachments have been under the staff supervision of counterintelligence division, AFSC. Under the new organization all field detachments will be under the direct control of CG AFSC without any intervening AFSC staff supervision. Each field detachment commander will receive his orders from the CG and report directly to the CG.

b. Task Groups: These are AFSC operational teams especially organized to perform specific tasks in response to NSC requirements. Currently, an AFSC task group is devoted to Cambodian operations. Several AFSC liaison and intelligence

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUL 1 1997

DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 62

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60,
AND DA FORM 509, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
WAS OBSOLETE 1 JAN 63.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 222 0366 72
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

Teams are presently assigned to duties in Cambodia.

Under the new organization task groups like field detachments will be under the direct control of the CG.

c. Specialists: These individuals will provide technical intelligence expertise on an as-needed basis to the TASK Groups and Field Detachments.

d. Institute for Strategic Intelligence and Studies: This organization represents an ambitious expansion of the present AFSC school division which provides training in various intelligence skills and languages to students from the various Thai Armed Forces and National Police organizations. The "Institute" will continue to provide specialized intelligence training to military and police students. Additionally, more comprehensive courses and studies in strategic intelligence will be offered. In a major departure from current practices, the "Institute" will give intelligence training to Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Economics and other RTG agency representatives selected for assignment to Thai Embassies abroad.

e. Training Division: This division will be divested of all external (non-AFSC) training responsibilities and concentrate upon providing specialized intelligence and technical training to AFSC assignees only.

f. Domestic Security Division: Will provide personal security and counterintelligence services for the entire AFSC organization and such other organs as may be directed by the NSC. Basically the division will conduct personal security investigations (BI), compile dossiers and give security clearances to individuals assigned to AFSC and to other sensitive posts. The scope of investigations will include wives, prospective wives, and close relatives of all individuals investigated. Additionally, this division will be responsible for internal physical and document security of AFSC and other selected organs. In carrying out this mission the division will conduct periodic counterintelligence surveys and inspections.

g. Countersubversion Division: This division will be responsible for conducting the "counter-coup" portion of the AFSC mission. Officially, the division will conduct operations to detect and neutralize individuals participating in activities inimical to the Revolutionary Council (SIC). It is interesting to note that even though the new AFSC organization has not been officially promulgated, the Bangkok Metropolitan Branch of the division is already operating. This Branch, headed by LTC Surindr, former chief of the AFSC Cambodian Task Group, has a budget of 8000 Baht (US \$400) and 2000 liters of gasoline per month. It is conducting counter-subversion (counter-coup) operations in the BANGKOK metropolitan area.

h. Technical Division: Has responsibility for providing technical support to the AFSC operational divisions, field detachments and task groups.

i. Miscellaneous: The operations of VIP security and signal divisions would remain essentially unchanged under the new AFSC organization.

Logistics Division is responsible for providing financial, material and transportation support to all AFSC administrative and operational entities. Plans and Operations Division is responsible for developing doctrine,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 222 0356 72
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 500th MI gp

outlining objectives and formulating operational concepts in accordance with the AFSC mission. Intelligence Division constitutes the intelligence production and dissemination organ of AFSC. Additionally, this division will produce special studies and reports as required.

5. (U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

6. (U) ~~(S)~~ During the conversation, the US Army officer noticed consistency on three points:


- a. AFSC primary mission would continue to be counter coup.
- b. Within the counterintelligence field, AFSC would be concerned with counter subversion as opposed to countersabotage or counterespionage.
- c. The Deputy CGs, MG PANAT and MG PRASERT, would continue to have only minor involvement in AFSC plans or operations.

Field Comments:

1. (U) ~~(S)~~ The U. S. Army Officer felt that the most significant item of the reorganization was the increased amount of direct control given to the CG. For example, the reports from the Field Detachments will bypass the regular headquarters staff.
2. (U) ~~(S)~~ This reorganization will remove the present CIC Group of AFSC. This particular action may be the result of CIC duplication of information gathered by Royal Thai Army Military Intelligence.
3. (U) ~~(S)~~ The reorganization will allow for effective central control by the AFSC of MAP payments. Prior to this, the MAP program has three separate accounts with CIC, the Signal Division, and HG AFSC.
4. (U) This report was dispatched for review by the appropriate US agencies prior to publication outside TH.

6USC 552 (b) (1)

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 31 JUL 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Encl

THAI
S-1/arc

<p>NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM (Classification and Control Markings)</p>		<p>This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.</p>	
1. COUNTRY: ROYAL KINGDOM OF THAILAND		8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 223 0022 72 (6900-003-72)			
2. SUBJECT: (U) Class Roster of Thai Intelligence Students		9. DATE OF REPORT: 26 October 1972			
3. ISC NUMBER:		10. NO. OF PAGES: 1			
		11. REFERENCES: DIRM 7A4			
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 11 August 1972		12. ORIGINATOR: 441st MI Detachment, APO SF 96331			
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Bangkok Thailand 28 Apr - 11 Aug 72		13. PREPARED BY: [Redacted] MAJ, GS Chief, Intelligence Division			
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2		14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Signature] JOHN W. BAKER, COL, GS Director of Intelligence HQ USARECO, APO SF 96331			
7. SOURCE: 22230058					
15. SUMMARY:					
<p>(X) (CONFIDENTIAL) This report forwards a class roster of Thai Army personnel who attended an Intelligence Course in Collection and Counterintelligence during the period 1 May to 29 June 1972.</p> <p>(This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM due to the nature of the source and source's continuing collection requirements.)</p> <p>(Evaluation Reports, DD Form 1480, prepared on this IR will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.)</p>					
(Leave Blank)					
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:		17. DOWNGRADING DATA:		18. ATTACHMENT DATA:	
DIA 1 USARPAC, CPIN-CH 1 DA, ACISI-CIPC 1 USAIRR 1 CINCPAC, J233 1 USARJ, GB-I 1 500TH MIG 1 SPEC COMS 1 7TH PSYOPS GP 1 441ST MID 2 CIFT 1		CLASSIFIED BY DIA (DIAM 58-2) EXEMPT FR. GDS OF EO 11652; EXEMPT CAT: 2; DECLASSIFY ON: NA		1 Enclosure 1. (U) Class Roster, 1 cy, 3 pg	
				REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUL 1 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1F	
		<p>CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM (Classification and Control Markings)</p>			

DD FORM 1396

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 O-715-217

REPLACES DA FORM 1480, 1 AUG 60,
OPNAV FORM 3922 (Rev 10-61),
AS FORM 117 JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62.

(สำเนา)

บัญชีรายชื่อผู้เข้ารับการศึกษา ปี ๖๔

หลักสูตร การต่อต้านข่าวกรองและการข่าวลับ

ลำดับ	ยศ - ชื่อ	พบเหตุ
1 ๑๐	[REDACTED]	Remarks: Biographic reports are contained in the following IIRs: 2 223 0054 72
2 ๒๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0023 72
3 ๓๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0014 72
4 ๔๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0024 72
5 ๕๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0025 72
6 ๖๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0026 72
7 ๗๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0027 72
8 ๘๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0028 72
9 ๙๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0009 72
10 ๑๐๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0029 72
11 ๑๑๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0030 72
12 ๑๒๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0011 72
13 ๑๓๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0031 72
14 ๑๔๐	[REDACTED]	2 223 0032 72

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

End 1, IR 22230022 72

- ๒ -

ลำดับ	บค - ๕๑	หมายเลข
15 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0033 72
16 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0034 72
17 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0035 72
18 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0036 72
19 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0037 72
20 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0038 72
21 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0039 72
22 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0040 72
23 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0041 72
24 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0042 72
25 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0043 72
26 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0044 72
27 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0045 72
28 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0046 72
29 บค.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0047 72

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

ลำดับ	ยศ - นาม	หมายเลข
30 นอ.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0048 72
31 นอ.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0049 72
32 นอ.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0050 72
33 นอ.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0051 72
34 นอ.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0052 72
35 นอ.	[REDACTED]	2 223 0053 72

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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COUNTRY: ROYAL KINGDOM OF THAILAND

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 223 0007 72

(6900-001-72)

SUBJECT: Line and Block Chart of the
Royal Thai Army, Military
Intelligence Unit (U)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 27 September 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM LJ35; 1K1

DATE OF INFORMATION: 3 August 1972

12. ORIGINATOR: 441st MI Det, APO SF 96331

PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: Bangkok, Thailand
20 September 1972

13. PREPARED BY: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GS
Chief, Intelligence Division

EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *John W. Baker*
JOHN W. BAKER
Colonel, GS
Director of Intelligence
HQ USARBCO, APO SF 96331

SUMMARY:

(C-~~FD~~) This report forwards a line and block organizational chart and information on the newly reorganized Royal Thai Army, Military Intelligence Unit. The unit is located in Bangkok (12 50'N 100 15'E) Thailand.

(This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM due to the nature of the source and source's continuing collection requirement)

(EVALUATION REPORTS (DD Forms 1480) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL)

1. (U) LOCATION: 145 Unnuaysongkram Road, Bangkok 3 Thailand (12 50'N 100 15'E). This area is the old 21st Royal Thai Army Regiment area. The area is also known as Sapan Gasgomon.

2. (U) MISSION: To provide intelligence trained personnel to work at the Division level in the Thai Army.

3. (U) OBJECTIVE: The Armed Forces Information Center (AFIOC) and the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) were tasked with supplying intelligence for the Division Commanders; however, with the political situation and power of these two agencies, the Army Commanders did not trust them and were not using

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USARPAC, GPIN-CM	5
DA, ACSI-CIPC	1
USAIRR	①
CINCPAC, J233	1
USARJ, GB-I	1
500th MIG	1
SPEC CONS	1
7th PSYOPS GP	1
441st MID	2
CIFF	1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2)
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652;
EXEMPT CAT: 2; DECLASSIFY ON:
N/A

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

1 Enclosure
(U) (C-~~FD~~) Line & Block Chart
of Royal Thai Army,
Military Intelligence
Unit, 1 cy, 1 pg

16

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ON 11/11/97
BY CDR USAF/COM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-5.5 DOD 5200.1R

5 USC 552 (b)

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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2 223 0007 72

REPORT NO. (6900-001-72

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ORIGINATOR 441st MI Det,
APO SF 96331

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the personnel from these agencies. This brought about the reorganization of the Military Intelligence unit. The objective of the Military Intelligence unit is to provide the Commanders with Army staff personnel and a military intelligence capability oriented to the combat situation. The RIA, Military Intelligence Unit was reorganized in the late winter and spring of 1972 with an increased TO&E.

4. (b) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT STAFF

Commanding Officer: Special Colonel [REDACTED]

Executive Officer: Major [REDACTED] (other names unknown)

S-1: Major [REDACTED]

S-2: Unknown; The S-2 officer was on a special assignment to Cambodia.

S-3: Major [REDACTED] Asst S-3: Captain [REDACTED]

S-4: Major [REDACTED]

Commanding Officer, MI Det CSOC 1: CPT [REDACTED]

Commanding Officer, MI Det CSOC 2: CPT [REDACTED]

Commanding Officer, MI Det CSOC 3: MAJ [REDACTED]

Commanding Officer, MI Det CSOC 4: MAJ [REDACTED]

NOTE: In October 1972, CPT [REDACTED] Commander of MI Det CSOC 2, and MAJ [REDACTED] Commander of MI Det CSOC 3 are scheduled to change positions.

5 USC 552 (b) (5)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) D/A

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 19-23

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This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: ROYAL KINGDOM OF THAILAND

8. REPORT NUMBER

2. SUBJECT: (U) Biographic Report on
LT SOMCHI Hiranyasthiti, Royal
Thai Army

9. DATE OF REPORT: 25 September 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. []

5 USC 552a (b) (2) DIA

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 13 August 1972

12. ORIGINATOR: 441st MI Detachment, APO SF 96331

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: []

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

7. SOURCE []

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: []

15. SUMMARY:

5 USC 552 (b) (3) DIA

(C-REF) Attached is a Biographic Report on LT Somchi Hiranyasthiti, Directorate of Intelligence Office, Royal Thai Army.

5 USC 552a (b) (2) DIA

DIA
5 USC 552a (b) (2)

DIA
5 USC 552a (b) (2)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. CORRELATING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

[]

1
5
1
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[]

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3 Inclosures
1. (U) 1396-1; 1 cy, 3 pg
2. (U) 1396-18; 1 cy, 2 pg
3. (U) One 4x5 Photo
w/leg

DD FORM 1396

DD FORM 1396-1, 1 SEP 72
GPO: 1972-0-250-000-000-0
AT: 1972-0-250-000-000-0
117-100-100-000-000-0

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE		OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY	
CONTINUATION SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM <small>(Classification and Control Markings)</small>	REPORT NO. [] PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES ORIGINATOR []	
PHOTOGRAPHIC TITLING LOG <small>(Leave Blank)</small>			
OKINAWA/THAILAND [] Bangkok, Thailand [] 1LT Somchi Hiranyasthiti/[] Pentax Spotmatic - []		(b)(1) DIA	
<div style="text-align: center;">25</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM <small>(Classification and Control Markings)</small> </div>			

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Page 1 of 3 Pages

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BIOGRAPHIC REPORT			
GENERAL INFORMATION			
1. COUNTRY ROYAL KINGDOM OF THAILAND		2. DATE OF INFORMATION ON FILE 1972 August 13	3. DATE OF REPORT ON FILE 1972 August 28
4. NAME a. FULL NAME (Give full name in Roman letters, in natal order, and with natural English name, if known to name; other than surname, underline same. Give phonetic pronunciation of name as appropriate). SOMCHI Hiranyasthiti			
5. NAME OR NAMES BY WHICH INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES TO BE ADDRESSED (1) IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE: Lieutenant Somchi Hiranyasthiti (2) ORALLY AT OFFICIAL GATHERINGS: Lieutenant Somchi			
6. FULL NAME IN NATIVE ALPHABET			
7. VARIANTS, ALIASES, OR NICKNAMES UNK			
7. POSITION a. PRESENT POSITION: Directorate of Intelligence Office, Royal Thai Army, Bangkok, Thailand		b. DATE ASSUMED POSITION (Year, month, day) 1972 (Summer; month unknown)	
c. RANK TITLE (In English and Native language) First Lieutenant		d. DATE OF RANK (Y, M, D) 1972 June	
8. SERVICE Army		9. BRANCH OF SERVICE Army Field Forces	
10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (Town, State, Province, Country) Unknown			11. SEX Male
12. PRESENT ADDRESS (No. and unit for unit identification) []		13. TELEPHONE NO. []	
14. NATIONALITY Thai		15. RACE Mongolian	
16. CITIZENSHIP (Indicate dual citizenship where applicable) Thailand		17. PHOTOGRAPHED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
18. RELIGION Buddhist		19. MARRIAGE STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARRIED <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/> DIVORCED <input type="checkbox"/> WIDOWED	
20. TITLES AND HONORIFICS (Phonetic, British, French, etc.)			
21. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION			
22. AGE Twenties		23. BEARD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
24. BUILD Small		25. POSTURE Erect	
26. PHYSICAL DEFECTS None observed		27. GENERAL STATE OF HEALTH Good	
28. HAND OF FEAR YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		29. GLASSES YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
30. PERSONAL BACKGROUND			
31. CIVIL EDUCATION (List schools, location, in what country, university, honors, and include dates. Omit months, days) Pennsylvania Military College Chester Pennsylvania, USA			
32. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY (Include dialects, degree of fluency, and ability to act as translator/interpreter) English - Excellent []			
33. TRAVEL (List countries, dates, and purpose) United States - for civilian schooling Europe - in connection with military duties Japan - in connection with military duties Republic of the Philippines - in connection with military duties Republic of Vietnam - in connection with military duties Canada - unknown, possibly during time spent in the United States Malaysia - in connection with military duties			

(b)(6)
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ON 6 JUN 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
DATE 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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DIA

37. MILITARY SERVICE

a. List military service in chronological order. (Include all military service, including part-time, temporary, and reserve service, units served with and positions held. Do not include civilian service or reserve status.)

b. List awards and decorations together with circumstances for awarding and award description.

- a. Basic Airborne Course, Fort Benning Georgia, USA; dates unknown.
- b. Thai Airborne Course, dates unknown.
- c. Member of the Army Field Forces.
- d. Presently with the Directorate of Intelligence, Bangkok, Thailand.

38. EMPLOYMENT OTHER THAN MILITARY SERVICE (Employment with other military, civilian, or non-military organizations. Years, months, days.)

None

39. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS (Professional, social, business, or other organizations. Years, months, days.)

Unknown

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Page 3 of 3 Pages

(X1)

DIA

40. U.S. ACQUAINTANCES AND RELATIVES (Name, position or occupation of relatives, domicile, nature and duration of relationship. Include U.S. military or other U.S. official acquaintances, relatives under this item.)

41. PREFERENCES (Personal preferences in food, drink, tobacco, entertainment, sports, hobbies.)

Light drinker.

42. PUBLISHED WORK (Title of article or book; author, name of publisher, date published, publisher.)

Unknown

SPOUSE - FAMILY

43. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE

44. MAIDEN NAME OF SPOUSE

45. DATE (Year, month, day) AND PLACE OF BIRTH

46. NATIONALITY (Indicate dual citizenship where applicable)

47. RACE

48. RELIGION

☐ PRACTICING
☐ NONPRACTICING

49. BACKGROUND (Education, languages, preference in food and drink, hobbies, preference in entertainment, special interests, prior sexual orientation.)

50. CHILDREN (Names, sex, ages, marital status, other areas of interest such as schools, health, military service.)

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

1. COUNTRY THAILAND	2. FULL NAME OF SUBJECT SOMCHI Hiranyasthiti	3. DATE OF INFORMATION: Yr, Mo, Day 1972
<p><i>GUIDANCE:</i> This supplementary information will be attached to DD Form 1396-1. This supplement has been designed to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information to foreign nationals, and to provide for a collector's assessment of subject. Sensitive information of an operational nature which must be tightly controlled (Paragraph 7b, DIAI 58-13) should not be included in this supplement. Where practicable, the following information will be furnished:</p>		
51. POLICE RECORD (Other than minor violations): None		
52. RELIGION - Effect of subject's religion or religious connections on his actions, military advancement, political views, etc. Subject is a practicing Buddhist. Subject's religion does not seem to affect his political or military views.		
53. ACQUAINTANCES AND RELATIVES - Apparent influence of acquaintances and relatives on subject's views or career Subject's father is the Commanding General, Army Field Forces, Royal Thai Army.		
54. CHARACTER - Subject's character, strengths and weaknesses, intelligence, loyalty, judgment, ability to communicate, leadership ability, and influence. Significance of individual in shaping international policies of his country. Subject is quiet and not the least outspoken. He is confident in himself. His confidence seems to be as a result of his father's rank and influence rather than his own ability.		
55. POLITICAL ORIENTATION - Attitude towards United States and other countries. Remarks and actions of subject toward representatives of the United States and its allies, and to representatives of non-aligned nations and Communist bloc nations. Political activities and attitudes, important official contacts, party affiliations, potential political influence in country in the event of a change in government. Although Subject is pro-US, his loyalty first is to his country and his King. Subject's education in the United States has greatly influenced his thinking along the American line.		

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Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

29

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DD FORM 1396-1s

DOD BIOGRAPHIC REPORT
SUPPLEMENT (U)

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Page 2 of 2 Pages

36. PERSONAL APPEARANCE - Appraisal of subject's dress, personal habits, mannerisms, eccentricities, peculiarities of speech and gait, prominent or unusual physical features, e.g., teeth, eyes, shape of face, complexion, tendency toward balding, etc.

Subject always dresses in a very neat fashion. Both his uniform and civilian clothing are maintained in the highest standards.

37. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SPOUSE - Spouse's political views, appearance, personality, attitude toward United States and other countries, influence on husband. Spouse's family connections influencing the husband's career.

Subject is to be married in October. His fiancée is the daughter of the Military Attache for Thailand in Washington, D. C. Subject's fiancée has attended a Swiss school and is a graduate of the University of Maryland.

38. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

a. Length of time collector has known subject and frequency of contact(s). Indicate how much of the information is based on the collector's own observation. Indicate other sources for information on subject.

(b)(1)
DIA

b. Best ways of gaining subject's confidence and exerting influence on him.

(b)(1)
DIA

c. Military reputation, competence, and significance. Include financial status, dependence on personal or political connections for military position. Reputation in own service, collector's own assessment of military competence, and military and/or political potential of subject.

(b)(1)
DIA

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GROUP 3
-DOWNGRADING AT 10-YEAR INTERVALS
-NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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1. COUNTRY: THAILAND/BURMA/JAPAN/LAOS
2. SUBJECT: (U) RTG Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center Supports Dissident Elements in Burma
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: As of 16 Aug 72
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BANGKOK, Thailand 16 Aug 72
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C.B. INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 730 0144 72 (0710-08-K)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 14 SEP 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
11. REFERENCES: ICR U-GPA-26043, para 12a(1),(2),(3), and (6)(a),(b) DIRM 1C1b(1),(4),(6),(7) & (12), 6A2a & e, 6B6a, 6B7a & c, 7B8
12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp
13. PREPARED BY: TOSHIO AOYAGI, COL, MI (25/72)
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Alfred W. Bagot*
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:
(S/NFD) Report contains information concerning support of dissident elements in BM by the Royal Thai Government Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC). Mentioned are the type support rendered to the Shan State Army (SSA), why this support is provided, AFIOC's "slight" contact with the Karens, an offer of financial aid to U NU from a four-man delegation representing Japanese business interests, and the escape from BM to TH of two high-ranking persons. Additional information tells of an SSA support apparatus in TH, AFIOC's primary reason for providing support to the Burmese dissidents, and the duties of an AFIOC NCO in the FANG (NC 2303)(1955N/9913E) area, TH.

(This report is marked NO FOREIGN DISSEM to protect the sensitivity of the source and his access, and the sensitive activities of a friendly foreign government.)

MAP REFERENCES: AMS Series 1501, 1:250,000, Sheets ND 47-11 & 12; NE 47-6, 7, & 14; NE 48-5 & 9; and NF 47-15.

16. (S/NFD) The following information concerning the support of dissident elements in BM by the Royal Thai Government Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) was provided by MG CHAMNIAN, AFIOC's Deputy Director for Operations:

a. TH's National Executive Council (NEC) directed that AFIOC do nothing in BM that might endanger the relations between BM and TH. Therefore, AFIOC provides minimal support to dissident elements in BM. That support provided by AFIOC is directed in the most part to the Shans (Shan State Army - SSA).

b. The SSA is provided support because the Thais consider the Shans to be Thai people (they are known as Tai Yai). The following support items have been provided:

(1) Cloth or uniforms

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
DIA 1
ACSI, DA 1
CINCPAC 1
USARPAC 3
500th MI Gp 1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 3
DECLASSIFY ON: N/A

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
None
Field Distribution:
OSA AMEMB Bangkok 7 Sep 72
J2, USMACTH "

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15 USC 552a (1)

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 736 0144-72

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

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- (2) Medical supplies
- (3) Limited amounts of .22 caliber ammunition
- (4) Three radios for intelligence reporting

c. AFIOC maintains "slight" contact with the Karens. This contact is maintained to assist the Shan State Political Party (SSPP) to gain representation in the Burmese United Liberation Front (ULF). The ULF is a composite political organization seeking the overthrow of the Ne Win Government.

(1) The ULF consists of the Parliamentary Democratic Party (PDP), U Nu faction, New Mon State Party, Kayah Progressive Party, representatives of the Karen Liberation Army, and others.

(2) The SSPP is seeking independent representation in the ULF. Some members of the ULF contend that the SSPP is represented by Jimmy YANG of CHIANG MAI (MA 9877) (1847N/9859E), TH. However, the SSPP contends that YANG is Kokang Chinese and not Shan; thus, there can be no true representation. The PDP recently agreed to allow SSPP representation. When a representative has been selected, YANG will no longer be recognized as a Shan State representative, but will become a member of the PDP (position unknown).

(3) All members of the ULF have agreed to the overthrow of Ne Win's government and to the establishment of a Federation of Burma. Details concerning the new federation have not been drawn up.

d. AFIOC provides no support to U NU. One of U NU's headquarters is located at KO MANAO (MN 5328)(1632N/9933E), BM, which is about 20 km south of MAE SOT (MU 5247)(1642N/9933E), TH. On 23 Jul, a four-man delegation representing Japanese business interests visited this site. This group informed U NU's representative that those present were prepared to provide five million dollars to be used in U NU's attempt to overthrow NE WIN. One of the representatives was a former Japanese Imperial Army colonel, a Mr. IKEDA (fnu), who is now the manager of the Thai Nippon Mineral Company, Limited, 31/6 New Road, BANGKOK (PR 6420)(1345N/10031E), TH. Another member of this delegation was a "Japanese general."

e. On 28 July, two high-ranking persons escaped from BM into TH. One was a well known author and the other was COL U BO MONG (phonetic from Thai). The colonel was trained in JA prior to World War II. MG CHANNIAN was of the opinion that the monetary offer and the defection of these two individuals were related. Both individuals are now living in BANGKOK. MG CHANNIAN feels that Japanese mining interests are behind the monetary offer.

2. (S-REFD) The following additional information was provided by a trained US observer in northern TH:

a. The SSPP military arm is the SSA. The SSA maintains a support apparatus in CHIANG MAI. This apparatus receives financial support from AFIOC in the amount of four hundred dollars monthly. This money is used to rent housing and purchase food for SSA representatives. This support apparatus is used by the SSPP/SSA as an outlet for propaganda (seeking the establishment of a SHAN Autonomous State) and as a vehicle to seek financial, material and political support. Arms and ammunition usually are purchased by an SSA representative from FAR contacts in CHIANG KHONG (PC 4542) (2017N/10018E), TH, and VIENTIANE (TE 4588)(1758N/10236E), LA.

b. AFIOC's primary purpose in providing support to the SSPP/SSA is to enable them (AFIOC) to obtain information from BM. For this reason, AFIOC provided the Shans with radios. Radio contact with SSA Headquarters in BM is maintained with an AFIOC radio located in the Chiang Mai action officer's house. The SSA support element in CHIANG MAI also uses this radio to communicate with their headquarters. Radios in the hands of the SSA provide communication between SSA battalions and SSA Headquarters.

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 66

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AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 730 0144 72

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

ORIGINATOR 500th MI Gp

c. AFIOC has an NCO stationed in the FANG (NC 2303)(1955N/9913E) area, TH. This NCO has made trips into BM with SSA troops. It is believed that this NCO conducts local liaison and serves as the AFIOC radio repairman for those radios in the SSA.

(u)

Comment of Preparing Officer: ~~(S-NPD)~~ The information in this report was forwarded by Special Activities BANGKOK, TH, Msg DTG 070545Z Sep 72, Subject: RTG Armed Forces Intelligence Operation Center (AFIOC) Support to Dissident Elements in Burma (C) (NOTAL). Referenced ICR U-GPA-26043 uses such terms as "friendly Asian countries, governments and or intelligence agencies" in its requirements. Although the cited information reports support by a "friendly intelligence agency" of a dissident group from a "less friendly country" rather than the government of that country, it is felt the ICR should be cited since this situation, as it exists, is somewhat unique and does show the support and intelligence-gathering affiliations on a country/group level rather than a country/country level.

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ON 9 Jul 97
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

33

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: THAILAND
2. SUBJECT: (U) Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) Organization
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BANGKOK, TH, May 72
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 730 0095 72 (5330-06-K)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 18 JUL 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 6
11. REFERENCES: USARPAC ICP (DIRM 6)

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp
13. PREPARED BY: WILLIAM R. EXLEY, COL, MI (1/72)
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: *Alfred W. Bagot*
ALFRED W. BAGOT
Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:
(S-REF) Report provides information on the 1 Apr 72 reorganization of AFIOC. Reported are the divisions, their functions, and the individual who heads each division. Report also includes AFIOC's position within the Royal Thai Ministry of Defense (MOD).
(Report is marked NO FOREIGN DISSEM to protect the source and his access.)

MAP REFERENCE: AMS Series 708, 1:50,000, Sheets 5032-II, 5069-I, 5563-II; 7015, 1:50,000, Sheets 5544-IV, 5943-I; 1501, 1:250,000, Sheets NE 48-5 and 48-9.

1. (S-REF) MISSION:

The Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) is responsible for the other intelligence-related subjects as directed by the Supreme Command, Royal Thai Armed Forces.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
DIA (w/Encl) 1
ACSI, DA " 1
CINCPAC " 1
USARPAC " 3
PACAF " 1
PACFLT " 1
USARSPHAI " 1
USAINTC " 1
USAIRR " 1
500th MI Gp " 1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA (DIAM 58-2)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 3
DECLASSIFIED ON: N/A

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
1 Enclosure:
(S-REF) Chart depicting AFIOC structure, 1 cy, 1 pg

Field Distribution:

OSA, Bangkok 2 Jun 72
USMACTHAI, J22 "

500TH MI GP
72-4951
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1 SEP 62

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2. (C) ORGANIZATION:

a. AFIOC is a centralized, Ministry of Defense (MOD) level collection agency for the Royal Thai Armed Forces. AFIOC is under the direct control and command of the Supreme Command, and is part of the latter's headquarters element.

b. The AFIOC Director, LTG WALLOP Rojanawisut, is assisted by MG CHAMNIAN Pongpairaj, Deputy Director for Operations, and MG M. L. PONGSWATE Wachariwong, Deputy Director for Administration. As the result of a reorganization which became effective 1 Apr 72, there are now six main elements in the AFIOC headquarters structure. Most elements are headed by a Special Colonel (O-7). These include: Division 1 (formerly Plans and Policies Division) under Special Colonel (SPEC COL) SURAPOL Petrakul (known as Chief, Division 1); Division 2 and 3 headed by SPEC COL CHANNARONG Wibulronnarong and SPEC COL KOBBOON Patanabuta, respectively (formerly combined under a single Operations Division; the former was recently Chief, Reports Division; however, the reorganization dissolved this section and apportioned it along geographical lines to Divisions 2 and 3); Division 4 (a new division responsible for security, source control and operational data) under COL (Police) (P) BANCHOB Phongsaphon; Division 5 (formerly Communications Division headed by SPEC COL CHAM Janseri; and Division 6 (previously Support Division) commanded by SPEC COL SURAPONGSE Srisanan. As of 1 Apr 72 (the reorganization date), AFIOC had an authorized TOE strength of 320 personnel, although actual assigned strength was only 280.

c. A complete breakout of each division by mission is as follows:

(1) Administration Branch - (Although technically not a division in the sense of the term being employed above, it has been included for purposes of clarity):

(a) Headed by LTC RANGSRI Manichai, this branch is responsible for the general administration of the AFIOC compound located at 242/5 Rama V Road, BANGKOK, Thailand. Specifically, the branch maintains personnel data on assigned and attached individuals, as well as processing personnel actions and managing overt funds made available by MOD for maintenance and construction purposes.

(b) MG M.L. PONGSWATE, Deputy Director for Administration, has a somewhat unique role in this configuration, being involved in both long-range planning which cuts across divisional lines, e.g., Military Assistance Program (MAP) requirements or the development of an EEI system, as well as with some of the administrative workload handled by LTC RANGSRI. In general, however, MG M.L. PONGSWATE functions as an administrative staff officer, concerned with future requirements or needs on an AFIOC-wide basis, and who works closely with both LTC RANGSRI and SPEC COL SURAPOL (see chart attached as enclosure).

(2) Division 1:

Headed by SPEC COL SURAPOL, this section is responsible for the coordination of all activities and operations within AFIOC to insure optimum utilization of personnel and equipment. Specifically, Division 1 conducts management surveys, short- and long-range planning, preparation of progress reports, as well as reviewing current and proposed operations. Additionally, this section is charged with all non-intelligence training, e.g., language instruction, and is the principal point of contact for the MAP Advisor even though some of these requirements may have been generated by MG M.L. PONGSWATE, Deputy Director for Administration.

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(3) Division 2:

Headed by SPEC COL CHANNARONG, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition to the conduct of the above operations, this section is now required to screen its own input and publish reports based on its collection data. [REDACTED]

(4) Division 3:

(a) Under SPEC COL KOBBOON, [REDACTED]

(b) MG CHAMNIAN, Deputy Director for Operations, is also linked to Divisions 2 and 3 in much the same manner as MG M.L. PONGSWATE is associated with the Administration Branch and Division 1. As with the latter, MG CHAMNIAN is concerned with the overall conduct of AFIOC operations, rather than with the actual specifics involved in their daily functioning. MG CHAMNIAN does take a personal interest in both the Laotian and Cambodian projects. (Prior to 1966, MG CHAMNIAN was dual-hatted as both Deputy Director, AFIOC, and Chief, Operations Division. He was replaced by his then assistant, SPEC COL KOBBOON, in an earlier reorganization.)

(5) Division 4:

Headed by COL (P) BANCHOB Phongsaphon, this section has primary responsibility for security, source control and operational data generated by Divisions 2 and 3. Prior to the 1 Apr realignment, both these functions were performed on an in-house basis by the Operations Division and maintained as a separate subsection. Security was previously under Support Division. Current evidence suggests that this section will be utilized as a data bank/record depository for current as well as future operations.

(6) Division 5:

Under SPEC COL CHAM, this division is responsible for both communications and photographic support to AFIOC intelligence operations. Specifically, this section maintains control over cryptographic systems as well as radio training procedures for both AFIOC and collection agent personnel. In addition to these functions, it operates the AFIOC radio net and staffs the photographic laboratory.

(7) Division 6:

Commanded by SPEC COL SURAPONGSE, this division functions as an internal unit supply/maintenance element whose primary responsibilities include vehicle maintenance, buildings and grounds, repair and utilities as well as related logistical functions. Additionally, the AFIOC language training laboratory, classrooms, printing and carpentry shops operate as subelements of the above even though they may be programmed by other sources, e.g., language training requirements as directed by Division 1.

3. (C) TRAINING:

a. Most senior officers at AFIOC (O-5 and above) as well as a selected group of company grade individuals have attended at least one US service school. In most cases training was at either USARPACINTS (formerly OKINAWA) or USAINTS, (now at Fort Huachuca), the latter normally in the form of the Senior Foreign Officers Intelligence Course. Except for those personnel who have received US Service School instruction, intelligence-related training at AFIOC is limited to basic principles and procedures absorbed while working at the headquarters element.

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This training may also be culled from operational experience while assigned to the field. In neither case is the training adequate to permit development and conduct of sophisticated operations. Perhaps more important is the tendency to rotate field personnel on a frequent basis (the normal up-country tour is one year, but may be considerably shorter). This rotation, coupled with an inclination to shift people to BANGKOK, as they rise in rank, precludes deriving any significant degree of value from area knowledge. Specific operational familiarity acquired from an up-country assignment also suffers, in spite of the fact that officer personnel initially assigned to AFIOC can expect to spend their entire service careers with the agency.

b. Enlisted personnel are slotted against support assignments and are employed as radio operators, instructors or in other routine clerical positions. A select few, in the senior grades, are used as case officers whenever an officer is unavailable. This is usually the exception rather than the rule. In general, most enlisted personnel have had extensive military experience prior to the AFIOC assignment. With the exception of radio operators, who receive adequate in-house instruction, training is still by the "on-the-job" method.

c. In the last five years, largely as a result of the pressures generated by the VS conflict, as well as by increased MAP allocations for training purposes (current MAP training costs approximate \$50,000 per annum but will drop to \$20,000 per annum with FY 73), there have been noticeable improvements in AFIOC training procedures. An example of this type of upgrading effort was a modified DAME and DASE course offered to both officer and selected enlisted personnel in the summer of 1970 by the 500th MI Group. Conducted under the auspices of the Support Detachment, Japan, the course lasted approximately six weeks and provided the minimum necessary professional skill in the listed areas. In spite of these gains, however, training at AFIOC remains an ad hoc function that lacks both continuity and agency-wide coordination. In addition, MAP training support is scheduled to end with the beginning of FY 75. This will further compound an already serious deficiency.

4. ~~(CONF)~~ EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONAL FUNDS:

a. The AFIOC yearly ICF Budget is approximately 9,000,000 baht (US \$450,000). There is also an unknown amount of contingency funds allocated by MOD, plus open budgeting for construction of fixed facilities, pay and maintenance. Current evidence suggests that the combined budget approximates US \$2,000,000 per annum.

b. While detailed information as to the exact quantity and status of the equipment AFIOC possesses is not available, it is known that not all of this equipment originated from MAP sources.

[REDACTED] This equipment encompasses a wide variety of materials and is distinctive in its requirements for application to a specific operational function. It must be obtained in accordance with operational requirements and Thai security considerations. By contrast, MAP generally furnishes standard military, communication and photographic equipment in consonance with AFIOC's known operational deployment (MAP assistance in this area will also terminate with the beginning of FY 75).

c. Over the years, part of this specialized inventory has been provided by the various (US) Army or Air Force teams stationed in the AFIOC compound through their respective supply elements. It has also been obtained unilaterally by AFIOC from local sources who either duplicated what was originally supplied on a loan basis or else improved upon a particular design to meet specific AFIOC requirements. AFIOC has the capability to duplicate sophisticated intelligence-related equipment and in numerous cases has improved upon the original design.

5. ~~(S-REF)~~ STATUS OF OPERATIONS:

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a. From a historical perspective, military planning by the Royal Thai

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Government (RTG) has revolved around the suppression of illegal activity within the kingdom and border security. AFIOC, as an agency of the Supreme Command, has been principally charged the mission of border security and consequently has limited its intelligence collection efforts to shallow penetrations of neighboring countries--specifically, shallow border penetrations against LA, East BM, South CH, VN, CB and MY, although other agencies are interested in these areas as well (the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) collects against CB and MY while the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has a collection requirement for BM and YUNNAN Province, CH).

b. The overall AFIOC priority for collection against its target countries is as follows: (1) LA: (2) eastern BM, followed in order by southern CH (YUNNAN Province), VN, CB and MY. Against these targets, the agency is required to collect data on the following subjects (in descending order of importance):

- (1) Military Intelligence (to include Order of Battle, operational summaries and contingency planning)
- (2) Military Geography
- (3) Biographical Information
- (4) Economic Intelligence
- (5) Political Intelligence
- (6) Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence
- (7) Sociological Intelligence
- (8) Scientific Intelligence

c. In-put is collated at the headquarters element and published in weekly Intelligence Summaries by country. These reports are then distributed in 20 copies; two copies are usually made available to US agencies involved with bilateral operations with AFIOC. J2, Supreme Command, receives at least one copy of the summaries; however, the remaining distribution is presently unknown.

d.

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- (2)
- (3)
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Field Comments:

1. (U) (S-~~FD~~) Although criticized in recent years as unprofessional (largely as a result of LTG WALLOP's fall from favor with the THANOM faction) and usually overshadowed by such agencies as AFSC or DCI, which are better funded and have more resources at their disposal, AFIOC is the only Thai intelligence agency that is completely chartered for external collection. AFIOC plays an important role in providing in-put for overall contingency planning. Should source be lost the RTG would be faced with a critical shortage of intelligence that would, in all probability, create gaps in its ability to handle external threats.

2. (U) (S-~~FD~~) There is a definite need to upgrade collection efforts, particularly with regard to training of AFIOC and agent personnel, and reorient operations for long-term trends. To accurately gauge AFIOC's successes or failures over the years means that its external mission must be viewed in the light of an overriding RTG concern with internal security. This view has relegated AFIOC to a position of secondary importance.


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Enclosure to 500th MI Gp
IR 2 730 0095 72

ORGANIZATION CHART: ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE OPERATION CENTER (EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL 1972)




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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREAT STUDY

THAILAND

15 March 1971

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication has been reviewed in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency and the assistance of this agency is gratefully acknowledged by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

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APPENDIX 1 - Counterintelligence Gaps

APPENDIX 2 - Index of Soviet, PRC, East European, and North Vietnamese
Cultural, Controlled, Front, and Sympathetic Groups

APPENDIX 3 - Index of Personalities

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APPENDIX 4 - Photographs of Known or Suspected Soviet Intelligence
Personnel

APPENDIX 5 - Prototype Letter

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PREFACE

1. (U) This publication analyzes the intelligence threats posed by the Warsaw Pact nations, the People's Republic of China, and North Vietnam to the United States Army in Thailand.
2. ~~(S)~~ (U) Information presented in this study lists Soviet, CHICOM, North Vietnamese, and East European diplomatic and trade mission personnel represented in Thailand; identifies intelligence personnel; discusses significant hostile intelligence operations, and assesses the extent of the threats posed both to Thailand and the US Army presence there.
3. (U) The date of information for this study is 1 January 1971. Recipients of this publication are reminded of the strict caveats attached. *REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT AUTHORIZED.*
4. (U) Reader attention is invited to the Counterintelligence Gaps identified in Appendix 1. Comments, suggestions, or queries pertaining to this publication may be directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, ATTN: ACSI-CIA, Washington, DC 20310.
5. (U) To assist the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, in evaluating the utility of this publication in meeting consumer requirements, addressees are requested to provide information as set forth in the prototype letter at Appendix 5.

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INTRODUCTION

1. (U) Thailand has enjoyed friendly relations with the United States for many generations and is one of the most stable and prosperous nations in Southeast Asia. During the last two decades, the Thai have been a key ally of the United States in the struggle against communism in that area. Since the early 1950's, Thailand has followed strong anti-communist and pro-Western foreign and domestic policies. The Thai however, have a history of accommodation to hostile countries when under pressure, such as the aid given to the Japanese in World War II. By nature the Thai could exhibit this again in the future. The country was one of the founders of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and SEATO headquarters is now in Bangkok. Thailand has made a substantial contribution to the war effort in Vietnam. Besides permitting the use of its territory for the launching of air operations over Vietnam and Laos, Thailand has sent a division-size contingent to fight in the Republic of Vietnam. Since 1965, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has been fighting a communist-inspired insurgency in its own country. Small bands of insurgents in the more remote areas of the country have carried on a campaign of terrorism with varied results.
2. (U) Thailand has a population of about 36 million people, most of whom live in rural areas. The country is ruled by a constitutional monarchy dominated by a military oligarchy. The rule of the military has not been overly oppressive and a start has been made toward economic development of the country. Other than the communist movement, there is virtually no opposition to the present regime. The Thai people have generally shown little interest in politics. The national political scene is characterized by an absence of demonstrations, political violence, and extremist movements.
3. (U) About 40,000 US troops are now stationed in Thailand. Most of these troops are US Air Force personnel stationed at seven major air bases throughout Thailand. The majority of these troops are engaged in air operations in support of the Vietnam war. There are also significant numbers of US Army personnel engaged in such support activities as the development of logistical facilities, the construction of communication lines, and logistical support of the US Air Force in Thailand. The United States also provides a major program of military assistance and advice to the Thai military.
4. (U) The hostile intelligence and subversive threat posed to US Forces in Thailand emanates from several sources. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist agents working through the indigenous communist movement or through the large populations of ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese living in Thailand have the potential to conduct a wide variety of intelligence operations against US Forces. Little information has been uncovered on these activities. A major hostile intelligence threat in Thailand is posed by the espionage activities of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Bangkok.

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SECTION I

THE SOVIET THREAT

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(U)
SECTION I. (S/NFD) THE SOVIET THREAT (U)

A. SOVIET FACILITIES IN THAILAND

1. DIPLOMATIC

- a. *Embassy*
- b. *Location:* 108 North Sathorn Road, Bangkok
- c. *Size:* 50 personnel assigned
- d. *Personnel Listing:* NOTE: All names with an asterisk (*) preceding them are known or suspected agents of the Committee For State Security (KGB), or agents for the Chief Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of Defense (GRU), or Suspect Intelligence Service (SIS) personnel. All names with a double asterisk (**) preceding them are Bangkok Soviets in the USSR as of August 1970. It is not known whether these Soviet personnel will return to Thailand in the near future. All names with a triple asterisk (***) preceding them fit into the above two categories.



SOVIET EMBASSY

Figure 1

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date of Arrival</u>
AKSENOV, Vladimir Alexandrovich AKSENOV, Nina Aleksandrovna (wife)	Physician	30 Oct 68
*BAKUSHIN, Nikolay Vasilevich	Chauffeur	17 Nov 66
BASKAKOV, Aleksey Ivanovich	Guard	25 May 67
***BYKOV, Fedor Stepanovich **BYKOV, Mariya Andreyevna (wife)	Second Secretary	1 Jun 67
DMITRIYEV, Ivan Romanovich **DMITRIYEV, Aleksandra Vasilyevna (wife)	Counsellor	23 Feb 67
***FILATOV, Aleksey Nikitovich **FILATOV, Raisa Ivanovna (wife)	Attache	15 Jun 67
FOMICHEV, Ivan Nikolayevich FOMICHEV, Yelena Alekseyevna (wife)	Interpreter	Unknown
FOROSTYAN, Anatoliy Grigoryevich FOROSTYAN, Valentina Sergeevna (wife) FOROSTYAN, Nataliya Anatolyevna (daughter)	Chauffeur	26 Mar 69
GERASIMOV, Nikolay Mikhaylovich GERASIMOV, Nina Ivanovna (wife)	First Secretary	6 Oct 67
IZOTOV, Valentin Alekseyevich IZOTOV, Galina Nikolayevna (wife)	Employee	Unknown
*KAZAKOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich KAZAKOV, Valentina Pavlovna (wife) KAZAKOV, Sergey Aleksandrovich (son)	Employee	12 Jun 68
*KHARITONOV, Yevgeniy Fedorovich **KHARITONOV, Nina Aleksandrovna (wife)	Attache (vice consul)	24 Sep 69
*KHLOPYANOV, Vasily Ilich **KHLOPYANOV, Galina Alekseyevna (wife)	Second Secretary	20 Nov 68
KNYAZKOV, Yuriy Vasilyevich KNYAZKOV, Zinaida Makarovna (wife) KNYAZKOV, Alla Yuryevna (daughter)	Employee	12 Jun 68
*KOCHETOV, Andrey Vsevolodovich **KOCHETOV, Eleonora Karlovna (wife) **KOCHETOV, Andrey Andreyevich (son)	Attache	3 Apr 68

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KORNEYENKO, Vasiliy Petrovich	Employee	7 Aug 68
KORNEYENKO, Zinaida Petrovna (wife)	(Guard)	
*KOSMODAMIYANSKIY, Viktor Valentinovich	Third	25 May 67
KOSMODAMIYANSKIY, Lyubov Vitalyevna	Secretary	
(wife)		
*LAKHTARINA, Vitaliy Konstnatinovich	Attache	18 Dec 68
LAKHTARINA, Alla Nikolayevna (wife)		
LAKHTARINA, Margarita Vitalyevna		
(daughter)		
LYSIKOV, Aleksandr Fedorovich	Employee	20 Nov 68
LYSIKOV, Serafima Ivanovna (wife)	(Guard)	
*MACHEKHIN, Aleksandr Yegorovich	Third	22 Feb 68
MACHEKHIN, Lidiya Nikolayevna (wife)	Secretary	
MACHEKHIN, Viktor Aleksandrovich (son)		
MAKEYCHIK, Iosif Pavlovich	Supply Officer	24 Apr 68
MAKEYCHIK, Yenina-Yelena Vladislavovna		
(wife)		
***MALAKHOV, Valentin Sergeyevich	Counsellor	23 Apr 69
**MALAKHOV, Yuzeфа Timofeyevna (wife)		
**MALAKHOV, Yevgeniy Valentinovich		
(daughter)		
MANUYEV, Ivan Semonovich	Employee	14 Sep 67
*MARKIN, Yuriy Illarionovich	Third	13 Apr 67
MARKIN, Alla Mikhaylovna (wife)	Secretary	
MARKIN, Yevgeniy Yuryevich (son)	(Protocol Officer)	
MATSKOV, Valentin Vladimirovich	Employee	15 Dec 66
MISHCHENKO, Anatoliy Nikloayevich	Employee	Unknown
MISHCHENKO, Nadezhda Illnichna (wife)		
MISHCHENKO, Lyana Anatolyevna		
(daughter)		
*MIZIN, Viktor Vladimirovich	Attache	12 Jun 68
MIZIN, Maya Valentinovna (wife)	(Protocol Officer)	
MIZIN, Konstantin Viktorovich (son)		
***OBNOVLENSKIY, Leonid Anreyovich	Second	24 Sep 69
**OBNOVLENSKIY, El'vita Vladimirovna	Secretary	
(wife)		
PALTOV, Yuriy Andreyevich	Employee	Unknown

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PALTOV, Tatyana Vasilyevna (wife)		
PALTOV, Sergey Yuryevich (son)		
PETRUKHINA, Valentina Vasilyevna	Secretary/ Typist	13 Jul 67
RABCHEVSKIY, Aleksey Antonovich	Employee	Unknown
RABCHEVSKIY, Valentina Grigoryevna (wife)		
RABCHEVSKIY, Aleksey Alekseyevich (son)		
RODIONOV, Aleriy Ivanovich	Employee	23 Oct 68
RODIONOV, Yekaterina Alekseyevna (wife)	(cook)	
RODIONOV, Andrey Valeryevich (son)		
ROMASHOV, Vladislav Aleksandrovich	Employee	7 Dec 67
ROSANOV, Anatoliy Anatolevich	Ambassador	Nov 69
ROSANOV, Irina Nikolayevna (wife)		
*SELEZNEV, Boris Nikolayevich	Attache	1 Oct 69
SELEZNEV, Nataliya Vladimirovna (wife)		
SELIVERSTOV, Sergey Nikolayevich	Employee	24 Jul 68
SELIVERSTOV, Yevgeniya Nikolayevna (wife)		
SEMENOV, Stanislav Nikolayevich	Second Secretary	Unknown
SEMENOV, Galina Georgiyevna	(Information)	
SIDOROV, Vladimir Petrovich	Employee	28 May 69
SIDOROV, El'vira Vasilyevna (wife)		
SIDOROV, Petr Vladimirovich (son)		
***SOLOMATIN, Vladimir Iosifovich	First	17 Nov 66
**SOLOMATIN, Galina Yevgenyevna (wife)	Secretary	
SPIRINA, Nina Aleksandrovna	Employee	Unknown
*TREPOLETS, Vladimir Afanasyevich	Attache	15 Nov 68
TREPOLETS, Inna Vitalyevna (wife)		
*VOROBYEV, Georgiy Anatolyevich	Third Secretary	24 Sep 65
VORONIN, Viktor Nikolayevich	Attache	Unknown
VORONIN, Valentina Fedorovna (wife)		

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***VSESVYATSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich	Third	25 May 67
**VSESVYATSKIY, Lyudmila Vasilyevna (wife)	Secretary	
**VSESVYATSKIY, Olga Vladimirovna (daughter)		
YEFIMOV, Gennadiy Konstantinovich	Second	Unknown
YEFIMOV, Nataliya Nikolayevna (wife)	Secretary	
YEFIMOV, Konstantin Gennadiyevich (son)		
YEFIMOVA, Lyudmila Viktorovna	Employee	16 Nov 67
*YEROSHENKOV, Oleg Vasilyevich	Third	21 Jul 66
	Secretary	
*YERSHOV, Boris Aleksandrovich	Attache	26 Sep 68
**YERSHOV, Nataliya Mikhaylovna (wife)		
**YERSHOV, Yuiya Borisovna (daughter)		
*ZAGVOZDIN, Georgiy Aleksandrovich	Attache	13 Apr 70
ZAGVOZDIN, Tatyana Achmetovna (wife)		
ZAGVOZDIN, Oleg Georgiyevich (son)		
ZENIN, Aleksey Alekseyevich	Employee	10 Jul 68
ZENIN, Aleksandra Zakharovna (wife)	(Chauffeur)	

2. TRADE

a. Soviet Trade Mission (EXPORTKHLEB)

- (1) Location: 22 Soi Klnag, Bangkok
- (2) Size: 14 personnel assigned
- (3) Personnel Listing:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date of Arrival</u>
*BELYUTIN, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich	Employee	27 Apr 70
BELYUTIN, Nataliya Nikolayevna (wife)		
FADEYEV, Anatoliy Alekseyevich	Employee	30 Jan 69
FADEYEV, Mariya Alekseyevna (wife)	Employee	Unknown
GUSEV, Gennadiy Fedorovich	Employee	Unknown
GUSEV, Zarema Aleksandrovna (wife)		
GUSEV, Yuriy Gennadiyevich (son)		

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KARPOV, Nikolay Petrovich KARPOV, Ahanna Ivanovna (wife)	Commercial Counsellor	31 Jul 68
MIKHAYLOV, Yuriy Petrovich MIKHAYLOV, Irina Dmitriyevna (wife)	Employee	Unknown
OCHERETIN, Viktor Ivanovich	Commercial Counsellor	Unknown
PONOMAREV, Yevgeniy Ivanovich PONOMAREV, Tamara Leonidovna (wife)	Employee Employee	Unknown Unknown
**RUMYANTSEV, Anatoliy Kuzmich **RUMYANTSEV, Marina Mikhaylovna (wife) **RUMYANTSEV, Dmitriy Anatolyevich (son)	Employee	3 Sep 69
RYBAKOV, Yuriy Konstantinovich **RYBAKOV, Svetlana Arkadyevna (wife) **RYBAKOV, Konstantin Yuryevich (son)	Employee	6 Sep 69
*SHERSTOV, Konstantin Mikhaylovic	Employee	28 Sep 67
STEPANOVA, Galina	Staff Secretary	Nov 69
*SYURIN, Yuriy Alekseyevich	Engineer Manager	11 May 67

b. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)
(United Nations organization with Soviet representation)

- (1) Location: Slalsantitham Rajadamnorn Ave., Bangkok
- (2) Size: 6 representatives assigned
- (3) Personnel Listing:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date of Arrival</u>
BURLIKOV, Viktor Stepanovich BURLIKOV, Valentina Mikhaylovna (wife)	Engineer	6 Oct 67

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FRONT VIEW ECAFE COMPLEX

Figure 2



SIDE VIEW ECAFE COMPLEX

Figure 3

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BURLIKOV, Olga Viktorovna (daughter)
BURLIKOV, Pavel Viktorovich (son)

*CHUB, Oleg Kirillovich	Engineer	3 Oct 69
**CHUB, Galina Petrovna (wife)	Officer	
**CHUB, Aleksey Olegovich (son)		

*KAZMIN, Yuriy Borisovich	Economic	22 Jun 67
**KAZMIN, Olga Mikhaylovna (wife)	Affairs	
**KAZMIN, Olga Yuryevna (daughter)	Officer	
**KAZMIN, Natasha Yuryevna (daughter)		

KHRUSTALEV, Yevgeniy Vladimirovich	Counsellor	12 Feb 69
**KHRUSTALEV, Yelena Maksimovna (wife)		
KHRUSTALEV, Antoliy Yevgenyevich (son)		
KHRUSTALEV, Sergey Yevgenyevich (son)		

SHIRYAYEV, Viktor Ivanovich	Employee	2 Apr 69
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*SHUMARIN, Anatoliy Yevdokimovich	Attache	17 Nov 66
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c. *Soviet-owned Trading Firms:* None known to exist in Thailand

d. *Offices of Soviet Common Carriers:* AEROFLOT, a Soviet airline of a commercial and passenger transport nature, is not in Thailand at present. Negotiations that were underway between the governments of the Soviet Union and Thailand to provide for AEROFLOT overflight and landing rights in Bangkok have terminated without agreement. It is probable that these negotiations will resume in the future and agreement will be reached giving AEROFLOT landing rights in Thailand.

3. PRESS -- TASS

a. *Location:* Office in Soviet Embassy, Bangkok

b. *Size:* One person assigned

c. *Personnel Listing:*

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date of Arrival</u>
*SHUBICHEV, Yevgeniy Konstantinovich	Correspondent	24 Feb 66
**SHUBICHEV, Inna Aleksandrovna (wife)		

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4. CULTURAL: The Soviets are trying to arrange cultural exchanges with Thailand; the Thais have remained aloof from any binding agreements in this area.

B. LOCAL SOVIET CONNECTIONS

1. CONTROLLED AND FRONT GROUPS: None known to exist in Thailand
2. SYMPATHETIC GROUPS: None known to exist in Thailand
3. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE DEALING SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE SOVIETS: None known to exist in Thailand
4. POTENTIAL THREAT POSED TO US ARMY: Negligible

C. KNOWN OR SUSPECTED SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL: NOTE: (The following are Soviets currently stationed in Bangkok who are known or suspected intelligence officers. The designations "Known KGB" and "Known GRU" are applied to individuals on the basis of information developed during their previous assignments or on the basis of their active participation in agent operations in Thailand. The designations "Suspect KGB" and "Suspect GRU" are applied to persons who have not been observed in agent operations, but whose activity patterns show marked association with "Known KGB" or "Known GRU," as the case may be. The designation "Suspect Intelligence" is applied to persons who exhibit only one or two of the many characteristics that usually indicate intelligence affiliation.)

1. TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL IN THAILAND: 29

- a. Known KGB: 7
- b. Suspect KGB: 7
- c. Known GRU: 3
- d. Suspect GRU: 5
- c. SIS (Affiliation unknown): 7

2. DIPLOMATIC (Embassy -- Bangkok)

- a. BAKUSHIN, Nikolay Vasilevich
Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB
- b. BYKOV, Fedor Stepanovich
Born 24 September 1929, USSR
Second Secretary - Political Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: SIS

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- c. FILATOV, Aleksey Nikitovich
Born 28 January, 1926 Moscow, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect GRU
- d. KAZAKOV, Aleksandr Sergeyevich
Born 16 October 1935 Moscow, USSR
Employee, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect GRU
- e. KHARITONOV, Yevgny Fedorovich
Born 1937 Moscow, USSR
Attache-Vice Consul, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB
- f. KHLOPYANOV, Vasiliy Illich
Born 1927 Moscow, USSR
Second Secretary-Consul, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB
- g. KOCHETOV, Andrey Vsevolodovich
Born 1942 Alma-Ata, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB
- h. KOSMODAMIYANSKIY, Viktor Valentinovich
Born 1935 Moscow, USSR
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB
- i. LAKTARINA, Vitaliy Konstantinovich
Born 18 February 1935 Moscow, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect GRU
- j. MACHEKHIN, Aleksandr Yegorovich
Born 1937, USSR
Third Secretary-Asst. Information Officer
Intelligence Status: Known GRU
- k. MALAKHOV, Valentin Sergeyevich
Born 14 January 1924, USSR
Counsellor-Political Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB
- l. MARKIN, Yuriy Illiaronovich
Born 1937 Moscow, USSR
Third Secretary-Political Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB

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- m. MIZIN, Viktor Vladimirovich
Born 25 October 1935 Moscow, USSR
Attache-Protocol Officer, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB
- n. OBNOVLENSKIY, Leonid Anreyovich
Second Secretary (Press)
Intelligence Status: SIS
- o. SELEZNEV, Boris Nikolayevich
Born 27 February 1930 Smolensk, USSR
TASS Correspondent, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect GRU
- p. SHUBICHEV, Yevgeniy Konstantinovich
Born 27 February 1930 Smolensk, USSR
TASS Correspondent, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB
- q. SOLOMATIN, Vladimir Iosifovich
Born 4 November 1925 Moscow, USSR
First Secretary-Cultural Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known GRU
- r. TREPOLETS, Vladimir Afanasyevich
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: SIS
- s. VOROBYEV, Georgiy Anatolevich
Born 22 April 1936
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB
- t. VSESVYATSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich
Born 28 July 1930 Moscow, USSR
Third Secretary-Political Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB
- u. YEROSHENKOV, Oleg Vasilyevich
Born 28 August 1932
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known GRU
- v. YERSHOV, Boris Aleksandrovich
Born 1938 Moscow, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB
- w. ZAGVOZDIN, Georgiy Aleksandrovich
Born 1939, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB

3. COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES

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a. *Soviet Trade Mission (EXPORTKHLEB)*

- (1) BELYUTIN, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich
Born 21 June 1938 Orel, USSR
Employee, Soviet Trade Mission
Intelligence Status: SIS
- (2) SHERSTOV, Konstantin Mikhaylovich
Employee, Soviet Trade Mission
Intelligence Status: SIS
- (3) SYURIN, Yuriy Alekseyevich
Engineer, Manager
Intelligence Status: Suspect GRU

b. *Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)*

- (1) CHUB, Oleg Kirillovich
Born 1930 Moscow, USSR
Officer, Railway Section, Transport & Communications
Intelligence Status: SIS
- (2) KAZMIN, Yuriy Borisovich
Economic Affairs Officer
Intelligence Status: Suspect KGB
- (3) SHUMARIN, Anatoliy Yevdokimovich
Attache
Intelligence Status: SIS

D. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: The Soviet diplomatic base in Thailand, as elsewhere, is used as a platform to launch intelligence operations against non-communist nations. Soviet intelligence operatives feel they are making inroads against the capitalist nations by maintaining a presence in Bangkok. While the Soviets primarily seek to recruit personnel who could be valuable to them in future assignments, their interest is also directed toward the identification, cultivation, and recruitment of Americans of immediate intelligence potential. Thailand also provides the Soviets with a training ground for their agent handlers.

1. SPOTTING: Soviet operatives in the Bangkok area generally spot US military personnel at restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and meetings of local social organizations. As another Caucasian in an oriental environment, the Soviet has very little difficulty making initial conversation with an American at these locations. The Soviet usually indicates his nationality early in the conversation. Some Americans sever the association at this point, but others let it continue as an interesting and different experience. The Soviet quickly seeks to establish the American's rank and duty position. If the American has no immediate or future intelligence potential, the Soviet

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casually breaks the contact. If he has intelligence potential, the Soviet will try to meet the American in a quieter and less distracting environment. This second contact usually is made soon after the initial meeting. Initial conversation at the second meeting normally concerns the cultural differences between the US and the USSR. Mention will again be made of the common bond of two Caucasians in the Far East. At this point, the Soviet will determine which of two approaches to use in surfacing a possible motivation for the American: ideological or monetary. If the ideological approach is chosen, the Soviet will make an appeal to the American in the cause of world peace. The Soviet will portray the Soviet Union as the standard-bearer for forces of good. If the American accepts this explanation of the world situation, the Soviet will continue to play on the same theme, hoping to recruit the American for long-range intelligence purposes. If ideology cannot be used as a motivating factor, the Soviet will indicate that payment will be made for information provided by the American on a continuing basis. Soviet spotting activity is normally accomplished by the operative himself. Although it is possible, there is no firm information indicating that other Soviet personnel are tasked with surfacing specific leads for future approach by an agent handler. American personnel who have agreed to cooperate with the Soviets are generally tasked with spotting duties. They may be told, for example, to develop a friendship with a secretary at the American Embassy for the purpose of using her as a sub-source. This delegation of spotting activity, however, is not aggressively followed up by the Soviet operative.

2. **TRAINING:** The Soviets are not known to use any elaborate or formal agent-training programs in Bangkok. Sources are alerted to surveillance and listening techniques, but they are given no instruction on evasive measures. Simple instructions are given on the use of a camera and how to pass a briefcase in a casual manner; however, no formalized training program is followed.

3. **TARGETING:** Requirements levied on sources are rather general in nature and they are in consonance with a source's access to information. The Soviets are particularly interested in US-Thai relations, disposition of troops, and new plans, programs, and equipment to be introduced into Thailand. The Soviets have further expressed interest in the possible presence of US nuclear and biological weapons in Thailand. In general, the Soviet operative stresses the need for the source to furnish classified documents of any nature. The Soviets have not diverted sources from their natural placement and access to furnish information that would necessitate exposure, risk, and possible compromise.

4. **OPERATIONAL METHODS:** Personal meetings are used almost exclusively between the Soviet handler and the American source. Initially, meetings occur every seven to 15 days. After the American has indicated his willingness to cooperate, meetings are scheduled 20 to 30 days apart. Once the American can be depended upon to provide information regularly, meetings take place one or two months apart and generally include the transfer of documents, a verbal debriefing, and guidance for future activity. After

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this working relationship is established, meetings occur at selected restaurants in Bangkok where the presence of the agents will not arouse suspicion or attention. This also permits the Soviet handler and American source to conduct business in relative privacy. Dates and times for these meetings are scheduled by the Soviet at the convenience of the source's normal daily schedule. Cover for these meetings includes the two identifying themselves as friends with intellectual curiosities about the other's culture, way of life, and outlook on the world situation. Occasionally, the Soviet gives the source an accommodation telephone number for use in emergency situations.

5. **FINANCES:** The Soviet handler pays expenses for food and liquor consumed at personal meetings and provides source with at least "pin money" (\$10-\$20) to cover the cost of taxis and other conveniences. When the source begins furnishing documents and information requested by the Soviets, he is usually given \$50-\$100 for his efforts. The Soviet stresses that he will be able to pay \$20,000 to \$50,000 if the source can provide a number of valuable classified documents. There are no reports to indicate that a source has received as much as \$20,000, however.

6. **EQUIPMENT:** The Soviets normally do not issue equipment. Russian items, such as caviar and vodka, are freely passed to sources, but these should be considered as incentive items rather than equipment.

7. ANALYSIS

a. Although no contractual agreements have been concluded as a part of recruitment, several Americans have been recruited in Bangkok. These individuals were spotted and had requirements levied on them. They provided information and documents and received payment for them. Subsequent meetings were held with future contact arrangements established. The Soviets are apparently using Thailand as a training area. The Soviet agents are being trained to operate not only in the Far East, but in the Free World itself. A few of these operatives have only theoretical training, while others are experienced in an East European operational climate. In Bangkok, operatives are given the opportunity to function in a new area under different conditions. Meeting and handling American sources in Bangkok serves as a training vehicle to enable the Soviet operative to operate more knowledgeably at a future date.

b. Beside using Bangkok as a training area, the Soviets are believed to be using the city to spot, assess, and condition American sources for future intelligence operations in other parts of the world. An American source's immediate value to the Soviets is limited by the short length of his stay in Thailand. Furthermore, the Soviet operative may feel that his American source's future access and value should not be jeopardized to satisfy short-range requirements. For example; a young, mature soldier with a college background could be seen as a potential State Department employee. An Army major is viewed as a potential colonel or general officer with future access to highly sensitive information. Conditioning the

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American to serve Soviet needs at this time will facilitate gaining his cooperation and confidence for use in future operations. It is anticipated that sources developed and tested in Thailand will be recontacted after their arrival at a new duty station for further intelligence collection activities. To date, the Soviets are not believed to have initiated any high-level intelligence operations against US Forces or installations in Thailand.

E. CONCLUSIONS: The Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam pose a threat to US Forces, personnel, and interests in Thailand. The Soviet Union poses the single greatest hostile espionage threat to the US in Thailand, however. While the Soviet Union's operations in Thailand appear relatively limited, not all of the known or suspected Soviet intelligence personnel in Thailand have been detected engaging in intelligence activities. The Soviets are capable of conducting espionage operations against the US in Thailand without being detected. This leaves open the possibility that there are more high-level, long-range operations that have not been detected by the security agencies. It must be assumed that long-range operations have been undertaken against US Forces in Thailand. The Soviets can be as successful in recruiting agents in Thailand as they have been throughout the world. Because of the large number of US personnel that are exposed to the free-roaming Soviet agents in Thailand, it is very likely that recruited American personnel will be performing espionage missions for the Soviets in future years. The Soviet Embassy in Bangkok serves as a good base for operations. The Soviet agents are only limited in the sense that they do not want to be detected performing illegal activities that might jeopardize their stay in Thailand. The primary aim of the Soviets, however, still appears to be the spotting and preliminary cultivation of American sources for future use. While Soviet intentions in Thailand against US Forces are focused on the long-range potential operations, the vulnerability of the US security posture to the Soviets should not be minimized. Therefore, US personnel whose best potential lies elsewhere will still be of immediate value to the Soviets by providing timely information on current US activities.

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SECTION II

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) THREAT

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SECTION II. (S/NFD) THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) THREAT (U)

A. PRC FACILITIES IN THAILAND

1. DIPLOMATIC -- None
2. TRADE -- None
3. PRESS -- None
4. CULTURAL -- None.

B. LOCAL PRC CONNECTIONS

1. CONTROLLED AND FRONT GROUPS: The PRC has no controlled or front groups, but it does influence the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).

2. SYMPATHETIC GROUPS

a. Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)

(1) Nature: The CPT, Thailand's indigenous Communist Party, was formally organized in 1942, although the roots of communism in Thailand extend back into the 1920's. The CPT was outlawed and went underground in 1952. In that same year, the party adopted a resolution which proclaimed that armed struggle was the only path to socialism for the Thai people. Organizational activities and the building of an infrastructure of village supporters proceeded in many areas of the country. Overt insurgency broke out in 1965 and has continued ever since. Although the insurgent movement has created problems for the Thai, it does not threaten the stability of the government at present. The CPT has received some material aid and training from North Vietnam, but the greatest external influence on the party comes from the PRC. The exact degree of Chinese Communist influence and/or control has not been determined. The Chinese have been the greatest source of ideological support for the Thai communists. They have provided training for Thai insurgents and members of the top leadership of the party. Several members of the CPT Central Committee are located in the PRC, which has provided some material support and funding to the organization.

(2) Funding: The Communist Party of Thailand receives some financial assistance from the People's Republic of China. Reports indicate that the People's Republic of China buys Thai currency in Hong Kong for use by the Communist Party of Thailand.

(3) Size: The CPT has an estimated 600-800 members. It also controls about 4,000 armed fighters.

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(4) Location: CPT headquarters is probably based in Bangkok, although other headquarters may be located in the PRC, Laos, and various parts of Thailand.

(5) Key Personalities

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
Phichit Na Sukhothai aka: Chou Soul-lien Phayap Angkasing, Chu P'I-tu, Chi'iu Chi, Nai Pamov, Prabandhu Virasakdo, Kundong, To, Lung, Yai, Phi Yai Praphan Wirasak	Honorary Chairman and Senior Advisor, Politburo and Central Committee
Phayom Chulanon	Central Committee Member, Leader of Patriotic Front of Thailand
Sak Suphakasem aka: Aran Chomphu Meuang Binh	Central Committee Member
Nit Phongdapphet (female) aka: Thip Suri	Central Committee Member, CPT Representative to the PRC
Asani Polachai aka: Phi, Sai Fak, Kulis Indushak, Atsani Polachai, Asani Polachan, Kuwit Inthisak, Asni Ponchandra	Central Committee Member, Director of <u>Voice of the Thai</u> <u>People Radio Station</u>
Wirat Angkhathawon aka: Susan, Wirach Angsathaworn, Ang Lan, Chang Chih	Politburo and Central Committee Member, CPT; Northeast Branch Chairman
Wiroj Amphai aka: Wirot Amphai, Sak Supradheb,	Central Committee Member, insurgent leader in Northeast Thailand

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Viroj Amphai,
Wirot Iamamphai,
Shaioherd Chouwong,
Chorp Amprom,
Virojana Amphai

Song Noppakun
aka: Phairat, Mu,
Prasong Wongwiwat,
Dang, Som, Ba

CPT North Branch Chairman;
Politburo and Central Committee
Member

Damri Ruangsutham
aka: Pradit Ruangsutham,
Boo, Wong, Wang U,
Som

Insurgent leader in northern
Thailand, Central Committee
Member

Prasit Tniensiri

Central Committee Member; leader
of insurgency in Southern Thailand

Dang
aka: Kist
Sa Noh Charoenphanit

Central Committee Member; leader
in Northern Thailand

b. Thai Patriotic Front

(1) Nature: Front group of the CPT led by Sino-Thai
exiles in the PRC

(2) Funding: Probably channeled through the Communist Party
of Thailand from the People's Republic of China

(3) Size: Unknown

(4) Location: Unknown -- probably PRC

(5) Key Personalities: Phayom Chulanon -- Central Committee
Member, Leader of the Thai Patriotic Front

c. Voice of the Thai People

(1) Nature: Clandestine radio station of the CPT

(2) Funding: Probably subsidized by the PRC

(3) Location: Transmitters near Kunming, Yunnan Province, PRC

(4) Key Personalities

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
Asani Polachai	Central Committee Member of CPT, Director of <u>Voice of Thai People</u> Radio Station

d. *New Chinese Youth Organization (NCYO)*

(1) Nature: The NCYO is reportedly a pro-Chinese Communist youth organization among those who are ethnic Chinese or of Chinese descent. The organization operates an illegal Chinese-language school.

(2) Funding: Unknown

(3) Size: 66 members

(4) Location: Bangkok

(5) Key Personalities

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
Chao Neramitakun aka: Wu Ming-tu Tek Sae Ngow	Chairman
Thanongsak Keotchophet aka: Sengmuai Sae Ngow Wu Ch'eng-mei	Treasurer
Huaching Sae Tang aka: Ch'en Han-chen	Coordinator Executive Committee Member
Lu Chung-fa aka: Chenghuat Sae Low	Executive Committee Member
Ch'en Chun-hsin aka: Kunsing Sae Tang	Executive Committee Member
Ch'en Hsi-ping aka: Saipheng Sae Tang	Executive Committee Member

e. *Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO)*

(1) Nature: The CTO is the guerrilla force of the Communist Party of Malaya. The CTO has established secure base areas in Thailand to operate against Malaysia. It also controls significant areas of the five southern provinces of Thailand. The CTO has also developed an auxiliary of Malay and Chinese youths in the border area to act as a reserve force.

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MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (CTO)

Figure 4



THAI OFFICIALS EXAMINING SUPPLIES

Figure 5

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(2) Funding: Funds are provided by the Communist Party of
Malaya

(3) Size: The CTO has 1,500 men and 2,500 youths in the
auxiliary

(4) Location: Secretary General's Headquarters, Sadao,
Thailand

(5) Key Personalities

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
Chin Peng aka: Ong Boon Hua, Chen Ping, Chang Ping	Secretary General of Malaysian Communist Party; Director of Terrorist Operations
Musa bin Ahmad	Chairman of Central Committee of Malaysian Communist Party; leader of Malaysian terrorist movement

3. BUSINESSES DEALING SIGNIFICANTLY WITH THE PRC

a. Phoy Kuan Association of Thailand

(1) Nature: The Phoy Kuan Association of Thailand is a money exchange company used by local Chinese to send money to their relatives in the PRC. Money is forwarded either overtly (using the official exchange rate) or covertly (using the blackmarket rate). The money is sent through Hong Kong. The organization has not been known to participate in subversive or espionage activities; however, it has the capability to do so.

(2) Size: Unknown

(3) Location: 56 Bamrungrat La., Yaowarat Rd., Bangkok,
Thailand Stores of the association are located throughout Thailand.

(4) Key Personnel

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
Kho Puayhong	President, Phoy Kuan Association
Tang Hooniak	Vice President
Ko Ngoktung	Treasurer

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Lo Kaipuang	Secretary
Bay Haimeng	Public Relations
Tang Siawhung	Executive Committee
Ung Keng-Hung	Committee Chairman
Tang Suloy	Committee Supervisor
Ang Yiakthing	Committee Auditor

b. Thailand Travel Agencies

(1) Nature: Although travel between Communist China and Thailand is illegal, there are at least six travel agencies in Bangkok that arrange, on an individual basis, travel to Communist China. It takes about one month to make all the arrangements from the time the traveller (mostly ethnic Chinese) applies to the time he leaves, ostensibly on a round trip to Hong Kong. It is believed that the Thai officials are aware of this travel but are bribed to ignore it. The travel arrangements are handled very quietly and confidentially.

(2) Size: Six known travel agencies

(3) Location

MITR BORIKARN
285/3 Plaplachai Road
Tel: 26417

Thai Travel Service
1174-1178 Charoon Krung Road
Tel: 31250

Roong Thrap Ltd.
466 Jawaraj Road
Tel: 25329

Universal Travel Agencies
44 Rajdamri Road
TEL: 55761

Rama Travel Service
1797-99 Rama VI Road
TEL: 57896

Victory Travel Service
99 Rajdamner Avenue
Tel: 81657

(4) Key Personnel: Unknown

4. POTENTIAL THREAT POSED TO THE US ARMY

a. Political/Intellectual: Although the Communist Party of Thailand is small at the moment, it has the potential to be an effective vehicle of Chinese penetration. The 3.5 million ethnic Chinese residing in Thailand also pose an inviting target for PRC exploitation. These overseas Chinese in Thailand are well assimilated compared with those in other Southeast Asian Nations, but most of them have a traditional

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attachment to the land of their ancestors. The PRC has often exploited such sentiments for intelligence purposes. It is estimated that Chinese subversive activities using either the local insurgent movement or the ethnic Chinese population of Thailand would be directed primarily at the Thai Government and population rather than against US Forces stationed in Thailand. Such activities would be a danger to US Forces stationed in Thailand only insofar as they would influence either the Thai Government or population to adopt a hostile attitude towards the United States. Such a situation is not considered likely in the near future.

b. Economic: Negligible

c. Paramilitary: Insurgents in Northeast Thailand pose a threat to US air bases and other installations in the region through sabotage and small-scale attacks.

C. KNOWN OR SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL: None

D. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES: The PRC intelligence services are believed to be conducting low-level operations throughout Thailand, although little evidence has been surfaced to date. The probable targets of Chinese Communist espionage are Thai military and civilian organizations and US and Soviet personnel. Chinese Communist intelligence most probably exploits contacts with the indigenous communist movement and attempts to recruit ethnic Chinese with Thai citizenship. While PRC intelligence sources are probably low-level observation-type agents, it is possible that they have a few high-level sources who are officials in the Thai Government. A number of Thai insurgents have been trained in the PRC and this training is believed to have included instruction in espionage and sabotage techniques.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. The PRC-aided insurgency in Thailand has met with little success in most of the country. The movement in the Northeast has suffered some difficulties, but the insurgents in the North have had greater success. The insurgents in this area, mostly mountain tribesmen, control portions of the tribal populations and have forced a withdrawal of Royal Thai Government forces from several areas. Eventhough the insurgency has suffered some minor set backs, it has continued to grow slowly but continuously

2. Although the PRC has a large potential pool of intelligence recruits in Thailand, there is little evidence that it is effectively exploiting this pool. Intelligence activity is low at present. Thus far, the PRC threat to Thailand has been assessed as minimal. The primary objective of PRC policy toward Thailand is to encourage the elimination of close relations with the US in hopes of reducing and ultimately removing the US presence in Southeast Asia.

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SECTION III

THE EAST EUROPEAN THREAT

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(u)
SECTION III. (S/NFD) THE EAST EUROPEAN THREAT (U)

A. EAST EUROPEAN FACILITIES IN THAILAND

1. DIPLOMATIC: There are no East European diplomatic delegations now in Thailand, although Yugoslavia and Thailand recently agreed to establish full diplomatic relations. Thailand can be expected to conclude similar agreements with other East European countries in the future.

2. TRADE

a. Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Corporation

(1) Location: 197/1 Silom, Bangkok

(2) Size: 3 persons assigned

(3) Personnel Listing

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Date of Arrival</u>
FRONEK, Mirko	Chief	Unknown

Remaining personnel unknown

b. Polish Foreign Trade Office

(1) Location: 283 Surawongse, Bangkok

(2) Size: Unknown

3. PRESS: None known to exist in Thailand

4. CULTURAL: None known to exist in Thailand

B. LOCAL EAST EUROPEAN CONNECTIONS: None known to exist in Thailand

C. KNOWN AND SUSPECTED EAST EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL: None known to exist in Thailand

D. EAST EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: No information is available on East European intelligence operations in Thailand. The small representation of East European countries in Thailand limits the possibility of such operations taking place. As Thai-East European relations improve and trade and diplomatic relations increase, however, the East European countries can be expected to launch intelligence operations.

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E. CONCLUSION: The extremely limited representation of the East European countries in Thailand indicates that their threat, either to the US Forces in Thailand or to the RTG, is minimal. Even though these countries are increasing their relations with Thailand, it is doubtful that their intelligence operations or general threat will reach the proportions of the Soviet hostile espionage threat or the subversive threat of the PRC. As their influence increases, however, the East Europeans could pose a hostile espionage threat to US Forces in Thailand.

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SECTION IV

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THREAT

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(U)
SECTION IV. (S/NFD) THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THREAT (U)

A. NORTH VIETNAMESE FACILITIES IN THAILAND

1. DIPLOMATIC -- None
2. TRADE -- None
3. PRESS -- None
4. CULTURAL -- None

B. LOCAL NORTH VIETNAMESE CONNECTIONS

1. CONTROLLED AND FRONT GROUPS: Central Association of Patriotic Overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu Cuu Quoc Hoi) (Trung Uong)

a. Nature: Pro-North Vietnamese organization among the approximately 40,000 Vietnamese refugees in Northeast Thailand. The organization controls the activities of the Vietnamese refugees.

b. Location: Scattered throughout the Vietnamese refugee areas.

c. Size: Approximately 85 - 90 per cent of the Vietnamese refugees are Trung Uong members or sympathizers.

d. Funding: Largest part of the organization's finances is provided by its members; only a small portion comes from North Vietnam.

e. Key Personnel: Unknown

2. SYMPATHETIC GROUPS: Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) (See Section II paragraph B2a.) While the CPT has closer ties with the PRC, it is also sympathetic to North Vietnam and draws some support from the North Vietnamese Government and possibly from Vietnamese refugees in Northeast Thailand.

3. BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE DEALING SIGNIFICANTLY WITH NORTH VIETNAM: None known to exist in Thailand

4. POTENTIAL THREAT POSED TO THE US ARMY

a. Political: Negligible

b. Economic: Negligible

c. Paramilitary: The Vietnamese in Thailand have the capability to conduct subversive, terrorist, or sabotage operations against US installations; however, there is very little evidence that they will exercise

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this capability. The Vietnamese are watched very closely by the RTG security agencies and any indication that these refugees are actively supporting the CPT or are engaging in terrorist attacks would lead to their imprisonment or deportation. The Vietnamese generally are not actively involved in the communist insurgent movement.

C. KNOWN OR SUSPECTED NORTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL: No information available.

D. NORTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: Information on North Vietnamese intelligence operations in Thailand is severely limited. The North Vietnamese conduct intelligence operations in Thailand from their embassy in Vientiane, Laos. The embassy in Vientiane is conducive as a base for intelligence operations in Thailand due to the embassy's close location to Thailand and the large Vietnamese population in the northeastern portion of Thailand. North Vietnamese intelligence agents are directed primarily against the RTG and the Thai military; however, it is believed they are also collecting information on US Forces in Thailand.

E. CONCLUSIONS: The threat posed by the North Vietnamese is primarily directed against the RTG, not the US Forces in Thailand. The primary threat to US Forces by the North Vietnamese is their potential cooperation with the CPT in activities against US military installations in Northeast Thailand. In this respect, the North Vietnamese probably gather low-level tactical information on US installations for possible use by terrorists in sabotage or mortar attacks.

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APPENDIX 1

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GAPS

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APPENDIX 1. (S/NFD) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GAPS (U)

A. SOVIET THREAT SECTION: More information is needed on the following:

1. Soviet personnel engaged in intelligence activities in Thailand.
2. Dates and places of birth of Soviet intelligence personnel.
3. Local addresses (in Thailand) of Soviet intelligence personnel.
4. Photographs of Soviet intelligence personnel.
5. Any local Soviet connections, such as front groups, friendly trading firms or businesses and personnel dealing significantly with the Soviets.
6. Soviet intelligence operations.

B. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THREAT SECTION

1. The degree of control exercised by the PRC over the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), flow of funds, role of PRC Embassy in Laos.
2. All facets of the Thai Patriotic Front.
3. PRC intelligence activities to include personnel, organizations, targets, and methods of operation.

C. EAST EUROPEAN THREAT SECTION

1. Names and addresses of East European facilities in Thailand.
2. Local East European connections, such as front groups, sympathetic groups, or businesses and personnel dealing with East European countries.
3. East European intelligence operations.

D. NORTH VIETNAMESE THREAT SECTION

1. The degree to which the North Vietnamese are involved with the Communist Party of Thailand.
2. North Vietnamese intelligence operations (including names of personnel, targets, organizations, and methods of operation).

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APPENDIX 2

INDEX OF SOVIET, PRC, EAST EUROPEAN, AND NORTH VIETNAMESE CULTURAL,
CONTROLLED, FRONT AND SYMPATHETIC GROUPS

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APPENDIX 2. INDEX OF SOVIET, PRC, EAST EUROPEAN, AND NORTH VIETNAMESE
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APPENDIX 3

INDEX OF PERSONALITIES

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APPENDIX 4

PHOTOGRAPHS OF KNOWN OR SUSPECTED SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

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BELYUTIN, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich

Born 21 June 1938; Orel, USSR
Employee, Soviet Trade Mission
Intelligence Status: SIS



BYKOV, Fedor Stepanovich

Figure 6

Born 24 September 1929, USSR
Second Secretary - Political Section,
Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: SIS



Figure 7

CHUB, Oleg Kirillovich

Born 1930; Moscow, USSR
Officer, Railway Section,
Transport & Communications
Intelligence Status: SIS



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Figure 8

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FILATOV, Aleksey Nikitovich

Born 28 January 1926; Moscow, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected GRU

Figure 9

KAZMIN, Yuriy Borisovich

Economic Affairs Officer
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB



Figure 10



Figure 11

KHARITONOV, Yevgny Fedorovich

Born 1937; Moscow, USSR
Attache-Vice Consul, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB

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KHLOPYANOV, Vasiliy Illich

Born 1927; Moscow, USSR
Second Secretary-Consul, Soviet
Embassy
Intelligence Status; Known KGB



Figure 12



Figure 13

KOCHETOV, Andrey Vsevolodovich

Born 1942; Alma-Ata, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB

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KOSMODAMIYANSKIY, Viktor
Valentinovich

Born 1935; Moscow, USSR
Third Secretary, Soviet
Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected
KGB



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Figure 14

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Figure 15

LAKTARINA, Vitaliy Konstantinovich

Born 18 February 1935; Moscow, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected GRU



Figure 16

MACHEKHIN, Aleksandr Yegorovich

Born 1937, USSR
Third Secretary-Assistant
Information Officer
Intelligence Status: Known GRU



Figure 17

MALAKHOV, Valentin Sergeyevich

Born 14 January 1924, USSR
Counsellor-Political Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB

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MARKIN, Yuriy Illiaronovich

Born 1937; Moscow, USSR
Third Secretary-Political
Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB



Figure 18

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Figure 19 9

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MIZIN, Viktor Vladimirovich

Born 25 October 1935; Moscow, USSR
Attache-Protocol Officer, Soviet
Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB

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Figure 20

SELEZNEV, Boris Nikolayevich

Born 27 February 1930; Smolensk, USSR
TASS Correspondent, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB



Figure 21

SHUBICHEV, Yevgeniy Konstantinovich

Born 27 February 1930; Smolensk, USSR
TASS Correspondent, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB

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Figure 22

SOLOMATIN, Vladimir Iosifovich

Born 4 November 1925; Moscow, USSR
First Secretary-Cultural Section, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known GRU

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TREPOLETS, Vladimir
Afanasyevich

Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: SIS



Figure 23



VSESVYATSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich

Born 28 July 1930; Moscow, USSR
Third Secretary-Political Section,
Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Known KGB

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Figure 24

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YERSHOV, Boris Aleksandrovich

Born 1938; Moscow, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB



Figure 25

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ZAGVOZDIN, Georgiy Aleksandrovich

Born 1939, USSR
Attache, Soviet Embassy
Intelligence Status: Suspected KGB



Figure 26

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APPENDIX 5

PROTOTYPE LETTER

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(classification)

SUBJECT: *Counterintelligence Threat Study - Thailand*

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSI-CIA
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This command/agency has received the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), Department of the Army, counterintelligence research study entitled *Counterintelligence Threat Study - Thailand*.
2. To assist OACSI in the evaluation of the utility of specific counterintelligence research projects in meeting publications support requirements of individual commands/agencies, the following information is provided:
 - a. Subject publication is of *distinct/considerable/little* value to this command/agency in relation to our requirements for counterintelligence information.
 - b. Information contained in subject publication is of *distinct/considerable/little* value in relation to the security mission or requirements of this command.
 - c. It is requested that this command/agency be *continued on/deleted from* distribution lists of future counterintelligence research projects of this nature.
 - d. Request that the number of copies of this category of publication disseminated to this command/agency be *increased/decreased to* ____.
 - e. In terms of substantive content, subject publication is rated *excellent/good/fair*.
 - f. In terms of format and editorial style, subject publication is rated *excellent/good/fair*.
 - g. The utility of counterintelligence research projects of this nature to this command would be enhanced by adoption of the following suggestions:

(signature block)

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COUNTERTERRORISM

RESEARCH PROJECT

1 DECEMBER 1964

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INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES, THAILAND (U)

1 DECEMBER 1969

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication has been reviewed in consultation with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency and the assistance of these agencies is gratefully acknowledged by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

Users may submit comments, suggestions, or queries pertaining to this publication to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310 ATTN: CIA.

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- Annex 4: Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army
- Annex 5: A. Special Operations Center
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
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(S/NFD) INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES, THAILAND (U)

A. (S/NFD) NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

1. THE KING is the titular head of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). His principal function is to serve as a living symbol of national unity and identity, similar to the role of the monarchy in the United Kingdom. Since adoption of a constitutional system following a *coup d'etat* in 1932 the King has had little real power. The stature of the kingship has grown, however, with the coronation of the present regent, Phumiphon Adulyadej. Most political regimes have attempted to identify themselves more closely to the King. In recent years, the King has exercised some influence over government decisions, although the military leaders retain firm control of the government. Since early 1969, the King has been highly critical of the Royal Thai Army's role in counterinsurgency operations, specifically among the hill tribes in northern Thailand. He has said in public forums that the army's punitive practices are pushing the tribesmen toward communism. In 1969 the King encouraged the army to change its tactics, and his informal role in countersubversion policy may increase significantly. Three small agencies aid the King. (See Figure 1 on page 2 and Figure 2 on page 3.)

a. The Privy Council is composed of nine members appointed by the King from among the senior nobility and elder statesmen. Its function is to advise the monarch and, under certain conditions, appoint a regency to exercise royal powers. The Privy Council, which provides a link between the throne and the administration, occasionally has demonstrated some influence over governmental decisions.

b. The Office of the Royal Household organizes ceremonial functions (of which there are many) and administers the finances and housekeeping of the royal court.

c. The Private Secretariat performs clerical and secretarial tasks for the King.

2. The COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, or Cabinet, is the highest office of the Executive Branch. It frames and implements all important national policies and is the center of the entire political system. The Cabinet is comprised of heads of the 13 ministries, six deputy ministers, two deputy prime ministers, and the Prime Minister. Each minister is appointed by the Prime Minister. The Cabinet meets frequently to formulate legislative proposals and executive policies. Within the Cabinet, however, most executive power is concentrated in the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defense. Key positions in the Cabinet are manned by two persons: Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien. In addition to holding the top two positions of the Office of the Prime Minister (the single most important executive office) these two men also hold the top military and police positions. Prime Minister Thanom is concurrently Minister of Defense and Supreme

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ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT (RTG)




Figure 1


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— CONTROL

- - - COORDINATION

Source: CIA Documents

ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT (RTG)



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Source: NIS 42 (GS)

Figure 2

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Commander of the Armed Forces. GEN Praphas is also the Minister of the Interior, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and Commander in Chief of the Army, the strongest of the three services. Both men also hold top roles in all the major intelligence and security services, as well as in the National Security Council, the highest policymaking board of the intelligence community. (Figures 1 and 2)

3. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

a. Mission

(1) The National Security Council (NSC) is the primary policymaking body within the Royal Thai Government. It was established by the National Security Act of 1959. The NSC consults and makes recommendations to the Council of Ministers on internal and foreign affairs, economic and military policy, and other matters involving national security. It usually meets once a month.

(2) Members of the NSC include:

- (a) The Prime Minister
- (b) Deputy Prime Ministers (2)
- (c) Minister of National Defense
- (d) Minister of Foreign Affairs
- (e) Minister of Communications
- (f) Minister of National Development
- (g) Minister of Finance
- (h) Minister of the Interior

(i) Secretary General, NSC (This post presently is held by General Wichit Songkhram.)

b. Functions

(1) The Secretariat serves as the daily working body for the NSC. It consists of the Secretary General, a deputy secretary general (Air Chief Marshall Dawee Chulasap), and three assistant secretary generals (Air Vice Marshall Sitthi Savetsila, Major General Chusak Wathanaponchai, and Colonel Sanan Phunphat). Permanent members of the Secretariat perform the administrative chores of the NSC. They also handle the membership of the various NSC boards and committees. The Secretariat often dispatches inspection teams to investigate matters of immediate concern to national security. In early 1968,

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for example, one such team investigated the presence of Chinese irregular units operating in northern Thailand. The team recommended that these units be forced to leave Thailand. In January 1969 another team investigated the serious insurgency occurring in north-central Thailand at that time. The Secretariat is believed to have four divisions, as follows:

- (a) Internal Affairs Division
- (b) External Affairs Division
- (c) Military Affairs Division, headed by Lieutenant Commander Prasong Sunsiri
- (d) Economic and Social Affairs Division, headed by Mr. Sunit Sutthanukun.

(2) The Planning Board, consisting of seven members and chaired by the Secretary General of the NSC, meets once a week. It is responsible for recommending long-term government policy in response to specific requests from the NSC, or at its own initiative when the chairman feels a policy or policy change is needed. In July 1968 the Planning Board prepared long-term government policy toward Malaysia and Singapore in response to questions from the Cabinet. This study supported an earlier RTG decision not to commit Thai military units against the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) as the Malaysians wished. Another study recommended that the RTG resist increasing cultural activities by Nationalist China in Thailand. The most significant Planning Board study in recent years, which was initiated by the board itself, involved a recommendation to revise RTG policy towards the hill tribes in north Thailand. Within six months after the report was submitted to the NSC, policy changes were in force along the recommended lines. Studies in 1969 on the Laotian situation, however, have had less an impact on Royal Thai Government policy.

(3) The Preparatory Board has 32 members. Chaired by the Secretary General, the Board is supported by an Assistant Secretary General. The board is responsible for preparing the agenda for National Security Council meetings. It also makes recommendations on immediate policy issues in response to requests from various ministries, the NSC, or when the chairman feels policy is needed. The board is broken down into four committees, as follows:

- (a) Internal Policy Committee
- (b) External Policy Committee
- (c) Military Policy Committee
- (d) Economic Affairs Committee

(4) The Coordinating Board consists of ten members, chaired by the Deputy Secretary General. Its main tasks are to see that government policy is known to the various ministries and to supervise implementation

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of the policy. Directives are issued to the ministries in the name of the Secretariat. The Coordinating Board also may be called on to prepare studies and recommend policy.

(5) The Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), an element of the Office of the Prime Minister, submits reports to the NSC and briefs the NSC on specific issues at the NSC's request. All other RTG intelligence services perform the same functions at the NSC's request. (For further information on the IAB, see paragraph A, 4.)

(6) The NSC became embroiled in a dispute between the Royal Thai Army and the then Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) (paragraph B, 2) over policy and responsibility for countersubversion and counterinsurgency. The National Security Council's downgrading of CSOC by injecting the RTA command structure between CSOC headquarters and its operating elements was followed by the NSC's decision to assume responsibility for all policy determinations affecting countersubversion and counterinsurgency. In the past, countersubversion policy was made within CSOC. Policy was approved by a rubber-stamp Council of Ministers without recourse to the NSC. The new policy means that NSC committees must either prepare, or study in detail, all countersubversion plans before they are approved by the NSC. Subsequent changes in RTG countersubversion policy among the hill tribes were prepared in the NSC. Following an inspection trip by an assistant secretary general, the NSC was advised that a joint center for control of all border movements would be established, marking a more aggressive role for the NSC.

(7) In 1968 the National Security Council finally acknowledged the serious problem of poor coordination and delineation of responsibilities among the various RTG intelligence and security services. The NSC ordered the Department of Central Intelligence (DCI) (paragraph A, 5) to prepare a study on this matter. Although DCI's effort to centralize operations under its own control was rejected, the NSC did make an initial step to resolve some of the more blatant rivalries. If the problems of RTG intelligence continue unresolved, the NSC may be willing to formulate additional reforms.

c. Capabilities

(1) Since assuming the dominant intelligence and countersubversion responsibilities of the country, the NSC is receiving greater support from outside agencies. The studies on which policy decisions are made are consequently of greatly improved quality. The NSC performs its mission well.

(2) Although the NSC is technically subordinate to the larger Council of Ministers (i.e. the Cabinet), the Council of Ministers actually adds little more than rubber-stamp approval to NSC recommendations. This is because the members of the NSC concurrently fill the more influential positions of the Council of Ministers. When a decree is required to implement a policy decision of the NSC, approval of the Council of Ministers is obtained and arrangements are made to have it signed by the Prime Minister and the King.

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(3) In policy matters relating to coordination between agencies or affecting a single ministry, the Council of Ministers is occasionally bypassed. In such a case, policy is issued directly by the Coordinating Board.

(4) Although policy papers are prepared in detail by the several boards and committees of the National Security Council, final decisions always rest with the formal meetings of the NSC members. In many cases, open discussions follow presentations and briefings, at which there are often good interchanges of ideas between the ministers present. The most important decisions, however, remain in the hands of Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas.

(5) Policy papers prepared by the Planning and Preparatory Boards are often withdrawn by the requesting Minister on the grounds that the paper is no longer pertinent. This causes some wasted effort.

(6) On 31 January 1967, the Council of Ministers approved a policy paper prepared by the NSC covering the entire spectrum of national security policy. This is the first known comprehensive document to be used by all RTG ministries as a guide for reaching department-level decisions. Although necessarily general, it has served as a useful tool for the various ministries. The document covers internal, international, military, economic, and sociological affairs.

(7) A DCI proposal recently approved by the NSC was the assignment of specific intelligence collection responsibilities to the various RTG intelligence services. The objective of the study was to force intelligence coordination by the fragmented and competing elements of the Thai intelligence community. The probability of attaining a smooth implementation of a national intelligence collection plan, however, is not great -- certainly in the short run. If counterinsurgency planners continue to receive inadequate intelligence support, however, the impetus for change may follow.

(8) (See Figure 3 on page 8 for the National Security Council organizational chart.)

4. INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (IAB)

a. Mission: The Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), the senior intelligence advisory element at the national level, is responsible for the supervision and coordination of all RTG intelligence activity. The IAB also advises the Prime Minister and the National Security Council on intelligence matters.

b. Functions

(1) The IAB, variously called the Intelligence Advisory Committee and Intelligence Advisory Group, is an element of the Office of the Prime Minister and is directly subordinate to the National Security Council. The IAB was established originally by executive order in September 1958 on the

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)




Figure 3

Source: CIAD Analysis

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advice of the Cabinet. Formal Cabinet approval did not occur until June 1959. Subsequent orders in 1960, 1961, and 1963 added additional members to the IAB. The order of 19 August 1965 superseded all prior orders concerning IAB membership and is believed to be the order under which the IAB is currently organized. This order designated the following members of the IAB:

- (a) Director, Department of Central Intelligence
- (b) Commander, Armed Forces Security Center
- (c) Commander, Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center
- (d) Director of Joint Intelligence (J2), Supreme Command
- (e) Director of Intelligence (G2), Royal Thai Army
- (f) Director of Intelligence (N2), Royal Thai Navy
- (g) Director of Intelligence (A2), Royal Thai Air Force
- (h) Commander, Central Investigation Bureau, Thai National Police
- (i) Deputy Commander, Border Patrol Police
- (j) Commander, Special Branch, Thai National Police
- (k) Representative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- (l) Representative, Ministry of the Interior
- (m) Representative, Ministry of Economics
- (n) Deputy Director, Department of Central Intelligence
- (o) Police MG SANGHA Kittikachorn, Secretary, IAB
- (p) Police COL CHAT Chawangkun, Deputy Secretary, IAB
- (q) Police COL CHANA Samutwanit, Deputy Secretary, IAB
- (r) Police COL SAROEM Phatanakamchon, Deputy Secretary, IAB.

(2) The Intelligence Advisory Board acts as the instrument of the Prime Minister and the National Security Council. It implements intelligence and counterintelligence operations at the national level as required for national security.

(3) The board prepares National Intelligence Estimates on problems of national security and indicates intelligence requirements in accordance with the estimates.

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(4) The IAB directs and controls the coordination of overt and covert intelligence at the ministerial level. It also levies requirements on appropriate agencies. Division 7 of the Department of Central Intelligence serves as the IAB's operating arm in this function.

(5) The IAB directs and controls the coordination of intelligence production in the form of intelligence estimates on current situations or in any other form as required.

(6) The IAB directs and controls the coordination of intelligence reports to the Prime Minister and the National Security Council on matters affecting national security and requiring decision at the national level.

(7) The Intelligence Advisory Board directs and controls the coordination of information between agencies at the ministerial level, as well as information with foreign countries.

(8) The IAB directs and controls the coordination of counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, and other acts affecting the national security.

(9) The IAB also performs whatever intelligence activities may be directed by the Prime Minister or the National Security Council.

c. Capabilities

(1) Although the Intelligence Advisory Board has been the senior advisory body on intelligence to the Prime Minister and National Security Council since its inception in 1959, it did not have the authority or means to supervise and coordinate all government intelligence activity until September 1968. This upgrading of the IAB, accomplished under the direction of Secretary General Wichit Songkhram, is the latest in a series of efforts to improve the government intelligence structure. In the past, the various intelligence collection agencies have reported directly to the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior. No agency was required by law to coordinate with other agencies on matters of national security; neither did these agencies have to report their intelligence and counterintelligence operations to a central authority at the national level. The new IAB operational arm, Division 7 of the Department of Central Intelligence (DCI), is designed to eliminate these difficulties. Division 7 is given authority to assign collection responsibilities and coordinate the collection and dissemination of the evaluated information. The IAB then prepares intelligence studies with the information. If functioning properly, the IAB (with its operating arm [DCI]) could become the dominant intelligence body in the country. The IAB had not attempted, however, to assert this authority as of mid-1969.

(2) The political function of intelligence and security services in Thailand may hinder the successful operation of an intelligence coordination body. Most Thai intelligence and security services are assigned missions of

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political intelligence collection; intelligence services have traditionally served as a means to political power. The separation of powers between key government leaders that pervades the governmental structure is mirrored by the careful balance of control over the intelligence services. The new IAB could upset this balance of power. Debate over the delimitations of functions between the IAB, DCI, and Division 7 of the DCI illustrate some of these problems. In an initial recommendation, for example, DCI suggested that Division 7 be assigned responsibility for preparing the mission and roles of all other Thai intelligence services. The National Security Council, however, would not grant this power to any single independent agency. Furthermore, Division 7 does not yet have an organization or budget. It is not expected to be fully manned for at least three years. In other words, the structure for centralized control now exists, but the apparatus to enforce that control does not. The future of the Intelligence Advisory Board depends on how far DCI will push the coordinating role of Division 7.

(3) IAB surveys and estimates before 1968 were regarded lightly within the intelligence community, in general, and by the NSC and the Prime Minister, in particular. These products consisted of the most elementary collation of reports from other government agencies. In November 1967, for example, the IAB completed an analysis of internal and external policies of neighboring South-east Asian nations. Some of the IAB conclusions were as follows: "Installation of a leftist government in Burma would allow Communist China to use Burma as a base of operations against Thailand"; "Failure of the Lao to control the Thai-Lao border will cause difficulties for Thailand"; "Cambodia will use the refusal of Thailand to recognize Cambodian borders as a propaganda item"; and "Political maneuvering within the South Vietnamese government may create a situation which the Viet Cong can exploit." The document was little more than a listing of known facts and the most obvious conclusions. In June 1968, however, the IAB published an excellent estimate of the threat posed to Thailand by Communist China. This may mark an improvement in the IAB product, but it could also be a document prepared by DCI and published without change by the IAB. In 1969 there was additional evidence of worthwhile independent IAB analysis involving studies on the impact of US withdrawal on Thai policy and of communist capabilities to infiltrate Thailand.

5. DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI)

a. Mission

(1) The Department of Central Intelligence (DCI) was established on 17 January 1954 as a component of the Office of the Prime Minister. DCI is a regular government agency with Civil Service status and is required to function within the laws and regulations of the Civil Service Commission. It originally borrowed about 100 police officers to staff the organization, but government policy later required the DCI to return them to the Police Force. Since 1957 the DCI has depended on the Civil Service to fill vacancies. DCI has no special budgeting procedures; funds are channeled through the Office of the Prime Minister.

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(2) The DCI is responsible for the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence and for the collation of intelligence information received by all elements of the Royal Thai Government (RTG).

b. Functions

(1) The Department of Central Intelligence collects political, economic, and military information (mostly from overt sources) on countries of intelligence interest to Thailand. Its principal areas of concern are the contiguous countries, Communist China, the United States, the USSR, India, and the United Kingdom.

(2) DCI collects domestic intelligence on known or suspected communists. It monitors activities of foreign minorities within Thailand, including Chinese, Malays, Burmese, Vietnamese, Khmers, Laotians, and Indonesians.

(3) The department provides personnel and physical security support to all RTG civilian agencies, conducts counterespionage activities and operations, and directs special investigations of communist subversion efforts.

(4) DCI briefs Thai Foreign Service Officers on conditions within their assigned countries, informs them of DCI essential elements of information (EEI) for that country, and debriefs them on their return to Thailand.

(5) DCI sponsors an anti-communist educational and counterpropaganda program throughout Thailand. This program is aimed at all three levels of the country: high-level government officials; medium-level government employees (businessmen and educators), and the general populace.

(6) DCI acts as an operating agency of the National Security Council and the Intelligence Advisory Board in directing and controlling intelligence and counterintelligence operations at the national level.

(7) DCI coordinates the operations of intelligence agencies at the ministerial level in the collection, production, and reporting of intelligence.

(8) DCI coordinates the exchange of information between RTG intelligence services and those of foreign governments.

(9) DCI conducts investigations for all civilian agencies of the RTG, performs routine name checks for other Thai intelligence and security agencies, and enforces the National Security Act.

(10) DCI provides some staff support for the IAB. IAB is chaired by the Director, DCI. DCI also prepares intelligence annexes for all studies which require decisions by the Prime Minister or the NSC on matters of national security.

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(11) The Department of Central Intelligence maintains training sites where courses on counterespionage, counterpropaganda, countersubversion, and countersabotage are taught. Both civilian and military individuals, agencies, and units attend these classes. Training courses for DCI personnel are also held at the sites.

(12) The department maintains liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and participates in a limited exchange of information of mutual interest with several of these services.

(13) DCI maintains liaison with other intelligence and security agencies of the Royal Thai Government. Several agencies provide input to the DCI staff studies for the Intelligence Advisory Board and many agencies assist in security investigations. DCI has close association with the National Police Special Branch and the Armed Forces Security Center, both of which provide some assistance in the conduct of domestic intelligence operations.

(14) DCI is known to have conducted some mail intercept operations to and from Burma and Cambodia. It has also made phone taps on some Indonesians living in Thailand. It is likely that DCI has performed similar functions against other targets.

(15) In April 1968 DCI made contact with leaders of the Chinese Irregulars located in northern Thailand to discuss the possibility of RTG use of irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations in Meo tribal areas. It is not known whether DCI would control the operations of these forces or if the mission would be assigned to the military should an agreement be reached. An element of the Office of the Prime Minister possibly was selected to make the original contact due to the sensitivity of the mission.

(16) The department conducts covert operations throughout the country to detect and provide advance warning to the RTG of impending *coups d'etat*. Most DCI covert operations are concerned with political activities. In 1967 DCI conducted background investigations of persons selected by the military establishment as potential members of a government party and a controlled opposition party.

c. Organization: (See Figure 4 on page 14)

(1) The Director, Department of Central Intelligence, is General Bunmark Thesaputra. The most important Deputy Director is Major General Prakorb Charumani, a close friend of Premier Thanom. DCI headquarters includes a Secretariat and six divisions. The Secretariat handles all matters pertaining to personnel, finances, and other administrative functions. Control of DCI is centralized. No major decisions are made or actions taken without approval from the Director or his deputies (although some division chiefs are given more latitude than others). In November 1966 DCI had approximately 320 persons assigned.


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Figure 4

Operational in October 1968

Source: CIA Documents

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(2) The functional breakdown of DCI is as follows:

(a) The Research, Analysis, and Records Division performs research and analysis functions at the request of the Director, DCI.

(b) The Security and Counterespionage Division investigates and affords security clearances to DCI personnel, counters opposition efforts to penetrate the service, maintains physical security of DCI installations, and conducts name checks for other government services. The division performs similar functions for all other RTG civilian agencies. Its five sections include:

1. Security Section
2. Planning Section
3. Training Section
4. Personnel Section
5. Investigation Section

(c) The Internal Affairs Division is concerned with internal subversion emanating from local communists, foreign communist governments, and neighboring states. The division has six sections:

1. Section 1, General intelligence information on communism.
2. Section 2, Thai communists.
3. Section 3, Soviet activities.
4. Section 4, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian activities.
5. Section 5, Malaysian, Indonesian, and Burmese activities.
6. Section 6 compiles dossiers on known or suspected communists and other subversives.

(d) The Non-Asian Affairs Division provides current intelligence information on countries and regions of interest to the Thai government. It has six sections:

1. Section 1, Western Hemisphere.
2. Section 2, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
3. Section 3, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Northern Europe.

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4. Section 4, Africa.
5. Section 5, United Kingdom and Australia.
6. Section 6, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Greece.

(3) The Asian Affairs Division has five sections:

1. Section 1, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
2. Section 2, Burma, India, and Pakistan.
3. Section 3, China, Japan, and Korea.
4. Section 4, Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia.
5. Section 5, Middle East.

(f) The Technical Support Division is subdivided into three functional sections:

1. Section 1 provides technical support to the other divisions.
2. Section 2 handles all communications within DCI and monitors foreign radio broadcasts.
3. Section 3 conducts a training school for personnel in communications and other technical assignments. It also maintains all the other DCI training sites.

(g) Division 7 of the Department of Central Intelligence was formed in October 1968 to help solve problems in intelligence coordination. It originally was intended to become a "super control agency," supervising operational matters of all other services. The Cabinet cut back its functions, however, and it is not able to write the missions and roles of the other agencies. Division 7 has no funds at this time and is not expected to be fully manned for at least three years. The following mission for Division 7 has been approved:

1. To coordinate the collection, dissemination, and production of intelligence at the ministerial level
2. To coordinate counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion operations among the several national and military security agencies
3. To receive intelligence requirements from the National Security Council and the Intelligence Advisory Board and to translate these requirements into specific instructions as the basis for intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

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d. Capabilities

(1) The capability of the Department of Central Intelligence to conduct covert or clandestine operations within Thailand against hostile foreign intelligence services, the Communist Party of Thailand, or other subversives is extremely limited. Since its inception, the DCI has conducted only a few such operations, and these were on an *ad hoc* basis. Most operations use overt sources, usually members of the leftist community who are well aware of their superiors. Those covert operations DCI has performed were assisted by the National Police Special Branch, which provided logistical support not available to DCI. Some improvement can be noted over the past five years. Even this improvement must be described as minimal, however.

(2) The department's overseas operation consist largely of clipping articles from foreign newspapers, magazines, and other unclassified sources. These are then forwarded to the Prime Minister with appropriate comments. Some DCI personnel are sent overseas to engage in limited joint operations with foreign agencies, but these operations rarely extend beyond normal liaison responsibilities. The Prime Minister and the National Security Council, however, often have important foreign policy decisions on information supplied by DCI.

(3) Most of DCI's efforts are directed toward collection of information of a purely political nature. This greatly restricts its ability to perform its primary assigned function. Nevertheless, DCI's capability in this area is good. It has excellent contacts in the leftist community and should be in a position to detect any potential political opposition before it can be expressed overtly. Should a similar emphasis be placed on more conventional intelligence operations, DCI's capabilities could improve considerably.

(4) DCI also suffers from severe administrative problems. Since 1957 DCI has tried to fill its vacancies, but it has been restricted by Civil Service law and policies. In 1963 some positions were filled, but these amounted to only 20 per cent of the required total. This shortage of personnel has forced DCI to abandon plans for sending agents abroad and throughout Thailand on specific intelligence missions.

(5) Still another problem has been funds, which are first assigned to the Office of the Prime Minister and then disseminated to DCI. Continuity of funding suffers when the Office of the Prime Minister concludes that its limited resources should be diverted temporarily to other agencies. DCI personnel have received limited training and have similarly limited experience in intelligence operations. Although the DCI schools gradually have improved the quality of personnel, the level of professionalism is still below the standards necessary for a professional intelligence service. Nepotism and assignment of family friends to positions over more deserving individuals causes some morale problems. Personnel security procedures have improved considerably during the past few years, primarily due to the continued political role of DCI. Protection of sources is no better than other agencies.

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(6) The creation of the new DCI Division 7 is another Royal Thai Government effort to solve a long-standing problem -- collation of intelligence information and a means of central direction for competing intelligence and security services. DCI always has had the mission of collating information from all intelligence services, but has not had any active program to accomplish the mission. Jealousy among the intelligence services and the ease with which each service can communicate directly with the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are the chief reasons. This current effort to eliminate fragmentation and competition within the intelligence community seems to have higher level support than other similar past efforts. It is unlikely, however, that the other services will give up their collation and reporting responsibilities easily. The propensity of the senior Thai leaders to communicate directly with the agency involved in a particular operation will not be eliminated immediately. Nevertheless, this is a valuable step in the right direction. Should the new division establish its authority over rival agencies, however, DCI may gradually lose some of its operational assets and responsibilities. The RTG leadership is not likely to encourage the creation of a single national intelligence service due to the political threat it may pose.

6. NATIONAL SECURITY COMMAND (NSCC)

a. Mission: The NSCC was formed in April 1962 and given the responsibility for integrating all the efforts of Royal Thai Government agencies concerned with countering communist subversive and insurgent activities. RTG officials later decided the mission was too comprehensive for an organization the size of NSCC. The NSCC was divested of this responsibility and assigned supervisory duties over the Mobile Development Unit (MDU) program, the Regional Border Committee (RBC) at Songkhla (which may shortly be lost to the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate [CSOD]), and operation of Radio Station 909 in Sakon Nakhon Province. The NSCC works primarily on passive or preventative operations. (See Figure 5 on page 19.)

b. Functions

(1) The NSCC supervises the operations of the General Border Committee (GBC) of Malaysia and Burma, and coordinates Regional Border Committee operations with the ministries involved with Regional Border Committee (RBC) operations. This function is expected to be handed over to CSOD.

(2) The NSCC plans and represents Thailand at joint meetings with Malaysia on communist subversion along their common borders. It also provides general guidance to GBC personnel on Thai policy towards Malaysia. This function also is expected to be handed over to CSOD.

(3) The NSCC determines the size, content, and expansion of the MDU programs.

(4) The NSCC operates Radio Station 909 in Sakon Nakhon Province and acts as the RTG's Voice of Northeast Thailand.


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Figure 5

NATIONAL SECURITY COMMAND (NSCC)



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Source: CIAD Analysis

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(5) The NSCC conducts training courses for Thai technical school graduates who are assigned to work among the villages selected for MDU operations.

(6) The NSCC plans; administers, and supervises an annual conference for youth representatives from MDU target areas.

(7) The NSCC directs operations of the Medical Mobile Units, 24-man, medical, civic teams which visit rural villages throughout Thailand.

(8) The three-man Psychological Operations Branch of the NSCC plans National Security Command psychological operations policies and coordinates them with other RTG agencies engaged in psychological warfare (particularly the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate).

c. Capabilities

(1) The NSCC performs its mission, as reduced, adequately. Most decisions are made by the Assistant Chairman, Major General Lertrob, and are usually accepted by the Chairman, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasap. The NSCC Policy Board is chaired by the Prime Minister, but the board rarely meets. The three subordinate commands (Northeast, North, and South) are little more than paper organizations.

(2) The NSCC presently has no capability to coordinate counterinsurgency operations for the RTG. Formation of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) in December 1965 eliminated this function for the NSCC. In 1965 the Supreme Command wished to expand NSCC's area of operations, but GEN Praphas, fearing army domination of his police forces, successfully argued for creation of the new organization. Its authority over communist suppression in the South was lost to the CSOD, due to a greater communist threat and negligible NSCC capability.

d. Mobile Development Units (MDU's)

(1) Mission: The Mobile Development Units (MDU's) were designed to counter the communist insurgent, subversive, and intelligence threats to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in rural sections of the country. MDU's are expected to create an immediate impact in their target villages, using civic action and psychological warfare programs.

(2) Functions

(a) The MDU program is a three-stage campaign with short-range, mid-range, and long-range objectives. In the first phase, the MDU headquarters (which is selected, staffed, and supported by the National Security Command [NSCC] in Bangkok) dispatches 18-man Mobile Development Teams to carry out small development projects, civic action, and public relations activity to demonstrate government presence and concern. High-impact activities might include medical clinics; demonstration of new crops, pesticides, and fertilizers; films; folk plays, and construction of wells. This stage lasts

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between six weeks and two months. During the second stage (lasting approximately one year), MDU teams develop additional projects on a more responsive and intensive basis. These usually require mobilization of local ability and labor. In the latter stage, projects are continued by trained local leadership with direct assistance from the several RTG ministries. The MDU gradually gives up operational control of their projects, with only a small NSCC staff remaining for intelligence collection duties.

(b) The MDU operates a training center at Ratburi, where personnel assigned to MDU operations are briefed on operations and their objectives. Most of this training involves graduates of Thai universities and vocational schools who will be used to develop agricultural and cottage industries at MDU sites. Some training is offered to local personnel selected to operate projects with MDU assistance.

(c) The MDU Construction Company operates as the NSCC's base logistical command. It supports all MDU building operations in the country. While much of its initial effort has been directed towards construction of MDU facilities, it has built several important networks of security roads in support of countersubversion plans.

(d) MDU personnel are often used as sources by other RTG intelligence and security services. Their contacts with ministry personnel in Bangkok and the provinces, their association with local village leadership, and their personal observation of conditions in areas likely to support subversive activities make them valuable informants. The MDU organization has its own information collection function in identifying problem areas for further government action. Most of this information, however, deals specifically with information relating to MDU operations. MDU personnel are not likely to report information dealing directly with subversion or corruption through MDU channels. Instead, they will report this information through their own ministries, or through another intelligence service -- notably the Special Branch or the Armed Forces Security Center. Much information, however, goes unreported.

(3) Organization

(a) In April 1969 there were 22 MDU's in operation throughout the country. MDU numbers 21 and 22 were deployed to the mid-South in March 1969. MDU 23 was deployed in Trat Province in June 1969; MDU 24 is assigned to Phetchabun. Two others are in the preliminary planning stages, and another three are projected for 1972. The National Security Command plans to move additional MDU's into areas suspected of being communist subversive targets but not yet experiencing overt insurgency. Areas so designated are in the north and north-central regions of the country. Other considerations include development needs, previous RTG neglect, and population inaccessability.

(b) Each MDU consists of about 120 persons, of which 80 are NSCC staff technicians from several RTG ministries; the remainder are Royal Thai Army personnel. They are commanded by an RTA colonel. The military command

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structure was formulated to provide for a single authority for MDU operations and to prevent ministry interference with assigned personnel. Each MDU has a headquarters element based in a provincial or district seat. Under the headquarters are a varying number of teams or subdevelopment bases. The number depends on how many personnel are available and the size of the budget approved by the NSC. MDU's 21 and 22, for example, each had 11 teams on a budget of about 1.25 million dollars. Military personnel provide communications, leadership, engineering skills, and transportation. The civilian ministries and agencies provide men with the more specialized skills, including educators, doctors, veterinarians, and sanitary engineers.

(4) Capabilities

(a) The MDU program is one of the most successful village development and countersubversion projects formulated by the Thai government. MDUs are designed to bring the Royal Thai Government (RTG) authority into the rural villages, impressing upon villagers the ties they have with the government. The RTG is presently competing with the subversives, the representatives of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), at all levels. MDU's serve to counter subversive propaganda. Despite the several difficulties identified below, the MDU operations are improving with each lesson learned in previous operations. One of the more important aspects of the MDU program is that it is generally Thai-planned, Thai-funded, and Thai-operated. The RTG demonstrates through its MDU program that it is interested in developing all -- including human -- resources. The RTG demonstrates that it is willing to meet the subversive threat at its own level, using similar tactics.

(b) Two major difficulties with the MDU program are that MDU personnel have not been mobile and they failed to develop the target villages properly. When the MDU's were formed in 1962, units spent two days at a time visiting as many villages as possible in the Northeast. In each case, teams describe to the villagers the many development wonders that were to follow, but in most instances there was no follow-up. The subsequent rise in expectations was followed by a distinct cynicism of the villages. By 1965, however, the MDU method of operation had changed. MDU teams are now expected to remain semi-permanently in their base camp and provide development projects to larger numbers of villages over a longer period of time. This has had some success.

(c) Villager contact with MDU teams is more limited than originally planned. The model village concept has failed because surrounding villages have not patterned themselves after the model village as intended. Village leaders see no reason to spend their own extremely limited funds for improvements provided free of charge to the model village. They expect the same services to be given to them. In the model village itself, projects are too often handed to village leaders as they were prepared in Bangkok, where there is often too little understanding of local needs. Furthermore, the MDU teams are urged to produce, rather than to teach. The result is an excellent short-term showcase, with many projects ceasing to function almost immediately after the team leaves for the next village. To date, MDU projects have failed to be self-sustaining and, for this

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reason, have not made many permanent improvements in village life. MDU personnel rarely consult with local officials about village needs. Once the MDU leaves, the village leadership is unwilling to retain dictated changes. When communication lines are open between the village leaders and the commander of the MDU, however, success is the rule and not the exception.

e. Regional Border Committee (RBC)

(1) Mission: The Regional Border Committee (RBC) consists of both Thai and Malaysian personnel. It plans and executes operational plans targeted against the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) in the Thai-Malaysian border area, whether conducted by Thai forces, Malaysian forces, or both. The RBC does not preclude the functions of Thai and Malaysian military and police commands, but it does require coordination of these plans with the RBC.

(2) Functions

(a) The RBC implements the policies of the General Border Committee (GBC), a biannual meeting of top Thai and Malaysian military and intelligence officers. Thai representatives are members of the National Security Council (NSC). The RBC officers receive their instructions from their own headquarters, and not from the GBC. Although the GBC members might agree on a tactical point, for example, the orders to implement the new policy would be formulated in each national command and transmitted to the national representation on the RBC. If both staff officers do not receive the same orders from their superiors, no action is taken.

(b) Despite an organization which might suggest the contrary, the RBC serves a support function. The Operations Section has no control over actual counterinsurgency operations. The RBC draws up the plans for operations, but they are implemented by the national commanders of the forces involved. Plans often prove inadequate. At other times, implementation and coordination are poor.

(c) The RBC prepares position papers and recommendations for the GBC. These deal with proposed changes in the border agreements between the two nations and usually involve improved measures for permitting quick, joint action against the CTO. Large military and police operations must be approved by the GBC.

(3) Organization: (See Figure 6 on page 24)

(a) The GBC must approve all policies concerning counterinsurgency on the Thai-Malaysian border. In most instances, the RBC recommends the policies and they are approved by the GBC. Nevertheless, the GBC is expected to direct the activities of the RBC. The Royal Thai Government National Security Command is responsible for the activities of the Thai contingent to the GBC and the RBC, including planning and implementation of RTG policies. The GBC does not have an independent staff. The national RBC contingents


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REGIONAL BORDER COMMITTEE (RBC)

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Figure 6

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compose its staff during the GBC meetings. These meetings can also be called during emergencies.

(b) The Joint Chairmen (one Malaysian and one Thai officer) are responsible to the GBC for implementation of all approved policies and for the supervision and operation of the RBC. They also formulate and recommend large operations to the GBC and approve small-scale operations.

(c) The Deputy Chairmen (one Thai and one Malaysian officer) are the permanent representatives of the Joint Chairmen for the day-to-day functions of the RBC. The Thai Joint Chairman, for example, may also serve as the Border Patrol Police Area IX Commander, or with an RTA unit. This takes up most of his time. The Deputy Chairmen act as chairmen in absence of the latter.

(d) The Secretariat consists of one Thai and one Malaysian. They arrange for all meetings of the RBC, prepare its agenda, maintain minutes of the meetings, and conduct liaison with other departments for the chairmen as required.

(e) The Administrative Division is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the RBC. The division also handles finances and equipment.

1. The Records and Files Section keeps permanent records of all information received by the RBC. It maintains all files and indices, and performs name checks on personnel and organizations in support of other desk officers.

2. The Clerical Staff types all correspondence, directs all mailings, and handles all other office work as required by the RBC.

(f) The Intelligence Division receives all raw intelligence reports from the field teams and all other agencies (Thai and Malaysian) contributing to the RBC. The division processes, disseminates, and collates these reports and forwards them to the General Border Committee and other approved agencies. The Intelligence Division carries out its own intelligence planning for operations within the areas under RBC jurisdiction. The division carries 19 men, six of which are in the Operations Section.

1. The Intelligence Planning Section is responsible for planning, coordinating, and supervising the collection and evaluation of information pertaining to Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. It is also responsible for planning counter-intelligence activities.

2. The Intelligence Operations Section is responsible for processing, collating, and disseminating information received from field teams and other agencies. It also maintains the CTO order-of-battle and situation charts. It is further responsible for initiating the necessary registry action on the reports received.

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3. The Research Section is primarily responsible for full-time research on the CTO organization and structure. The section prepares papers on specific elements of the CTO apparatus and method of operation as directed. The section maintains close liaison with the other divisions and submits recommendations to the Intelligence Division on appropriate action against the CTO. It is also responsible for handling all captured CTO documents.

4. The Security Section maintains the security of the RBC office building and compound, issues security passes, maintains a register of movement of regulations involving the movement, storage, and destruction of classified information. The section also issues security regulations relating to the RBC and the field teams, and advises individuals and divisions on security precautions.

5. The field teams are responsible for collection of information from the field and liaison with local officials and agencies. The number and location of these teams vary according to collection requirements. These teams often conduct their own patrols. They are under Thai operational control, but 15 Malaysian Special Branch officers operate with the teams.

6. The Joint Interrogation Center was established in July 1968, following the June meeting of the General Border Committee. Its duties include interrogation of suspects, captured personnel, and those who surrender. The center, located at RBC headquarters in Songkhla, is manned by two Thai and two Malaysian teams. Each team consists of four men. The center was organized at the behest of the Thais, who did not have trained interrogators familiar with Malay or Chinese.

(g) The Operations and Planning Division is responsible for all tactical planning against the CTO. The Intelligence Division provides all available information. The RBC Operations Room is located in Alor Star, Kedah, Malaysia.

1. The Operations and Planning Section is responsible for planning, operations, and liaison with ground forces of both nations.

2. The Psywar Section handles all psywar activities targeted against the CTO.

(4) Capabilities

(a) The RBC can only be as good as the cooperation between Thai and Malaysian officials. While agreements can often be worked out in the General Border Committee (GBC) meetings in Kuala Lumpur, implementation of these agreements may proceed sporadically, depending upon personal relationships between Thai and Malaysian officials within the Regional Border Committee. For the most part, coordination is adequate. This has not always been the case. In 1966 and 1967, the senior Thai representative to the RBC and the Thai member of the Secretariat (both Border Patrol Police [BPP] officers) were reported to have collaborated with the

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Communist Terrorist Organization. This collaboration included the sale of arms and the passing of advance information on counterinsurgency operations. Time still has not completely healed the harmful effect this activity had on Thai-Malaysian relations in the RBC. There are other reasons for Thai-Malaysian mistrust in the RBC. The Thais generally consider the CTO a Malaysian problem, despite the fact that the CTO presently is based in southern Thailand. CTO and Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) propaganda appeals to this Thai assumption. CTO documents claim no interest in Thai territory and that the CTO expects to return to Malaya in due time. In instances where Thai officials or civilians are killed in CTO operations, letters of apology are usually sent to the Thai officials. Despite Thai disclaimers, the propaganda does have an impact. For example, reports show that some Thai military and police officials are willing to sell arms to the CTO while refraining to do so to the Communist Party of Thailand, which they view as a serious internal threat. Many Thais still hold these views despite intelligence reports showing that the CTO is organizing among the Chinese population in southern Thailand, and is attempting to recruit large numbers of young Thai-Malays. The Thai-Malays are another source of friction between Malaysian and Thai officials. The Thais are fearful that Malaysia has designs on the Thai-Malay and Thai-Muslim population of the South. For this reason, the Thais do not wish Malaysians to operate on the Thai side of the border in any substantial number. In some cases, for example, the RBC has authorized Malaysian Field Intelligence Teams to operate in certain areas. Local Thai officials, however, have refused to have anything to do with the Malaysians.

(b) Despite the difficulties identified above, the Thais and Malaysians have generally improved relations since the exposure of the BPP collaboration in 1967. In mid-1967, Operation Sawasdee was launched in Yala Province, involving police from both countries on both sides of the border. The limited success was encouraging and has led to similar operations in 1968. A highly successful CTO ambush of a Malaysian convoy led to an early calling of the GBC in June 1968. During that meeting, the Thais refused the most significant request of the Malaysians -- permission to move Malaysian army units across the border, without prearrangement, in pursuit of CTO units. Some advances were implemented, however. The Malaysian Police Field Force unit operating in Thailand was increased 100 per cent to 400 men. The Malaysian army was granted permission to cross the Thai border in special situations (i.e., ones in which the Thai army and police forces are unable to handle) but the National Security Command (NSCC) must approve the move beforehand. The two nations agreed to a liaison officer exchange, to coordinate the flow of men and supplies, and to facilitate clearance of Malaysian helicopters landing in Thailand to drop off men and supplies. One Malaysian officer was stationed in Betong and one Thai in Droh. Continued improvement in relations can be expected as additional GBC meetings are held. No revolutionary changes are likely to occur unless the CTO drastically change their orientation, or there is an increased awareness among Thai officials of the potential threat to Thai security presently being posed by the CTO organizational activity. In August 1968 the NSCC informed the Malaysians that they would have to move two police companies back across the

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border since the GBC agreements allowed only two such units on Thai soil. Four were engaged in operations.

(c) During the 1969 racial riots in Malaysia, Thai officials offered to help prevent CTO units from crossing into Malaysia. Fifteen of 25 Border Patrol Police platoons were ordered to patrol the Thai/Malaysian border for this purpose. Despite high intentions, the RBC (and particularly the Thai contingent), put virtually no pressure on the CTO.

(d) Since the Régional Border Committee (RBC) intelligence apparatus was established in June 1965, the quality and quantity of reports have improved considerably. Between June 1965 and July 1967, 456 intelligence reports were processed on the 8th CTO Regiment, 257 on the 10th CTO Regiment, and 976 on the 12th CTO Regiment. Between 20 February 1967 and 21 July 1967, 511 such reports were processed. The RBC Intelligence Division has published approximately 130 weekly intelligence summaries to date; these have been quite useful by operational units. In addition, the Intelligence Division produces monthly summaries, which are a compilation of the weekly summaries. The first RBC Intelligence Quarterly, published in June 1967, offered a well-documented analysis of the CTO threat in the border regions. Subsequent publications mirror the improved status of the Intelligence Division. Despite these visible improvements, the intelligence structure of the RBC is hampered by a lack of qualified personnel to collect, collate, and analyze material. Many intelligence agencies retain material that the Intelligence Division should receive; the division operates on the assumption that it receives only about 75 per cent of the available information on the CTO. Most of these inadequacies are Thai, not Malaysian. While part of the problem may rest with the low Royal Thai Government priority given the RBC, inadequate Thai intelligence procedures and training play a part. Most of the intelligence production of the RBC is prepared by the Malaysian contingent of the Intelligence Division, and then published over the signature of the RTG representative. Malaysian Special Branch and Thai National Police Special Branch activities in the Intelligence Division of the RBC illustrate the superiority of the former over the latter.

7. COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (CSOD)

a. General: While CSOD is manned primarily by military officers, it represents an attempt to coordinate the military, police, and civil agencies in a national effort supervised by the highest level of the Royal Thai Government. For this reason, it is carried under the National Executive portion of this document. CSOD has undergone two major reorganizations since its inception. The first occurred in October 1967 and involved a significant loss of authority to the Royal Thai Army. The second occurred in May 1969 and, among other things, involved a change of name. CSOD's former nomenclature was the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC

b. Mission: The Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) is responsible for coordinating and approving all Royal Thai Government (RTG) countersubversion and counterinsurgency operations. Before its initial reorganization in October 1967, CSOD was responsible for conducting

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counterinsurgency operations with forces available to it from other RTG agencies. The Royal Thai Army (RTA) has assumed this mission. The National Security Council (NSC) has assumed responsibility for establishing policy and principles of operation. While the RTG ostensibly has maintained CSOD's significant role in counterinsurgency, CSOD approval for army actions emanates from the CSOD Chief of Staff who is simultaneously the RTA Chief of Staff. The CSOD general mission is to implement the defense and communist suppression policy by coordinating and supervising the use of all national resources to maximum effectiveness, according to designated policy.

c. Functions

(1) CSOD assists the NSC in national-level counterinsurgency policy and planning, but does not now control troops, directly or indirectly, without passing through RTA channels of command and control.

(2) CSOD is responsible for coordination and operation of national intelligence plans relating to communist insurgents in peace and wartime, including counterintelligence. CSOD handles planning and operations, and supervises operations of the Civil-Police-Military (CPM) and the Joint Security Centers (JSC) intelligence functions. (See Annexes 1 and 2 for discussions of the JSC and CPM respectively.)

(3) CSOD coordinates national public relations plans, psychological warfare plans, and public security plans relating to counterinsurgency.

(4) CSOD coordinates the political struggle involving economic and social plans designed to win public support for the government. These include community development plans and assistance to the population by military agencies.

(5) CSOD analyzes operational, research, and inspection reports prepared on and by field units and presents these to the CSOD commander for action, if any.

(6) CSOD coordinates all educational and communications plans in counterinsurgency for all levels of civil, police, and military organizations and personnel.

(7) CSOD recommends the enrollment, promotion, dismissal, and transfer of all officials engaged in communist suppression operations.

(8) CSOD is responsible for budgeting the national counterintelligence program and making allocations to units according to priority. CSOD does have special budgetary resources and funding procedures that other ministries and the RTA do not have.

(9) CSOC's reorganization had a significant impact on functions, despite RTA and NSC disclaimers to the contrary. As CSOC lost direct control over operations, there was some question as to its future role in counterinsurgency planning. Decisions that formerly were made by the Operations and

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Coordination Section, within the Direction and Coordination Center (DCC), reverted to the Chief of Staff, CSOC. Beginning in November 1967, there was considerable confusion as to the exact functions that CSOC would perform in the future. CSOC hesitated to plan operations for fear the army would reject them, with a subsequent loss of face for CSOC officials. In January 1968, CSOC formulated a plan for the establishment of hill-tribe security companies after the Border Patrol Police and the army submitted different individual plans. Gaining initiative from this initial test of its remaining power, CSOC submitted another plan. Called Concept No. 111, it was designed to organize counterinfiltration teams along the Thai-Laos border. Although the area under consideration was under martial law with Royal Thai Army responsibility, police and civil authorities were given significant roles in counterinfiltration operations. In May CSOC was writing plans for village protection in areas where the RTA had no operational elements. It was then assigning the task of fulfilling these plans to the police and local civil authorities. By late summer 1968, CSOC was preparing plans and operations for use by police units in areas that the army felt they were unable to handle. Division of responsibility was determined by army interests.

(10) The 1969 reorganization of CSOC (which involved the name change to the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate) had less an impact on functions than the 1968 changes. CSOC was a creation of the Thai Cabinet formed under martial law and Article 17 of the old Constitution. The new Constitution was put into effect in 1968. A new anti-communist law was passed in February 1969. CSOD's formation was designed to legitimize the old suppression function of CSOC and correct certain weaknesses in the old organization. CSOD's formation, for example, tended to formalize the Royal Thai Army's role as coordinator of RTG efforts in countering communist subversion in Thailand. Designation of RTA regional commanders as heads of the CSOD regions gives them all the authority they need to coordinate civil, police, and military activities. The commanders are now able to recommend promotion, censure, or transfer of recalcitrant officials of any service or department operating in their region. The new structure also broadened the RTA's responsibility to virtually the entire country (with the exception of the Malaysian border area). CSOD Regions 4 and 5 are both headed by the Commander of the RTA Fifth Military Circle, who is now responsible for implementing national suppression policies instead of coordinating them. This control, as is true with all RTA regional commanders, is not automatic. It goes into effect when suppression operations require resources greater than those available to civilian and police organizations. Province governors, however, are required to submit provincial suppression plans to the CSOD regions for approval.

d. Organization: (See Figure 7 on page 31)

(1) The Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) is commanded by General Praphas, who is concurrently Deputy Premier, Minister of the Interior, and Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA). Praphas' wide range of responsibilities does not permit considerable time for direction of CSOD operations. Most decisions are made by the Chief of

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
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Figure 7

COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (CSOD)

ORGANIZATION CHART

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— Chain of Command

- - - - Chain of Coordination

Source: CIAD Analysis

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Staff, General Surakit Malayarp, who is concurrently Chief of Staff of the RTA. The RTA commanders simultaneously serve as the CSOD regional commanders, and the Commander of the Fifth Military Circle directs CSOD Regions 4 and 5. The CSOD Regional Commander has the authority to exercise command and control over subordinate units when suppression operations require resources greater than individual civilian and police organizations can provide. The CSOD Regional Commander is also expected to approve all communist suppression plans submitted to him by the province governors, who have been designated directors of communist suppression in their provinces. There are 35 such provinces.

(2) The primary staff element of CSOD headquarters is the Direction and Coordination Center (DCC). (See Figure 8 on page 33) This element is headed by LTG Saiyud Kerdphol who, with his key assistants, represents the modernist element in the Royal Thai Army. Before the RTA takeover in October 1967, this section made most of the RTG counterinsurgency decisions. Plans would be formulated within the DCC and passed forward to General Saiyud for approval. Since then, however, the DCC has filled an advisory and staff role, with most decisions being made by the RTA. The DCC contains the following sections:

- (a) Adjutant Section
- (b) Logistics Section
- (c) Personnel Section
- (d) Psychological Operations Section
- (e) Civilian Section

(f) Operations Section, which now plans operations instead of coordinating them.

(g) Intelligence Section, which publishes a daily intelligence summary from reports received from subordinate elements and collated by CSOD analysts. Most reporting is as cursory as that provided by the collection agency, with little independent analysis or investigation/follow-up activity. Intelligence support is restricted substantially by budgetary considerations. In 1967, for example, CSOD funds for intelligence comprised less than 1.5 per cent of the CSOD budget. In 1968 the DCC Intelligence Section was preparing plans for intelligence operations along the Thai border regions. These plans involved efforts to recruit and train intelligence collection and action teams from both border villages and in the hill-tribe communities of the North. The section would provide planning, training, and support to police units who would have primary operational functions. The DCC also envisioned agent penetration of Laos and Communist China, as well as Special Operations Units which would report on enemy infiltration of Thailand from bases across Thai borders. Since the DCC Intelligence Section has no operational intelligence resources under its operational control, these concepts are little more than an exercise in paper planning. The section has been able

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
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Figure 8

DIRECTION AND COORDINATION CENTER (DCC)

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Source: DOD IRR's

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to publish several reports evaluating the CSOD contributions to countersubversion. In 1967 the Intelligence Section coordinated a joint civil-police intelligence survey of a district in Nakhon Phanom Province. The survey provided valuable information on the subversive infrastructure in that area.

(3) The Civil Affairs Division is responsible for directing activities of ministries, departments, and bureaus concerned with administration, development, public relations, education, public security, and welfare in threatened areas. In cooperation with the police, it is responsible for arrests, detention, investigation, and re-introduction of communist suspects and prisoners.

(4) The Services and Support Division provides technical, logistical, and financial assistance to elements directly engaged in CSOD-directed operations.

(5) The Interrogation Division operates the CSOD Interrogation Center, which performs most high-level countersubversion related interrogations in the country. Interrogation reports are disseminated to all civil, police, and military units engaged in countersubversion.

(6) The Intelligence Division was dissolved in November 1967 following the Royal Thai Army takeover the previous month. Most of its personnel were transferred to the RTA Army Operations Center G2, which now performs the former functions of the Intelligence Division.

e. Capabilities

(1) The inability of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) to adequately perform its mission in 1967 is illustrated by the high-level decision to give operational control of countersubversion to the Royal Thai Army (RTA). As originally conceived, CSOC was intended to coordinate civil government, police, and military operations directed against the subversives. As 1965 progressed, it became increasingly clear to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) that earlier stopgap measures, emphasizing development and information collection, were not sufficient to eliminate the expanding subversive threat. In that year, the RTG attempted to determine whether a combined civil, police, and military approach would work or whether a conventional military approach would provide a better solution. CSOC was formed from selection of the former choice. Despite its efforts to establish the civil administration as the primary instrument of countersubversion (with military and police elements providing the manpower and materiel as required) CSOC never really functioned as an integrated command. Military and police commanders resented taking orders from provincial governors, and their support for CSOC-inspired operations was less than wholehearted. CSOC was also unable to mitigate serious bureaucratic struggles between the several RTG ministries engaged in countersubversion in one form or another. If coordination between these ministries is weak in Bangkok, it is appalling in the provinces where CSOC operated. Each ministry is unwilling to support programs which might subsequently mean less responsibility for themselves, and

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CSOC fit this description to all but the Department of Local Administration (DOLA). CSOC's 0910 operation in northeast Thailand was its greatest success, but the operation also was partly responsible for the subsequent RTA takeover. The 0910 concept called for use of local security personnel and police forces in the villages to identify subversives and eliminate the subversive support structure on which the insurgent units depended for food, personnel, supplies, finances, and intelligence. Considerable activity by subversives in 1967 caused alarm in Bangkok. The 0910 operations revealed new areas infected by the insurgency; this was due partly to improved reporting procedures and movements by insurgent groups attempting to escape 0910 target areas. CSOC did not have the forces available to eliminate enemy units moving out of these areas. This situation permitted some RTA officials (who were critical of the CSOC concept in the first place and who had legitimate complaints about inadequate CSOC support to RTA units under CSOC control) to question the integrated command structure. Personality clashes and organizational rivalries played a significant role in the decision to grant authority to the RTA; RTA arguments, however, boiled down to the statement: "You (CSOC) had your turn. You could not stop the insurgents. Now let the army have a chance." In October 1967 General Praphas gave authority to the RTA, and CSOC began operating as a planning and staff unit. Although CSOC has offered many operational concepts, most are not approved if the RTA does not support them. CSOC ideas, and these are its greatest capability, are in limbo.

(2) The reorganized structure of CSOC, now CSOD, performed sporadically. Since October 1967, suppression operations have been carried out more energetically; army troops are better equipped and operate in larger units. More direct pressure is put on the subversives. The result is increased enemy kill ratios and desertion rates, at least in the Northeast. The RTA's Second Army, which operates in the Northeast, has shown itself sensitive to the concerns of the non-military aspects of countersubversion. It has exercised restraint in applying the army's overall direction to civilian programs and has generally maintained the CSOC concept as mirrored in the 0910 operation. This was not true in the North until recently. The RTA Third Army showed relatively little concern for civilian programs and plans coordination. Instead, the Third Army approached the problem as a conventional military exercise. Its target was the Meo tribesmen operating out of Laotian bases and in local villages in very high terrain. RTA civic action and psychological operations among the Meo were minimal, and resettlement by force disrupted the tribal societies. Major changes in RTA strategy (see page 75) using CSOD concepts have yet to bear real fruition. The Thais have operated on the assumption that the subversion could never extend into lowland Thai villages in the North; consequently, the RTA has not yet developed the joint Royal Thai Government (RTG) structure in the North that CSOC used in the Northeast. In areas of the country where subversion is relatively light, the military takeover succeeded in encouraging suppression activity at the expense of police-military cooperation.

(3) RTG counterinsurgency in the Northeast is now operating satisfactorily, but it is not clear whether this is due to an improved system or to time

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needed for the 0910 operation to make its impact. Some problems of coordination, jealousy, and incompetence remain, but this is mostly a problem in CSOD's component parts. Problems in the North, however, reached a point in 1969 where the RTG decided to institute CSOD's concepts of pacification, rural development, village security, and local decision-making. Much of the thinking emanating from CSOD originates from its headquarters and LTG Saiyud. Saiyud and his aides are members of the modernist clique of the RTA, while the present RTA leaders are representatives of the traditionalist element. If the RTG decides to reinstitute CSOD's plans, the modernist clique may be placed into RTA leadership positions or the RTG may return CSOD's operational authority. Choice between these alternatives will be determined by internal political considerations.

(4) CSOD's intelligence structure suffers from many of the difficulties of the parent organization. It has no operational element of its own, and has no direct authority over other services. The DCC Intelligence Section is capable of preparing intelligence assessments of countersubversive operations and compiling order-of-battle studies, but is not proficient with handling estimates of subversive capability. CSOC greatly improved intelligence coordination between the several services, but still has serious personnel, training, and financial limitations. The army takeover seriously damaged CSOD intelligence when the Army Operations Center G2 took over the functions of the Intelligence Division. Civilian and military rivalries, reduced by the establishment of CSOD, have since resumed to the detriment of intelligence coordination. G2 depends on the Special Operation Center and army field units for information and apparently is unwilling to use information collected by the Civil-Police-Military elements (CPM's) and the Joint Security Center (JSC). Mutual distrust is again taking its toll of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) intelligence capability.

(5) The Communist Suppression Operations Directorate's Interrogation Center has improved its capability considerably since its formation. Trained interrogators, improved facilities, and experience in dealing with dissemination, coordination, and collation problems have roles in the increased capability. The center also is increasingly able to use the mass of data collected through interrogations. New prisoners now have their names and backgrounds checked against master lists. In the past, cursory name checks and improper questioning resulted in the release of key insurgent personalities because they were not identified properly. A recent Interrogation Center project was to identify personnel working on Thai bases and installations who had attended the North Vietnamese Communist Party training school in Hoa Binh, North Vietnam. CSOD compiled 75,140 photographs of personnel working on these bases and presented them to captured insurgent personnel. Of these, 49 persons were tentatively identified as having been seen at the Hoa Binh school. Investigation of these individuals are handed over to the police. Despite these improvements in interrogation and collation, the quality of intelligence on the insurgent structure is grossly insufficient for the requirements of Thai counter-insurgency and countersubversion.

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B. (S/NFD) ARMED FORCES

1. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) (See Figure 9 on page 38)

a. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is directly responsible for the maintenance and deployment of sufficient armed forces to provide for the defense of the nation. A 23-man Defense Council advises the Ministry. Headed by the Minister of Defense, it includes the Supreme Commander and his three deputies; the Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters and his three deputies; the Commander in Chief; deputy commanders in chief; chiefs of staff from the three services, and three other generals, usually retired from active duty, who have distinguished themselves in national service. The Defense Council is a good example of the Thai propensity for a modern administrative structure, but with changes inimically Thai which change the character significantly. Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas, for example, hold six of the 23 eligible positions on the Defense Council. The Council advises the Minister on general military policies, budgetary matters, mobilization, conscription, and related matters.

b. The Ministry of National Defense is organized into the Office of the Under Secretary and the Supreme Command Headquarters.

(1) The Office of the Under Secretary is comprised of all the administrative and industrial departments of the ministry:

(a) The Secretariat Department is responsible for correspondence, personnel matters, and recruitment.

(b) The Judge Advocate General's Department performs legal services and supervises the military courts.

(c) The Finance Department handles budgetary matters, pay and accounting procedures, and military real-estate management.

(d) The Defense Energy Department is responsible for establishing policies, plans, and programs for the procurement and distribution of petroleum products for the armed forces. It also supervises the activities of government plants that produce, refine, and sell these products.

(e) The Armed Forces Industrial Department consults other ministries on matters pertaining to military supply requirements. It also supervises certain industrial plants that produce items the military needs, such as clothing, leather goods, storage batteries, glassware, foods, and pharmaceutical products.

(f) The Office of the Aides-de-Camp to the King advises His Majesty on his functions as Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF).


(2) The Supreme Command Headquarters, the highest component in the military command structure, has administrative and general staff functions

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Figure 9

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND)



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Source: US Army Area Handbook for Thailand

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for exercising control over the three military services. Four components report directly to the Supreme Commander, RTARF, while the remainder operate under a deputy supreme commander, an assistant supreme commander, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters, and three deputy chiefs of staff. (See Figures 10 and 11 on pages 40 and 41)

(a) The Office of the Secretary to the Supreme Commander performs public relations functions and handles other matters as directed.

(b) The Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) is responsible for all counterintelligence functions within the RTARF. (See page 42)

(c) The Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) is the external intelligence collection agency for the RTARF. (See page 58)

(d) The National Security Command (NSCC) handles Royal Thai Government counterinsurgency functions not performed by the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD). NSCC directs Mobile Development Unit operations, supervises the joint border committees, and conducts some psychological warfare projects.

(e) The Adjutant General Department, Directorate of Joint Personnel (J1), Directorate of Joint Intelligence (J2), Directorate of Joint Operations (J3), and Directorate of Joint Logistics (J4), each within its respective field, are concerned with coordinating the comparable activities of the three military services. (The J2 is discussed in paragraph B,4.)

(f) The Directorate of Joint Communications is responsible for developing and maintaining an effective military communications network, coordinating military and civilian communications and cooperating with foreign military forces as required.

(g) The Directorate of Education and Research develops and supervises the implementation of military education programs. It performs some research involving military security, military history, and directs the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School.

(h) The National Defense College.

(i) The Armed Forces Staff College.

(j) The Armed Forces Survey Department is responsible for military mapping and ground survey operations.

(k) The Budget Office is charged with formulation of the overall military budget and coordination of the service budgets.


(l) The Office of Southeast Asian Treaty Organization Medical Research Projects coordinates these projects with RTARF agencies.

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Figure 10

ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES




Source: US Army Area Handbook
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Figure 11

ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION



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— = Chain of Command

- - - = Coordination

Source: Various DOD/IRRs

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c. Although the Ministry of Defense is administratively responsible for supervision of the component services, it exercises little direct authority over them. This is the result of the absence of an organization equivalent of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Thai practice of using senior officers concurrently in a number of politico-military positions. The Supreme Command Headquarters is not likely to issue orders to the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army (RTA) because of his concurrent position as Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Supreme Commander, and Minister of the Interior. Other key officials may hold similar positions, or have familial relationships with the royal family or the Prime Minister. Most decisions, therefore, are made by the commanders of the services and the Prime Minister, following long and tedious conferences.

2. ARMED FORCES SECURITY CENTER (AFSC)

a. Mission

(1) The Royal Thai Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) originally was formed by royal decree in 1955 as a part of the Armed Forces Intelligence School (AFIS). Until 1959 its mission was restricted to the training of selected personnel from the Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. In 1959 the AFSC was placed on the same level as the J2 Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Its mission expanded to include communications intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

(2) In 1961 a Ministry of Defense regulation defined the general mission of the AFSC as follows:

"The Armed Forces Security Center is responsible for the overall counterintelligence operations and security measures of those elements under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Command Headquarters. It advises and inspects the various official units of the Supreme Command Headquarters in matters relative to security, performs electronics and communications security, and acts as the training center for all intelligence and counterintelligence subjects."

(3) In May 1966 the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) was given the additional mission of providing protection for the royal family, the Prime Minister, and visiting foreign dignitaries.

b. Functions: In accordance with its stated mission, the AFSC has assumed the following functions and responsibilities:

(1) Acts in the name of the Supreme Commander as a central coordinating point for the CI activities within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF).

(2) Functions as a CI planning and policy staff for the Supreme Command Headquarters (SCH) (as well as for the three military services) to insure counterintelligence and security standards of operation, uniformity, and prevention of duplication of effort.

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(3) Assumes responsibility for all academic training in intelligence and counterintelligence within the RTARF.

(4) Assists the unit training programs in intelligence within the military services.

(5) Performs the function of a central records facility for military CI files.

(6) Assumes sole responsibility for military electronics intelligence and counterintelligence within Thailand.

(7) Performs CI operations for the SCH and others, as may be directed by higher authority or on request by any of the armed services.

(8) Assumes responsibility for the development of CI concepts and doctrines.

(9) Assumes responsibility for security inspections and advice to all RTARF organizations.

(10) Furnishes protection to the royal family, the Prime Minister, and visiting foreign dignitaries.

(11) Furnishes field teams with counterinsurgency training to Royal Thai Army (RTA) military units.

(12) In June 1966 General Praphas asked the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) to investigate a group of military officers opposed to the present regime. Although the results of the investigation are not known, it is likely that this is only one of many instances in which the AFSC serves as an investigative instrument targeted against the political opposition of the Thanom government, and identifies the coup threat posed by military units and personalities.

(13) General Praphas also used the AFSC on matters where overlapping interest between police agencies and the armed forces occurred. In August 1966 Praphas ordered LTG Chairatana, Commanding General of the AFSC, to conduct a study and provide recommendations pertaining to the method that should be employed in handling personnel detained by the police in the Northeast. The study was completed in mid-September. Recommendations were sent to the Ministry of Interior for study. As expected, AFSC urged an increased military involvement in interrogation of communist suspects.

(14) The AFSC conducts some covert penetration operations against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) insurgent infrastructures, but the military has limited jurisdiction in its conduct of such operations. In May 1966, however, AFSC personnel informed visitors from the US Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, that some such operations did exist. An increase in these operations

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depends on a careful delineation of jurisdiction with the Thai National Police Special Branch. In July 1969, AFSC officers were training five Meo for use in unilateral operations against communist tribal groups in the North.

(15) Counterintelligence Division-directed (see paragraph c, (2) (b), below) operations by the Khmer Serei (KS) have had limited success. While supported by the AFSC, the KS was capable of marginal harassment and low-level intelligence operations; no real guerrilla warfare against the Cambodians had been developed. While there were a few military successes, other KS operations resulted in serious attacks against Thai villages in retaliatory raids. The AFSC rarely, if ever, coordinated operations with the Thai National Police or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. KS units, furthermore, experienced shortages in weapons, supplies, and money, which have affected their operational capability. Reports that AFSC personnel misappropriated funds meant for the KS are unsubstantiated; reports of AFSC profiteering from KS smuggling operations, however, are more common. Most KS problems, however, were due less to poor AFSC operational support than to government policy decisions to drop full support of the KS and (in 1968) reduce Thai support. By early 1969, the KS forces were down 600-700 men from 1,300 the year before. In February 1969 the Royal Thai Government (RTG) asked the Republic of Vietnam to repatriate its remaining 109 Special Forces troops serving with the KS in Thailand. The RTG explained that Thailand was withdrawing support to the KS. This report was confirmed by a KS leader and an AFSC official. In May 1969 about 300 KS troops defected to Cambodia. Four AFSC officers were arrested while engaged in smuggling timber across the Cambodian border, allegedly shared by AFSC Commanding General Chairatana. Thailand has evidently closed down the bilateral operation with the Republic of Vietnam and stopped Thai-supported KS operations.

c. Organization: (See Figure 12 on page 45)

(1) The Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) is an element of the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Prime Minister Thanom is designated Commander of the AFSC. Minister of the Interior Praphat is Deputy Commander. A Second Deputy Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) serves as Assistant Commander of the AFSC. The AFSC is advised by the AFSC Advisory Board which consists of many of the higher ranking intelligence officers of the three services and the Royal Thai Government (RTG). LTG Chairatana is Commanding General of the Advisory Group. It is known that the AFSC also receives some directives from the J2, Supreme Command. As of March 1968, AFSC strength was estimated as approximately 850.


(2) The AFSC consists of the following divisions:

(a) The Administration Division handles personnel matters and other administrative functions, including control of AFSC funds.

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ARMED FORCES SECURITY CENTER



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(b) Data on the Counterintelligence (CI) Division's current strength is not available. Estimates, based on limited access, place the figure at 265 personnel. This estimate is probably low since operational units, referred to as Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) teams, account for 236 persons. This leaves 29 positions for three subdivisions, the Filing Section, 19 special teams, and the division chief. (See Figure 13 on page 47)

1. The Informant Processing Subdivision of the Counterintelligence Division serves as the source control element of the division, but its coordination with other RTG intelligence agencies is minimal. This subdivision may receive interrogation reports from the Thai National Police Department (TNPD) sources. AFSC agent coding is accomplished by a series of letters and numbers; the former designates the area in which the agent was recruited and the latter identifies the agent's number and the year he was recruited. Numbers representing the year are based on the Thai calendar year.

2. The Administration Subdivision handles personnel matters and other administrative functions for members of the division, including control of confidential funds.

3. Data on the organization and function of the Operational Control subdivision is not available. The unit probably provides some analytical and advisory support to the CIC operational teams. It is known that officials of the CI Division conduct liaison missions with the Thai National Police and the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate. Others provide briefings to officials of friendly intelligence services. Both may be responsibilities of the Operational Control Subdivision. This section also may be synonymous with the CI Division's Special Section which provides support and direction to the Khmer Serei.


4. The Filing Section maintains files on all known communists, suspected communists, military personnel, civilian personnel (probably officials of the Royal Thai Government), individuals attending an Armed Forces Security Center training course, and all persons on whom the AFSC has conducted a background investigation. The section also maintains a separate file on subversive incidents.

5. The CIC Group is administratively controlled by the CI Division, but, in many cases, reports directly to the AFSC commander and probably is operationally controlled by him. CIC Group field teams are designated "A", "B", "C", and "D" in descending order of importance and with a strength of 29, 21, 14, and eight men per team respectively. "A" Teams are at service command levels, "B" Teams at army level, "C" Teams at division level, and "D" teams at smaller military field units. No "D" teams presently exist, but they are slated for activation in the near future. Each team may be augmented with additional technical, operational, administrative, and signal teams of unknown strength when necessary. The CIC Group conducts both overt and covert CI operations involving Thai military personnel. This includes an equivalent to national agency checks and background

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION



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Source: CIAB Analysis

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investigations. Some CIC personnel are furnished to Civil-Police-Military units involved in "communist suppression" operations. Other teams provide counterintelligence training to the three military services. (See Figure 14 on page 49).

a. Team "A" units are deployed at Headquarters, Supreme Command; Headquarters, Royal Thai Army (RTA); Headquarters, Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF); Headquarters, Royal Thai Navy (RTN), and Headquarters, Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC).

b. Team "B" units are deployed at Headquarters, 1st Royal Thai Army, 2nd Royal Thai Army, and 3rd Royal Thai Army. They publish monthly intelligence summaries on information received and on government operations.

c. Team "C" units are deployed at Royal Thai Army Training Center, 5th Military Circle, 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 3rd Division.

d. Technical, Augmentation, and Support Teams are organized as follows:

<u>Team Designation</u>	<u>Number of Teams</u>
Signal (SA)	4
Lie Detector (TC)	4
DAME (TD)	4
Investigative Photography (TO)	0
Transportation Augmentation (AA)	2
2nd Echelon Maintenance (AB)	1
Signal Supply (OA)	2
Maintenance Supply (OC)	1
DASE (DA)	4
Undetermined (OB)	1

(c) The Research and Technical Division provides technical support to the CIC Group, the VIP Security Unit [see paragraph (d) below], and other divisions of the AFSC as required. This support includes Defense Against Methods of Entry (DAME), Defense Against Sound Equipment (DASE), Photography, and Polygraph. The research section of this division collates and analyzes intelligence information gathered by the CIC Group. Information used in production of AFSC studies also comes from overt news sources and reports from other agencies (particularly captured documents and interrogation reports). No strength figures are available for this division. If personnel attached to CIC technical, augmentation, and support teams are actually


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Figure 14

CIC GROUP



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carried in this division, apparent discrepancies in strength figures for the Counterintelligence Division as outlined in paragraph (2) above may be explained in part. The division consists of the following known elements: (See Figure 15 on page 51)

1. Technical Branch
2. Document Examination Branch
3. Research Branch
4. Photography Section
5. Laboratory (projected as of January 1967)

(d) The Security Division functions as the control office for all personnel security investigations conducted by the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC). Investigations conducted on members of the Royal Thai Navy, Royal Thai Air Force, and certain army personnel are performed by special agents organic to this division. All national agency checks are conducted by members of the Security Division. It is also responsible for the physical security of the AFSC and internal investigations relating to security. All security policy for the Royal Thai Armed Forces is formulated by the division. It directs the VIP Security Unit which provides security for the royal family and the Prime Minister. The unit has an estimated strength of 35, but is scheduled for an increment of 40 new members. Overall strength of the division is not known. (See Figure 16 on page 52)

(e) The Signal Division directs the First Signal Research Unit which conducts all communication intelligence and communications security operations within the military services. As with the CIC Group, operations are often controlled by the commander of the AFSC.

(f) The Armed Forces Security School is administratively controlled as one of the Armed Forces Security Center's six divisions. The school's present physical plant was completed on 24 June 1966, and received most of the construction funds through US Military Assistance Program (MAP) channels. The AFSC is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence training for the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). Instructors include personnel from all military services; the Department of Central Intelligence; the Thai National Police Department (TNPD); the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Defense; Chulalongkorn University, and Thammasat University. Students are predominantly from the military services. In 1967 some police elements and civilian ministry officials attended strategic intelligence courses. Between 250 and 300 students are graduated yearly. Some include officers to the Lao Armed Forces (FAR) and the Lao Neutralist Forces (FAN). The following courses are available:

1. Strategic Intelligence
2. Combat Intelligence

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
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Figure 15

TECHNICAL AND RESEARCH DIVISION (AFSC)




Source: CIAD Analysis

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VIP SECURITY DETACHMENT



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Source: DOD/IRR

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3. Order of Battle
4. Prisoner-of-War Interrogation
5. Security
6. Intelligence Analysis
7. Photo Interpretation
8. Investigative Photography
9. Defense Against Methods of Entry (DAME)
10. Defense Against Sound Equipment (DASE)
11. CIC Agents Course
12. Languages (English, Cambodian, Vietnamese, Malay, Burmese, and Chinese Mandarin)

d. Capabilities

(1) The Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) is considered one of the most proficient indigenous military counterintelligence units in Southeast Asia. It is the most capable military intelligence organization in Thailand and is capable of conducting most types of CI duties within the armed forces. Most AFSC personnel are motivated, well-trained, and professionally astute. Every attempt is made to prevent revelation of operational procedures and missions to any foreign intelligence service. The Prime Minister relies more heavily on AFSC reporting on internal matters than any other Thai intelligence agency.

(2) Rivalries between military and police officials, which exist throughout the Royal Thai Government (RTG) political and administrative structure, restrict necessary coordination between the AFSC and the National Police Special Branch. Although AFSC interrogation personnel are located in police interrogation centers in the Northeast and South, these rivalries will continue as long as there are no clear delineations between police and military responsibilities with respect to penetration operations against the insurgent infrastructure. As military responsibilities in counter-insurgency operations increase, the AFSC is expected to play an increasingly important role. Since any increase in AFSC responsibility will come at the expense of the Special Branch, the chances for improved coordination between the two are limited. General Praphas' position as Deputy Commander of the AFSC and Minister of the Interior will not greatly help to suppress these hostilities.

(3) The traditional military interests of the RTG have been limited to, first, detection of possible *coup* activity in the military establishment,

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and, second, intelligence and counterintelligence services to the Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Supreme Commander. The AFSC, as an agency of the Thai Supreme Command, has been preoccupied with the former. According to one field grade officer of the AFSC, the counter-coup portion of the AFSC's mission consumes 50 per cent of the center's effort. The other 50 per cent is divided among the three services and special operations.

(4) During the past several years, the AFSC has assumed a stronger role in providing counterintelligence support to the Royal Thai Army in the north-east, north, and west-central regions. In September 1967 the AFSC deployed a portion of their 1st Army Detachment to Kui Buri District, Prachuab Khiri Khan Province, in support of RTA counterinsurgency operations. During their first month of operation, this detachment was credited with identifying and apprehending 40 suspected insurgents. While this increased effort is in direct relation to the RTA's increasing responsibility in insurgency suppression, it is also an indication that the Ministry of Defense is prepared to allow the AFSC to target more of their resources in insurgent-infested areas of the country. The increased AFSC role in this area came at the expense of the Thai National Police and the Special Branch, following criticism of their counterinsurgency performance. Neither agency would provide any significant assistance to the AFSC detachment. This incident again illustrates the serious problems of coordination and communication between RTG intelligence and security services.

(5) The Administration Division is operating effectively. It recently completed staffing action requesting assignment of an additional 400 men to AFSC.

(6) The Research and Technical Division is considered as one of the most professional and capable divisions of the AFSC. The technical equipment is of high quality and is usually of the latest model. Technical proficiency is maintained by continuous training when not supporting operations. Technical elements have adequately supported the CIC Group during counterinsurgency operations, consisting of polygraph and photography teams to identify and interrogate suspected insurgents. The research section of the division is also considered effective. In the past, the Office of the Supreme Commander has levied requirements directly on the division. These are completed within suspense dates and in satisfactory detail. A recent study concerned an analysis of the communist movement in Thailand and the appeal of communism to the Thai people.

(7) Although the Security Division is considered as one of the better staffed AFSC elements (because of its multitude of missions) it frequently proves to be ineffective in all but its support to the royal family and the Prime Minister. The division adversely affects the efficiency of the conduct of background investigations by the AFSC. The Counterintelligence Division is responsible for personnel security investigations on RTA personnel. The Security Division is responsible for the air force, navy, and army personnel assigned to the Ministry of Defense or Supreme Command

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Headquarters. Severe problems of duplication of effort and confusion are often generated by staffing leads between the two divisions. The counter-intelligence portion of the Security Division's missions (excluding policy matters and decisions) should be transferred to the Counterintelligence Division. Internal politics, however, has effectively blocked any change. The Chief, Security Division, a special colonel, believes that loss of any part of his mission might reduce the grade of the chief of the restructured division, thus rendering him surplus. It is possible that the Commander, AFSC, will wait until the present chief comes up for reassignment or retirement before making the change.

(8) The VIP Security Detachment performs adequately. This unit received its initial training between April and May 1966, in an 11-week course taught by the Armed Forces Security School (AFSS) instructors. Students were well-qualified for the training and have performed well since that time. It is not known whether the additional 40 persons assigned to the unit have arrived. If the detachment now has 75 persons, however, it should have no personnel problems, unless their mission has been broadened to include other high Thai officials.

(9) The Signal Division originally was intended to perform its communications intelligence and security missions by sending mobile units to the field. The division, however, has continually insisted on operating from fixed stations, intercepting voice and Morse Code-type signals. Most operations are directed against Laos and Cambodia, with a limited effort against North Vietnam. Recently, the Signal Division directed operations against alleged Thai insurgent radio communications, but they have had no verified successes to date. The division's communications security monitoring and training operations are effective. The division's equipment is limited, but is adequate for present operations. The recently initiated direction finding effort is hampered by a lack of reliable communications equipment, but this problem is expected to diminish as additional equipment and training is made available. Despite these problems, the Signal Division is probably the most professional division at the Armed Forces Security Center. Personnel selected for training are above average in intelligence and are highly motivated. Although there is a shortage of personnel (290 assigned -- 423 authorized), an increased input is expected. During a recent visit, Air Marshal Dawee, Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters, was favorably impressed with AFSC's COMSEC and COMINT operations. He pledged his full support to the assignment of more personnel to the Signal Division.

(10) The Armed Forces Security School is one of the finest in Southeast Asia, despite the fact that it is not used properly by the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The combined military services are reluctant to nominate candidates for intelligence training due to a justifiable fear that once an individual is trained, he will be reassigned. This results in a personnel loss, rarely replaced, to the nominating unit. Nevertheless, the AFSS attempts to fully qualify its trainees, and most of the courses offered are taught by qualified instructors. In a recent Prisoner-of-War Interrogation course, the AFSS held a practical exercise in which students were taken to Kui Buri

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District and allowed to interrogate suspected insurgents arrested in sweep operations. This is the first known instance where the AFSS showed signs of exploiting the existing internal situation as a training vehicle. One internal problem that has yet to be resolved is each division's responsibility of training all newly assigned personnel, which effectively undermines the AFSS's position, despite the fact that AFSS instructors often assist in the courses.

(11) The AFSC is extremely sensitive about the activities of the Counterintelligence Division. Much of the processing within the CI Division is time-consuming and a duplication of effort. Compartmentation is ineffective because of the number of persons handling raw agent reports and because the identity of recruited sources are known by practically everyone working within the division. Source control methods are poor. All reports concerning certain geographic areas are forwarded to the desk chiefs, which include north, northeast, south, and central Thailand; Laos; Burma; Cambodia, and Vietnam. Desk chiefs are required to submit a monthly report on activities in which their desks are involved. These reports are usually quite elementary. The division has serious problems communicating with their subordinate element, the CIC Group. This is due to a courier communications system and because CIC personnel often fail to report much of what they do and receive. CI Division is presently establishing radio communications capability with their field stations.

(12) The CIC Group is comparatively well-trained, well-equipped, and is capable of performing most types of overt counterintelligence missions. The length of time required to complete a background investigation, however, is excessive. This is due to the method of performing these investigations. According to the CIC, all investigations should be covert due to a reluctance by those interviewed to give RTG officials any information. Another explanation may be the prevailing view among the three services that the CIC's primary mission is to spy on them. Because military power is the basis of Thai military control, this view may be justified. Most of the CIC's aggressive counterespionage and countersubversion operations are doomed to failure at the start. Bound to the belief that overt records checks and interviews will compromise an operation, cases are often initiated without the necessary background information, planning, or coordination. Other problems of the Counterintelligence Corps Group are a lack of adequate transportation, communications, malfunctioning of administrative practices in filing and recovery of reports, practically no suspense dates, and very inadequate manpower levels. Activation of "D" Teams at district and regimental levels will help alleviate this last problem, but they must be augmented by service counterintelligence units to which the CIC can provide training and guidance. As the Thai military becomes more involved with counterinsurgency, the need for additional CIC manpower will become acute. Another problem related to CIC operations is the lack of ample confidential funds for use in clandestine operations, at least at the working levels. Although the unit is reported to have sufficient funds, the bulk of it is spent at the headquarters on entertainment of foreign and in-country intelligence personnel. The Armed Forces Security Center recently completed a

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concept for the long-range penetration of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). The CIC would be responsible for carrying out the mission. This will present the CIC with a valuable test, for no other Thai agency is performing this mission with success.

(13) Despite the CIC Group's weaknesses, some of the detachments are performing well. The CIC Detachment to the First Army has been operating since October 1967. It has been directly responsible for the capture or surrender of more than 100 insurgents. Much of this success, however, was achieved at the expense of cooperation between the AFSC and the Special Branch, which left when the AFSC moved into the area. The Third Army CIC Detachment has recruited five Meo hill tribesmen as agents, and is presently training them in Bangkok for eight weeks prior to dispatch into the northern hills. This experimental program was expected to last until July 1969, at which time the AFSC was to terminate the project or expand it considerably. CIC teams also are operating out of the Fifth Military Circle in the South, but their operational capability is not known.

(14) The Counterintelligence Division's Filing Section maintains index cards on personalities and folders containing incident and source reports. Index cards are pre-printed. They reflect the background of the subject on the front and a brief summary of the investigation or report on the back side. A color code denotes the type of case. Each incident report is assigned a registration number, filed by area, and summarized in an area summary folder. Although the system is manageable and sufficient for existing AFSC requirements, certain deficiencies do exist and may be expected to cause additional problems as the volume of reports increases. Presently, the registration number of a report is not recorded on the personality index card and a physical search of the appropriate area registration book must be made to locate a specific report. Although the area registration book indicates the volume number in which the report is located, reports within each volume are seldom filed in sequence. Furthermore, there is no method to indicate if the subject of a report has been searched or indexed. Search of names in each report received is not automatic and takes place only when the case officer initiates the search. Security procedures in the filing system are inadequate. All reports from Armed Forces Security Center sources reflect the proper name of the source at the top of the index; these names remain on the report when it is filed. Some index reports have the word "informant" in English at the upper right corner. It is not known if these poor security procedures exist at CI Division's operational levels.

(15) The AFSC formerly supported espionage, sabotage, and subversive operations against the Royal Khmer Government of Prince Sihanouk through the Khmer Serei (KS). In 1963 the AFSC assumed responsibility for these operations from the Ministry of Defense. The RTG coordinated activities with the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) of the Vietnam, which jointly has supported the KS for several years. In November 1965, the AFSC established a special office under Colonel Sophon, Operations Officer, Counterintelligence Division, AFSC. This office was staffed by 17 Thai Army officers who were responsible for obtaining training, clothing, and supplies

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for KS units in the Dong Rek mountains of Thailand. Special Operations Center 23 served as a front for this operation. Funds for these operations are received by direct requisition from the Prime Minister through an AFSC officer. In October 1968 these funds amounted to US\$10,000, but were augmented by timber smuggling operations across the Cambodian border. KS training was conducted at the Special Warfare Center of the Royal Thai Army at Lopburi; officers at the center were informed that the KS were Laotian soldiers. KS arms and ammunition were supplied by the Republic of Vietnam government. A recent thaw in Thai-Cambodian relations brought about a substantial reduction in Thai support in KS units in March 1969. This was followed by major KS defections in May 1969. The AFSC Khmer Serei operation is presently inactive.

3. ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CENTER (AFIOC)

a. Mission

(1) The Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) originally was established in 1955 as the Armed Forces Intelligence Service (AFIS), a part of the Armed Forces Security School (AFSS). Its mission was to develop the intelligence capabilities of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). When the Armed Forces Security Center was formed in 1958, AFIOC remained a part of the AFSS and was charged with external intelligence collection.

(2) In April 1965 the AFIS was redesignated as the AFIOC. School functions became a responsibility of the AFSC. AFIOC's present responsibility is the clandestine collection of military intelligence information and other intelligence activities as directed by the Supreme Commander, RTARF.

b. Functions

(1) AFIOC collects military intelligence information in Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Yunnan Province, Communist China. A collection effort against North Vietnam began in 1967.

(2) The Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center conducts covert liaison with Royal Laotian Government intelligence and security services and provides assistance as needed.

(3) AFIOC directs the operations of covert liaison officers assigned to Laotian Armed Forces and Neutralist Forces units.

(4) AFIOC provides limited support to paramilitary operations in Sayaboury Province, Laos, and in the Shan States of Burma.

(5) AFIOC monitors foreign intelligence and paramilitary operations in northern Thailand and adjacent areas.

(6) AFIOC is believed to collect information on US military assistance to Laos.

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(7) AFIOC is reported to have dispatched a case officer to Songkhla Province to conduct joint intelligence collection operations with Malaysia under the aegis of the Combined Intelligence Headquarters (CIH). These operations will be targeted against the Communist Terrorist Organization along the Malaysian border.

c. Organization: (See Figure 17 on page 60)

(1) AFIOC is a centralized collection agency for the Royal Thai Armed Forces, under the direct control and command of the Supreme Command Headquarters. AFIOC receives command intelligence requirements from the J2 and the Directorates of Intelligence of the three services. In addition, the AFIOC director has the authority to generate Essential Elements of Information (EEI) requirements based on intelligence information gaps which become apparent to him and his staff through daily operations. Although AFIOC is considered a joint service effort, the majority of personnel, particularly those in key positions, are members of the Royal Thai Army (RTA).

(2) The Director, AFIOC (LTG Wallop Rojanawisut), is assisted by a deputy director, and an assistant director. There are six divisions, each headed by a special colonel. In April 1967, AFIOC was manned by 219 persons, 101 officers and 118 enlisted men. AFIOC is authorized 313 personnel.

(3) The Administration Division is responsible for administration and internal security of the AFIOC area. It maintains data on assigned and attached personnel, processes personnel actions, and manages overt funds provided by the Ministry of Defense.


(4) The Operations Division is responsible for all intelligence operations and related activities conducted by AFIOC. It directs the activities of all personnel located in Bangkok and directs and maintains operational teams in the field. It also directs the operations of covert liaison officers stationed with Laotian armed forces in Laos.

(5) The Plans and Policies Division coordinates all activities and operations within the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center to insure optimum utilization of funds, personnel, and equipment. It conducts management surveys, short and long-range planning, preparation of progress reports, and reviews current and proposed operations. This office conducts all non-intelligence training.

(6) The Research and Report Writing Division prepares intelligence information reports for dissemination to the Supreme Command. It maintains operational files, keeps order-of-battle (OB) files, and analyzes incoming AFIOC intelligence information.

(7) The Support Division functions as an internal unit supply/maintenance element. It is responsible for vehicle maintenance, buildings and grounds, repairs and utilities, and related logistical functions. The division also supervises the language laboratory, education classrooms,

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printing shop, and carpentry shop. The Support Division does not provide any assistance to the AFIOC collection elements in the field; this is performed by the Operations and Communications Divisions.

(8) The Communications Division operates the AFIOC radio net nation-wide and provides communications support to all AFIOC intelligence operations. A secondary function is the training of all AFIOC personnel and collection agent personnel in radio operation. The division also operates the photographic laboratory, controls the AFIOC cryptographic system, and provides photographic support for operations.

d. Capabilities

(1) The Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center currently wields little influence on the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, and the National Security Council (NSC). Because the Project 333 (under the Office of the Prime Minister) operates in Laos, and the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) has assets in Cambodia, AFIOC operations are more or less limited to North Vietnam, Burma, and Yunnan Province of Communist China. Reporting has been of such low level that little of it is given consideration in policy matters.

(2) AFIOC has a very limited capability for conducting clandestine military intelligence collection operations against targets in Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and Communist China. This is clearly illustrated by the center's apparent failure to launch any deep penetrations of the targets. Furthermore, much of AFIOC's information comes from their liaison functions with other Royal Thai Government (RTG) official agencies. One reason for these deficiencies is that Thailand's traditional interests have been the suppression of illegal activities within their own country and the maintenance of border security. Neither of these interests calls for penetration operations deep in foreign territory. The Supreme Command, therefore, uses AFIOC only as one element of border security. (Since 1965, the AFIOC has shown greater interest in deeper penetrations. It is believed, however, that this interest is less a result of increased concern by the Supreme Command than the professional intelligence rationale of AFIOC officers that a threat exists from these areas and should be targeted.) As long as the primary intelligence concern of the RTG remains with the internal security situation, AFIOC's operations will remain low-level and a low priority.

(3) Manning strengths for most of the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center are adequate. The single exception is in the working levels in the field. The main area of deficiency involves case officers in the northern posts. Additional increments are required to permit each handler to work with an optimum number of sources, but at the same time allow increased training and better planning for each operation. Another difficulty is that as officers increase in rank, AFIOC moves them to headquarters slots. This precludes continuity derived from specific operational familiarity and area knowledge. In addition, operational tours last for only one year. By the time case officers become familiar with their operations, they are reassigned. AFIOC needs enlisted or warrant officer case

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officers who can be expected to remain at a specific post for three to five years. If not, tours of officers should be extended and kept on field assignments for a specified time, even following promotions.

(4) Training for most of the senior officers is adequate. Most have attended at least one course in a US intelligence school. Training of personnel at the operational level, other than the few sent to the United States Army, Pacific, Intelligence School, is limited to basic principles and procedures absorbed while working at Headquarters, AFIOC, or gained through experience subsequent to assignment in the field. In neither case is the training adequate to permit development and conduct of relatively sophisticated operations.

(5) The Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center's yearly budget is \$340,000. No serious shortage of funds necessary to the operational effort has been noted. The quantity and status of equipment is not known. Most of it is obtained through the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) channels, including standard military communications and photographic equipment. Other types of equipment are obtained through Thai channels. MAP does not provide the specialized intelligence equipment AFIOC requires for the conduct of intelligence operations. This equipment encompasses a wide variety of materials, is distinctive in its requirement for the application to a specific operational function, and must be obtained in accordance with operational requirements and security considerations. Data on the amount of equipment required and the amount presently available are not available.

(6) During LTG Wallop's tenure AFIOC has been reluctant to maintain direct liaison with other services and agencies. Liaison is based on personal relationships rather than formal agreements. When contact with other services is required, a requirement is forwarded through channels for processing through the Supreme Command to the particular agency. The reply is returned in the same manner. This procedure is cumbersome and generally ineffective. AFIOC relationships with the Armed Forces Security Center are characterized by mutual distrust and jealousy on both sides; no liaison is conducted with the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate. Exchange of information between the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center and these agencies would be of mutual benefit due to the intelligence collection lead potential it would provide. Since the missions of these agencies do not overlap; there is no practical reason why coordination and liaison does not occur. An exception to the general rule concerns relations with a fellow clandestine collection agency, the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI). This is due primarily to close personal relationships and the assignment of senior officers of one agency to the other. AFIOC requests for assistance from the police are presented directly to the DCI for action. Until directives for coordination are formulated by the highest Thai military levels, it is unlikely that anything will be done to improve liaison channels.

(7) The physical and personnel security at AFIOC headquarters in Bangkok is effective. Security at AFIOC field stations, however, is extremely lax

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and requires immediate strengthening. Field stations usually are located in residential areas. Invariably they are fixed in their locations, enabling local residents to become aware of any activities taking place. Unauthorized persons are permitted on the premises. Since most AFIOC case officers can expect to remain with AFIOC throughout their military tour, the identification process which this poor security allows is a particularly serious problem.

(8) AFIOC's response to EEI requirements has improved since the establishment of an EEI coding system. Designed exclusively to control AFIOC's acquisition and reporting of information, it is not applicable to other agencies. The system consists of one letter and four digits. The letters represent the country (L for Laos, B for Burma, and so on) and the digits represent the EEI requirement. Most reports now are related to specific collection requirements, even though few operations are organized in response to these EEI. This is particularly true with EEI levied by the service directorates and the J2. Although AFIOC is expected to respond to these EEI, no directive establishes EEI priorities. The EEI levied by the director of the center usually receives first priority.

4. DIRECTORATE OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE (J2)

a. Mission: The Directorate of Joint Intelligence serves as the J2 of the Supreme Command, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), and serves as the staff secretariat on intelligence matters for the Chief of Staff at the Ministry of National Defense (MND) level. (See Figure 18 on page 64)

b. Functions

(1) The J2 is responsible for coordinating the activities of the Directorates of Intelligence of the three military services, but has no command responsibility over them. The service directors can, and often do, report directly to the Chief of Staff. The Thai practice of "divide and rule" is particularly applicable here.

(2) The J2 staff reviews intelligence reports from other government intelligence services. It does not, however, ask for clarification or further information. At times, however, the J2 dispatches an intelligence officer to investigate significant intelligence reports.

(3) The J2 prepares a monthly intelligence summary for use by the Chief of Staff, with copies forwarded to the service directorates, Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC), and the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC).

(4) The J2 periodically calls all-service intelligence planning conferences. These have little function, and less value.


(5) The J2 plans, supervises, and carries out protocol and foreign liaison activities for the Supreme Command.

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Figure 18

DIRECTORATE OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE (J2)



—— Chain of Command

- - - Coordination

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(6) The J2 is responsible for preparing Intelligence Estimates as an annex to Directorate of Operations operational plans. In January 1968 the J2 prepared the Intelligence Annex to the Supreme Command's "Surasakmontri" plan, in preparation for transfer of counterinsurgency responsibility from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense.

(7) The J2 levies intelligence requirements on the AFSC, AFIOC, and other national level intelligence organizations through its Intelligence Division. This division serves as the central collecting point for incoming information and outgoing intelligence requirements, but has no decision-making authority.

(8) The J2 staffs a small intelligence section in the headquarters of the Supreme Command Forward, the RTARF's tactical operations center.

(9) In January 1969, LTG Chareon Pongpanich, J2 Supreme Command, was appointed head of the intelligence section of the United Thai Peoples Party (UTPP), the regime's political apparatus. This action brought the J2 into a political role for the first time. During the election campaign, the J2 received newspaper and other reports on opposition party organizations, policies, candidate biographies, and membership lists. The J2 collected additional information from Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) personnel operating in the provinces, and from the Mobile Defense Units (MDU's) of the National Security Command (NSCC). The J2 was also given authority to request information from other government intelligence services.

c. Capabilities

(1) The J2 has no operational units, despite its part-time use of the Volunteer Defense Corps and dispatch of investigating intelligence officers. While efforts to improve the intelligence product are being made, the J2 reports usually contain considerable rumor, unconfirmed information, and outdated reports. Most intelligence production consists of compiling reports from a wide variety of sources without any effort to collate or analyze, although there is a clear effort underway to improve the product. Protocol and foreign liaison take up most of the J2 staff's time. Personnel are poorly trained and not motivated.

(2) Although the AFSC and AFIOC are expected to work closely with the J2, this does not occur, except when the Supreme Commander or Deputy Supreme Commander so directs. The J2 is also unable to control the service intelligence directorates despite the minor upgrading of the J2 following the Ministry of Defense assumption of countersubversion responsibility. The AFSC and AFIOC commanders are able to assign intelligence requirements to their own units. In this way, J2 requirements can be designated a low priority.

(3) The recent use of the J2 to coordinate collection of political intelligence improved its reputation among other services. This likely will

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be temporary. The J2 was probably selected on a personality basis. LTC Chareon is a close personal friend of Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulasap, the campaign coordinator of the United Thai Peoples Party (UTPP). If Dawee's power increases, he probably will carry Chareon with him. Nevertheless, it is not likely that the J2 will be upgraded; Chareon would probably be named to another intelligence post in the Royal Thai Government.

5. ROYAL THAI ARMY (RTA)

a. Mission: The Royal Thai Army is responsible for the defense of the kingdom from an external aggressor, for assisting the Thai National Police (TNP) in the maintenance of internal security, and for carrying out the directives and missions issued to it by the Minister of Defense.

b. Functions

(1) The RTA traditionally has functioned almost exclusively as a conventional ground defense force. The RTA's area of operation, however, is not limited to Thailand's geographical boundaries. As Royal Thai Government (RTG) policy has specified communism as the greatest single threat to Thailand's independence, the RTA has directed its own operations toward the general policy of containing both Communist China and North Vietnam. A Thai infantry battalion fought with the United Nations Forces in Korea. Thai forces have provided some direct military assistance to Laotian neutralist forces since 1963, and a volunteer division is operating against the North Vietnamese army/Viet Cong in Bien Hoa Province, Republic of Vietnam.

(2) The RTA supports Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) objectives in Southeast Asia, and participates in most SEATO planning and training exercises. The RTA has been particularly disappointed over SEATO's failure to come to the direct aid of the Laotian government against North Vietnamese aggression. This failure has encouraged the Thais to develop unilateral defense plans for Laos if communist forces ever enter the Mekong River valley.

(3) North Vietnamese aggression in Laos and the Republic of Vietnam illustrated to the Royal Thai Government that their conventionally oriented forces would be incapable of blunting the recently established pattern of communist attack -- subversion, insurgency, and guerrilla operations. While primary responsibility for countersubversion and internal security remained with the Thai National Police in 1963, the RTA expanded its counterinsurgency and civic action plans and programs. In 1963 the RTA dispatched several RTA companies to the Laotian border. After the immediate crisis passed, the Thai organized small civic action/intelligence units called Special Operations Centers (SOC's) for border operations [See paragraph d, (6) below, and Annex 5]. That same year, the RTA contributed considerable manpower and resources to the Mobile Development Unit (MDU) program which conducted high-impact civic action projections in rural villages. (See paragraph A,6,d) By 1965, creation of the Communist Suppression Operations Center (CSOC) committed regular RTA units to countersubversion and anti-guerrilla operations in the North-east for the first time.

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(4) In October 1967 the Royal Thai Army (RTA) was given responsibility for communist suppression operations in the northeastern, northern, and west-central regions of the country, thus emasculating CSOC's former responsibilities. At present, the RTA through the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, controls the Joint Security Centers (JSC's), Civil-Police-Military (CPM's), Communist Suppression Committees (CSC's), and all police elements. (See Annexes 1 through 3) These moves, which have placed the RTA in control of all RTG counterinsurgency operations, are a result of the substantial increase in communist operations in 1967. The RTA, however, still is responsible to the CSOD commander in the planning, preparation, use, and supervision of subordinate units for preventative suppression operations in conformity with established policies, plans, and concepts of operations. This responsibility, nevertheless, has little real meaning since the CSOD Commander and Chief of Staff and the RTA Commander and Chief of Staff are one and the same.

(5) Under the reorganization, the Army Operations Center (AOC), as the operational arm of the RTA, performs the following functions:

(a) Conducts preventive and suppression operations as assigned by CSOD both in peace and war.

(b) Supervises clandestine and overt intelligence activity, as well as counterintelligence operations, both inside and outside the country -- disseminates results of intelligence operations to subordinate units, and handles prisoners and defectors.

(c) Conducts psychological operations with operational troops.

(d) Provides for village security, using civil, police, and military forces as available.

(e) Conducts civic action programs to promote and support government political, economic, and social policies.

(f) Performs other missions associated with countersubversion as assigned.

c. Strength, Composition, and Disposition

(1) The Royal Thai Army has an authorized strength of 150,074 troops; current actual strength, reflecting understrength combat and support arms, is about 118,000 (August 1969) officers and men. The increasing subversive threat evident in 1966 stimulated the Royal Thai Government to require that RTA conscripts serve a full two-year tour instead of the routine shortened 18-month term. The new policy has brought the RTA strength posture to well above the desired 80 per cent figure.

(2) The RTA is equipped primarily with US World War II-type weapons and equipment. Principal field artillery weapons in 1969 included sixty-three

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75mm pack howitzers, one hundred-thirty-one 105mm howitzers, and twelve 155mm howitzers. Major anti-aircraft weapons include 76 US 40mm anti-aircraft guns and 24 British manufactured 40mm weapons. The RTA has one hundred-sixty-two 4.2 inch mortars, 182 M24 light tanks, and 8 M41 light tanks. RTA units engaged in counterinsurgency have been issued moderate numbers of M-60 machine-guns, 40mm grenade launchers, and M-16 rifles. The army air arm consists of 93 aircraft, of which 33 are helicopters.

(3) Principal elements of the RTA are three infantry divisions, a mechanized cavalry division, a Special Forces Group (reinforced battalion), a separate regimental combat team, an airborne battalion, and a field artillery battalion. Two units, the aviation and airmobile companies, were activated in May 1967 and are expected to have future importance in view of their role in countersubversion and force mobility. Roughly 50 per cent of total RTA strength is in or near Bangkok. Of increasing importance in recent years are areas infected by subversion and infiltration from Laos -- particularly the Northeast, where about 20 per cent of the RTA strength is based. Additional deployments to the North may occur as insurgency spreads. An airmobile company (16 UH-1's) supports counterinsurgency operations. The RTA also maintains a 150-man company in Korea in support of United Nations operations. The 316-man Thai artillery force was withdrawn from Laos on 26 June 1969. In July 1968 the initial contingent (5,000) of the newly formed Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force was dispatched to the Republic of Vietnam. RTA strength in Vietnam in November 1969 was 11,600.


d. Organization: (See Figure 19 on page 69)

(1) The Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army is charged with carrying out the directives and missions issued to him by the Minister of Defense. He is assisted by a Deputy Commander in Chief, two Assistant Commanders in Chief, and a Chief of Staff. Major counterinsurgency and countersubversion decisions are made within this group. General Praphas, the RTA Commander in Chief, fills other key positions within the Royal Thai Government and it is difficult to isolate his various decisions on these internal security matters as emanating from the RTA or another agency. It is certain, however, that other RTG officials acknowledge Praphas' primacy in internal security matters. Praphas controls the RTA, the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), the police, and other civil elements of the Ministry of the Interior. These organizations include all the elements in the total RTG countersubversion effort. Praphas probably carefully scrutinizes the various alternatives available to him (which affect his several roles and interests) while making final policy determinations. Most decisions and plans, however, are prepared before they reach the Commander in Chief and after considerable informal discussion with him. Most decisions affecting RTA policy towards countersubversion are now being made by the Chief of Staff, General Surakit Malayarp. The Chief of Staff acts as the spokesman for the General Staff, weighs external political considerations, and represents the RTA within other elements of the Royal Thai Government bureaucracy. The Chief of Staff embodies the army as an institution; he

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personifies its traditions, power, prestige, and authority, and, as such, it is often extremely difficult for him to resist positions strongly advocated by the General Staff as representing RTA opinion. Generally, this is what occurred in October 1967 with respect to countersubversion and the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate. The Chief of Staff, GEN Surakit, served simultaneously as the Chief of Staff, CSOD. Since countersubversion prior to October 1967 was primarily a function of the police and civil authorities, Surakit delegated most decision-making to LTG Saiyud Kerdpon of CSOD. In 1967, as the insurgency expanded, tensions grew within the General Staff of the RTA and among the army area commanders. They believed that CSOD had failed to halt the subversion, and that CSOD was not using RTA units properly or pursuing aggressive policies. When these views were made known to Surakit, his resistance was only temporary.

(2) The General Staff's sections are concerned with personnel, logistics, and operations, in addition to the RTA comptroller and Army Secretary. Most of the important staff work on countersubversion takes place here, particularly within the Directorate of Operations and Directorate of Intelligence. The Army Operations Center (AOC) is the focus of the staff's authority over the area commands. Major decisions affecting the RTA are made at meetings of the General Staff. Attended by RTA unit commanders, they involve considerable bargaining and politicking. Personal and familial ties play significant roles. Under the present RTA organization (See Figure 19, page 69) there are two senior officials for each staff section, a LTG as Assistant Chief of Staff, and a MG as Director. The major focus of power and authority in these categories (Personnel, Logistics, and Operations) lies with the Director, who has bureaucratic control over staff sections and their officers. The more senior position is honorific and outside the direct line of command; the views of incumbents are respected but their influence is based primarily on their personal relationships with senior officials. The General Staff includes the following staff sections:

- (a) Secretary of the Army Staff
- (b) Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (The Director of Personnel controls the staff and serves as the RTA G1.)
- (c) Comptroller
- (d) Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics (The Director of Logistics controls the staff and serves as the RTA G4.)
- (e) Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, who supervises two directorates, but has no control over their staffs. These are:
 - 1. Directorate of Operations
 - 2. Directorate of Intelligence (Refer to Annex 4 for a comprehensive discussion of the Directorate of Intelligence.)

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(3) The Special Staff of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) is concerned with administrative and fiscal matters, the use of army funds, and the discipline and welfare of RTA troops. None of the following departments have a direct impact on RTA intelligence or countersubversion decisions:

- (a) Adjutant General Department
- (b) Finance Department
- (c) Provost Marshal General Department
- (d) Inspector General Department
- (e) Special Services Department

(4) The Technical Staff has eight staff sections, each of which has a significant role in supporting RTA units engaged in counterinsurgency operations. The impact of these sections on major countersubversive decisions, however, is minor; they operate in support of troop units already committed by others. The staff sections include:

- (a) Ordnance Department
- (b) Post Engineer Department
- (c) Signal Department
- (d) Quartermaster Department
- (e) Transportation Department
- (f) Medical Department
- (g) Veterinary and Remount Department
- (h) Army Construction Department, which handles matters pertaining to military real estate and the construction of military facilities.

(5) The Training Staff provides for training of the RTA, and has a direct impact on the capability of RTA to perform its internal security mission. This staff consists of the following schools and sections:

- (a) Army War College
- (b) Command and General Staff College
- (c) Chulachomklao Military Academy
- (d) Territorial Defense Department, which is charged with planning and supervising training of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers,

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and of individual reserve units. The Royal Thai Army maintains no reserve units, but conscripted service personnel who have completed their service comprise a reserve force subject to recall under mobilization order. Conscripts and NCO's remain in reserve status for 23 years. Upon separation, officers are assigned to the army reserve until 45 years (company grade), 50 years (field grade), and 55 years (senior grade) of age. All other able-bodied men who do not serve are placed in the reserve until age 45. Mobilization capacity with external support is estimated at 304,300 at mobilization date plus two years.

(e) The Army Field Forces prepares training doctrine, prescribe training objectives, supervise and inspect training facilities, and coordinate the allocation of funds for training purposes. It also tests army field equipment against self-prescribed quality standards. It has the following sections:

1. Logistics School
2. Cavalry Section
3. Infantry Section
4. Artillery Section

(6) The Army Operations Center (AOC) is the forward command headquarters of the General Staff. Prior to 1967, it was used simply as the forwarding agent for policy decisions reached by the General Staff and the Chief of Staff; the Chief of Staff headed the Army Operations Center. With the advent of full RTA responsibility for counterinsurgency, the AOC was upgraded to a command element insofar as counterinsurgency decisions were concerned. To obtain full control over the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), the AOC was interposed between CSOD headquarters and the operational army commands; responsibilities that were once CSOD's were relegated to the "new" AOC. This process is illustrative of the Thai political method of carrying out changes. In actuality, the new method took all power from CSOD and placed it in the hands of the General Staff. To do this directly, however, would greatly damage the prestige of both persons responsible for CSOD and the RTA. The Royal Thai Government, therefore, retained the CSOD structure. This way, CSOD and its officials remain. Under the new AOC, three intelligence structures and projects have either increased in stature or have been organized. One, the Special Operations Centers (SOC's), was always under the AOC and has only increased in stature since 1967. The second, the G2 Section, was organized to replace CSOD's Intelligence Division. It is supported by the Directorate of Intelligence, RTA. Project 311, in initial planning stages, is designed to alleviate serious intelligence weaknesses in the present RTA structure for counterinsurgency. (See Annex 5 for detailed discussions of the Special Operations Centers, the G2 Section, and Project 311.)

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(7) Area Commands and Tactical Units: Thailand is divided into four major military commands, which are directly responsible to the Commander in Chief. They are the First, Second, and Third Army Areas and the Fifth Military Circle. Area delimitations correspond, in general, to the country's major geographical regions -- First Army in the central region (Bangkok), Second Army in the northeast region (Korat), Third Army in the North (Phitsanulok), and the Fifth Military Circle in the South (Nakhon Si Thammarat). Each army area is divided into two military circles. The Fifth Military Circle, considered an independent command, is manned by the 5th Regimental Combat Team. The army areas are manned by RTA divisions. Military circles are subdivided into military districts in which the tactical and service units of the combat forces are stationed. Each district has jurisdiction over one or more of the 21 military provinces which, in most cases, include one or more of the political administrative provinces. The major tactical units include the three infantry divisions, one anti-aircraft and one artillery division (stationed in Bangkok and under the direct control of the RTA Commander in Chief), and the one independent regimental combat team assigned to the Fifth Military Circle. Smaller combat units include a Special Forces Group, an airborne battalion, and a field artillery battalion. The commanding general of each army area is responsible for procurement of manpower and equipment, mobilization and conscription procedures, and maintenance of security. The chain of command proceeds from the commander in chief through the Army Area Command headquarters, downward to the military circle, military district, and active unit. (See Figure 20 on page 74)

(a) First Army Area: Most RTA First Army forces are based in Bangkok, and play a major political role. In September 1967 the Commander, Royal Thai Army, established a special suppression staff to conduct counter-subversion against insurgent activity in four west-central provinces along the Burmese border. This staff placed operational control of all counter-subversion under RTA First Army. The RTA First Army established a forward headquarters at Prachuab Khiri Khan Province and coordinated several major drives against subversives. About 315 men are presently engaged in counter-subversion operations. In 1968, the First Army Commander was successful in uniting military, civil, and police assets in a coordinated attack on the enemy organization. He did, however, alienate some important civil officials and the entire Thai National Police Special Branch. First Army controls over local Joint Security Center (JSC) intelligence production activities are quite strict. Former RTA First Army commanders organized private intelligence teams, which were targeted against the local subversive infrastructure. These teams identify disgruntled subversives and encourage them to defect. Defectors subsequently are interrogated at First Army headquarters by special interrogation teams using cameras and polygraphs, and then released; other intelligence teams monitor their activities after they return to their own villages. The First Army reputation in the area is excellent, particularly when contrasted with the performance of

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
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Figure 20

ROYAL THAI ARMY OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION



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Provincial Police officers in past years. First Army intelligence coverage of areas not known to have overt activities is minimal, and little effort is being made to identify incipient subversion. Following an ambush of RTA troops on 10 February 1969, The commander authorized RTA patrols and ambushes directed against the insurgents for the first time. He has retained the psychological warfare effort.

(b) Second Army Area: About 19,700 officers and enlisted men are assigned to the strategically located RTA Second Army, of which about 4,000 are directly engaged in countersubversion operations. The commanding officer, RTA Second Army, controls counterinsurgency operations in his area. The headquarters is at Korat; a forward headquarters at Sakon Nakhon controls the RTA counterinsurgency in the Northeast. The Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) 0910 operation was fully operational by the time the RTA was given authority and, since 1967, the Second Army Area Commander has been reluctant to use the full authority given him. He may, in fact, be under strict orders to deal cautiously with the provincial and police authorities. In any event, the 0910 plan showed its greatest sign of success under RTA administration, although this was due mostly to the continuation of ongoing programs. Coordination and cooperation between military and civil forces have not been damaged. More logistical support now is available to RTA units directly engaged in countersubversion. The RTA enjoys a better reputation among the villagers in the Northeast than the Provincial Police. Second Army battalion-size operations are conducted in a professional manner, and tactical operations are characterized by increasingly successful small-unit actions.

(c) Third Army Area: The RTA Third Army took control of counterinsurgency operations in the North as insurgency and subversion increased considerably. Almost no civil efforts were made in the field. Only the Border Patrol Police (BPP) had been conducting civic action among the hill tribes. BPP intelligence sources have reported subversive activity in the area for several years, but the government never took any action. At the first signs of serious trouble, the RTA Third Army moved into the hills of the North in force, only to experience severe casualties from ambushes and boobytraps set by the insurgents. The use of maximum force was due partly to the nature of the northern insurgency, which was in fact a Meo rebellion under communist direction. Tactics which would never have been permitted against lowland Thai were encouraged in the northern hills. The Third Army was given authority to apply airpower, artillery, and mortars; the RTA exercised greater control over available police assets; suppression plans were approved without modification, and Bangkok deferred to the Third Army on almost all basic decisions. The implicit belief in Bangkok that the RTA, as an institution, could solve any problems it addressed, was a grave error. Rivalries between the police and military were accentuated, as were those between the RTA and Department of Local Administration (DOLA) of the Ministry of the Interior. The most serious differences were between the RTA and the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD). By March 1968, over 4,000 troops of the 14,516 man Third Army were engaged directly in counterinsurgency; major use of artillery and airpower were

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underway, and tribesmen were evacuated en masse from the hills. At this point, the RTA Chief of Staff visited Third Army and began to develop a "softer line" with the tribesmen. Beginning in mid-January 1969, the RTA Third Army brought about a major regroupment of its forces, reducing the troops engaged against the terrorists from 12 to seven companies. Forward headquarters were deactivated, and operations that engaged the enemy in the higher elevations were limited severely. While some Thai officials claim these moves as a shift in strategy, there is little doubt that it was brought about primarily by defeat in the field. The reduced figures on insurgent incidents in the North since then are due to the reduction of RTA patrols in the hills. Three factors of note were evident during the Third Army operations in 1968. These were the almost total lack of counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla warfare training and capability; the highly disrupted relations existing between the civil and military forces in the North; and the inept performance of the intelligence assets of the Third Army. The approval of CSOD's concept of operations for the North in April 1969 marks movement by the RTA away from traditional military response towards concepts of pacification, rural development, village security, and local decision-making. The assignment of LTG Samran (the former First Army Commander) to the North has had a significant impact on RTA counterinsurgency operations. He has heavily emphasized civic action, psychological warfare, and re-education. Samran considers his first priority task is to teach Thai officials that they must deal fairly with the Meo tribes. This new approach to counterinsurgency and countersubversion is not expected to have immediate results, but its potential is virtually unlimited.

(d) Fifth Military Circle: The Fifth Military Circle commands the operations of the Fifth Regimental Combat Team, which has three infantry battalions, one field artillery battalion, and several special arms. It has about 1,600 men, although less than 750 are engaged in operations. As regional command of CSOD, the Fifth Military Circle supervises all suppression operations in the Midsouth, and has the effect of placing indirect military control over the civil authorities. While most RTA units are used to support police and civil operations in the field, the structure now exists from which to establish complete RTA control over countersubversion. RTA S2 sections in the Fifth Military Circle are undermanned and poorly trained. The most useable information is collected by the police forces and civil authorities.

(e) There are other independent combat units which operate directly under the Chief of Staff, RTA. These include an anti-aircraft division, a cavalry regiment, and the Lopburi Military District. Two units are of intelligence interest. These are the Special Forces Group and the Psychological Operations Company, the latter being an element of the Special Warfare Center. (The Psychological Operations Company and the Special Forces Group are discussed in detail in Annex 6.)

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e. Capabilities

(1) The Royal Thai Army gradually has improved its conventional combat readiness to cope with a wide range of situations, including overt aggression. The RTA is growing in professional competence and is capable of using modern equipment effectively. The RTA could defend Thailand successfully from aggression by the Pathet Lao (without massive North Vietnamese assistance), Cambodia, Malaysia, or Burma, without external assistance. The RTA could not contain a massive invasion by Communist Chinese or North Vietnamese forces without considerable external assistance in troops and material, particularly arms and transport.

(2) RTA capability to conduct effective countersubversion and counterinsurgency operations is marginal, and is aided only by a comparatively meek enemy and superior arms, equipment, and numbers. Lack of training and experience are directly responsible for the RTA's weakness in this field. The army's counterinsurgency capability is expected to improve within the next few years as RTA units engage the insurgents within Thailand, as more units receive specialized training, and as NCO's and officers return from Thai units in the Republic of Vietnam with experience in fighting an aggressive insurgent force. Increments of modern weapons presently used in Vietnam and modern air transportation facilities will encourage further improvement. It is too early to make a full assessment of the RTA's future counterinsurgency capability. Present RTA aggressiveness is in marked contrast to some other nations which have faced incipient insurgency and failed to respond in time.

(3) The RTA's intelligence capability is minimal. The political role of intelligence services in Thailand precludes development of a strong army intelligence element. Thai military intelligence functions are performed at the Joint Staff level by the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) and the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC). While many RTA personnel are trained in intelligence collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination, most of these work outside of the Directorate of Intelligence (DOI). Most RTA G2's and S2's perform their intelligence duties as a secondary function, usually without the most elementary training or encouragement of their superiors. Deployment of military intelligence units to army commands is a step in the right direction, but it is only a beginning. While much of the information the RTA needs in performing its counterinsurgency mission is available from the police and civil agencies, as long as the severe rivalries between these agencies exist, the RTA will have to develop its own counterintelligence and intelligence collection capability. While these improvements in all likelihood will involve expanding AFIOC and AFSC operations, they will also require considerable upgrading of the Special Operations Centers (SOC's) and the DOI.

(4) RTA security of information procedures is poor, but probably no worse than those of other government forces. The two major difficulties

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are loose talk among families of RTA officers and an apparent lack of understanding as to why basic security procedures are needed. The "need to know" principle is just not understood. In mid-1968, for example, insurgent forces in the Northeast received two weeks' notice to evacuate their bases before a planned RTA operation got underway. The leak reportedly was traced to the market place of Nakhon Phanom where the dates, targets, and units of the operation were topics of general discussion.

(5) The RTA's political role has a deleterious impact on its operational function. The fragmentation of power and authority which develops from this political role means that commanders of combat units do not have control over the elements which are supposed to provide necessary support. Furthermore, the rivalries between army officers and those of the other services and police are extreme; cooperation is based either upon personal friendship, family needs, or intense mutual need. Preoccupation of senior officers with political and economic affairs is a chronic weakness not likely to be removed for a long time. The government's use of the army as a means of political modernization in the rural villages, while of immense value to the country, necessarily involves a strain on limited RTA resources.

(6) The negligible local production of war materiel and subsequent dependence on external sources for weapons and modern equipment limits the RTA's defensive capability and severely restricts offensive capability. Ninety per cent of the RTA's materiel needs are imported. The government is aware of this problem and is attempting to reduce this dependence. The RTA has developed several homemade weapons, including a 105mm rocket and elementary air-cushion vehicles. Nevertheless, Thailand is not likely to develop the resources to become self-sufficient in arms production for many years.

(7) Thai army units have an estimated basic materiel load which would enable them to operate for about five to 10 days without resupply. Resupply from depot complexes concentrated around Bangkok could extend this time frame to, at best, 30 days. The army logistical base is hampered by complex requisition procedures and a complicated checking process designed to prevent losses. This has resulted in a system which is not able to support combat units sufficiently, even in peacetime.

(8) The RTA's shortage of senior NCO's and junior company grade officers is acute. In May 1968 the RTA had a total shortage of 11,682 non-commissioned officers, and the General Staff was forced to approve reduction of the NCO course from one year to six months. This is a further reduction in the course, which in 1966 involved a two-year program. RTA junior grade officers are often former NCO's who have been promoted as a reward for long and faithful service. As a result, most junior officers are over-age. Unable to respond to the physical rigors of unit command, they illustrate minimal leadership capabilities. Young officers are encouraged by the political rewards system to seek staff positions instead of command positions. The newly established Officers Candidate School will alleviate some of this

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problem, but the spoils system which spawns the weakness of the junior officer corps is endemic to the RTA.

6. ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE (RTAF)

a. Mission: The Royal Thai Air Force is responsible for the air defense of the country. This involves the tactical air support of ground and naval forces, support of counterinsurgency units, and the aerial movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. As subversion/insurgency has escalated in Thailand, the RTAF's role in countering the threat has increased substantially.

b. Functions: The RTAF performs the following activities in direct support of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) countersubversion/counterinsurgency efforts:

(1) RTAF helicopters under control of the two Direct Air Support Centers (DASC), co-located with the forward headquarters of the Royal Thai Army Second and Third Armies, provide movement of supplies and troops in support of the RTG counterinsurgency effort. Requests are submitted to the DASC by the RTA Second and Third Armies, either for support of deployed RTA elements or for support of the provincial Civil-Police-Military elements (CPM's) and Communist Suppression Committees (CSC's). RTAF helicopters ordinarily augment the Air Division of the Thai National Police Department (TNPD), except when directly involved with RTA troops.

(2) The Air Operations Center of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) assigns all RTAF fixed-wing support for movement of troops and supplies involved in counterinsurgency operations. Some flights are established on a regular basis, while others are arranged to meet developing requirements.

(3) The DASC's, after informing the Air Operations Center, arrange illumination support to RTA units, police forces, and villages under attack.

(4) The RTAF directs airstrikes against identified targets. Most are pre-planned, but the RTA field commanders are authorized to call (through the DASC's) for immediate airstrikes in direct air support of RTA troops engaged in combat. Pre-planned strikes are approved by the Air Operations Center and are often required to also be approved by the Commander, RTAF. In some instances, the Commander, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), will disapprove strikes approved earlier.

(5) RTAF psychological warfare units support other RTG psychological warfare programs with air-supported loudspeaker teams and leaflet drops into insurgent-infested terrain. Few of these Royal Thai Air Force missions are run at present due to failure by the Royal Thai Army to request them. They are expected to increase as RTA tactics shift in the North.

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(6) RTAF reconnaissance aircraft have not been used extensively until recently due to a lack of trained crews, aircraft, and photographic materials. Recent personnel and equipment increments are expected to enhance use of the RTAF in reconnaissance missions.

c. Strength, Composition, and Disposition

(1) Total personnel authorization for the RTAF is approximately 33,600 men with 26,400 currently assigned. This figure is illusory since about 8,000 are security forces which do not provide services pertinent to an air force. There are about 3,400 officers, and about 800 pilot/aircrew personnel. There is no active reserve force, but RTAF personnel who have met their military service obligation and subsequently been discharged are subject to recall in a national emergency. Some 12,000 persons fit this category.

(2) The RTAF is patterned after the United States Air Force. In 1967, it was organized into a seven-wing structure with similar aircraft organized into 13 squadrons. In July 1969, there were 51 jet aircraft, 26 transports, 189 propeller-driven craft, 55 helicopters, and 15 miscellaneous aircraft. The RTAF has operational aircraft for air reconnaissance, tactical fighter-bomber intercept, airlift, and aircraft control warning.

(3) The 13 RTAF squadrons are deployed in eight airfields around the country. Seven squadrons are located at Don Muang Air Base, adjacent to the Don Muang International Airport terminal north of Bangkok. Two tactical fighter squadrons are based in the Northeast, another at Prachuab Khiri Khan, and one at Chiang Mai. A tactical fighter intercept squadron is based at Takli and one tactical air support squadron is at Sattahip.

d. Organization: (See Figure 21 on page 81)

(1) The Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Air Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the air force. He also coordinates air force operations with other military forces to attain a unified defense of the kingdom. He is assisted by a vice commander in chief and a deputy commander. The command structure consists of five groups -- Coordinating Staff Group, Special Service, Logistics/Support, Education, and Combat.

(2) The Coordinating Staff Group consists of seven directorates which perform routine staff functions, and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

- (a) Directorate of Personnel
- (b) Directorate of Plans and Research
- (c) Directorate of Logistics


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Figure 21

ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE: ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND



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(d) Directorate of Operations: This directorate has a Psychological Operations Section, comprising three officers and three men, which advises the Director of Operations on psychological operations planning, indoctrinates RTAF personnel on psychological warfare, and coordinates psychological operations with the RTAF planning staff and other agencies.

(e) Directorate of Intelligence (See Annex 7)

(f) Office of Special Investigations (OSI)

1. Mission: The Royal Thai Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) is subordinate to the Commander in Chief, RTAF, and is responsible for intelligence missions as directed by him. The OSI is not recognized by the Ministry of Defense as having the counterintelligence mission of the RTAF; this mission is assigned to the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC).

2. Functions

a. OSI conducts counterintelligence operations, security investigations, and technical investigations as directed by the Commander in Chief, RTAF.

b. OSI has assumed the responsibility of maintaining RTAF base security in conjunction with the Air Police.

c. OSI is responsible for controlling area source nets in the vicinity of all RTAF air bases to develop an early warning system.

d. OSI is assigned 37 of an authorized 57 men.

3. Capability: The ability of OSI to conduct counterintelligence operations and security investigations is extremely limited. OSI presently supplies minimal security to RTAF bases. OSI has been unable to develop area source programs at the air bases because of the burden of extra duties imposed on OSI personnel.

(3) The Special Service Group is composed of two directorates: Civil Aviation and Welfare. The Director of Civil Aviation coordinates the activities of civil and military aviation, provides air navigation facilities, and operates a common system for air traffic control.

(4) The Logistic Support Group has seven directorates: Supply, Transportation, Civil Engineering, Communications, Armament, Medical Services, and Air Engineering.

(5) The Education Group has five components: The Education and Training Directorate, Flying Training School, Air Force Academy, Air Command, and General Staff College.

(6) The Combat Group directs operations of the Tactical Air Command and the Royal Thai Air Force Security Regiment.

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(a) Tactical Air Command (TAC): (See Figure 22 on page 84)

1. Mission: The TAC commander is responsible for all tactical air operations and exercises operational control over all tactical air wings. He also supervises the activities of the two Direct Air Support Centers (DASC's) at Sakon Nakhon and Chiang Klang.

2. Functions

a. The TAC administers, organizes, equips, trains, and employs the tactical air squadrons. These units are kept in a state of readiness for use in support of naval and ground forces and counterinsurgency units.

b. TAC units must also be prepared to engage in the aerial movement of personnel and supplies, as well as in air rescue operations.

c. TAC controls all RTAF intelligence operations outside of the Directorate of Intelligence (DOI), RTAF. Intelligence elements are attached or assigned to the seven air wings. The two DASC's are the only known elements within the RTAF presently engaged in positive intelligence collection activities. One officer and one NCO work with army, civilian, and police counterparts.

d. Squadron 11, Wing 1, based at Don Muang Air Base, is responsible for reconnaissance management. It has one attached photography laboratory.

e. The 71st Tactical Air Support Squadron supports the TAC units with Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft and is responsible for psychological warfare training and operations. It has 10 U-10B's which are used in leaflet drops; one is equipped with a 1,000-watt loudspeaker system.

f. The 62nd Transport Squadron, principally responsible for providing logistics and personnel airlift for the RTAF, has a secondary mission of psychological warfare. Two of the 18 C-47 aircraft are equipped with loudspeakers. All are capable of being used in leaflet drops. The equipment needed to install three additional loudspeaker systems is also available.

3. Capability


a. The TAC presently has a limited technical reconnaissance capability. The only infrared equipped aircraft -- a C-47 -- presently is on assignment with the Ministry of Defense, under Royal Thai Army control. Three replacement RT-33's were received early in 1968 and are now operational. Two photo laboratories, one at Squadron 11 and the other at Tactical Air Command (TAC) headquarters, could provide sufficient support for present requirements. They would not be able to support an expanded photo reconnaissance program, as is presently envisaged for northern Thailand. TAC has enough photointerpretation equipment, but not enough trained photointerpreters.

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Figure 22

(U) ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION (U)



Source: US Army Area Handbook for Thailand

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b. Royal Thai Air Force psychological warfare units have sufficient operational capability to support psychological warfare operations at the current level. They may have considerable difficulty supporting expanded operations directed against the hill tribes under the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate plan for northern Thailand, however. Two C-47's and one U-10 are now equipped with loudspeaker capability. Other C-47's are available on short notice. They are not being used properly because CSOC-directed counterinsurgency operations rarely called for psychological operations. The installation of a new Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at Chieng Klang, with subsequent deployment of additional Forward Air Controllers (FAC), should enhance coordination between RTAF and other Royal Thai Government agencies. This might be followed by a better use of RTAF psychological warfare assets, particularly by the RTA and the Border Patrol Police.

c. The RTAF Air Wings usually assign intelligence duties as an additional responsibility. Personnel rarely have been trained in intelligence functions. This may change as the Air Force Intelligence School produces more trainees.

(b) RTAF Security Regiment

1. Mission: The RTAF Security Regiment maintains internal security for the RTAF bases and performs basic police duties on these bases.

2. Functions

a. The infantry battalions of the Security Regiment consist of about 990 men each. All battalions are armed with light infantry weapons (some of which are over 40 years old). Each Battalion conducts infantry training and plans for the defense of RTAF bases from attack. Since the 1968 attack on Udorn Air Base by a small subversive force, the RTG has tried to improve the posture of the infantry battalions. It has met with little success. The battalions are now responsible for all security matters within 12 miles of the base. The RTAF objective is to have one infantry battalion for each major base.

b. The Air Police battalions, of which there were two (at 20 per cent. strength) in May 1968, perform routine police functions on Royal Thai Air Force bases and have a secondary security mission in support of the infantry battalions. The Air Police are selected from among the best men in the RTAF Security Regiment and receive considerable training in weapons and police tactics. The armed attack on Udorn has stimulated strengthening of the Air Police; one battalion is planned for each base.

c. The regiment has a secondary political role. In 1953 the RTAF was instrumental in the prevention of a military coup by the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) against the army-dominated government. The security regiment was organized in 1953 for two reasons: to prevent any group opposing the government from taking control of the air force bases by force, and to permit the Commander, RTAF, to insure control of the RTAF.

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3. Capabilities: The RTAF Security Regiment has poor personnel, poor training, poor weapons, and poor equipment. While the air force battalions are superior to the infantry battalions, neither would be able to protect the RTAF air bases from small, guerrilla-type attacks. The regiment would likely respond better, however, against a conventional ground assault by a numerically inferior force. In either instance, major damage to the target should be expected. Substantial training and equipment is needed to improve the negligible capability of the regiment.

e. Capabilities

(1) The Royal Thai Air Force has a limited but improving capability to perform its present mission and would perform well against a like or lesser nation. The RTAF would not be able to withstand a direct attack from Communist China or either Vietnam. The troop movement capability is limited by available planes and trained personnel, but is sufficient for routine operations at present or slightly expanded levels. Air support for counterinsurgency is good, but there are considerable difficulties with helicopter support and precision bombing. The Direct Air Support Centers are operating effectively with the Royal Thai Army and civilian agencies engaged in counterinsurgency. In any general war situation -- or in a greatly expanded insurgency environment -- the RTAF will require considerable training and logistical assistance.

(2) The RTAF, as with all of the Thai services, is a topheavy and inefficient organization. Attainment of general rank is often based on qualifications other than ability or experience. The political aspect of promotion causes a serious morale problem, which is accentuated by pay inequities. Pay for most middle-level officers is quite low. The generals are able to supplement their income by serving on corporate boards. This reduces the degree of effective leadership in the higher echelons.

(3) RTAF training programs and facilities have expanded and improved in all areas, including intelligence. Overall technical capabilities have made marginal gains, as have on-the-job training programs for mechanics and enlisted support personnel. Pilot training is expanding. Tactical units are concentrating their development efforts in areas which may be needed in combating an expanded insurgency (particularly in helicopter support missions, ordnance delivery, air reconnaissance, personnel drops and resupply, and leaflet drops).

(4) Most logistical support to the RTAF is from external sources. RTAF maintenance and supply management programs are cumbersome and fragmented. Improper assignment of personnel, lack of pre-planning for periodic inspections and maintenance, and faulty requisitioning are major difficulties. Recent improvements reflect, however, the expanded training programs and the RTAF's increased use in counterinsurgency. As this need expands further,

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additional RTG resources will be deployed to the RTAF. The RTAF has recently demonstrated its awareness of counterinsurgency requirements by cancelling plans to purchase a squadron of F-5 fighters in lieu of one or two squadrons of OV-10 aircraft.

7. ROYAL THAI NAVY (RTN)

a. Mission

(1) The Royal Thai Navy is responsible for defending the seaward approaches to Thailand by means of patrol operations, anti-submarine warfare, and mine warfare. It also defends the transport of marine and other security forces conducting amphibious operations. The RTN recently was given primary responsibility for defending the river approaches to Thailand, particularly along the Mekong bordering Laos. The Royal Thai Government has delegated this responsibility to the Marine Police for the time being. The RTN additionally is charged with assisting the Royal Thai Army (RTA) in maintaining internal security.

(2) The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) maintains an amphibious force in readiness, protects naval establishments, and supports army ground missions as directed by the Ministry of Defense.

b. Strength, Composition, and Disposition

(1) The RTN has a total strength of approximately 21,000. About two-thirds of naval personnel are stationed in the Bangkok naval complex. The RTN is equipped with one destroyer escort (with another expected in 1972), and 62 patrol craft (including 18 mine warfare). The navy also has 43 amphibious ships/craft, nine auxiliary, and 11 service craft. Ships are berthed at Pak Nam, near Bangkok, off the ordnance station at Bang Na, and off the naval station at Ban Sattahip. The Naval Air arm has 10 propeller aircraft.

(2) The RTMC has an approximate strength of 7,000 persons and is organized into battalion-size units. These units are based at the Sattahip Naval Base and along the Cambodian border.

c. Organization: (See Figure 23 on page 88)

(1) The Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Navy is assisted by a deputy commander in chief and a chief of the naval general staff. The Naval Headquarters, more centralized than the Royal Thai Army, is divided into five groups.

(2) The General Staff Group consists of the following elements:

(a) Secretariat


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Figure 23

ROYAL THAI NAVY ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND ORGANIZATION



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Source: US Army Handbook for Thailand

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- (b) Administrative Department
- (c) Operations Department
- (d) Directorate of Intelligence, aka Intelligence Department (see Annex 8)

- (e) Logistics Department
- (f) Communications Department
- (g) Personnel Department
- (h) Inspector General Department

(3) The Special Service Group consists of three departments:

(a) The Hydrographic Department produces hydrographic studies, distributes hydrographic charts, and provides for markers for use by commercial and naval navigation.

- (b) Naval Science Department
- (c) Welfare Department

(4) The Logistics Service Group has the following departments:

(a) The Naval Dockyard, broken down into Ship Construction, Workshop, and Electrical sections, performs engineering activities, ship construction and repair, operation of the drydock, direction of engineer construction, and training of naval engineering personnel.

- (b) Ordnance Department
- (c) Supply Department
- (d) Medical Department
- (e) Finance Department

(5) The Education Group is composed of the Naval Education Department, the Naval Academy, and the Naval Officers School. One real indication of RTN interest in intelligence was the formation of the Royal Thai Navy Intelligence School in 1966. Approximately 100 officers have received a basic security course; ten others have been trained in intelligence collection. A Fleet Intelligence Course was scheduled for July 1969. Other RTN intelligence officers have attended, or are scheduled to attend, the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) school; the Royal Thai Air Force Intelligence School; the Royal Thai Armed Forces language schools; the Language

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Institute, Supreme Command Headquarters, and the Royal Thai Army Language School. Furthermore, intelligence instruction now is presented at the Royal Thai Naval Academy, Royal Thai Navy Lieutenant School, and the Naval Staff College. While these programs will have only a minimal short-range impact, they are indicative of Royal Thai Navy concern over its weak intelligence capabilities.

(6) The Naval Operations Group is the operational command of the RTN and is composed as follows: (See Figure 24 on page 91)

(a) The Royal Fleet is responsible for the training, equipment, and administration of the naval operating forces and for maintaining them in a state of readiness for combat. The Royal Fleet has five operational squadrons -- anti-submarine, mine warfare, patrol, air, and amphibious service. Other activities include the Fleet Training Command and the Naval Transport Department. Two subordinate elements are of intelligence interest:

1. Royal Fleet Intelligence Staff (See Annex 9)

2. Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Platoon

a. Mission: The primary mission of the SEAL Platoon is to conduct specialized clandestine support operations, in and from restricted waters, rivers, and canals, in support of the internal security and defense of Thailand. The secondary mission is to develop tactics, doctrine, and support equipment necessary for the conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations.

b. Functions: The SEAL Platoon conducts clandestine intelligence collection by sea; performs clandestine attacks on enemy shipping, supply routes, and other military installations in maritime areas; assists in landing, supplying, and evacuating raiders, agents, saboteurs, and guerrillas; and penetrates rivers and inland waterways for demolition raids.

c. Capabilities: Only three of eight authorized officers and 32 of 48 authorized non-commissioned officers have been assigned to the SEAL Platoon. Some equipment is available, but most is awaiting personnel assignment and training. The SEAL Platoon is not operationally effective at this time.


(b) The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) has been kept small by the Royal Thai Government since the 1951 attempted *coup d'etat* directed by the Royal Thai Navy. The Marine Corps is an elite unit about the size of a reinforced regimental combat team (7,000 men). The Marine Corps is based at Sattahip, about 75 miles southeast of Bangkok, although there are small contingents in Bangkok. One battalion is deployed along the Cambodian border in Chanthaburi Province. The RTMC has two elements of intelligence interest:

1. RTMC Intelligence Staff (G2, RTMC) (see Annex 9)

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ROYAL THAI NAVY OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION



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2. Reconnaissance Company, RTMC: The primary mission of the company is to conduct reconnaissance in support of the RTMC Brigade but it is also expected to infiltrate -- by sea or land -- enemy territory for the purpose of developing, organizing, and training indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. In addition, the company is to assist the RTMC in counterinsurgency training. In mid-1968, the Reconnaissance Company was at 90 per cent strength and was organized into a single headquarters and three reconnaissance platoons. The unit is capable of performing its primary mission, although training and equipment are persistent problems.

3. The Naval District is responsible for administering and maintaining internal security at the two naval bases at Bangkok and Sattahip.

d. Capabilities

(1) Despite minor personnel and training problems, the capabilities of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) have improved slightly during the past ten years, particularly in escort duty, minelaying, and minesweeping functions. Despite increasing shortcomings in communication, coordination, and command, the RTN is considered capable of performing its coastal patrol and anti-infiltration missions in defense of seaward approaches to Thailand. It is further considered capable of providing transport and limited support to amphibious operations. These facilities, however, have not been taxed by current counterinsurgency operations, or operations against the Cambodians. Reports of communist infiltration into Prachuab Khiri Khan Province in 1967 brought a quick response by coastal patrols. The RTN, however, has been unable to break up the considerable smuggling activity between Thailand and her neighbors, Burma and Malaysia.

(2) Outside business interests and political maneuvering within the officers corps, dependence on foreign supply, old and inefficient ships, and the shortage of technically trained personnel limit the overall RTN capability. Training improves only slightly each year, and regularly scheduled training exercises, particularly submarine search/attack, are rare. The naval air arm is weak and will only be able to assist anti-submarine warfare operations once newer aircraft are obtained. Six anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft were purchased in 1969 (one was already lost) but this only marginally improves ASW operations and anti-infiltration air coastal patrol operations. The purchase of a new destroyer escort should improve operations on the west coast of the Kra Peninsula.

(3) Royal Thai Marine Corps units have made notable progress in training, discipline, and overall proficiency of land, sea, and amphibious operations. The RTMC is the most effective organization of its size in the armed forces, with a high capability of conducting battalion-size landings against light resistance. RTMC night jungle counterinsurgency missions are excellent.

C. (SYNFD) CIVILIAN -- MINISTRY OF INTERIOR The Ministry of Interior is responsible for local government administration and the maintenance of

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routine internal security. Historically, it has been headed by the dominant personality in Thai politics due to its control over the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and Thai National Police Department (TNPd). The ministry often is used to control potentially disruptive political threats to the regime in power. At present, General Praphas is the Minister of Interior, although his power usually is demonstrated through his concurrent position as Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army. As the highest official in both the police and army, Praphas can balance the rivalries between the two. Of the two major elements of the ministry, DOLA receives less direct supervision than the TNPd. Under the changing political conditions DOLA can be expected to become an increasingly significant source of political control.

1. DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION (DOLA)

a. Mission: The Department of Local Administration (DOLA) administers the provincial government organization and provides support to the organization as required.

b. Functions

(1) DOLA is one of the most important civil elements of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) in the counterinsurgency effort. DOLA serves as a point of coordination between the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) and the provincial authorities.

(2) DOLA also serves as a point of contact between the governors and the various ministries which have representatives in their provinces. In some instances, the DOLA can influence the headquarters of other ministries more easily than the governor can impress their local ministerial representatives. In instances in which the Minister of the Interior supports DOLA requests, the other ministries normally make an effort to assist DOLA.

(3) DOLA directs the Volunteer Defense Corps, and operates village informant systems under CSOD direction. These functions are a part of DOLA's assigned mission, but DOLA is often required to coordinate this activity with the Thai National Police Department.

c. Organization: The Department of Local Administration (DOLA) is an element of the Ministry of Interior and is on a par with the Thai National Police Department (TNPd). Present DOLA strength is not known. The department consists of the Bureau of Provincial Administration (BPA), and the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC). (See Figure 25 on page 94)

(1) Bureau of Provincial Administration (BPA)

(a) Mission: The Bureau of Provincial Administration administers the Department of Local Administration's province apparatus, and is the single most important element of the department. Other bureaus and divisions of DOLA serve as support elements to the provincial administrations.


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Figure 25

DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION (DOLA)



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(b) Functions

1. The province governors have supreme authority, at least theoretically, over their respective provinces. This authority ostensibly covers all matters involving counterinsurgency. Since the recent takeover of counterinsurgency by the Royal Thai Army (RTA), however, the governors have lost their decision-making authority and coordinating responsibility to the appropriate military staffs and commanders. In many instances the RTA has not superseded the role of the governors and their actual control over local counterinsurgency matters continue.

2. The power of the governors is fragmented, since each ministry representative at province level has direct ties with ministry headquarters. While the governor can prevent these individuals from performing certain activities, he cannot force them to spend project funds in given areas. Therefore, while the governors have powers of restriction, the local ministry representatives also can restrict the amount of funds entering the province.

3. The importance of the governors lies on their ability to apply human and material resources for village security and development projects. Some of these resources are an innate part of the DOLA organization, including the Volunteer Defense Corps apparatus. Far more important, however, is the ability of the governors to influence the allocation of resources from the police, the Accelerated Rural Development program, the various ministries, and the Royal Thai Army. The ability of the governors to perform this function lies less on authority than on individual personality and ability.

(c) Capabilities

1. The governors have relatively little direct authority over foreign elements interfering in the affairs of their provinces. The governors are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Local Administration, and may not have any background in their assigned province. The extent of their power in their respective provinces depends on their personality and their willingness to exert influence over semi-autonomous agency representatives. The present provincial administrative organization has several weaknesses, but it was so devised with careful deliberation. The Royal Thai Government has been concerned more with potential manipulation of the provinces by ambitious governors than with effective use of the provincial apparatus.

2. In instances where a strong and able personality is assigned as a governor, he often is able to exert a wider influence than might be expected. In these cases, the governor has been able to establish control over the local sources of power and finance. When this occurs, the governor usually has a private intelligence organization which keeps him informed on all matters of local interest. The intelligence apparatus normally is informal, has no security procedures, training, or technical capability, and often operates within the police and military informant system. Governor Phat of Ubon has admitted directing such an organization.

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(2) Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC)

(a) Mission: The Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) is the paramilitary reserve available for call to active duty in the event of an emergency or civil disaster. In either event, the VDC would be assigned to any of the services as directed by the Minister of Defense. In addition to its "national guard" role, the VDC provides a manpower base for village and *tambon* armed units through the Village Protection Units (VPU).

(b) Functions

1. The VDC provides direct assistance to the army, police, and air force as needed, in matters involving guard and security functions.

2. The VDC serves in a paramilitary support role for the army and police in combat operations against insurgents as directed by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior.

3. The VDC performs guard, security, and counter-guerrilla functions under the direction and authority of the provincial governors and their administration. In many provinces, the VDC is the only military force available to the governors.

4. The VDC collects and reports combat and political intelligence on conditions in local areas. When not operating in a specific unit, VDC members often serve as informants to the local police forces and national intelligence services.

5. In recent counterinsurgency operations in northeast Thailand, the VDC generally have been employed in one of three ways -- as elements of village protection forces, usually led by *tambon* or provincial police; as elements of strike units; and as security guards for local, provincial, and national installations.

6. The VDC has no authority to arrest, suppress, or maintain peace unless orders or stipulations are conferred upon the VDC by administrative or police officials.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 26 on page 97)

1. The VDC originally was created by Rama VI on 1 May 1911, and was then known as the "Honorable Corps of Wild Tigers." In 1954 Parliament renamed it the Volunteer Defense Corps, and placed the organization under the Ministry of Interior. It grew rapidly from 18,000 persons in 1955 to 120,000 personnel in 1957. The VDC was virtually eliminated in 1958, following a *coup* attempt against Sarit Thanarat. The VDC budget was reduced from 7.5 million *baht* to 50,000 *baht* per year, and the Royal Thai Government imposed strict controls on weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The VDC was considered a political threat to the military regime during this period.


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Figure 26

VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS (VDC)



———— = Executive and Command Channel
----- = Coordination Channel

Source: CIAD Analysis

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In 1962 the RTG allocated eight million *baht* to the VDC and retraining and refurnishing of the VDC as a paramilitary unit began.

2. The Volunteer Defense Corps is administered by the Department of Local Administration (DOLA), but the Royal Thai Government has retained some control over its operations at the highest levels of the Cabinet. This is to prevent a recurrence of illegal political use of the VDC. The National Security Council (NSC), within the Office of the Prime Minister, has the responsibility for national direction of the VDC. Immediately subordinate to the National Security Council is the Central Committee of the Volunteer Defense Corps; this committee is comprised of members of the offices of the Ministers of Defense and Interior. This committee permits Ministry of Defense monitoring of VDC activities, but the command channel of the VDC passes through the Ministry of Interior and Department of Local Administration.

3. The Central Committee and subordinate subcommittees formulate command and policy matters for the VDC. Coordination exists between the Committee, Interior, Defense, and the National Security Council, but absence of a command channel above the Interior level is indicative of the dominance of the VDC by local authorities.

4. The central and regional Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) headquarters are equivalent to the national-level Volunteer Defense Division of the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and its regional elements. Both elements coordinate with their Royal Thai Army (RTA) counterparts. The Volunteer Defense Division administers the VDC program; acts as the Secretariat to the National VDC Committee; applies for and administers the VDC budget; requests training for the VDC through the local RTA command, and maintains personnel and weapons rosters.

5. The provincial (Changwat) VDC headquarters are commanded by the governors of each province. Governors command all VDC elements within their respective provinces. They are authorized to activate individual VDC members or whole VDC units as required. In most cases these are the only forces over which governors have complete control.

6. Each province is authorized two VDC Provincial Companies. Each company consists of 160 personnel. The province companies operate at the discretion of the provincial governor. They often are dispersed to individual districts, at which time they are controlled by the district officer. (See Figure 27 on page 99)


7. The District Force VDC platoon usually consists of 40 persons, including a commander (the district officer), three squad leaders, and three 12-man squads. Many of the VDC volunteers are civil servants; school-teachers often serve as platoon or squad leaders. As of 1 March 1969, the District Force VDC had 11,979 men on the rolls, of whom 5,851 were on active duty status. Others were working in Mobile Development Units and for the Thai National Police Department (TNPD). (See Figure 28 on page 100)

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Figure 27

VOLUNTEER DEFENSE COMPANY (VDC) (PROVINCE)



Source: CIAD Analysis


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Figure 28

VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS (VDC) PLATOON (AMPHUR)



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Source: CIAD Analysis

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8. The Village Protection Units (VPU's) of the VDC were formed in 1967 in preparation for implementation of the Communist Suppression Operations Command's (CSOC) 0910 Operation in the Northeast. The VPU's function as local security force units in rural Thai villages within insurgent-infested areas. While some Village Protection Units are operating under the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, the Volunteer Defense Corps expects to expand the VPU to wide areas of the country. In support of their local security mission, the VPU's are to perform the following functions:

a. Repel assassination teams led by insurgents, and other small insurgent bands whenever possible. If they are faced with a superior force, the VPU's are to evade combat, call for assistance, and engage in intelligence collection and passive resistance.

b. Alert and request direct assistance from Royal Thai Government reaction forces in their regions, as needed.

c. Report, identify, and attempt to neutralize village subversives and their supporters, obtaining assistance from other villagers. They are to organize intelligence/information "cells," to include reporting on insurgent organization and methods of operation within and around their village.

d. Alert villagers to the dangers posed by the subversives and directly and indirectly challenge the subversive propaganda. They attempt to prevent village support to subversives and insurgents, using both persuasion and force as necessary.

e. Protect the village population, its leaders, and visiting government workers. They have the power of detention until investigation can be conducted by higher police officials.

f. Stimulate self-help projects in their villages. The VPU's act as contacts for the Ministry of National Development programs in the villages. They conduct all their activities in the context of existing village life, to keep the slightest "foreign" influence from having a deleterious impact.

9. The VPU program is the result of an evaluation of earlier pilot projects of a similar nature, involving the Volunteer Protection Teams (VPT's), People's Assistance Teams (PAT's), and Village Security Officers (VSO's). The VPT's were established in Ubon Province at the instigation of the Governor. Members of the VPT's served as village defensive units and local policemen. This program has been highly successful in Ubon Province and serves as the prototype for the VPU's village defense functions. Unlike the VPT's, the PAT cadre had no legal status or authority to make arrests in villages. While the PAT's received far better training than all of the other self-defense forces, their role as a paramilitary arm of the governor often led to their being used as a full-time VDC. PAT cadre often did not operate in their

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home villages, and lost their close ties to village leadership. At the same time, however, the PAT's received superior support from the DOLA and other Thai agencies. Almost simultaneously with the launching of the PAT program in October 1966, the VSO program was initiated under DOLA sponsorship. In time, the VSO's became shotgun-carrying adjutants of the village chiefs and, for the most part, were well motivated in defense of their native villages. Several problems did develop in time. In some cases, poor personnel screening permitted insurgents to infiltrate the organization. Pay was low and training insufficient. Poor weapons and insufficient personnel permitted terrorists to attack and disarm several VSO's. Support to VSO's from the army and police was generally inadequate; subsequent efforts to band several VSO's together were ineffective.

10. The VPU organization involves a simple structure at the operating level, and a highly complex administrative and support system emanating from the highest levels of the government. Operating elements are ten-man units operating at the lowest Thai administrative element, or the village. Each VPU unit operates under the authority and sanction of the Village Council, which is headed by the Phuyaiban (village chief). The council provides general operational guidance, but the VPU is under the day-to-day command and control of its leader. This man is chosen by the Volunteer Defense Corps command channel or the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD).

11. Each VPU is considered a temporary group, and is organized as determined by the security and subversive situation in the area. The leader has a more official status, but is no higher in authority than the village chief. VPU's receive pay as a cost-of-living allowance, but do not receive quartermaster items. Members will get line-of-duty death and injury benefits, and eight weeks of training in paramilitary, intelligence collection, and village development subjects.

12. VPU's are established in selected areas where intelligence indicates that subversive organizational efforts are underway, but which have not led to operations of large armed insurgent groups. Their area of operations, however, is related to the locations of other Thai security and civil units. Initial planning calls for VPU units in Udorn, Sakon Nakhon, and Kalasin Provinces in the Northeast, and current planning envisages 9,000 trained additional VPU members in two years. In July 1969 North Thailand had 42 VPU's in Chiang Rai, 22 in Nan Province, ten in Tak Province, and ten in Uttaradit Province.

13. As is true with all Royal Thai Government counterinsurgency programs, the National Security Council (NSC) has authority over the VPU's. Administration of the program, however, is under the Department of Local Administration (DOLA), itself under the Ministry of Interior. DOLA will be responsible for some support (including budgetary matters) and also will be accountable for arranging interdepartmental support. Administration is channeled to VPU units through the DOLA province governors, district officers, and Tambon (cluster villages) officials.

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14. The Royal Thai Army (RTA), Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC), and the Thai National Police Department (TNPd) provide assistance to Village Protection Units when it is requested. The TNPd also is expected to provide training and equipment support as required and available.

(d) Capabilities

1. The use of the VDC as a political instrument by local authorities has discouraged rapid growth and operational use of the VDC concept. This stigma will continue as Thailand moves into a new political phase. Recent government efforts to improve and expand the VDC have been of some value. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) has offered governors whose provinces have little active insurgency the forces with which to operate against the insurgent political apparatus. Efforts to improve the VDC will probably continue, although the RTG is likely to press for better means of centralized control of the VDC structure. DOLA now provides the administration, the RTA gives weapons and training, and the TNPd offers local direction.

2. A long history as a patriotic organization, established contacts between members and the local population, and familiarity with local areas provide the VDC with a counterinsurgency capability not found in most national agencies. Individual members provide the RTG intelligence services with valuable information, although the VDC does not have its own intelligence element. VDC also provide the Governor with the bulk of his intelligence information, and serve as unofficial members of his unofficial intelligence agency. The VDC's status, however, serves as a beacon to the communist insurgent. Just as the general populace knows who the VDC are among them, the insurgent knows that these men are either providing information to the Governor or to the police. In December 1968, 1,373 VDC members were serving as intelligence agents. In the South and Northeast, VDC members are primary targets for insurgent assassination teams, mostly because of their unofficial intelligence role. Selected assassination, and the subsequent impact on morale, has had a harsh effect on VDC capabilities. Insurgent penetration of the VDC is relatively easy and common.

3. Personnel problems pervade the VDC structure. VDC members are called up on a voluntary and individual basis in most insurgent-active provinces. If a government official's unit is subsequently called for active duty, he often is either held as missing or moved from his old important post into a less responsible position. VDC personnel procedures are not equipped to identify or trace persons who refuse the call to active duty or who move from one district to another. Furthermore, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) often fails to coordinate with the VDC in reporting newly discharged RTA officers and enlisted men to VDC recruiting teams. The most serious personnel problem of the VDC, however, is leadership. Most RTA officers and senior enlisted men are career army men, and are not able to serve as VDC platoon and squad leaders. The RTG has circumvented this leadership vacuum by recruiting the district officers, district education officers, and school-teachers to serve as VDC platoon leaders. This measure has provided

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effective leadership during training cycles. The RTG has failed to consider that, in a national emergency, these officials will be needed far more in their original positions than in the VDC. Furthermore, VDC members often identify with their local leader, whose charisma may not be transferable to his successor.

4. Training and equipment are continuing problems for the Volunteer Defense Corps, although the Royal Thai Government has placed an increasingly high priority on VDC training when Royal Thai Army troops are available. In 1967, for example, most of the VDC district platoons received retraining, as did most of the township squads. Most province companies, however, have not been retrained in three or four years. The VDC basic weapon -- the 1903 Springfield rifle -- is too heavy for combat in close terrain. It also offers far less firepower than weapons presently available to most insurgents. The VDC does not have organic communications equipment; VDC units require a means by which to communicate with the local Provincial Police authorities and the provincial administration. The Border Patrol Police trains VDC personnel along the borders.

5. There is basic disagreement over VDC effectiveness as a counter-subversive and counterinsurgent force. Reports from villagers in widely dispersed sections of Thailand are critical of VDC activity. The VDC soldiers are described as ineffective, cowardly, and poorly disciplined, particularly when compared with regular Royal Thai Army units. Officer control over the individuals' behavior is slight, and incidents between troops and the populace are common. There is often little popular participation in the defense process. This opinion of the VDC, however, is less common among villages which have experienced overt subversive incidents for several years. There, where the threat is particularly evident, VDC weaknesses are less causes for complaint. In addition, the communist insurgents regard the VDC as a threat to their operations, and believe the VDC has seriously disrupted their organization.

6. Capabilities of the Village Protection Units are impossible to determine since the program has barely passed the drawing-board stage. The concept is sound, particularly because of extensive use of lessons learned in other Royal Thai Government paramilitary programs. Furthermore, subversives have a high regard for VPU capabilities. The most important single element of the program is support. If past behavior is indicative, the Village Protection Units will be challenged by the insurgents almost as soon as they are deployed. These groups must receive sufficient and immediate armed assistance from external RTG forces. If the VPU's can be assured that needed reinforcements will come to their aid when requested, they will fight to defend their families, homes, and property from the insurgents. No system of village security could be viable without ready support from professional security services in the vicinity. In July 1969, two VPU's in Sarat Thani Province were attacked and overrun by insurgents. No other RTG units came to their aid. While the VPU's have not stopped all logistical support from reaching the insurgents, they have greatly hindered insurgent food supply, propaganda operations, recruitment,

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and intelligence collection. The weaknesses of the VPU's are being corrected by rigorous training programs instituted by the RTA and the TNPD. DOLA presently is constructing a large training site in Prachuab Khiri Khan Province where VPU forces will be trained in the future.

7. The *Tambon* Police are expected to play the dominant armed assistance role for the VPU. This is paradoxical because the TNPD has opposed the DOLA concept from the start. Some of the TNPD's arguments are valid. The police have pointed out that VPU arms may be lost to the insurgents by attack and by surrender, and that the arms would then turn on police and military forces. The TNPD is also unhappy about the minimal level of training the VPUs are to receive. Some of the TNPD's objections certainly are politically motivated. Police officers are concerned that the VPUs could be used as a political base from which DOLA officials threaten the existing police and military power structure. This too is a valid objection, but one which must be met if the VPU program is to get under way.

d. Capabilities

(1) Department of Local Administration personnel in the provinces are severely limited in the performance of their functions by the administrative burdens placed upon them by the Royal Thai Government. At the same time, DOLA personnel are often limited by their own lack of abilities. Charges of corruption emanating from the provinces are rarely disproved. Changes in personnel usually only mean changes in the amount of corruption. DOLA is attempting to build a staff of professional provincial administrators, but local influences often encourage assignment of a local man. The local man often is able to exert more control in his province, but he is exposed to more external pressures.

(2) DOLA is extremely limited by a poor working relationship with the Thai National Police Department. Jealousy and mistrust pervade both agencies and proper coordination of effort is hampered. Since both agencies perform security work, coordination is an absolute necessity. Until this coordination develops, the VDC Village Protection Units will remain still-born, and DOLA channels of information and intelligence will remain closed to the police.

2. THAI NATIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT (TNPD)

a. Mission: The Thai National Police Department (TNPD) is charged with law enforcement, criminal investigation, and internal protection and security of the country and its people. TNPD duties embrace not only the more routine police functions normally associated with a police department, but others of a paramilitary nature as well. There is no comparable agency in the United States; it can be compared with a combination of the city police, county sheriff's office, state police, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Treasury

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Department, Border Patrol, Park Police, Coast Guard, and the National Guard. In time of war, the TNPd operates under military control.

b. Function

(1) Most of the TNPd's functions are indicated below. Many of the changes which have overtaken the TNPd in the past ten years are due to the changing political scene in Bangkok and the general rise in communist insurgency and subversion. While the TNPd generally has followed their conventional law enforcement function, it has -- since 1965 -- concentrated specifically on expanding and improving its counterinsurgency operations; protecting vital facilities, personalities, installations, and lines of communication; intelligence activities, and general rural protection against communist terrorism.

(2) In the 1950's, the TNPd played a significant role in Thai politics, serving as an instrument of power for the Director and as a balancing factor to the army and Prime Minister. Following the 1958 *coup d'etat*, the TNPd became subservient to the Royal Thai Army (RTA). It did retain some functions of a political nature. These included identifying persons within the Royal Thai Government (RTG) working in opposition to the present RTG leadership faction and monitoring their activities. The TNPd also monitors political opposition originating outside the RTG. With the advent of elections and political parties, the TNPd's political functions are expected to broaden considerably.

c. Organization

(1) The TNPd is one of the major elements of the Ministry of Interior. The Director General exercises administration and control over the department through a deputy director general and two assistant director generals. The Deputy is responsible for most of the TNPd administrative and functional divisions. He also controls the Provincial Police. One Assistant supervises the Metropolitan Police Bureau and the Education Bureau. The other Assistant is responsible for the Inspector-General's office and the Central Investigation Bureau (CIB). The CIB controls the operational elements of the TNPd which have investigative responsibilities outside of Bangkok -- with the single exception of the Provincial Police. The latter's placement outside of the CIB is another example of an arbitrary separation of power by Thai commanders intent on maintaining political balance. Police strength presently is about 74,000 men. The major elements are identified below and in Chart 29.


(2) Metropolitan Police Bureau (MPB)

(a) Mission: The Metropolitan Police Bureau (MPB) is responsible for law enforcement and fire protection within the two provinces of which the twin cities of Bangkok and Thonburi are a part. The MPB is the first line of defense against communist insurgency, terrorist activity, propaganda, and assaults upon vital lines of communication, food supplies, government installations, and other vital services within the capital area.

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THAI NATIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT (TNPD)



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Figure 29

Source: USAID

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(b) Functions

1. The Metropolitan Police Bureau inspects and controls about 83,000 diverse business establishments.
2. The bureau monitors the activities of, investigates, identifies, and prosecutes all personnel known or suspected of engaging in economic or political subversion.
3. The MPB supervises the traffic in the capital area and conducts research aimed at preventing and reducing accidents in the metropolitan area.
4. The bureau is responsible for the protection of major Royal Thai Government (RTG) buildings and offices from sabotage and vandalism.
5. The MPB is responsible for the safety of juveniles in conjunction with the activities of the Juvenile Court.
6. It organizes, plans, and coordinates the activities of youth clubs in the metropolitan area for the purpose of developing a sense of civic responsibility in city youth.
7. The MPB supervises and trains the Fire Brigade Division which has a nation-wide responsibility for preventing and fighting fires, promoting fire prevention programs, managing the fire suppression training school, and maintaining fire engines and equipment.
8. The bureau trains personnel from other Thai National Police Department (TNPD) elements upon request.
9. The MPB prepares plans for controlling riots.
10. It controls illegal entry of aliens into Bangkok.
11. The MPB is the information center for the rapid relay of news and information to the general public.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 30 on page 109)

1. The Metropolitan Police Bureau was first organized in 1861 as a small modern police unit modeled after its European counterparts. It was then known as the Kong Police. It expanded rapidly and the name was changed to *Kong Tra Wain* in 1877. In 1914 it began operations in the provinces, but was under one central division in Bangkok, called the *Krom Kong Tra Wain*. A few years later it subdivided into the City Police and Provincial Police. The City Police subdivision was renamed the Metropolitan Police Bureau. Since 1960 the Metropolitan Police Bureau has been organized into a police system similar to the large metropolitan police forces throughout the world today.


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Figure 30

METROPOLITAN POLICE BUREAU (MPB)



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2. The MPB area of operations includes approximately 1,549 square kilometers, of which about one-half is composed of the two cities of Bangkok and Thonburi. This area is the economic, political, and military center of Thailand, and is rapidly becoming the major tourist center of Southeast Asia. It is also the location of several headquarters for international agencies. The MPB serves approximately 3,150,914 persons; the population is increasing rapidly.

3. The MPB is commanded by a commissioner of lieutenant general rank, one deputy commissioner, and three assistant commissioners, all of major general rank. There are six (includes one projected) line divisions, four subdivisions, and seven support sections. In December 1968 there were 59 MPB stations manned by an authorized 7,940 MPB personnel. The present MPB Commissioner is Police Lieutenant General Torsak Yomnark.

(4) The line divisions are as follows:

a. The Northern Bangkok Division has four subdivisions and 21 precincts.

b. The Southern Bangkok Division has three subdivisions and 15 precinct stations.

c. The Thonburi Division has four subdivisions and 24 precinct stations.

d. The Traffic Division includes the Traffic Police units (200 men of which 150 are on roving motor patrol) and the Traffic Violations Unit. The Traffic Violations Unit was organized in June 1967 to maintain records on driver violations in order to identify repeating offenders.

e. The Public Disaster Division was formed in January 1968 from the older MPB Fire Brigade, itself formed in 1959. It fights fires, helps accident victims, relieves drought conditions in the city, formulates plans and programs to alleviate firefighting problems, and provides assistance to fire and other disaster victims. The division includes the Fire Brigade, which provides firefighting and prevention services to the areas served by the Metropolitan Police Bureau, and the Disaster Relief Centers, which presently are being constructed and planned for each regional capital. Two centers are operating at Khonkaen and Nakhon Si Thammarat. These centers, which cost US\$60,000 each, are to be equipped with vehicles, boats, and communications equipment to deal with any disaster, from fire to floods. The centers will be equipped to train disaster volunteers (mostly youths), provide emergency food and housing, and offer information to the public. The centers will also attempt to coordinate civil plans for fighting fires.

f. The Detective Division was still projected at the end of 1968. This division will direct and centralize all MPB investigations. It also will take over all MPB intelligence operations.

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5. The MPB subdivisions are as follows:

a. The Mobile Patrol Subdivision includes all automobiles available to the MPB which have a radio communication capability. These units are used to provide quick response anywhere in the city.

b. The Police Dog Subdivision (K-9 Corps) maintains about 100 men and 40 dogs (Alsations and Dobermann Pinschers). The subdivision is used mostly at night to supplement regular police patrols in isolated areas having high crime rates.

c. The Building Safeguard Subdivision

d. The Juvenile Aid Subdivision. This section's strength authorization increased from six to 26 in June 1967, following an outbreak of virtual warfare between students of several schools and universities. In early 1969 the subdivision set up mobile patrol and roving lecture units to forestall street riots and gang warfare among competing student groups.

6. The following support sections operate as elements of MPB Headquarters:

a. Administration Section

b. Legal Affairs and Discipline Section

c. Records and Statistics Section

d. Logistics Section

e. Research and Planning Section

f. Communications Section

g. Intelligence Section

7. Two special committees operate at MPB Headquarters. One, an internal committee, operates as a coordinator between the operational elements of the MPB. It includes the Commissioner, his assistants, and the division commanders. It usually meets twice a month to equally distribute support commodities received, including revolvers, ammunition, and uniforms. In December 1966 a Committee of Land Traffic Study and Planning was formed with General Praphas as chairman. This committee meets infrequently and is assisted by the Traffic Division.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Metropolitan Police Bureau is an efficient and professional police force, capable of maintaining law and order in almost all situations. The MPB is able to provide effective security within the metropolitan area

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except under total riot conditions and/or extensive insurgent and sabotage operations. The MPB has some significant problems (as discussed below) but its professional leaders are successfully solving most of them. As in all major cities of the world, crime has increased over the past five years. A comparison of crime statistics for 1963 and 1967 is as follows:

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>
Traffic Violations	4,239	5,307
Minor Crimes	103,424	102,791
Major Crimes	189	528

2. The rise in major crimes and subsequent city-wide frustration led to a major MPB crackdown on crime in May 1968. In a seven-day period, 440 suspects were arrested in connection with 153 crimes. MPB officials ascribed the increase in crime on migration and unemployment, but it also appears likely that the increase in major crime, compared with the drop in minor crimes, means that crime is being organized and gangs formed for criminal efficiency. Growth of organized crime and the potential of these gangs being used by subversives requires that the MPB immediately improve its intelligence operations within the city. The recent arrests were of a shotgun approach and illustrated the serious lack of accurate intelligence in the metropolitan area. In-service training programs are necessary to improve intelligence collection operations, particularly those targeted against elements capable of conducting overt and covert sabotage. Once the information is collected, however, the MPB must be able to evaluate the information and disseminate it to the proper agency.

3. The MPB organizational pattern is efficient, although somewhat cumbersome. As is usually true with most Thai services, the MPB is over-staffed at the administrative and command level. Too many men are assigned routine clerical tasks and support functions, while there are not enough men for operational positions. Projected MPB plans to consolidate investigative units into a Detective Division will provide an adequate command and control posture and assist both the investigation of criminal complaints and the collection and dissemination of intelligence.

4. Personnel

a. Personnel strength is adequate although MPB officials often complain about a need for more personnel. It is believed, however, that more effective use of MPB personnel, along with increased mobility, would solve most of the current problems. The current strength averages out to about one policeman for every 430 persons. MPB strength has increased over the past two years. Approximately 1,700 persons joined the MPB between March 1967 and June 1968; 600 were replacements, however, for personnel who volunteered for the *Tambon* police program, while about 450 others filled existing

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vacancies. In the past year, authorized strength was increased by about 950 persons.

b. Recruits for the Metropolitan Police Bureau are generally of higher quality than those selected for the Provincial Police. One reason is that physical requirements are more demanding. At an examination in August 1967, only 50 per cent of those applying passed the physical exam. Also, most MPB recruits come from the metropolitan area where the educational program and native technical ability is higher than in the provinces. Many Provincial Police officers work with MPB as part of their advanced training. Most of the MPB commissioned officers have advanced Thai degrees or have attended schools in foreign colleges and universities. MPB personnel are receptive to innovation, training, and new techniques.

5. Training

a. The MPB conducts extensive in-service training programs. Although these courses and the instruction are still below requirements, they are far superior to training courses in other police units. MPB courses are used by large numbers of Provincial Police personnel each year. By fiscal year 1967, over 7,000 persons had received training in crowd and riot control and in a Practical Pistol Course. Other subjects taught as required include Patrol Techniques, Investigation, Suspect Handling, Identification and Records, Recruitment, In-Service, and Public Relations. The latter course was instituted in 1967 and is presently being given to all MPB non-commissioned officers.

b. MPB personnel are trained in foreign police schools. Some have attended schools in the United States, England, Germany, Canada, and Japan. The closest relations, however, are maintained with the Royal Malaysian Police. General Torsak observed Malaysian police methods in August 1967, and five of his officers studied command and staff techniques in February 1968. Contacts of this nature are expected to become more frequent.

c. One major training problem is communications. In September 1966 a survey of the MPB showed that often stations with a communications capability would still be unable to contact each other. It was found that few station personnel were familiar with the operation of the system. The Commissioner then approved a training curriculum and ordered all MPB officers and non-commissioned officers to attend a course in radio operation procedure. All MPB personnel are now being oriented to the MPB communications system. Training of radio operators is adequate, as is that of radio repair personnel.

d. In 1967 large numbers of Mobile Patrol vehicles were out of service due to the lack of trained mechanics and trained drivers. Training programs have been instituted to solve these difficulties.

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6. Equipment

a. Lack of effective equipment has been a problem for the MPB for several years. Communications equipment, vehicles, and stations are the greatest need. More effective police coverage can be provided either by a large increase of personnel or a more effective use of those available. Both communications and vehicular capabilities were improved in 1966 and 1967, including 51 vehicles provided to the Mobile Patrol and one vehicle made available to each of the then 41 precincts.

b. In 1966 the MPB began installation of radios in each of 41 precincts, connecting the local stations with MPB Headquarters. In 1968 radios were installed in the remaining 14 precinct stations. Equipment also was ordered for the installation of two-way radios in all police checkpoints. This would enable roving police patrols to contact their precinct without having to rely upon undependable telephones. Plans call for a network linking all 200 checkpoints with their bases. Installation of the first units began on 21 March 1968.

c. Inadequate physical plants are also a problem. In 1966 the MPB authorized a special appropriation of two million *baht* (\$100,000) to construct three new precinct stations. In June 1967 an additional 14 million *baht* worth of construction was authorized, from which a new Mobile Patrol headquarters, several fire departments, and 40 new police checkpoints were constructed. A pistol range was built on the roof of the MPB headquarters in 1967.

d. In July 1967 the Public Disaster Division (then the Fire Brigade) made plans to purchase 230 fire engines, 30 fire launches, and 122 other pieces of firefighting equipment in a 48 million *baht* (US\$2,400,000) modernization program. By June 1968 the Division had only 115 engines of the planned 230. Later in 1967, the MPB purchased six radio-equipped vans from Japan for use as mobile first aid units and ambulances. In early 1968 the MPB purchased 12 small boats for patrolling Bangkok's inland waterways. In June 1968 the MPB made first use of its new one-way mirror room in the headquarters building for suspect identification purposes.

7. Some MPB precinct officials have proven to be quite innovative when called to solve problems of inadequate intelligence. One printed a pamphlet in Thai and English and distributed it to all residents of his jurisdiction. The sheet asked that all residents assist the police in reducing crime and promised to investigate all matters brought to police attention. Procedures for reporting information enabled those who wished to remain anonymous to do so. One communist subversive and one opium smuggler were arrested in this manner. Although this technique is effective, it is only an expedient and cannot take the place of trained intelligence collectors.

(3) Education Bureau

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(a) Mission: The Education Bureau has the responsibility for providing continuous and competent police training at all levels within the Thai National Police Department.

(b) Functions

1. The Education Bureau functions as a central training command. It is responsible for all police recruit training, non-commissioned officer training, and police cadet training within Thailand.

2. The bureau administers courses at the Detective Training School and conducts other special training courses, conferences, and seminars that are held as required. One recently established course at the Samran Police Academy instructs police sergeants major who are qualified for officers' training.

3. The Education Bureau coordinates training activities of subordinate Thai National Police Department (TNPd) elements, although training responsibility remains with the operational unit. The bureau also coordinates training procedures and class materials with other security and military units, often assisting in joint training classes. In July 1967 the bureau became responsible for an anti-sabotage course attended by personnel from the Thai military services.

4. The Education Bureau continues to augment its course structure to meet developing needs within the TNPd. By the end of 1968, the bureau planned to establish a course for all officers holding the position of Police Amphoe (District) Chief or its equivalent. Officers nearing eligibility for such an assignment would be required to satisfactorily complete this training prior to appointment. The course was to include classes in Police Administration; Organization and Planning; Police Patrol; Investigation; Traffic Management, and a general review of laws, duties, and responsibilities of police, in general, and district chiefs, in particular.

5. The bureau also conducted special counterinsurgency courses for all TNPd elements in 1968. Some pilot courses took place in 1967. The countersabotage and jungle warfare classes are held at the Chaw Haw Counterinsurgency School, Korat. By January 1969, 561 officers had graduated from the course and two more classes were scheduled.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 31 on page 116)

1. The Education Bureau is commanded by one of the four police commissioners of the Thai National Police Department. Its headquarters is in Bangkok. The commissioner exercises overall command and is assisted by a deputy commissioner and assistant commissioner. In October 1967 the bureau was authorized 1,424 men. At the time, it was close to full strength.

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EDUCATION BUREAU

TNPD

Commissioner
Education Bureau

Assistant
Commissioner

Deputy
Commissioner

Headquarters
Division

Planning and
Operations Division

Discipline
Section

Administration
Section

Welfare
Section

Records and
Personnel
Section

Finance and
Supplies
Section

Physical Training
Section

Military Training
Section

Curriculum
Development
Section

Legal Section

Sociology
Section

Police
Techniques
Section

General Subjects
Section

Equipment and Training
Aids Section

Statistics and
Research Section

Provincial
Police
School #1

Provincial
Police
School #2

Provincial
Police
School #3

Provincial
Police
School #4

Provincial
Police
School #5

Sampran
Cadet
Academy

Detective
Training
School

Non-Commissioned
Officers
School

Metropolitan
Recruit
School

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Figure 31

Source: CIAD Analysis

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2. The Headquarters Division has five separate sections: Administration, Discipline, Records and Personnel, Finance and Supplies, and the Welfare Section.

3. The Planning and Operations Division is at Education Bureau headquarters and is responsible for providing logistical and technical assistance to the eight training commands. It is comprised of the following subdivisions:

a. The 1st Subdivision includes the Curriculum Development Section, Military Training Section, and Physical Training Section.

b. The 2nd Subdivision includes the Legal Section, Sociology Section, and Police Techniques Section.

c. The 3rd Subdivision has the General Subjects Section, Equipment and Training Aids Section, and Statistics and Research Section.

4. The nine training commands within the Education Bureau are:

a. Sampran Cadet Academy: This school is located at Sampran in Nakhon Pathom Province. The academy is responsible for training most police commissioned officers. It is a four-year course, similar to the army's Royal Thai Military Academy. Some officers are appointed from among college graduates, but most middle police officials are either from Samran or equivalent military academies. Samran graduates about 100 cadets yearly.

b. Detective Training School: Located in Bangkok, this school offers two courses for detective training. The basic course is three months long, and the advanced in-service course takes six weeks. Most trainees attend both courses. Each class usually is 100 strong.

c. Non-Commissioned Officers School: Also located in Bangkok, this school is responsible for presenting the regular promotion courses for lance corporals, corporals, and sergeants. Each course runs for three months, and the average class is made up of about 125 men. The school is prepared to handle classes of 200 if necessary.

d. Metropolitan Recruit School: This school is in Bangkok. It provides basic recruit training to all volunteers to the Metropolitan Police. Each course recently was extended to four and one-half months, and the classes involve simultaneous training for three companies of 180 men each for a total of 540 men per class. Class sizes are expected to increase as additional personnel for the Metropolitan Police are authorized. Yearly capacity of the school is about 1,620 persons.

e. Provincial Police #1: This school is located at Nakhon Pathom, and offers the four and one-half month basic training course for Provincial

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Police recruits. In June 1967 the Education Bureau was required to increase its annual output to about 1,800 students. This was accomplished by increasing the company size of all the Provincial Police schools from 90 to 120 men. Under the new strength figure, Provincial Police School #1 trained 480 students every ten weeks.

f. Provincial Police School #2: This school is located at Chaw Haw, Korat Province, and offers the four and one-half month basic training course for Provincial Police recruits. In December 1967 this school increased its company-size to 180 men, and increased its companies from five to six. It now graduates about 3,240 students per year.

g. Provincial Police School #3: This school is located at Lampang, and offers the four and one-half month basic training course for Provincial Police recruits. In 1969 the school increased its capacity to about 1,080 recruits per year.

h. Provincial Police School #4: This school is located at Yala and offers the four and one-half month basic training course for Provincial Police recruits. Also instructed to expand, the school now graduates approximately 1,800 recruits per year.

i. Provincial Police School #5: This school is presently under construction at Chon Buri and will offer the four and one-half month basic training course for Provincial Police recruits. The school is designed to instruct about 2,880 students per year, but the first class began in June 1968 with only 50 per cent projected size. It is not known when the school will be able to operate at full capacity.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Education Bureau's training commands now are well staffed, and they turn out disciplined young police officers with some knowledge of modern police techniques. Problems encountered while the Provincial Police schools were in the process of expanding caused only temporary disruption of the training process. It is generally conceded that much of the minimal improvement of the Provincial Police over the past few years has been due to the better qualified recruits graduating from their basic training.

2. Increased threat of insurgency and subsequent expansion of the Provincial Police has required additional burdens for the Education Bureau to train the new recruits. The Thai National Police Department intended to graduate at least 11,500 men a year by the end of 1968. Training capacity in 1969 is 12,000.

3. The Education Bureau has become increasingly concerned with training recruits to deal more effectively with the population. Public relations subjects are designed to develop greater rapport between the public and police, particularly in rural areas.

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4. Some serious morale problems continue to exist among the school instructors. Although the subject matter and financial assistance for course materials has improved considerably, a problem still exists. In addition, instructors are rarely given the promotion considerations of an officer in the field. This prompts instructors in the field to obtain new assignments. In some cases, motivation is severely lacking -- particularly at the Samran Police Academy. As with most Thai Police elements, the physical plant is improving much faster than the quality of personnel.

5. One of the more difficult problems the Education Bureau has to face is the declining number of young men seeking police positions. The caliber of those applying appears to be decreasing. This condition was not foreseen prior to expansion of the bureau's physical plant. While public relations programs may help, the TNPd may eventually resort to the draft as a source of recruits.

(4) Secretariat

(a) Mission: The Office of the Secretariat performs the personnel functions of the Thai National Police Department (TNPd).

(b) Functions

1. The Secretariat stores, protects, and maintains all TNPd personnel records.

2. The Secretariat assigns all police recruits from the Education Bureau's training commands to their initial duty stations.

3. The Secretariat handles the public relations activities of the TNPd.

4. The Secretariat directs a country-wide program designed to improve relations between the police and the general public, particularly to enlist public support in the TNPd's efforts to counter the prevailing subversive, insurgent, and criminal threat.

5. The Secretariat operates the message center which handles all TNPd official correspondence.

6. The Secretariat operates the "Police Administration Center" rooms which are used by TNPd officials for top-level planning meetings.

(c) Capabilities

1. The Office of the Secretariat is overstaffed (329 persons) and has too many senior officers. Few personnel are trained in administrative procedures, and there is too little incentive to develop new methods of operation. The Secretariat's efforts to improve public relations cannot be evaluated at present, although four public relations teams are now operating in the provinces.

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2. The Secretariat presently is developing, in conjunction with other elements of the TNPD, an improved management information system, using automatic data processing equipment and rented computers. This system will permit the TNPD to overcome traditional administrative and planning difficulties, and will result in vastly improved personnel policies. Secretariat personnel are being trained in the use of this equipment. Completion of the system is expected in 1969.

(5) The Prosecution Division prepares all files and records for the Attorney General's office in preparation for prosecution of criminal cases. This division plays a minimal role in countersubversion and counterespionage. It has 64 men.

(6) Finance Division

(a) Mission: The Finance Division is responsible for all budgetary and fiscal matters pertaining to the Thai National Police Department and advises the Director General on TNPD financial requirements.

(b) Functions

1. The Finance Division controls all cash transfers and accounting for disbursements and collections of the TNPD.

2. The division provides funds covering purchase of supplies, equipment, land, and buildings to the region and province Finance Sections.

3. The Finance Division supervises the activities of the 17 operational TNPD units in Bangkok and the 85 units outside Bangkok which have attached Finance Sections. It also provides limited support and guidance. The 85 Finance Sections are in region and provincial headquarters of the Marine Police, Provincial Police, Border Patrol Police, and the Special Branch.

4. The Finance Division prepares and disburses the biweekly TNPD payroll.

5. The division conducts regular and spot audits of all TNPD units disbursing and receiving funds provided by the division.

6. It formulates and monitors the yearly TNPD budget, and negotiates the final document with the Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance.

7. The Finance Division develops procedures and regulations for the curriculum and operation of the Finance School.

8. The division coordinates the operations of the Finance School with the Royal Thai Army Finance School and the Bureau of the Budget Finance School.

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9. The Finance Division prepares special studies on financial matters as ordered by the Chief, Finance Division, or the Director General, TNPD.

(e) Capabilities

1. Each finance section within the TNPD operational elements is controlled by that unit. Consequently, the division's responsibility is limited to providing advice and limited support. Their detachments are well treated by their controlling units.

2. The division has experienced major personnel and procedural weaknesses for several years. Completion of the Finance School in 1967 will help alleviate this problem in time, although the immediate outlook is not good. Another improvement has been the procurement of automated data processing equipment to control the TNPD budget and help disburse the payroll. As more modern equipment and more technically qualified personnel become available, operations of the Finance Division are expected to improve considerably. In June 1968, 196 of 208 authorized personnel were assigned.

(7) Quartermaster (QM) Division

(a) Mission: The Quartermaster (QM) Division is responsible for the procurement, distribution, storage, inventory, and repair of all Thai National Police Department (TNPD) equipment (with the exception of Signal Division equipment and aircraft). In fulfilling this mission, the QM supports elements of the TNPD in every part of the country.

(b) Functions

1. The QM prepares and enforces supply procedures and regulations as needed, and implements routine checks of TNPD compliance with these regulations.

2. The QM requisitions, stores, transports, and maintains TNPD supplies.

3. The QM maintains and repairs all TNPD firearms, and is responsible for purchasing ammunition in addition to manufacturing and reloading.

4. The QM evaluates and tests all existing and proposed new equipment to determine value and use in projected tactical situations.

5. The QM is responsible for maintaining all TNPD vehicles, to include purchasing, establishing accountability procedures and performing overhauls on all new or used equipment.

6. The QM rebuilds wrecked vehicles where economically feasible and recovers reusable assemblies from salvage vehicles.

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7. The QM is responsible for construction of all regional and provincial facilities directly related to supply and maintenance functions, as well as construction in QM facilities.

8. The QM Division conducts on-the-job training for technically qualified persons engaged in vehicle maintenance and weapons repair. It also trains men assigned to TNPd elements in supply, repair, and maintenance procedures as needed or requested.

(c) Organization

1. Information on the exact organization of the Quartermaster Division is not available. It is believed to have three subdivisions and 11 sections. It is likely that the three subdivisions are the Quartermaster Subdivision, Armament Subdivision, and the Vehicle Maintenance Subdivision. It is known that Repair and Inspection Sections are found in both of the latter subdivisions. A Maintenance Sections and Records Section are identified as being part of the QM organizational structure, although data on their higher headquarters is not available.

2. The Arms Repair Section of the Armament Subdivision is supported by stockmaking, machine, and blueing shops. The Reloading Section operates the .38 caliber bullet reloading equipment.

3. The QM operates a Central Garage in Bangkok which conducts 4th echelon maintenance and trains TNPd mechanics. The QM is responsible for vehicular maintenance facilities in the provinces and the provincial garage of the Provincial Police and other TNPd elements. In addition, the QM directs an unknown number of Inspection Teams and mobile gunsmithing crews. The QM will shortly take over operations of the 12 regional depots of the Provincial Police and the nine regional depots of the Border Patrol Police.

4. The QM present strength is 606 persons; requests are in to the TNPd for an additional 470 men. This request specifies needed technical qualifications.

(4) Capabilities

1. The QM Division has improved considerably since 1965, due in part to personnel changes and to expanded technical capability. The division generally is capable of accomplishing its mission, although it is somewhat restricted by limited personnel and equipment. Records-keeping has improved, but it remains a problem. Administrative procedures are far behind technical improvements, but this is not expected to cause serious difficulties.

2. The division's ammunition reloading capability has developed serious problems at all levels, particularly equipment problems and leadership difficulties. Production is now averaging about 10,000 rounds per week, higher than at any previous time but considerably lower than anticipated.

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3. The QM Division is the likeliest place within the TNPd for corruption. It is not known to what extent this occurs, although it is known that corruption has been reduced somewhat since 1965. Modernized records-keeping and other administrative practices should reduce the problem further. In August 1967 the TNPd QM Division ruled that the individual policeman was no longer responsible for normal breakage and loss. This should improve police morale and result in better reporting.

(8) The Foreign Affairs Division coordinates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all police matters involving foreign residents of Thailand. Division activities do not include matters involving aliens.

(9) The Medical Division operates the Police Hospital and arranges for medical assistance for police personnel and their families. It recently established a rural medical program in conjunction with the Border Patrol Police and the Provincial Police. The program involves medical aid and instruction for isolated Thai and hill-tribe villages in areas infected with insurgency and occupies most of its 259 personnel.

(10) Immigration Police

(a) Mission: The Immigration Police, also known as the Immigration Division, was established in 1917 as an independent department under the Ministry of Interior. Since 1932 it has been a division under the Thai National Police Department. The Immigration Police has two major responsibilities: control of entering aliens, including prevention of entry of undesirable aliens; and supervision of aliens within Thailand.

(b) Functions

1. The Immigration Division maintains immigration checkpoints in 23 provincial capitals, 49 district seats, and three separate villages outside of Bangkok. These checkpoints are staffed by approximately 450 persons. The Immigration Police maintain the checkpoint at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok where they handle approximately 2,000 visa checks a day. Outside the capital, the division checks about 1,000 visas a day. Primary effort is made along the Mekong River across from Laos to restrict illegal immigration related to the communist insurgency.

2. The Immigration Police implements new systems for alien registration control and establishes practices for disembarkation cards at Don Muang Airport.

3. The Immigration Police coordinate their activities with the Border Patrol Police, Provincial Police, Marine Police, and the Special Branch. This includes the receiving of intelligence reports from these units on matters pertaining to illegal immigration.

(c) Capabilities

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1. The Immigration Police perform their mission well at present, although they are unable to initiate any investigations of illegal immigration (which is the function of regular police units). Modern information retrieval systems for identifying and controlling aliens are not available at present. The unit is restricted by lack of transportation facilities outside of Bangkok.

2. Present manpower levels and available equipment are inadequate for handling the large jet airliners anticipated in 1970. Should the security situation in Laos deteriorate within the next few years, the Immigration Police would not be able to satisfy the increased requirements brought about by large-scale immigration.

3. Corruption charges are more common against the Immigration Police than other TNPd units, with the exception of the Provincial Police. Most of these charges involve low-level customs officials at checkpoints near the Burmese and Cambodian borders, although it most likely exists throughout the division.

(11) The Legal Division has 97 men assigned. Data on its exact activities is not available.

(12) The Planning and Research Division serves as the "think-tank" for the Thai National Police. Its mission is general, and it is assigned tasks relating to improvement efforts and modernization within the TNPd. It has 124 men.

(13) The 69-man Technical Division works with the Planning and Research Division on matters of improvement and modernization of the TNPd. The division also supplies technical support to TNPd units.

(14) The 231-man Welfare Division handles assistance to TNPd personnel and their families, and supports those families whose male members were killed in action while on TNPd duty.

(15) Provincial Police

(a) Mission

1. The Provincial Police is responsible for crime suppression and investigation, protection of the lives and property of the people, and detection of subversive activities throughout Thailand. (An exception is the metropolitan area of Bangkok and Thonburi, which is under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Bureau.)

2. The Provincial Police is administratively in charge of the Border Patrol Police (BPP). The BPP, however, is virtually independent of PP operational control and is considered a separate element of the TNPd within this study.

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(b) Functions

1. The PP conducts long-range five to 15-day patrols to pursue bandits and/or subversives and to visit as many isolated villages as possible.
2. The PP serves as the only representative of the Royal Thai Government in outlying regions.
3. The PP provides police forces for all cities and towns of the country, except for the Bangkok-Thonburi area.
4. The PP investigates all crimes, reported crimes, and suspected crimes, without necessarily coordinating these investigations with Department of Local Administration (DOLA) officials.
5. The PP provides forces for use by joint civil, police, and military agencies engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Provincial Police officials often serve as leaders of joint operations or agencies.
6. The PP coordinates its countersubversion operations with the TNPD Special Branch (SB) by reporting suspected subversion cases to the SB, which requests direct assistance from the PP as needed.
7. The PP maintains a very limited supervisory role over the Border Patrol Police.
8. The PP provides quick-reaction units (Special Action Forces - SAF) for use by all units of the TNPD in emergency or other serious situations.
9. The PP conducts patrol operations to safeguard lines of communications and protect airfields from insurgent operations and sabotage.
10. The PP collects intelligence while on routine patrols in isolated villages where communist subversion exists.
11. The PP performs limited undercover intelligence collection operations targeted primarily against bandit gangs. It also reports on suspected communist insurgents.
12. The PP performs civic action projects in villages where police are permanently assigned.
13. The PP maintains liaison with village councils and advises the council on security matters in villages where police are permanently assigned.
14. The PP organizes and directs the activities of a Youth Activities Program presently underway in 12 northeast provinces. The program is scheduled for expansion throughout the country in the next several years.

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15. The PP exercises routine police jurisdiction over the Vietnamese refugees in the Northeast and coordinates with the Special Branch in the control of their movement.

16. The PP maintains contact with the Chiang Mai Medical School for provision of volunteer medical personnel to train PP officers and men in elementary medical care and distribution of medicine.

17. The PP performs minor medical action programs while on sweep operations.

18. The PP conducts internal training for counterinsurgency at *Chaiya* (Victory) training sites at five locations in Thailand.

19. The PP directs and assists the training of Village Protection Units (VPU's) of the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) in coordination with the Department of Local Administration.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 32 on page 127)

1. The Provincial Police began operations on 13 October 1915, following a major reorganization of the Royal Thai Government under King Chulalongkorn. At this time the PP was attached to the Metropolitan Police, but was separated a few years later. The PP is the largest operational unit of the Thai National Police Department.

2. The PP is directed by a commissioner from Headquarters in Bangkok. He is assisted by a deputy commissioner and five assistant commissioners. As of 30 August 1969, the PP strength had reached approximately 42,000 officers and enlisted men. PP Headquarters contains at least three support elements which have their counterparts at regional and provincial levels. Little information is available on the PP support apparatus at present. Although it is known that PP elements have an intelligence collection mission, for example, no PP Intelligence Section is known to exist at PP Headquarters or at the PP Regional Headquarters. Four Scientific Crime Units are at Nong Khai, Phrae, Tak, and Suphan Buri, but data is not available on whether these are elements of a central support section at PP headquarters. The three identified support sections are:

a. Communications Section, which has subordinate elements at all nine PP Regional Headquarters.


b. Logistics Section, which also has subordinate elements, known as Regional Supply Centers, at all nine PP Regional Headquarters.

c. Administration Section.

3. There are nine PP Regional Commands. Each command has a Headquarters Section and supervises the police activities of from six to eleven provincial commands. Special Action Forces (SAF) operate as quick-reaction forces

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Figure 32

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between the Regional and Provincial Commands. Each Regional Command is commanded by a Police Major General. (The SAF is discussed further in Annex 11.)

a. Locations and strength figures are as follows: (See Figure 33 on page 129)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Region I	Ayuthya	4,041
Region II	Chachoengsao	2,963
Region III	Nakhon Ratchasima	4,745
Region IV	Khon Kaen	5,795
Region V	Lampang	3,978
Region VI	Phitsanulok	4,142
Region VII	Nakhon Pathom	3,591
Region VIII	Nakhon Si Thammarat	3,144
Region IX	Songkhla	4,071

b. Chaiya Training Centers: In 1962 four counterinsurgency training centers were established and controlled at the regional level. The Thai word *Chaiya* means "victory," and the centers were designed to promote better Provincial Police morale, in addition to the training of vital subjects. Another center was formed in 1967. The centers, within the police regions, (below) are in the following provinces:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Province</u>
Region II	Chonburi Province
Region III	Nakhon Ratchasima Province
Region IV	Udon Thani Province
Region V	Chiengmai Province
Region IX	Pattani Province


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4. There are 69 Provincial Commands. The Office of the Superintendent of the Commands serves as the headquarters. The commands usually are commanded by a police colonel. The headquarters normally are co-located with the province chiefs at the province capital. Each of the 69 commands has a

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Figure 33



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Source: CIAD Analysis

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pistol range for use in training. The only provinces which do not have a Provincial Command are Phra Nakhon and Thon Buri, both of which are controlled by the Metropolitan Police Bureau.

5. There are approximately 666 district and subdistrict Provincial Police commands, which are controlled by the Provincial Commands. These normally are commanded by police captains, although in certain cases majors and lieutenants are in control. These were formerly the PP's lowest echelon. In 1966 the PP instituted the *Tambon* (cluster village) Police Program which, for the first time, institutionalized Royal Thai Government authority below district level. (The *Tambon* Police are discussed in Annex 10.)

6. Muban Police Force: While the *Tambon* Police Station is the lowest level of permanent police presence at this time, discussions are underway within the Thai National Police Department (TNPd) to form a *Muban* Police Force as well. The *muban* is the Thai equivalent of hamlet and is the smallest socio-political structure in the countryside. Most *mubans* are part of a larger political unit, the *tambon* or village, and are tied to it by economy, ethnology, history, and psychology. While most *mubans* are located within several hundred yards from each other, some are not physically separated in any way. Others may be as much as several miles apart. The TNPd foresees use of a *Muban* Police Force in areas where *Tambon* Police Forces are already emplaced. Manpower projections and budgetary considerations are likely to preclude deployment of this force for several years.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Provincial Police is the most incompetent and corrupt of all major elements of the Thai National Police Department and has a limited capability to perform its assigned mission and functions. It is also deficient in most support and operational aspects. The PP has improved in the past five years, and should continue to do so.

2. The Provincial Police organizational structure is patterned along the lines of national police forces throughout the world. It is basically sound except that, as with most Royal Thai Government agencies, it is top-heavy with staff positions. Administrative practices seem ill-managed, particularly with respect to over-staffed administrative positions, poor use of available personnel, negligible delegation of authority, and ineffective use of persons with outstanding ability. Local authority is negligible; inconsequential matters are routed through higher channels, finally reaching the Director General whose time is often misspent. Lack of regular inspections of facilities, personnel, and equipment, and actual operations continues, although there has been a significant improvement over the past three years. The PP presently is large enough to find a special inspection section operating out of PP Headquarters quite valuable.

3. Personnel level is a continual problem for the Provincial Police. In 1965 the strength figure was 28,000, the same as in 1954. Between these years, the population of Thailand grew approximately 28 per cent.

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Since 1965, PP authorized strength has risen to 36,963, an increase of about 25 per cent. It is evident that PP personnel levels have not increased proportionately with the population. Yet Thailand has experienced a developing insurgency and has need for increased police coverage. In particular, the PP will need an additional 12,000 men to staff those *tambon* stations presently under construction or projected through 1969. While the PP has projected 53,150 men by the end of 1970, budgetary and recruitment difficulties may limit this objective. In addition, the population movements from isolated villages into large, growing provincial towns will necessitate a heavier concentration of PP personnel in these locations. Increased urbanization in Thailand has led to a higher percentage crime increase than population growth.

4. Employment requirements of the Provincial Police are particularly low; few of the younger officers are university graduates. Physical requirements are lower than most Thai National Police Department elements. Promotion is based almost solely on longevity or, for the senior officers, from the proper political contacts. This provides little incentive for personnel to exert more than minimum effort and fosters the tendency to avoid controversial situations and opinions. Instructor personnel are particularly hard to keep, since they often are not promoted while serving at a training center.

5. As is true with other elements of the TNPd, Provincial Police pay scales are extremely inadequate. A constable is paid the same wage as a Bangkok bank clerk or a gardener. The temptations to which a policeman is exposed, coupled with a ridiculously low wage, encourages the very corruption that serves as the insurgents' most effective propaganda weapon. Corruption exists throughout the PP structure and, although this is not unusual within the TNPd, the level of corruption is higher than other TNPd elements. Reports from southern Thailand suggest that the PP may be more feared than either bandits or terrorists. The opening of *Tambon* Police Stations in the past two years has opened these areas to Royal Thai Government administration for the first time. It would be tragic for corruption to alienate the very persons whom the Royal Thai Government has sought to reach for so long. Movement toward reform, however, can only come from above.

6. Since 1962, the Provincial Police has made efforts to improve the training of its new recruits and its more experienced personnel. In 1962 the PP established its first *Chaiya* (Victory) school for this purpose. Since that time, a total of 19,537 students were graduated from the five schools by March 1968. In addition to the routine counterinsurgency course, the PP schools have initiated seminars in administrative techniques for 165 senior officers; classes in investigation techniques to station commanders, which 848 medium-level officers attended in 1964; and another course in command and planning responsibility, which another 210 district commanders attended.

7. The *Chaiya* Counterinsurgency Course is given to each Provincial Police recruit, and is now offered to all PP personnel. It consists of study of new weapons systems (including the M-79 grenade launcher), up-to-date

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police subjects and techniques, basic paramilitary training, small unit tactics, map, compass, and cross-country navigation, first aid, self aid and sanitation, communist theory and tactics, raids and ambushes, and public relations.

8. The Provincial Police has made recent efforts to provide trained instructors at each of the Provincial Commands to serve as in-service instructors. During the past two years, some Special Action Forces (SAF) personnel have fulfilled this function. In 1967 the Udorn and Chiangmai *Chaiya* Schools conducted instructor training classes for one officer and two non-commissioned officers from each province. These instructors are now serving in their home province. Each Provincial Command has instituted a Practical Pistol Course for officers and senior non-commissioned officers. Despite its improvements, the PP remains the poorest trained unit of the Thai National Police Department and has had to import Border Patrol Police personnel to improve the quality of instructors.

9. The Provincial Command Headquarters generally are well maintained. All are clean and neat. Personnel, for the most part, are courteous and helpful. All, however, suffer from the same lack of equipment (such as communications gear, transportation, weapons, and field gear). SAF communications equipment is satisfactory and most of the *Tambon* Police Stations are able to contact their Provincial Command at any time. Beyond that, Provincial Police communications facilities are not dependable. Most PP weapons are of US World War II vintage. The M-79 has only recently been introduced, and the PP believes it needs M-16's and light mortars. Funds for facility construction have increased significantly in the past three years, including the *Tambon* Police Stations, SAF barracks, and pistol ranges for each Provincial Command. Much remains to be done. The supplies that are available have poor storage facilities, and prisoner detention houses are inadequate.

10. Intelligence collection, coordination, collation, dissemination, and analysis are virtually nonexistent. Provincial Police commands have no separate personnel or sections which perform intelligence functions. PP sources report information which is forwarded in the rawest possible form, with little determination of source or information evaluation. The PP forwards some information to the joint counterinsurgency agencies, but this is on an informal and irregular basis. It is estimated that large amounts of valuable information are lost by not being reported or collated at each PP level of command. PP personnel are not trained in intelligence collection procedures. This is evident upon studying insurgent assassination targets throughout Thailand in the past two years. More police informants were killed than any other single group of people, including village chiefs. Many low-level Royal Thai Government agency personnel are used by the police, so it is possible that the police informant kill ratio is even higher than believed. In September 1966, for example, there were seven assassinations by insurgents in all of Thailand; six were police informants. This illustrates the obvious lack of intelligence training of the persons handling these sources. It is also likely that the few PP sources yet remaining will dry up once potential sources learn that intelligence reporting is a

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dangerous hobby as practiced by the PP. PP units often fail to exploit captives and those who surrender. In March 1968 the Thai National Police Department's Special Branch arrested a Vietnamese and turned him over to the PP for investigation and prosecution. Following an unsuccessful interrogation, the suspect was turned over to a local hospital to recover from his hectic interrogation. Several days later, he was assassinated in the hospital, allegedly by PP authorities who were disgruntled by his failure to talk. Cases of this type will encourage the Special Branch to conduct their own investigations, and add more tarnish to the already damaged Provincial Police name. The PP acknowledges its weaknesses in the intelligence field. In April 1969 the PP tried to establish guidelines and procedures for intelligence compilation when the Commissioner prepared and forwarded a report to all PP commanders. This material covers the selection and supervision of secret agents, the handling of police informants, the interrogation of arrestees and defectors, the gathering and handling of evidence, and reporting procedures. While the effort is no panacea, it is a start.

(16) Border Patrol Police (BPP)

(a) Mission

1. The Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) is the primary border security element of the Thai National Police Department (TNPD). It operates along all portions of the country's border with other nations, including Malaysia, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia. The inland zone is approximately 16 miles wide and almost 3,000 miles long. The BPP often operates beyond the inland zone.

2. The peacetime responsibilities of the BPP are border reconnaissance and security, bandit suppression, prevention of smuggling, prevention of illegal entry and exit, and collection of border information to support the countersubversion and counterinsurgency operations within their area of jurisdiction.

3. In wartime, control of the BPP reverts to the Ministry of Defense for the conduct of unconventional warfare activities.

(b) Functions

1. The BPP conducts offensive and defensive patrols, maintains a series of fixed bases, and operates an intelligence network in all of its assigned areas. Each of these activities is designed to identify and apprehend or destroy those elements which endanger the security of rural border areas. Specific activities include the following:

a. Suppressing all smuggling and other activities involving illegal entry and exit of the borders.

b. Identifying all areas of subversive activity, infiltration routes, and potential invasion points.

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c. Identifying possible hostile penetrations by neighboring countries against Thailand and reporting them to the military.

d. Monitoring and containing the diverse political and cultural groups living in the border regions, including the Kuomintang Chinese, Vietnamese, Chinese, Shans, Karens, Cambodians, and the several hundred other tribal groups; formulating a population identification system to assist control measures.

e. Collecting intelligence on all illegal uses of the border, particularly Thai and foreign insurgents.

2. The BPP forwards intelligence information collected in the border regions to the Provincial Police and the Joint Security Centers for processing and collation.

3. The BPP provides training and instructors to the PP and other TNPD elements at the direction of the Director, TNPD, or upon request and approval of the Commander, BPP.

4. The BPP formulates programs and concepts for establishing hill-tribe units to operate within the BPP and the Royal Thai Army (RTA).

5. The BPP trains irregular hill tribesmen in counterinsurgency operations, elementary military subjects, and intelligence operations for use as static defense forces based in tribal highland villages along the Thai border.

6. The BPP directs the activities of Meo Special Teams operating independently in the northern hills. These teams are directed to ambush moving insurgent units and assassinate insurgent personalities.

7. The BPP conducts joint insurgent suppression activities with elements of the Malaysian Police in BPP Region IX targeted against the Communist Terrorist Organization.

8. The BPP conducts joint counterinsurgency operations with other Royal Thai Government (RTG) units under the direct supervision of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) and the Royal Thai Army in BPP Regions III, IV, and V.

9. The BPP develops and implements programs designed to counter communist efforts in the border areas. It does so through a friendly, cooperative, and local populace in the hill-tribe and border areas. These people are firmly committed to Thailand and willing to support the Royal Thai Government in identifying, locating, and eliminating communist subversives in the border regions. In support of this effort, the BPP has organized development teams to perform the following activities:

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a. Creating hill-tribe school "systems," with BPP teachers, books, supplies, uniforms, displays of the Thai flag, RTG symbols, and royal family position and interests.

b. Providing medical programs by BPP patrols, schoolteachers, medical platoons, dispensaries, and development platoons.

c. Developing trading centers and buying/marketing cooperatives for villages formerly dependent on one or two moneylenders and markets.

d. Constructing roads, airfields, and basic water supplies, including pumps, sanitary wells, water storage, and catch basins.

e. Building small earthen dams for irrigation or water storage in the Northeast.

f. Clearing and plowing fields.

g. Breeding animals for local consumption and cash income.

h. Developing handicrafts, using such unique tribal talents as metalwork, needlework, or pottery for local consumption and cash sales.

i. Providing scholarships to young hilltribesmen for studies in various occupations needed by the BPP. In 1966, for example, the BPP trained one Meo and two Yaos in medical record-keeping and hospital procedures. These men subsequently were hired by the BPP.

10. The BPP maintains public dispensaries in each of its headquarters buildings for use by local residents.

11. The BPP maintains liaison with local hospitals and health centers (particularly the Chiangmai Medical School) to obtain medical training for BPP personnel.

12. The BPP publishes a newspaper containing development, educational, and security information for the use of BPP field elements.

13. In December 1967 the BPP in Region V conducted a Boy Scout Jamboree for hill-tribe students to foster better RTG-hill-tribe relationships.

14. In March 1967 BPP Headquarters' G2 Section presented an intelligence briefing on northern Thailand (with emphasis on communist activities among the hill tribes) to the Policy Planning Committee of the National Security Council. The Border Patrol Police probably has presented similar briefings in recent months to other Royal Thai Government agencies in view of the deteriorating security situation in the North.

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(c) Organization: (See Figure 34 on page 137)

1. The Border Patrol Police has been unit organized, trained, and equipped since its inception in 1952 as a specialized, self-contained police/paramilitary unit having integral communications and command. Known originally as the Gendarmerie Patrol Force, the BPP came under political suspicion following the 1957 coup, until 1961, when communist activities in the Northeast revived Royal Thai Government interest in the organization. The headquarters is located in Bangkok and the eight area commands correspond to Provincial Police (PP) regions which have borders with foreign territory (excluding only PP Region I). Each Area Command controls several BPP companies, which in turn control the BPP operational elements -- the 30-man platoons. Below that are some special BPP teams organized for specific purposes as needed.

2. The BPP is controlled administratively by the Provincial Police, although it has always had considerable autonomy. Since the formation of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), it has become virtually independent. BPP officials wish to separate from its parent organization. In June 1967 the National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board concluded that the BPP will remain under the Provincial Police so that personnel can be interchanged. The BPP has similar control over the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) which is operating semi-independently. (PARU is discussed in Annex 12.)

3. BPP strength has grown steadily in the past three years as its responsibilities for counterinsurgency have grown. By September 1969, anticipated strength was approximately 8,100 men; an additional 2,400 men will boost total strength by 1,500 by 1970.

4. The BPP staff and organizational elements are discussed in detail in Annex 13.

(d) Capabilities


1. The Border Patrol Police (BPP) is a comparatively well-trained and well-equipped counterinsurgency force, with a reasonable capability to fulfill its mission. The BPP is the most effective counterinsurgency force within the Thai National Police Department, with the single exception of the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) (See Annex 12). BPP intelligence operations are inadequate, but far superior to anything yet accomplished by the Provincial Police. Marked improvements have occurred in BPP operations during the past two years, and further progress can be expected with additional training. Royal Thai Government interest in BPP improvement and expansion was a direct result of concern by Royal Thai Government officials over external support to the Thai insurgency. As insurgency began in the border regions, and since Thai police paid lip service to a Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese "invasion" as the cause for the problem, the Thais concluded that closing the border would be a valuable counterinsurgency solution. This is particularly true in the northern regions.

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BORDER PATROL POLICE



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Figure 34

Source: USAID

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During the past three years, however, insurgency has developed in the interior areas of the country. Should this continue, the TNPD may assign large numbers of BPP personnel to the Provincial Police. Such a move would cause serious damage to the BPP, with only slight improvement to the PP capability.

2. Personnel

a. As with most RTG security agencies, a numbers problem exists in the BPP. The BPP was augmented by 3,600 in 1969 (an increase of over 50 per cent), but this will not greatly improve the ratio of border area/official coverage. At present, the BPP has only one operational individual per each mile and one-half of the border. Since the BPP concentrates large numbers in Areas III, IV, and V, much of the border along Areas VI and VII is extremely bare of BPP personnel. Organization of the hill-tribe village defense forces certainly will alleviate much of the problem in the North with only a small increase in BPP personnel.

b. The BPP has the most critical shortage of officer personnel on a percentage basis among the police units. One of the problems is motivation. Few officers graduating from the Police Academy make the BPP their first choice, unless motivated by a high degree of patriotism. The BPP living conditions are bad, the work dangerous, and the pay no better than a soft PP job. In October 1967 less than 70 per cent of the authorized officers in grades of lieutenant and captain were assigned. To meet this critical platoon leader shortage, the BPP is expected to receive 185 new officers in April 1970. This increment would alleviate much of the personnel problem, were it not for the non-commissioned officer depletion. In early 1969 the BPP trained 1,100 recruits. Only 20 new platoons were formed, however, because of the lack of leadership cadre.

c. In June 1967 the TNPD initiated steps to improve the stature of the PP. During the next two months, approximately 620 older, more experienced BPP non-commissioned officers were transferred to the PP. This brought the transferred yearly total to approximately 1,000. It was the intent of the Thai National Police Department that the BPP transfer one of their older men for each new recruit assigned. Personnel transferred have included acting platoon leaders, deputy platoon leaders, communications personnel, instructor cadre, police school teachers, and a variety of other key operational personnel. This procedure got the PP's Tambon Police Program off to a good start, but the loss of so many valuable non-commissioned officers has left a critical void in the BPP structure -- a void which can only be filled by training and experience over several years. The BPP has been able to maintain most of its existing capability. Should the trend of transfer continue, however, the BPP will become little more than a training ground for PP officers and men. The TNPD assumption has been that BPP personnel are better trained than the PP -- which is certainly true. TNPD's efforts to have new recruits assigned to the BPP for subsequent training is difficult to understand, considering the number of BPP teachers lost through transfers.

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3. Training

a. Border Patrol Police recruits are drawn from the Thai National Police Department Education Division, following six months of training in police duties. After joining the BPP, each recruit receives basic line platoon training, involving eight weeks of additional training which includes fundamentals in weapons, tactics, intelligence activities, and civic action. Most BPP recruits are then sent to the line platoons for several years of experience before they are assigned to more specialized units or receive additional training. Mobile line platoons, heavy weapons platoons, and the other BPP units require their own specialized training which is provided to each BPP man before his assignment.

b. The BPP Training School at Camp Saritsena, Pitsunalohe Province, offers training for the Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP). In 1967 the MRP received a 371-hour curriculum, including 21 subject areas. Subject areas and hours of the curriculum are as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours/Day</u>	<u>Hours/Night</u>
Weapons Utilization; Range Firing	52	4
Platoon Tactics	8	4
Squad Tactics	8	-
Counter-Ambush	8	-
Quick Assaults	8	4
Reconnaissance Patrols	12	8
Individual Scouting and Patrolling	8	4
Information Gathering, verbal and visual	8	-
Report Writing	8	-
Communist Operations in Thailand	20	2
Map Reading and Compass	32	8
Area Search	8	-
Seal and Search	12	-
Public Relations	8	-
Helicopter Operations	8	-
Campsite Selection	8	-
HT-1 Radio Operation	2	-
Sanitation and First Aid	6	-
Night Bivouac	-	16
Comprehensive Field Exercise	36	40
Physical Training	<u>21</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	281	90

c. In addition to the above, the medic assigned to each platoon was given another 40 hours in refresher training, including first aid, field medical practices, individual medical training, general sanitation, and personal hygiene. Guest lecturers, from BPP units actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations, gave several hours instruction on communist tactics. MRP training has continued to improve during the past two years. Value of the program is graphically illustrated by the Provincial Police effort to transfer BPP personnel into their own units, and assign new

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recruits to be trained by the BPP. Nevertheless, courses are often too long and slow down manpower requirements.

d. Much of the BPP training effort is designed to assist civic action efforts. For example, BPP personnel receive medical training before being assigned to Development Platoons. Each unit has its own medic who has received extensive training at the Public Health Center, the TNPd Police Hospital, and at various local Public Health Centers. Some hilltribesmen are selected by the development centers to receive similar training. BPP schoolteachers also receive a medical familiarization course.

e. BPP schoolteachers receive regular training cycles, particularly during the long, hot-season vacation period. Subjects include teaching techniques, use of training aids, agricultural techniques, and market procedures. Such refresher courses usually last about a month.

f. The Border Patrol Police also provides specialized training to its personnel in areas or subjects as needed. In 1966, for example, the BPP received its first increment of M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers, after which the BPP provided special training teams to units receiving these weapons. In 1967 four grenadiers (M-79) and four riflemen (M-16) were trained for each of the 114 line platoons. In April the BPP held a Platoon Management/Leadership Course for platoon and squad leaders. In October 1967 three BPP personnel attended a jumpmaster course and are now qualified to rig and airdrop cargo bundles for BPP units in isolated areas. Other personnel, particularly senior officers, attend courses of other police and military units, and also receive foreign training.

g. In 1969 the BPP expected to organize an Officers Candidate School, in part to eliminate their shortage of qualified junior officers. Furthermore, the BPP hopes to have established a permanent training site to conduct counterinsurgency-type field exercises.

4. Funds: The Thai National Police Department budget authorization for the Border Patrol Police is very insufficient, usually failing to cover even basic operational and maintenance needs. Allocation of per diem funds provides for BPP patrol activity 50 per cent of the time, and payments usually are many months behind. Low pay levels are regrettably consistent with other TNPd units.

5. Equipment

a. Logistical support for the Border Patrol Police generally is superior to any other operational police counterinsurgency element. The two major Thai National Police Department problems, communications and transportation, were alleviated in 1962 and 1963 respectively. In 1962 the BPP communications system was revamped. New up-to-date radios were set up at the Command Headquarters, Area Headquarters, and down to the platoon level. Operators were trained and spare parts were made available. Since that time, the BPP has continued to modernize its equipment, including

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the use of FM-5s, FM-1s, GPT-750 transmitters, Collins 51S1 receivers, and Delco 5300 transceivers. BPP presently have voice communications capability from squad to major headquarters, including platoon voice communications to helicopters operating with the BPP. Instruction and repair capabilities on radio equipment are excellent.

b. In 1963 the BPP received over 150 wheeled vehicles. Mostly Jeeps and Dodge station wagons, they replaced old, worn-out makes. The terrain features in the border areas make standardization of vehicular support difficult. In some cases, a bicycle is more valuable than a truck. Most BPP patrols can operate only by foot or helicopter. (Helicopter support remains a serious problem, but this will be discussed in the Aviation Division section, paragraph C, 3.)

c. Weapons and ammunition also are adequate. The M-16's and M-79's provide excellent firepower to the mobile line and line platoons. BPP quartermaster teams have organized an ammunition rotation system so that older ammunition is used up before it becomes obsolete or unserviceable. Imposition of new control procedures has resulted in much old material being distributed or destroyed. The problem of equipment storage is thus eased.

d. BPP construction depends upon the amount of funds available. Eight Mobile Reserve Platoon (MRP) barracks and an intelligence/communications training facility at BPP headquarters were recently completed. Other construction underway includes ten new line platoon sites, family housing, and other miscellaneous repairs and renovations. In 1969 the BPP intends to construct 32 company headquarters, 33 new line platoon sites, and five area radio stations.

6. Intelligence Activities

a. The Border Patrol Police places more emphasis on intelligence operations than any other police element except the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit or the Special Branch. There are several reasons for this. First, the BPP mission calls for monitoring of a border in which there are few Thai residents. This necessitates an informant system of non-Thais, which takes considerably more effort than routine Provincial Police (PP) nets. Another reason is that the BPP have experienced serious manpower deficiencies over the past few years, and this has required the BPP to depend more on hired observers. There have been some limited successes for BPP intelligence in the past few years, particularly in the northern hill-tribe areas. In November 1966 BPP agents identified Meo personnel who had received training in North Vietnam, and initiated collection missions against communist areas of the North. For a long time these reports were disregarded in official Royal Thai Government circles, until the first insurgent-initiated incidents occurred in early 1967. In February 1967 BPP agents provided information leading to the capture of several key insurgents. BPP intelligence personnel also began a population identification program in November 1966, which involved photographing and identifying all Meos in the North. This program was stopped in December, after only about 2,180 had been identified.

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b. Border Patrol Police (BPP) operations deteriorated once active insurgency began in the North. Several BPP agents were assassinated in June 1967, due to inefficient security procedures. As early as February 1967 the sources of information on Meo activities had already begun to dry up, mostly due to fear of insurgent reprisals. The BPP responded by attempting to improve its operation. In February 1967, a special ten-day training seminar on intelligence was begun in Area V. It was followed by similar classes in Areas III and IV. In March, BPP Headquarters began another ten-day course for 21 non-commissioned officers. The course was designed to make instructors out of the NCO's. In April the commander of BPP Area II ordered all platoon leaders to receive special intelligence training. In May BPP training programs for the MPR included a special 12 hours of instruction to two men from each MRP. Topics covered included interviewing, interrogation, and verbal elicitation. In June 1967 BPP personnel received further training designed to gain better intelligence coverage on communist activities in the mountainous hill-tribe areas of the North.

c. BPP Headquarters began a series of detailed classes in collection procedures in August 1967. The course involved six months of on-the-job training for area intelligence personnel in order to update G2 and S2 operations. Training also involved dissemination, collation, and analysis procedures as well.

d. With the reorganization and reorientation towards an aggressive counterinsurgency posture now under way, the BPP is increasing its production and dissemination of intelligence. It is expected that intelligence production will be multiplied and refined as a result of ongoing training programs and increased professionalism at BPP Headquarters (as well as at Area Command G2 Staffs). BPP success in the field is limited, but improving, despite the emphasis on low-level order-of-battle information. The single sophisticated counterintelligence success occurred in February 1968 in Khlong Yai District, Trat Province. BPP intelligence personnel there identified several residents who gathered intelligence and recruited agents for Cambodian officials. BPP intelligence operations are improving, and an increased professionalism is evident. This trend is expected to continue.

7. The BPP's reputation among the population varies according to area. In most cases, it is more highly regarded than the Provincial Police (PP) due to less BPP resupply activities among the villages. Despite the beneficial comparison, Border Patrol Police operations still leave much to be desired. Most of the northern population believes that BPP officials are moderately corrupt and heavily engaged in the opium trade. The commander of Area V was relieved for that very reason in June 1968. In 1966 and 1967 the BPP in Region IX were considered ineffective. While on patrol BPP platoon leaders played their radios at full volume and Malaysian officials with whom the BPP conducted operations concluded that any contacts between BPP patrols and the insurgents were either staged or happened by accident. In June 1967 documents captured in a terrorist camp implicated two senior BPP officials in an extensive insurgent penetration of the BPP. One of

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these officers was believed, but not proven, to be LTC Sompote, BPP Area IX Commander. At the same time, a female secretary of the BPP was supplying intelligence to the insurgents. Other penetrations came to light in August when it was discovered that a BPP lieutenant colonel was supplying arms and ammunition to the terrorists, and another BPP sergeant major was providing information for money. Although these are isolated incidents, they serve to illustrate that BPP operations tend to vary from region to region; on the whole, however, BPP is an effective organization. In Area VIII, for example, the BPP conducted vigorous patrols and compelled insurgents to severely curtail their activities during the same period of time as the penetrations were coming to light in Area IX. Further north, again in August 1967, the BPP was criticized for poor planning and inadequate intelligence while on a search-and-destroy operation in Prachuab Khiri Khan Province. In the Northeast, BPP units have been among the most effective in countering the insurgents along the Mekong River. Along the Cambodian border, the BPP has successfully prevented Cambodian terrorists from causing serious damage to Thai villages.

8. It is in the North that the BPP is facing its greatest test from communist insurgents. Since June 1967 the BPP has suffered serious casualties, in most cases resulting from ambushes of patrols. It appears, however, that BPP patrols are less likely to be the major insurgent target in the next year or so and that BPP will be able to test its Mobile Reserve Platoon (MRP) concept a little earlier than planned. On 2 December 1967, the BPP line platoon at Ban Huai Khon in Nan Province was attacked by insurgents. Two BPP personnel were killed and three were wounded. The attack followed a series of incidents which began on 26 October, involving advance intelligence on the insurgents presence in the area, carefully planned subsequent collection operations by the BPP, and reinforcements of the post. Despite this preparation, the insurgents inflicted casualties and captured a radio, suffering no casualties themselves. In April 1968 the BPP Border Patrol Center at Ban Huai Khu in Chiang Rai Province was over-run by an estimated 100 insurgents. Fifteen of the 17 defenders were killed and the enemy captured all of the platoon's equipment. The BPP had indications of an impending insurgent attack in this instance, but failed to reinforce its unit. The BPP reportedly asked the Royal Thai Army (RTA) to send a company, but no RTA units arrived. Reports are unclear as to why BPP Mobile Reserve Platoons were not dispatched to the platoon's assistance. Following the attack, the RTA sent a company to recover the bodies. The company was subsequently ambushed. Bodies were not recovered until 4 May 1968, 18 days later. BPP operations in 1969 were more effective despite increased insurgent strength in the region, although MRP are still airlifted too late into trouble zones and others conduct no operations once they reinforce a position. In some instances, the BPP is forced by circumstances to rely upon Royal Thai Army assistance when a unit is in trouble. In March 1969, for example, insurgents surrounded a BPP outpost on a mountaintop in Pua district of Nan Province. After a two-day siege (during which insurgents using a heavy volume of small arms fire halted helicopter reinforcements and supplies) the RTA managed to drop two platoons within one-half mile of the base. These units subsequently fought their way into the

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beseiged camp. While the action avoided a serious BPP disaster, it is not certain that it would have been possible if the insurgents had used heavy weapons against both the base and supporting aircraft. While there is little evidence that the terrorists have these weapons, it is also true that the BPP is not prepared to defend against them.

9. Past incidents are not necessarily indicative of the Mobile Reserve Platoon capabilities, but they serve as indictments of the system as it presently operates. The insurgents are expected to make similar attacks in the future to eliminate the Border Patrol Police -- and consequently the Royal Thai Government -- from the hills. A successful defense against these attacks is vital to the RTG's counterinsurgency efforts and to the morale of the BPP. The RTA Third Army's decision to abandon the hill area contiguous to the Laotian border, while reducing RTA casualties, is expected to have serious repercussions for BPP morale and its reputation among the population. It is further expected that BPP intelligence sources in these areas will cease until the BPP returns in strength to their areas.

10. The Border Security Volunteer Team (BSVT) concept has not yet been fully tested. Without the support of tribal villages, the BPP will have considerable difficulty maintaining even its present limited posture in the northern hills. BSVT should not be limited, as it is now, to refugee camps. Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) and Border Patrol Police (BPP) hesitation with the program is damaging both to the BPP and RTG reputations among the hill tribes. Access to intelligence sources, which such teams will develop, should be worth the expense by itself. Unfortunately, prejudice and foot-dragging at the Bangkok level is superseding the recommendations of BPP local commanders.

11. Future Border Patrol Police problems may develop in Region IX as a result of the May 1969 *Operation Eclipse*, formulated by the Royal Thai Government following requests for assistance from the Malaysian government during the racial riots. The BPP redeployed nine line platoons to cover known border-crossing points. This was an attempt to forestall Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) units from moving into Malaysia during the crisis. While these moves failed to provide an effective deterrent to any determined CTO attempt to cross the border, it may mark the end of a semi-truce between the CTO and the RTG. On 2 June 1969, a CTO force of unknown size attacked two of the Border Patrol Police units in the first known report of a CTO attack on an all-Thai force. This follows the 11 May effort by the CTO to recover one of its base camps lost to the BPP and Malaysian forces. While CTO aggressiveness may diminish after the difficulties in Malaysia subside and BPP forces return to routine positions, it is unlikely that CTO-RTG relationships can again return to their former casual state. These recent incidents may mark a change of CTO policy with regard to the inviolability of Thai forces.

(17) Signal Division

(a) Mission: The Signal or Communications Division of the Thai National Police Department is responsible for all radio and telecommunications

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support to all TNPD elements. This includes planning, training, procurement, installation, and maintenance activities.

(b) Functions

1. The Signal Division plans and formulates policy for the establishment and expansion of an integrated telecommunications system for the TNPD.

2. The division maintains and supports a central repair facility in Bangkok, and smaller repair facilities in each of the nine police regions.

3. The Signal Division is developing and installing a system of emergency communication between the TNPD Operations Center, the Provincial Police (PP) Headquarters, the Metropolitan Police Bureau, the Crime Suppression Division (CSD), the Special Branch (SB), Fire Brigade, and the Signal Division.

4. The division is responsible for the installation and maintenance of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) Village Radio Project. The Department of Local Administration (DOLA), also of the Ministry of Interior, has the operating responsibility.

5. The Signal Division instructs and demonstrates radio installation methods to personnel of the Department of Local Administration and the Village Protection Units.

6. It trains police personnel in radio operations and telecommunications procedures.

7. The division performs maintenance checks on all Highway Patrol Police (HPP) and Marine Police (MP) equipment as required, and directs the activities of regional radio inspection teams in other TNPD units.

8. The Signal Division is responsible for planning and monitoring radio security regulations and procedures.

9. It conducts surveys for TNPD elements to select suitable locations for police checkpoints using communications equipment.

(c) Organization

1. The Signal Division is located within the Thai National Police Department (TNPD) compound in Bangkok. The division directs several subordinate elements, including a Depot Repair Shop, the Mobile Repair Shop headquarters, and the Warehouse Central Depot. In addition, the division is responsible for the Radio School and for manning and maintaining the TNPD's Central Message Center. Authorized Signal Division spaces outnumber positions filled, 616 to 514.

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2. Several signal elements operate in the field with the division's assistance and, in some cases, control. These are the Regional Repair shops, the Regional Inspection Teams, and the Radio Installation Teams. The latter are responsible for installing radios for the Village Radio Project, in addition to routine TNPD assignments.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Signal Division has received concentrated attention from the TNPD during the past three years and has developed an adequate repair and maintenance capability. Personnel strength now is sufficient and training is greatly improved, although technical competence needs constant improvement. The TNPD's recent authorization for the division to recruit police personnel directly from the technical colleges has improved the personnel situation.

2. The division's primary success has been in distribution of superior equipment to the TNPD operational elements. The Provincial Police (PP) is now receiving 3,146 FM-5 radios, 2,330 FM-1 radios, 121 HT-2 ground-to-air radios, and 417 single side band radios. The Marine Police has sufficient communications equipment both on shore and on their patrol vessels. The Metropolitan Police Bureau is in the process of developing a highly competent radio capability which will enable far more effective use of existing equipment.

3. The Crime Suppression Division, the Highway Patrol, and the Railway Police are also receiving valuable assistance from the Signal Division. Plans have been made for division assistance to the Air Division. Division personnel have been assigned to the Education Bureau to provide direct technical training assistance on telecommunications procedures to specialized TNPD personnel.

4. Phase I of the Village Radio Project and Phase I of the *Tambon* Police Program were completed in February and March 1968, respectively. A total of 1,449 radios were installed in the former and 580 in the latter. Phase II of the Village Radio Project presently is about 42 per cent complete (October 1968) and the *Tambon* Police Program is about 26 per cent complete.

(18) The Alien Registration and Taxation Division handles all matters pertaining to aliens (including Vietnamese and Chinese) and affixes and collects taxes owed by them. This division, however, does not interfere with the Special Branch's role over the Vietnamese refugees and the Chinese community. It has 156 men.

(19) Inspector General (IG)

(a) Mission: The Inspector General's Office is responsible for the inspection and evaluation of police units and activities throughout the country to determine effective compliance with Thai National Police Department rules and regulations.

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(b) Functions

1. The Inspector General (IG) supervises several eight-man inspection teams which are used to conduct meaningful and thorough inspections of as many TNPd divisions as possible.

2. The Office of the Inspector General reports the results of its evaluations and makes the proper recommendations to the Director General, TNPd, regarding improvement of police morale, efficiency, administration, and operations.

3. The IG evaluates security conditions and recommends measures to effectively counter threats of insurgency, subversion, and sabotage. In November 1966 the Inspector General conducted a comprehensive study of the Provincial Police (PP) as requested by the TNPd Director General. The study recommended that the PP establish an intelligence officer position throughout its organizational set-up, that the Provincial Police develop a decoration to be awarded to police personnel killed or wounded in action against communist terrorists, and that all commissioners, region commanders, provincial commanders, and their deputies receive staff and command training.

5. The Inspector General performs other functions as directed by the Director General. These may or may not involve inspection functions.

(c) Capabilities

1. The Royal Decree establishing the Office of the Inspector General granted considerable authority and responsibility. Most of the authority has been removed by order of the Director General. Consequently, the capability of the Inspector General depends for the most part on his personal relationship with the Director General. For example, an IG could cause serious embarrassment to the TNPd and its director were he to investigate charges of corruption and malfeasance in the TNPd with too much zeal. If the IG establishes a close relationship with the Director General and carefully balances his responsibilities, the office can perform a valuable service.

2. The Office of the Inspector General hopes to inspect all major police units and all TNPd divisions twice annually. In June 1968, however, the IG had only 78 men. This figure will have to be increased before the IG can achieve this capability.

(20) Crime Suppression Division (CSD)

(a) Mission

1. The Crime Suppression Division (CSD) is responsible for dealing with those significant crimes demanding extensive investigative work, time, and personnel beyond the abilities of local police forces to handle.

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2. CSD, along with the Thai National Police Department (TNPD) Special Branch (SB) and the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) has responsibility for protection of the royal family, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and other ranking officials and foreign dignitaries.

(b) Functions

1. Before 1963, data on the functions of the Crime Suppression Division (CSD) were not available. The only clear belief was that the CSD had responsibilities beyond simple police activities. Many members of the TNPD resented and feared CSD's power to invade normal functions of other agencies.

2. Following the death of General Sarit, the mentor of CSD's authority, a clearer delineation of CSD's functions became apparent. The jurisdiction of CSD is country-wide and involves conducting investigations of the following specific violations:

a. Any offense involving a national or foreign dignitary (the definition of "dignitary" is determined by the CSD, or by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister)

b. Property losses over a specified amount

c. Tax evasion

d. Black market operations involving commodities of high consumer demand

e. Narcotics sales, consumption, and transportation

f. Corruption of Royal Thai Government (RTG) personnel

g. Misfeasance or malfeasance of police and other RTG personnel.

3. CSD maintains a police unit equipped with transportation, communications, and weapons. Trained in riot-control techniques, the CSD police unit assists other police divisions in controlling riots, demonstrations, and related disturbances.

4. CSD maintains a police patrol in Bangkok to handle violations involving foreign civilian and military personnel.

5. CSD conducts other investigations as directed by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister.

6. CSD handled all matters involving personnel of foreign nations engaged in activities related to the Asian Games held in December 1966.

7. CSD assisted in the formation and implementation of plans and procedures dealing with the protection of US President Johnson in October 1966.

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8. CSD played a large part in the apprehension of 33 key members of the Communist Party of Thailand near Bangkok in August 1967.

(c) Organization

1. The Crime Suppression Division has only recently developed into a legitimate police organization. In past years, the CSD performed more political functions than those attributed to a police element. Corruption permeated all sections of CSD, and the unit was poorly regarded by both the population and other police elements.

2. CSD is an element of the Central Investigation Bureau of the Thai National Police Department (TNPD). Little information presently is available on the organization of CSD, but the following components are believed to exist at CSD Headquarters level:

a. Administrative Section

b. Logistics Section

c. Intelligence Section

d. Communications Section

e. Investigations Section

3. The organization of CSD operational elements is not known. Since CSD has nation-wide responsibility and acts as a standby force of ready reserves used to augment both the Metropolitan Police Bureau and the Provincial Police (PP), it probably has a regional breakdown similar to other police units. If this is the case, CSD would have ten regions (one regional subdivision for each Provincial Police region and one for the Bangkok area). Current authorized strength is 1,200 persons, of which 1,043 were assigned in June 1968.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Crime Suppression Division has had some spectacular successes. Each one has been duly reported in the press, due to the nature of cases assigned to the CSD. The press has not described some of the major failures of CSD investigations which occur with almost the same frequency. Consequently, a poor public image (which has restricted CSD's operations in the past) has dissipated. Political overtones to CSD's operations also have diminished since the present regime has been in power. This has limited other police opposition to CSD.

2. Training

a. In 1965, 86 CSD non-commissioned officers attended a two-week course in patrol techniques, investigations, and report writing. Fifty men attended

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a similar course in October 1966. Since that time, however, few of CSD's personnel have received further training in other than technical functions. Some probably have received training in other police units and subsequently transferred into CSD, but this number is small. Due to the type of cases assigned to CSD, personnel require extensive training in investigation techniques and use of sophisticated modern detection devices. Lack of this training reduces CSD's investigative capability.

b. Personnel of the logistics element and communications section have received limited training in technical matters pertaining to equipment utilization and repair.

3. Equipment

a. In 1966 CSD received six FM-1 radios and one VHF-FM 120 watt base station. In 1967 CSD obtained twenty-eight 30-watt VHF-FM mobile radios, ten FM-1 radios, and ten FM-5 radios. All of CSD's existing communications equipment was overhauled, and a 90-foot tower with high-gain antenna installed for use with the division's Bangkok base station. Construction of this station was completed in November 1967. All of the above has helped CSD establish an independent communications system. This system is necessary due to the specialized and sensitive nature of CSD operations, particularly the political ramifications of many of their investigations and operations involving other police services.

b. In October 1966 CSD obtained riot control equipment and supplies, including tear gas and gas masks.

4. The Crime Suppression Division needs additional vehicles, vehicular maintenance equipment, new maintenance facilities, and additional training for unit personnel engaged in vehicle maintenance. In past years, CSD operations have been hindered by lack of mobility.

5. Many of CSD's operational weaknesses are due to lack of sophisticated training in modern crime detection devices and techniques, as well as lack of equipment. Laboratory equipment for use in collection and preservation of evidence, and an increased fingerprint capability, would be invaluable. CSD personnel require immediate training in counterinsurgency, counter-subversion, intelligence collection techniques, management and personnel procedures, and modern techniques of crime investigation.

6. The Intelligence Section of CSD apparently is more capable than similar elements in other police units. This may be due, however, to a larger amount of information received from the local populace than to effective intelligence collection operations. CSD currently is developing a national reputation for quick reaction to information supplied by the population. In September 1967 CSD acted on a tip and arrested members of a gold-smuggling ring. In another case, a car-smuggling gang was apprehended. This section contributed to the 1967 break-up of the Communist Party of Thailand hierarchy.

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7. CSD functions could be more adequately accomplished if CSD elements were integrated into the Metropolitan Police Bureau and Provincial Police, but its responsibilities in investigation of police agencies and its handling of cases involving political matters militate against the likelihood that integration will ever occur. Nevertheless, CSD contributes to the important areas of counterinsurgency and countersubversion by reducing and/or eliminating sources and causes of subversive-insurgent propaganda. It further assists Royal Thai Government efforts to win and maintain the confidence of the people in their government. In 1968 CSD successfully solved a case involving the murder of a blonde, female Danish model in Saraburi Province. This case was given considerable publicity. Also in 1968, however, CSD failed to solve the murder of a Thai prostitute near Takhli Air Base. The communists made effective use of this failure in their propaganda operations. In June 1968 the CSD foiled a gang's efforts to provide false documentation to Thai nationals seeking employment on RTG military bases. This discovery was particularly valuable since large numbers of communists could have used this forgery ring to infiltrate agents into these installations.

(21) Special Branch

(a) Mission: The Thai National Police Department (TNPd) Special Branch (SB) is the principal internal security service of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The SB has broad and clearly defined internal security responsibilities, including the protection of the nation from attempts to subvert its officials and people. The SB also protects the King, senior officials, and visiting foreign dignitaries. Virtually autonomous, it wields considerable police and political power.

(b) Functions

1. The Special Branch (SB) represents the TNPd's primary mechanism for attacking the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and its front groups at the leadership level. Long-range, high-grade agent operations and arrest powers are used to meet these ends.

2. The branch investigates known or suspected subversives and their activities among Thai nationals, as determined by the Director General of the Thai National Police Department.

3. The SB monitors the activities of all aliens (particularly the Chinese) in Thailand.

4. The Special Branch mans (and often directs) counterintelligence and countersubversive operations performed by the Joint Security Centers (JSC) and the Civil-Police-Military (CPM) units (Annex 1 and 2, respectively) under Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) control.

5. The SB monitors the content of all publications in Thailand to detect direct or potential opposition to the regime. While censorship

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laws do not exist, the branch is able to exert considerable pressure on political deviants.

6. The SB conducts stationary, mobile, audio, and technical surveillance of designated targets, particularly against personnel and installations of foreign governments.

7. The branch conducts mail-intercept operations on a very selected basis. Most involve international air traffic, originating in Communist China, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and the USSR.

8. The SB maintains one telephone monitoring unit with a 15-line capacity.

9. The SB controls all Thai means of registration, including personal identification cards, resident permits, vehicular controls, business firm records, hotel records, and publishing licenses.

10. The SB collects a considerable amount of counterintelligence information on Soviet and satellite personnel and installations.

11. The SB maintains liaison with intelligence services of the Government of the Republic of China, Kingdom of Laos, Republic of Vietnam, Federation of Malaysia (through the Regional Border Committee), and the Republic of the Philippines.

12. In August 1967 the Special Branch arrested 35 members of the Communist Party of Thailand hierarchy, following a four-year covert operation. Details of this operation are provided in paragraph (d) 6. below.

13. In early 1968 the SB prepared an intelligence assessment of illegal Chinese immigration into Thailand at the request of the National Security Council (NSC). A clear and concise document, this study resulted in improved methods of population control and improved coordination between services.

14. In mid-1968, the branch was providing direct financial support to political figures long associated with the left wing and Communist China. During the 1968 elections, the branch may have arranged to establish a dummy opposition to the government party as a move to control political rivals. The SB may also be penetrating political groupings which have subsequently developed within the National Assembly.

15. In late 1968 the Special Branch conducted a joint operation with the Military Security Service of the Republic of Vietnam. This operation involved the transfer of detained overseas Vietnamese refugees in Thailand to the Republic of Vietnam. Additional operations are likely.

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(c) Organization

1. The Special Branch is organizationally a part of the Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) of the Thai National Police Department. It is headed by Police Major General Chatwangun, one of the most competent Thai intelligence officials regarding clandestine operations and communism. The 1,600-man Special Branch has seven divisions and three special units. (See Figure 35 on page 154)

2. Division I monitors the activities of all foreigners in-country with the exception of Chinese and Vietnamese, who are handled by other SB elements. It has four sections:

a. Section 1 deals with aliens from Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

b. Section 2 is responsible for Soviet and satellite officials, Middle East nationals, stateless persons, and nationals of countries without diplomatic ties with Thailand.

c. Section 3 handles aliens from the Asian continent.

d. Section 4 has the assigned responsibility of conducting counterespionage operations against countries with contiguous borders. The scope of this section's activities, however, is found more on paper than in fact.

3. Division II investigates subversive activities among the Thai populace. It is often referred to as the "political police" because of its role in detecting resistance to the regime in power. It also operates among the press and in labor.

4. Division III monitors the activities, membership, and opinions of all non-governmental associations and publication/communications media. It maintains complete files on each organization and provide these to other elements of the SB upon request. All new enterprises require police permission in order to operate; this division grants or refuses that permission according to available information. It monitors publications and radio and television broadcasts for subject matter hostile to the regime. If necessary, this division will exert pressure on offenders until objectionable items are removed.

5. Division IV is charged with the physical security of the King, diplomatic, and visiting officials. It also operates the Special Branch prison (Bang Khwang in Bangkok). This division is believed to be involved in far more political activity than its mission would indicate.

6. Division V is responsible for the supervision and control of the Chinese community throughout Thailand. While the division primarily is concerned with subversive activity, it makes little distinction between


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political subversion and cultural association with the mainland. It monitors all travel, legal and illegal, between Thailand and Communist China. It controls all registration procedures for Chinese schools, labor movements, newspapers, industries, and businesses; individuals also are required to register. The division conducts counterintelligence operations in Region IX against the Chinese dominated Communist Terrorist Organization. Graft developed by this division may surpass that by any other element of any other Thai intelligence and security service.

7. Division VI is responsible for investigating all pro-communist activities in Thailand. This division was formed in October 1959 as the Special Unit for Communist Suppression. This division probably is the most competent of all Thai investigative agencies dealing with the communist threat in Thailand; for example, it planned and implemented the highly successful high-level penetration operation against the Communist Party of Thailand in 1967. Its functions necessarily overlap those of the other divisions in the branch, and it is believed that Division VI dominates all conflicts over jurisdiction involving communist subversion. The other divisions, however, would probably supersede Division VI in matters having serious political ramifications. It has the following sections:

- a. Section 1 - Central Registration and Dossiers
- b. Section 2 - Thai Communist Activities
- c. Section 3 - Chinese Communist Activities
- d. Section 4 - Communist Activities in Neighboring Countries
- e. Section 5 - Communist Activities of the Soviet Union and Its Satellites
- f. Section 6 - Technical Support

8. Division VII has the same function as Division VI, but with a provincial geographic responsibility. The division was established in 1962 as a professional investigative organization to monitor CPT operations in areas of the country outside Bangkok. While it is recognized within the Thai intelligence community as an important collection unit, it does not have the favorable reputation of a high-level penetrant capability that Division VI has. Division VII was designed to support low-level operations against the CPT in conjunction with other Thai intelligence and security services. Division VII, for example, contributes manpower to the Joint Security Centers. Special Branch officers accompany the Royal Thai Army and other police units in the field on countersubversion operations. Acting as interrogators, they are familiar with CPT organizations and personalities. Division VII uses about 40 field offices located in Regions III, IV, V, VIII, and IX, out of which it directs intelligence operations. In 1968 the Special Branch explored possibilities of establishing offices in Regions II and VI but no decisions were reached. Rivalries with the Royal Thai Army

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resulted in the withdrawal of all SB personnel from Region VII in September 1967. Most Division VII field offices are poorly staffed and assigned personnel have been ineffective in their counterinsurgency role.

9. The Information Branch is the technical support section of the SB. It provides translations, photographic assistance, technical and surveillance operational support, and customs assistance to other SB divisions. As a by-product of its technical surveillance function, it collects considerable counterintelligence information on Soviet and satellite personnel and installations.

10. The Vietnamese Branch controls the movement and activities of Vietnamese residents of Thailand. It has several low-level penetrants in the local Vietnamese communist organizations and is particularly concerned with population control measures. While its function is primarily internal, it also runs some operations against North Vietnam through Vietnamese residents.

11. The Mail Intercept Unit spot checks international air mail originating in areas of potential subversive threats to Thailand. It further provides letter drops for all Special Branch divisions.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Special Branch (SB) has the best capability for covert counterintelligence operations and intelligence collection operations targeted within present national boundaries of all Thai intelligence and security services. The SB has the most capable personnel and provides the best training. It is able to provide the greatest operational security, a major problem in Thailand. This favorable assessment, however, demands immediate qualification. While the SB has the best personnel and training, it also has some of the worst individuals and most poorly trained. While it can perform some specific missions well, most SB operations are low-level and poorly planned. While security can be excellent, as in the Communist Party of Thailand Central Committee and the Vietnamese Refugee transfer cases, it is generally poor. Capability varies from division to division and section to section. On the one hand, the SB has performed superbly under stress, but on the other, it has experienced incompetence, disinterest, and corruption.

2. The Special Branch has extensive files relating to its general mission and its own personnel. Some files are cross-references, but the majority are not. All SB investigations and other documents are assigned file numbers and kept in numerical order. There is no central filing system. SB officers often keep personal file cards on persons of interest to them personally. Since each division and section keeps its own files, their nature and extent are determined by the various chiefs. Some SB officers keep files in their homes, particularly in cases involving information useful in blackmail situations or in dealing with political matters. Some files of this type are destroyed rather than handed over

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to a replacement. In mid-1968, the SB obtained equipment for a modern retrieval system. Microfilm was used as a central file repository. The development of this file system will be a slow process due to SB personnel resistance in releasing information on matters of a political nature. Division and section autonomy, coupled with paternalistic hiring practices, encourages the distrust and empire-building which is damaging to the formation of a real central filing system. Of all SB elements, the Information Branch has compiled the most thorough and accessible files repository. Since about 1962, it has gradually built up a considerable file based on information collected from its own telephone taps, shipping manifests, customs and immigration documentation, and certain other records provided by other SB divisions. The Information Branch also has established a file-check service of its own files and those of the other SB elements. It is probable that the Information Branch has, or has access to, almost all available information within SB that does not deal with criminal, intelligence, and political information. While by no means satisfactory, the Information Branch may provide a compromise between operational need and practical considerations. Use of modern ADP systems will be valuable to the SB, but it will not solve all of the branch's filing problems.

3. Personnel are assigned to the Special Branch (SB) from several sources. Some are routinely sent to the SB following graduation from the Thai National Police Academy, Investigation School, and the Samran Detective School. Others arrive directly from basic training to meet SB quotas. Many personnel seek out the SB, but usually for the wrong reasons. The intelligent and ambitious young officer rarely wishes to serve the SB for honor and country; instead, he often is cognizant of the almost unlimited opportunities for graft and corruption within the SB. Low salaries and minimal per diem allowances for junior officers encourage susceptibility to corruption. Graft also is the basis for another source of SB recruits. While all officers intended for the SB must be acceptable to the commander and division chief, often friends and relatives of high government and military officials are accepted so as not to offend the requesting official. Important officials in Thailand often are responsible for a large number of relatives and friends of political allies. A successful appointment to the SB relieves an official of that responsibility. A few men with special qualifications are selected for these abilities, particularly young men with language proficiency or who have attended professional intelligence training abroad. The latter, however, usually receive this training because of political or family ties. Despite these difficulties, there has been an increasing number of well-trained professional intelligence operatives working in the SB.

4. Since 1961, the Special Branch has made significant progress in the development of a relatively high degree of technical capability. Most of this capability is concentrated within the Information Branch, which has seven radio-controlled surveillance vehicles, telephone monitoring facilities, audio-surveillance devices, and audio countermeasure equipment. Only a limited number of select personnel have received the required training for their use; those that have this training perform well. The

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Information Branch also has a limited but excellent capability in the use of cameras for surveillance (as do Divisions V, VI, and VII). Technical capability within the SB can be expected to improve as more personnel are trained and as more equipment is made available.

5. SB agent operations are poor to fair, with a very rare operation that approaches excellence. There appear to be no prescribed procedures for the recruiting and training of agents and informants. Each SB case officer uses his own judgment and techniques. Many informants or agent recruits previously have been arrested for crimes and placed on parole following their agreement to cooperate. These are used for low-level penetrations, but rarely receive the necessary training for subsequent development. Training of agents is the responsibility of each case officer. The professional caliber of this training generally is low. Most SB operations are based on low-level informants who have a semiofficial position with the government. There are few pre-planned agent operations. Informants are handled loosely. They are not carefully checked and evaluated. For the most part, they are controlled only by financial remunerations or the threat of arrest and exposure. SB security procedures, especially in the Division VII up-country operations, are grossly inferior. Most informants linger in the SB compound to report directly to the case officer; some clandestine meetings are held at a popular local coffeehouse or at the case officer's home. Since the case officer is well known in the local community, this provides minimal security. Indications of poor security procedures by SB have increased substantially during the initial stages of the insurgency. While most agents and police informants assassinated by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) have belonged to the Provincial Police, Border Patrol Police, or the civil officials, an inordinate number have been SB agents. In 1967 two Special Branch case officers, one the acting chief of the SB unit in Chumphon Province, were murdered by communist terrorists. This occurred only two weeks after the two had reported on the identities of top local communists. The SB rarely attempts to evaluate their sources to weed out false agents and dual agents. Division VII operations are probably the worst. Too many of its case officers become embroiled in the prosecution process, to the detriment of intelligence collection. A Thai legal requirement that SB officers must testify in court hinders the SB's clandestine efforts. SB's direct participation in counterinsurgency also is damaging to covert operations. The most significant weakness of Division VII, however, is its dependence on case officers who have received only the most basic training in clandestine intelligence operations. Consequently, morale is low among SB officers in the field. Improvements in SB operations are consistent but very slow.

6. In 1967 Special Branch (SB) Division VI surfaced a four-year operation and pulled off a major *coup* against the Communist Party of Thailand. The operation, which showed excellent use of basic tradecraft tools, was successful mainly because of the professionalism, training, and dedication of a comparatively small group of officers within the Special Branch. While it should not be indicative of general SB operations, it illustrates the SB potential if given the proper advice, training, personnel, and support.

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The operation began in 1961 when Division VI recruited a low-level CPT member of a local union. During the next two years, this man was developed into an excellent source of information. By 1965 the Thai National Police Department (TNPD) wished to pick up CPT front group members identified in the operation. The SB, however, recognized his long-term value. In 1966 the agent identified a high-level member of the CPT responsible for directing political action of CPT cells. The SB initiated intensive surveillance of the CPT officer. In July the SB agent reported that the CPT official was drinking heavily and was tired of party work; the SB began formulating plans to recruit him. In January the CPT official was arrested secretly, confronted with the SB's complete record of his activities, and approached for recruitment. He broke down immediately and agreed to work with the SB. He was permitted to return home under covert escort, and gave his wife a cover story to explain a temporary absence. During subsequent debriefings at an SB safehouse, the CPT official revealed he had been used as a liaison officer between several key members of the CPT Central Committee. (The CPT had party leaders controlling insurgent groups and other operations in 1964, thereby breaking its own rules on compartmentation of party activities.) At this time, the SB decided they had a potential long-term double agent. The agent was permitted to return home. For the next six months, he reported movements of top CPT leaders to the SB. The Division VI staked out the homes of identified individuals, including the Central Committee member directing party activities in the Northeast. The double agent also established contact with all CPT members he knew while under SB surveillance. Within a short time, the SB began to formulate plans for a mass arrest. This operation began on 30 August 1967 with the secret arrest of a CPT penetrant of the SB who had been identified by the CPT official. Under immediate interrogation by the Commander of the Special Branch, his superior's name was added to the arrest list. For the next 24 hours, only five SB officers knew of the arrest plans. The task force was informed they were organizing to provide protection to the royal family, a routine SB function. On the following day, the SB dispatched 31 three-man teams to arrest the CPT targets; five teams were kept in readiness to react to information supplied from initial interrogations of the prisoners. Thirty-five party members were arrested (one escaped), including the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), four members of the Central Committee, the leader of the CPT apparatus that had the mission of penetration of the Royal Thai Government (RTG), a penetrant of the Special Branch and four other government penetration agents, members of a Bangkok-based terrorist group, and 11 other CPT officials. Apart from the evident damage this operation caused the CPT, it is remarkable as an example of a professional intelligence operation. SB planning, implementation, and security were flawless throughout the mission. The operation indicates what is possible for most Thai intelligence and security services when they are supported by high-level interest and professional intelligence training.

7. The Special Branch (SB) is capable of circumscribing Soviet intelligence operations in the Bangkok area. While the SB cannot be termed a sophisticated counterintelligence organization, its capability in audio-surveillance and vehicular-surveillance is good (despite being undermanned). It is unlikely, however, that the SB could adequately handle a

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large influx of Soviet and satellite intelligence personnel without substantial increases in personnel and equipment. Certain factors assist the SB in its operations against Soviet intelligence. These are as follows:

a. Reluctance of the Thai people to deal with Soviet personnel, who are generally viewed with suspicion and distrust.

b. Fear of SB repression of individuals associating with Soviets.

c. Basic Thai patriotism, which encourages the voluntary reporting of suspicious contacts to the police.

d. SB restriction of Soviet personnel, for the most part, to the Bangkok area, and the present Thai policy discouraging Soviet cultural and propaganda activities.

8. Special Branch handling of the overseas Vietnamese community provides examples of both its weaknesses and strengths. SB penetration of the Vietnamese residents in the Northeast generally is poor; there are several low-level informants, but only a few genuine penetrants of the clandestine refugee organization which is controlled from North Vietnam. Communication between Vietnamese residents and North Vietnam is monitored more successfully, partially because this represents a clearer threat to the Thai intelligence officers handling the Vietnamese. Corruption is very evident in the Vietnamese Branch. Most Vietnamese businessmen are required to pay off the SB officials, and more information collected is used to support SB bribery than in countering the subversive threat. Information on the SB arrest plans for top refugee leaders may have been divulged covertly to the Vietnamese community to protect this illicit source of funds. Nevertheless (as in the CPT case described above) the SB illustrated a remarkable capability to plan and implement a secure operation when high-level interest was involved. In September 1968, 100 Vietnamese refugees were moved out of their Korat prison to a Royal Thai Air Force base and transported by air to the Republic of Vietnam. For several days after this operation was successfully carried out, not even local officials were aware of what had happened.

9. As stated above, corruption pervades the entire Special Branch structure. Corruption provides a large portion of the income of SB personnel. Corruption procedures are well organized. In Division V (the most corrupt SB element) the top Special Branch personnel are paid off by the richest Chinese businessmen in Bangkok. Lesser SB officers are paid by less well-to-do Chinese in a well-developed pecking order. A basic sense of patriotism among the Thai, however, negates some of the damaging effects of corruption. For example, while a branch officer may be willing to accept payment from a Chinese engaged in illegal commercial activities, he would probably be horrified at the thought of accepting a bribe from a hostile intelligence service or a local communist official. Nevertheless, the opportunities which corruption provides to subversive organizations and hostile intelligence services are considerable.

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10. The official and unofficial political responsibilities of the Special Branch seriously damage its capability to direct operations against real subversive organizations and hostile intelligence services. Since any political opposition, including that permitted under the 1968 Constitution, must necessarily be considered subversive by the present military regime, far too much of the SB's time and resources are spent investigating known or suspected anti-regime personalities. Its responsibilities in investigating other intelligence services, particularly those of the Royal Thai Army, hinder any effective liaison between the two. Coup detection is likely to be more personally rewarding to an SB officer's career than communist detection.

11. There is considerable overlap of jurisdiction and lack of coordination between the SB and other security services. Information of mutual interest is exchanged on a haphazard basis, if at all. Relationships reflect broad rivalries and personality conflicts, particularly between the army and police. The SB's tendency to handle things "close to the vest" is even more pronounced when dealing with another service. Jealousies are particularly prevalent in the provinces where other police elements and military units resent SB incursions into what they consider their private jurisdictions. Integrated training courses under the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) and the Joint Security Centers (JSC) structure have alleviated some of the problems. Nevertheless, unnecessary duplication and unproductive competition between the SB and the other services is serious. In recent months, the SB, which has had an important role in the development of CSOD, has been strongly critical of JSC interference in SB affairs.

(22) Criminal Records Office (CRO)

(a) Mission: The Criminal Records Office (CRO) is responsible for nation-wide recording, filing, retrieving, and disseminating on/of criminal records and identification information.

(b) Functions

1. The CRO maintains technical operational control over, and provides technical assistance to, the Regional Records and Identification units of the Provincial Police.

2. The CRO provides information to, and answers queries from, the Provincial Police, the Border Patrol Police, the Special Branch, and all other operational elements of the Thai National Police Department (TNPd).

3. The CRO files all criminal and other fingerprint records of the TNPd.

4. The Criminal Records Office coordinates and plans all operations with the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory as required.

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5. The CRO participates, along with other TNPd operational and support elements, in developing improved, computerized Management Information Systems.

(c) Organization

1. The Criminal Records Office (CRO) is an element of the Central Investigative Bureau (CIB). Organizational structure at CRO headquarters in Bangkok is not known. A Fingerprint and Identification Section is known to exist at CRO headquarters, and the CRO coordinates extensively with the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, another CIB element. In June 1968 the CRO had 259 personnel assigned.

2. CRO supervises operations of 31 Regional Records and Identification Units which are located in each of the Provincial Police's nine regions. These facilities are in the following areas:

a. Region I: Phra Nakhon and Ayutthaya Provinces

b. Region II: Rayong Province

c. Region III: Buriram, Chaiyaphum, Sisaket, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Surin Provinces.

d. Region IV: Kalasin, Loei, Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Ubon, Roi Et, Sakon Nakhon, and Udon Thani Provinces.

e. Region V: Chiangrai, Chiang Mai, Nan, and Phrae Provinces

f. Region VI: Nakhon Sawan, Phitsanuloke, Tak, and Uttaradit Provinces

g. Region VII: Ratburi, Prachuab Kihri Khan, and Suphanburi Provinces

h. Region VIII: Nakhon Si Thammarat and Surat Thani Provinces

i. Region IX: Yala and Narathiwat Provinces.

(d) Capabilities

1. As with all of the technical offices of the Thai National Police Department (TNPd), the Criminal Records Office suffers from inadequate equipment and trained personnel. High-level TNPd interest in the CRO is quite recent. In some cases, the leadership is not yet convinced of its value. In addition, equipment is expensive and places excessive strains on the already burdened TNPd budget. Considering these limitations, the CRO functions well. Improvement in CRO capability will be in direct proportion to its receiving more and better equipment and a large increase in personnel. To date, 300 Provincial Police personnel have received training in CRO techniques.

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2. It is unlikely that additional Provincial Records and Identification Units will be organized until those presently in operation are evaluated. One determining factor will certainly be the value of these units, as demonstrated by an increased use by the Provincial Police, Special Branch, Marine Police, and Border Patrol Police.

(23) Railroad Police (RP)

(a) Mission: The Railroad Police (RP) Division is responsible for providing security to all facilities of the State Railroad System, both rolling stock and fixed installations, and security for freight, personal property, and individuals.

(b) Functions

1. The RP conducts and plans armed escorts for all trains operating in designated dangerous zones in the Northeast. This function was assumed on 25 March 1968.

2. The RP conducts armed escorts at all times for trains carrying military cargo of any type.

3. The RP prevents theft of railroad freight both within fixed railroad installations and while in transit.

4. The RP designs measures to prevent the fraudulent use of the railroad transportation system.

5. The RP conducts operations designed to curb the use of trains for smuggling purposes.

6. The RP conducts operations designed to curb the transport of narcotics.

7. The RP takes measures to deny use of the railroad as a means of transporting subversives, insurgent personnel, and insurgent material.

8. The RP prepares contingency plans to:

- a. Protect railroad personnel and property from insurgent attacks
- b. Protect the public from loss of life, limb, and property as a result of insurgent attacks on trains
- c. Prevent insurgent sabotage of the State Railroad System and facilities.

9. The Railroad Police prepares plans for the suppression of urban riots endangering railroad stations, rolling stocks, and the Headquarters, Railroad Police Division.

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10. The RP maintains a single side band radio net between the provincial railroad stations and the Headquarters, RP Division.

11. The RP collects intelligence on the use of railroad facilities by insurgents, smugglers, bandits, and subversives.

12. The RP coordinates its activities with the Metropolitan Police Bureau, Provincial Police (PP), Thai National Police Department (TNPd) Special Branch (SP), and the military services. These services also train RP personnel.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 36 on page 165)

1. The Railroad Police (RP) is a division of the TNPd within the Central Investigation Bureau. At the same time, however, it is also a Bureau of the Railroad Authority, under the Ministry of Communications. TNPd regulations govern the RP's personnel, basic training, operational, and administrative procedures. Budgetary support is provided by the Railroad Authority, except for weapons and ammunition, which are received from the TNPd budget.

2. The RP headquarters has five elements:

a. Administrative Section

b. Operations Section

c. Logistics Section

d. Training Section

e. Intelligence and Investigations Section

3. The RP has nation-wide responsibilities and operates in all areas where there are railroad facilities. There are field subdivision headquarters. The number, responsibility, and location of these, however, are not known with the exception of stations in Korat, Surin, Ubon, and Udorn.

4. Present strength of the RP is 543. In 1967 the Railroad Authority authorized an increase of 75 men from an RP request for 150 men. Nevertheless, the RP was 25 per cent below authorized strength by June 1968.

(d) Capabilities

1. Inadequate training, a manpower shortage, minimal logistical support, and a recently expanded mission restrict the capability of the Railroad Police (RP) Division. With current high-level interest in the RP's counter-sabotage responsibilities, additional support and manpower is expected to be forthcoming.

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
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Figure 36

RAILROAD POLICE DIVISION



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Source: CIAD Analysis

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2. Training

a. A report published in late 1966 revealed that the Thai railroad system was extremely vulnerable to interdiction through the destruction of bridges and rail lines. The consequences of sabotage for the overall Royal Thai Government (RTG) counterinsurgency effort heightened RTG concern for the improvement and development of the Railroad Police (RP) Division. In March 1967, 15 officers of the RP were trained for one month in countersabotage techniques. These officers were then used to teach other RP personnel throughout the system. All incoming RP personnel now receive the same course. In July and August 1967 RP personnel received instructions on the use of Wicham trolleys and railroad armored tanks. They were trained in weapons and tactics by the Royal Thai Army later in the year.

b. The RP now is conducting training in riot control tactics to a special unit of about 100 men. Twenty-five men are being trained in intelligence collection by the Special Branch and five officers are attending the counterinsurgency course at Chaw Haw. Twenty-eight men are being trained in the operation of a single side band radio net.

c. Comprehensive training of the RP is expected to continue for the next several years.

3. Equipment

a. In February 1967 the RP commander and other officials of the State Railroad System visited Malaysia to inspect the self-propelled, armored railroad cars (Wicham trolleys) developed by the British and presently used by the Malaysian Police. The purpose of the trip was to obtain technical and practical information on their use and possible suitability for Thailand. Up to this time, the State Railroad used sandbagged cars in front of trains operating in certain areas of the Northeast. Thai officials were aware that this did not offer protection against most types of mines but felt that it did instill a sense of security in the minds of the public. The Wicham trolley cars were rented from the Malaysian Government and installed on the line between Korat and Surin where Cambodian subversives have mined the rail lines for the past several years. Should the Thai insurgents initiate sabotage operations in other areas, the RTG probably will purchase some of these cars. They have proved quite successful in their operation to date. Each car has a driver, signalman, machine-gunner, and two automatic weapons men. Four more were acquired in September 1968. On October 21 the first known case of train sabotage occurred in Region VII near Kondambicha.

b. In 1967 the RP procured modern carbines and revolvers for use by operational teams and also obtained an unknown number of single side band radios. The Railroad Police also received modern locomotive headlamps, which were capable of lighting a track for approximately 500 meters. The older models could only throw a light beam about 100 meters. In

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February 1968 the RP provided riot helmets and batons to their riot control unit.

4. The RP has an extremely limited capability to provide anything more than simple personal and property protection to its users. In October 1967 the RP seized four million *baht* (US\$200,000) worth of opium from a train operating in the Republic of Thailand. Information for this operation, however, came from the Crime Suppression Division. Also in October, the RP seized a quantity of cigarettes and brandy smuggled from Laos. It is unlikely that the RP will conduct routine operations of this nature until their intelligence unit becomes operational, probably by 1970 at the earliest. Meanwhile, the RP will continue to use routine search procedures to detect criminal and insurgent activities.

(24) Marine Police (MP)

(a) Mission

1. The Marine Police is responsible for safeguarding all of Thailand's coastline, including bays and sounds accessible from the sea, and the Mekong River from smuggling, illicit entry, subversive activity, piracy, and violation of fisheries laws. In addition, the MP is charged with enforcing Thailand's navigation laws and providing security to her ports.

2. Since Thailand is a signatory to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, the MP Division is responsible for providing assistance to vessels and planes in distress, in coordination with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

3. The MP's area of operation includes 1,500 miles of coastline and harbors, and another 600 miles along the Mekong River. In June 1968 Thailand changed her designated territorial waters from three miles to 12 miles. Consequently, the MP is now responsible for approximately 18,600 square miles of water.

(b) Functions: The Marine Police is tasked with the following functions:

1. Conduct waterborne patrols from bases maintained at selected locations. The patrols are to:

- a. Enforce fishery and navigation laws.
- b. Supervise transport and harbor activities in the Port of Bangkok.
- c. Control immigration by sea and river routes and the import or export of goods over these routes.
- d. Guard against smuggling and river or sea piracy.

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- e. Supervise the suppression of customs regulations violations.
- f. Assist vessels in distress.
- g. Conduct air/sea search and rescue operations.
- h. Provide assistance to aircraft in distress (including foreign military and civil as well as domestic).
- i. Protect vessels and crews of the Thai fishing fleet.
- j. Prevent incursions by the Thai fishing fleet into foreign territorial waters.
- k. Prevent insurgents from obtaining material and personnel support from the sea and from across the Mekong River and assist in transporting suppression units up and down the coast. (In October 1967 one Marine Police (MP) vessel maintained a coast watch against insurgent resupply at sea in Prachuab Khiri Khan Province.)
- 2. Patrol waters in the vicinity of Sattahip Naval Base up to the 12-mile limit (despite the fact that the commanding officer of the Royal Thai Navy Base at Sattahip has the responsibility for all matters pertaining to security).
- 3. Conduct land patrols within the Port of Sattahip complex.
- 4. Participate in the Joint Security Operations Center, which includes elements of the Royal Thai Navy, Royal Thai Marine Corps, Highway Patrol, and the Provincial Police, to develop better security for U Ta Pao Air Force Base.
- 5. Participate in communist terrorist suppression operations in northeast Thailand at the direction of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD).
- 6. Provide armed guards for docked merchant ships in the Port of Bangkok.
- 7. Conduct routine searches of all waterfront housing in the Port of Bangkok to locate high-speed smuggler craft.
- 8. Participate in a Special Committee with the Customs Department, the Board of Tax Supervisors, and the Department of Agriculture established in 1967 to deal with the problems of rice smuggling, especially over the southern border.
- 9. Prepare plans for maintaining port security and coordinate these plans with the Customs Department and the Port of Bangkok Authority.

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(c) Organization: (See Figure 37 on page 171)

1. The Marine Police's present mission originally was the responsibility of the Royal Thai Navy. Following the unsuccessful navy *coup d'etat* in 1951, the Marine Police (MP) was quickly organized to bring about a reduction in naval forces and to enable the Thai National Police Department (TNPd) to assume a part of the navy's responsibilities.

2. The MP now has about 100 officers and 1,500 enlisted men. Present projections call for a total strength of 4,500 men by 1972. Most of the officers at MP headquarters and on the larger patrol craft are Thai Naval Academy graduates. All MP personnel have received six weeks of TNPd basic training. Ship engineering and communications officers are Bangkok Technical Institution graduates, and many have received additional training in-country or in foreign schools. MP personnel wear the TNPd uniform, but with distinctive collar devices and navy-style hats. An anchor device is worn on the left collar, and the emblem of the Central Investigations Bureau (CIB) is worn on the right collar. The MP use M-1 carbines, M-3 submachine guns, and pistols.

3. In December 1968 the MP had 166 vessels in operation. These ranged from small 20-foot river boats to 184-foot oceangoing craft. Armament includes 3.5-inch naval guns, 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft weapons, and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. MP vessels are numbered to indicate the length of the craft. All craft in the 800 series, for example, are 80 feet long. Those in the 400 series are 40 feet long, and so forth.


4. The MP is a division of the Central Investigations Bureau of the TNPd. It is commanded by a police major general who is assisted by four deputy commanders. MP headquarters coordinates and directs the operations of its operational elements and provides assistance to these units. MP headquarters is at Pak Nam, the Port of Bangkok, at the mouth of the Chao Phya River. MP headquarters has the following subordinate elements:

- a. Administration Section
- b. Planning Section
- c. Intelligence Section
- d. Air/Sea Search and Rescue Section
- e. Technical Services and Engineers Section
- f. Air Wing Section (All operational air elements were attached to the TNPd Air Division in 1967, where all requests for air support are now sent.)

5. Operational units are under direct control of the Marine Police (MP) headquarters, although the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate can use their assets at any time for suppressing insurgency and subversion.

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MARINE POLICE DIVISION - TNP



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Figure 37

* = Subdivision Headquarters

----- = Participation

Source: CIAD Analysis

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There are six subdivisions which have one or more bases under their control. Some of these bases have repair and maintenance yards under their control. The subdivisions and their subordinate bases are: (See Figure 38 on page 173)


<u>Subdivision-MP Bases</u>	<u>Location (Province)</u>
Gulf of Thailand	
Songkhla	Songkhla
Pattani	Pattani
Surat Thani	Surat Thani
Pak Phanang	Nakhon Si Thammarat
Chumphon	Chumphon
Narathiwat	Narathiwat
Tak Bai	Narathiwat
Indian Ocean	
Kantang	Trang (Subdivision headquarters)
Phuket	Phuket
Satun	Satun
Ranong	Ranong
Cambodia	
Chanthaburi	Chanthaburi
Trat	Trat
Khlong Yai	Trat
Mekong River	
Nong Khai	Nong Khai (Subdivision headquarters)
Bandan	Ubon
Chiang Khan	Loei
Bungkhan	Nong Khai
Nakhon Phanom	Nakhon Phanom
Mukdahan	Nakhon Phanom
Tha Bo	Nong Khai
Khemmarat	Ubon
Chiang Lan	Chiengrai
Bangkok Port	
Pak Nam	Bangkok
Sattahip Port	
Sattahip	Chon Buri (Subdivision headquarters)
Haad Sa	Chon Buri

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MARINE POLICE BASES

Figure 38



Source: CIAD Analysis

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Siracha

Rayong
Chon Buri

6. The Marine Police also provide a small detachment to work with several temporary or permanent *ad hoc* committees with other police elements or Royal Thai Government (RTG) departments. These detachments are directed by the Commander, Marine Police, and rarely involve more than two or three persons. The committees meet sporadically. Two of these committees exist, at present.

a. The Special Committee includes personnel from the MP, the Customs Department, and the Board of Tax Supervisors. It deals with matters related to rice smuggling across the southern border of Thailand.

b. The Joint Security Operations Center prepares plans and programs to develop better security for the U Ta Pao Air Force Base, located 11 kilometers east of Sattahip Naval Base. This center includes representatives of the Royal Thai Navy, the Royal Thai Marine Corps, the MP, the Highway Patrol, and the Provincial Police. Other Thai and foreign elements involved in the day-to-day operations at U Ta Pao are also represented on this committee.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Marine Police Division has improved considerably since 1965. A slight increase in manpower, large numbers of new vessels, and increased development of a maintenance and logistical system have sustained this improvement. Operationally, the MP has had increasing success in preventing smuggling and piracy in the Port of Bangkok and is conducting fairly successful port security patrols in the Port of Sattahip. Despite the increase in operations bases and patrol craft, the MP has had little success in other areas. The MP is not capable of performing its mission in these areas. Along the Mekong, the MP is unable to restrict river piracy or prevent insurgents from using the Mekong as a communications route to Laos. It is not expected that the MP will be able to restrict illegal activity until they are given substantial increases in material, patrol craft, operational bases, and personnel.

2. Equipment

a. Plans for construction of a shipyard and maintenance depot at Kantang were completed in December 1966. This project was designed to give the Indian Ocean MP fleet a repair capability unavailable since operations began several years before. The Kantang Yard began construction in February 1967. The site was built about ten feet higher than the surrounding land to protect it from damaging floods. Actual construction began in May 1967. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) budgeted 1,500,000 *baht* (US\$75,000) to build the yard (five acres), the railway, the machine shop, a winch, and generator house. The Kantang facility was dedicated on 20 March 1968, but additional sub-projects were too expensive. These will be completed as

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funds become available. The Kantang Yard project will permit the Indian Ocean fleet to maintain its own vessels without requiring a long trip to the Bangkok facilities.

b. Two smaller machine shops were completed in early 1967 at Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom to support the Mekong River fleet. These shops have a limited capability to perform maintenance on the larger vessels at present, but they are able to perform most simple technical tasks.

c. In 1967, 18 patrol vessels (which had long been out of commission) were repaired after spare parts, machine tools, and new engines were provided. These vessels are part of the Marine Police fleet.

d. Also in 1967, 33 shallow draft vessels were constructed and outfitted with outboard motors for use with the Mekong River fleet. These vessels are satisfactory as patrol craft, but they are only able to pursue small smuggler or insurgent craft.

e. In 1967, one 40-foot Stewart-type patrol craft and two 30-foot vessels were acquired for use at the Port of Sattahip. These vessels have performed adequately, despite minor difficulties with onboard radar. Engine performance is excellent, despite rough sea conditions in the area. Five 50-foot wooden hull vessels were built in Japan for MP use on the Mekong.

f. In June 1966 the MP began plans to construct fifteen 40-foot patrol vessels in Thailand. After a long period of administrative problems, the Bangkok Dock Company obtained the contract in December 1966. Construction began in February 1967. Plans called for Thai construction of the vessels, which are to be fitted with foreign engines and fittings. The keel laying of the 15 craft was celebrated with a formal ceremony attended by Thai National Police Department officials in April 1967. The first six were completed in early 1968 and high-speed trials in February of that year showed the vessels will maintain a sustained speed of 18 knots. Six were transferred to Nong Khai in April 1968, and the remainder were delivered in June 1968. Seven more are being completed in 1969. Not only will these patrol craft give an increased operational capability to the Mekong River fleet, but the experience gained through construction in Thailand will permit additional use of an internal capability in the future.

g. In 1967 the Royal Thai Government ordered a 184-foot patrol ship for use as an all-weather, oceangoing craft to counter smuggling and infiltration from the sea. Built in the Federal Republic of Germany, the craft weighs 400 tons, has a top speed of 18 knots, and is equipped with radar and heavy weapons. It was commissioned in February 1969. Presently under construction in Japan is an 80-foot patrol craft which will be used off Sattahip Naval Base. In mid-1969, seven 50-foot patrol boats were purchased from Japan.

h. In July 1966 the MP obtained 11 Jeeps for use at isolated operations bases. One was assigned to the Gulf of Thailand base, two to the Indian

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Ocean, and the remainder to the Mekong River bases. These Jeeps do not begin to solve the MP's land transportation problems.

i. Despite its improvements, the Marine Police will continue to suffer from inadequate facilities and equipment for some time. Many of the older MP patrol vessels are in poor condition. In September 1967 one wooden-hull craft exploded after being refueled. Some communications equipment was procured in 1966 and 1967, but MP communications capability ashore and afloat is woefully inadequate. Although plans are completed for construction of seven more 40-foot patrol craft, the MP will still lack effective coverage of wide areas along the Mekong and the coast-lines. MP patrols are responsible for approximately 18,000 square miles of water. Assuming that a maximum of 75 per cent of the MP fleet is operable at any one time, each MP vessel is responsible for about 200 square miles. This figure is greatly deflated since a large number of MP vessels operate along the Mekong River and in the Ports of Bangkok and Sattahip. Smugglers and pirates probably would operate more within harbors than along unpopulated seacoasts, but this is not true for insurgents' supply operations. The insurgents do not need -- nor presently have -- the capability to initiate extensive sea operations. Should this capability develop, the MP could do little to prevent it. Should Laos fall to the communists while the MP is attempting to improve its operational capability along the Mekong, the MP again would be unable to cope with the increased infiltration problems. Preventative maintenance is virtually nonexistent. This places a greater strain on MP facilities than is warranted.

3. Training: In September 1966 the MP graduated its first Diesel Engine Maintenance and Operations Class from the Thai Naval Dockyard Engineering School. The Dockyard School has been in operation for several years, and is well-equipped with a large teaching staff. The school provides the MP with a badly needed training capability. Other training programs are inadequate, but not too serious a problem since the MP has no investigative functions. MP officials have observed counterinsurgency maritime operations in the Republic of Vietnam and sent several officers to the army counterinsurgency course at Chaw Haw.

4. Marine Police operations in the Port of Bangkok have shown sustained development over the past two years. These successes suggest that, with the proper equipment and with effective leadership, the MP may yet become an effective police unit. In August 1966 Bangkok harbor was infested with smugglers. Acts of piracy were common. In one of three piracy cases that month, one of those implicated was an MP officer. The Thai National Police Department tried to respond to the Department of Custom's request for better protection, but the MP still refused to patrol at night (when most of the hijackings took place). Following replacement of the MP commander in December, the MP initiated aggressive patrols. These immediately resulted in increased arrests and a drop in the number of reported incidents. By March 1967, however, the smugglers and pirates had made an accurate assessment of the MP's capabilities and concluded that speed could solve their problems. Subsequently, reports of high-speed pirate vessels caused real

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frustrations for the MP. The MP patrol craft could not catch the pirate vessels which moved at about 43 knots. In June 1967 a group representing Bangkok shipping interest appealed to the TNPd for help. The MP tried to curb port crimes through the following measures: installation of 24-hour patrol operations; purging of undesirable MP personnel; increasing harbor patrol coverage from one craft to seven, and providing armed guards aboard merchant ships. The problem still became quite serious. In July, MP patrols captured ten long-shaft smuggler craft. Until 18 July, however, the multi-engined high-speed vessels continued to elude the MP. On 20 July, the MP received two 30-foot high-speed Bertram patrol boats and immediately captured two of the large smuggler vessels. A third was captured on 28 July. By December 1967, 11 of these smuggler craft were seized, and incidence of smuggling and piracy in Bangkok was drastically reduced. This example illustrates the MPS's potential when it has the proper supplies. In February 1968, however, a smuggler vessel outran three MP craft, including one of the high-speed Bertrams. Although the RTG purchased six additional Bertrams in December 1968, the MP may require even faster boats in the near future to keep up with the adaptable criminals.

5. Criminal activity also is high in other areas of MP operation, and the MP has had some success. Between 1965 and 1967, arrests for violations of fishing laws increased 86 per cent and 65 per cent for violations of narcotics laws. Between these years, the MP made 5,917 seizures of vessels in the Gulf of Thailand alone. These statistics reveal the vast responsibilities of the MP and dramatize its need for additional equipment and personnel.

6. The Marine Police has attempted to improve its Mekong fleet during the past two years, but this operation continues to be inadequate. During a Mekong River surveillance test, the MP used 18 men and four out-board-powered pirogues. One of these capsized and sank during the test operations. The MP was the weakest element of all the units participating in the test. Both the equipment and training was marginal for the assigned role and mission. Despite these inadequacies, the MP requested assignment of the primary responsibility for operations on the Mekong. The navy probably will be assigned this role, however. The primary reason for this decision will be the MP's inadequate budget. Another problem is high personnel turnover rate. This turnover is probably due to low pay, poor living conditions, and other material and equipment deficiencies resulting from a poor budget.

7. The present MP Commander has been very aggressive in promoting better MP performance since he took over in early 1967. In the past, however, all MP commanders have been energetic, eager, and effective during their first year. They have then all followed in various degrees the ineffective and/or corrupt path of their predecessors. Time will tell if this is to be the case with General Chavalit, the present commander.

8. Marine Police personnel stationed in the Port of Bangkok have failed to hinder the flow of Chinese Communist subversive propaganda distributed by

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seamen in Hong Kong. While this responsibility falls under the MP mission, a policy of non-interference evidently is in effect. If it wishes to do so, the MP can have little difficulty in cracking down on traffic in subversive literature.

9. Equipment maintenance is a serious problem for the Marine Police. Several 80-foot craft built in Japan require extensive preventive maintenance. Some of the difficulty is related to poor construction, but minimal maintenance aboard these ships is primarily to blame. Preventive maintenance procedures rarely are implemented by MP officers. Most vessels have to put into Bangkok for repairs about once a year. Communications equipment at the MP stations are also poorly maintained.

10. Coordination between MP officers and those of other police units are virtually nonexistent in the Malay peninsula area, and only slightly better in the Northeast. The Royal Thai Army has fair coordination with the MP in the North and Northeast, but none elsewhere. In the Malay peninsula, MP and Provincial Police do not coordinate at all. There is no lateral contact, and each operates as a completely separate entity. If a MP base wished to communicate with a local Provincial Police force, it would have to have the message relayed through Bangkok. The two forces do not have common radio frequencies.

(25) Highway Patrol Police (HPP)

(a) Mission

1. The Highway Patrol Police (HPP) Division is responsible for police protection and law enforcement on the approximately 5,300 kilometers of highways and roads outside of the metropolitan areas of Thailand.

2. The Highway Patrol also assumes responsibility for highway escort of the royal family and high-ranking members and guests of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). In performance of this mission, the HPP coordinates activities with the VIP Security Section of the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC).

(b) Functions

1. The HPP maintains mobile patrols on all major highways in the country and enforces both criminal and motor vehicle laws.

2. The HPP investigates and makes arrests of personnel violating the highway laws. The Division, however, is restricted from interrogating any person violating a criminal law on the highways; these persons must be turned over to the Provincial Police. In June 1967 the HPP was authorized to handle all traffic accidents within its jurisdiction. This function formerly was handled by the Provincial Police.

3. The HPP maintains programs to prevent accidents.

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4. The HPP is responsible for protection of communication lines in Thailand, to include protection from sabotage.

5. The HPP is responsible for highway escort of military convoys and cargo. In July 1966 the Sattahip pier and military base became operational and the HPP was required to provide increased coverage in this area. In December 1967 the HPP assumed an increased load of escort duty between Royal Thai Government bases used by US Forces. In February 1968 the HPP also was made responsible for all escort operations accompanying military supplies destined for Laos.

6. In October 1966 the Highway Patrol Police was placed on total alert. Checkpoints were established along highways leading to the Northeast. These were used to identify and prevent movement of potential demonstrators seeking to cause disturbances during the visit of US President Johnson.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 39 on page 180)

1. The Highway Patrol Police was organized in September 1969 with an authorized strength of 92 men. Strength increases were granted periodically, reaching 232 in March 1962. Following the present division commander's installment in 1963, a further increment raised the HPP strength to 272. By the end of 1965, an additional 60 men joined. In 1967 the Thai National Police Department authorized 150 more men and the formation of a new subdivision. These were received at the end of November 1967. By June 1969 HPP on-board manpower was 715 personnel. From this present base, the HPP plans to achieve a total manpower strength of 1,700 by FY 1973.

2. The HPP is an element of the TNPD Central Investigations Bureau and is operationally responsible to this unit. It is, however, administratively controlled by the Highway Department. In the past, this fact has served to aid the HPP as far as finances were concerned. It has also placed restrictions in operational capability due to the additional functions assigned by the Highway Department. In 1965 the HPP was responsible for maintaining the Highway Department's "weigh-in" stations, a time-consuming function. By 1967, however, this function was removed. Recommendations were made in 1968 to place the HPP under Provincial Police control, but this has not been approved.

3. The HPP is commanded by a police major general and two deputy chiefs. The Headquarters Division has six sections:

- a. Administrative Section
- b. Statistics Section
- c. Communications Section
- d. Mechanics Section


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HIGHWAY PATROL POLICE (HPP)



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Figure 39

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Source: CIAD Analysis

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e. Finance Section

f. Quartermaster Section

4. There presently are nine subdivisions under the HPP which correspond to the regions of the Provincial Police, Border Patrol Police, and other Royal Thai Government (RTG) administrative regions. This structure, however, does not represent the nation-wide coverage that it implies. In 1965 the Highway Patrol Police (HPP) was assigned to cover only the major highways in the country. At that time these included only routes within Regions 1, 2, and 7, with a small area of Region 3 along the road from Bangkok to Korat in Nakhon Ratchasima Province. In 1968 the HPP covered four routes: Bangkok to Prachuab Khiri Khan; Bangkok to Kanchanaburi; Bangkok through Korat to Nong Khai; and Bangkok to Sattahip. Key areas not patrolled at present include Lopburi to Chiangmai; Prachuab Khiri Khan to Betong; Khon Kaen to Ubon, and Udon through Sakon Nakhon to Nakhon Phanom. Since 1965 the HPP has constructed subdivision headquarters in Regions 3 and 4, at Phimai (Nakhon Ratchasima Province) and at Khon Kaen, respectively. These were completed in March 1968 following completion of a headquarters building in Bangkok in October 1967. Additional facilities are planned in the remaining four regions.

5. Within each subdivision, the HPP maintains smaller stations, substations, and resources control (two-man) points. HPP elements now man bases along all major highways in the identified regions, particularly along routes used by RTG military forces in the Northeast and Southeast. Six resource control points were established in 1967, from Sattahip north to Korat, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon, and Udon. There are now 24 stations and substations. Patrol jurisdictions cover about 2,000 miles of roads and highways throughout Thailand.

6. Expansion of HPP organizational and operational networks over the past two years has roughly corresponded to an increased need to counter the rising insurgency. For this reason, the HPP assigned 100 of their 150 increment in 1967 to the Khon Kaen Subdivision in the Northeast, which was reported with some pride by the subversive radio stations. Developing subversion in regions of the Mid-south and South will promote further HPP expansion into these areas, as will increased road construction in the Northeast. In 1969, however, HPP expansion was scheduled to take place in Region 6. A subdivision headquarters is being built at Tak with two resource control points at Phitsanulok and Nakhon Sawan. The plan is to add one new subdivision a year through 1972 at which time a force of approximately 1,700 will be patrolling Thailand's highways.

(d) Capabilities

1. Finances: In comparison with other police units, Highway Patrol Police financial support has always been satisfactory -- even generous. This is due to the financial control of the HPP by the Highway Department, which has always had a high Royal Thai Government priority. In 1966 the HPP received

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\$450,000, an increase of \$100,000 from 1965. In 1967 it expended about \$900,000, mostly on new equipment, construction of substations, and increased salary expenses for new personnel. Almost \$100,000 was spent on construction of the new HPP Headquarters building alone. In fiscal year 1968, the budget remained approximately the same. In 1969 there was an increase of US\$400,000, which will be used for additional construction and vehicular support in Region 6.

2. Training

a. In conjunction with their expanded mission and size in 1965, the Highway Patrol Police initiated efforts to upgrade their personnel professionalism as well. In 1966 there were ten four-week courses provided at the Chaiya Training School at Korat. All HPP personnel attended these courses. In December 1966 all HPP personnel were trained in the use of the shotgun and the Thompson submachine gun. In November 1967 the 100 new HPP recruits received routine police training and were given an intensive four-week course in Highway Patrol methods and procedures. All incoming HPP personnel will receive this training.

b. HPP also conducts specialized training. In July and August 1966, 80 HPP personnel took a three-day course at Sattahip. The course was designed to familiarize personnel with the responsibilities and techniques related to escort duty. In 1967 about 100 HPP personnel attended an antisabotage course at Hua Hin to prepare them for their mission -- protecting lines of communication in areas affected by subversion and insurgency. The Signal Division of the Thai National Police Department trained 28 HPP personnel in manning procedures and the use of single side band radio stations. In February 1968 the Commander of the HPP and six members of his personal staff received a one-week course in counterinsurgency. They did so to familiarize themselves with counterinsurgency problems and to learn how the HPP might assist Royal Thai Government counterintelligence forces. Following this training, the commander instructed that all of his junior officers were to receive an expanded three-week course in counterintelligence during 1968. In May 1968, HPP officers attended an Intelligence Management Course for two weeks.

c. HPP officers and men receive training from other national Highway Patrol units. In 1967, ten HPP personnel attended a six-week course in Malaysia; 16 took similar courses in Japan. In March 1968, six others left for Japan -- one to attend the Japanese Police Academy for two years, and the others to participate in the six-week course. In May 1967 the former commander of the HPP, MG Charoenchit, attended a traffic seminar in Paris. In September, he visited the Republic of Vietnam to observe highway patrol and counterinsurgency procedures in an advanced insurgency situation.

d. Training methods are adequate, as is the course material. Since completion of the headquarters building in Bangkok, many classes have used the space made available for classrooms and specialized training facilities.

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Increased HPP emphasis on training is responsible for rapid development of a professional police force.

3. Equipment

a. The Highway Patrol Police (HPP) depends on modern and sophisticated equipment to perform its mission adequately. In 1965 the HPP maintained 34 vehicles, but all were over three years old and none were equipped with radios. There were no ambulances for use in highway accidents.

b. In 1966 the HPP received its first major increment of vehicular support in the form of ten Chevrolet sedans and 13 Jeeps. These vehicles extended patrol and area coverage, which almost immediately resulted in more effective law enforcement on the highways as expected. In November 1966 the HPP received seven more Chevrolet sedans and radios were installed in HPP Jeeps escorting military convoys from Sattahip. The HPP obtained three Volkswagen ambulances in October 1967 and February 1968; it also obtained 28 new vehicles for patrol duty in that same period. In March 1968 the HPP disposed of 26 obsolete vehicles and purchased three Volkswagens and two motorcycles with the proceeds. The HPP presently operates a fleet of 108 patrol vehicles, following receipt in July 1969 of 21 cars for the new subdivision at Tak.

c. Following his return from a Paris traffic seminar in June 1967, Police Major General Charoenchit announced the purchase of four radar sets from the Federal Republic of Germany. The sets arrived in September and were operated on the Friendship, Sukhamvit, Paholyothin, and Petchkasem Highways. Two hundred and fifty speeders were caught the first week the radar sets were used. Traffic has slowed to a safe, normal rate since the sets were installed.

d. The Highway Patrol Police has received extensive logistical support both from the Thai National Police Department Quartermaster Division and the Highway Department over the past three years. The present level of available patrol vehicles is not sufficient. Compared with other national highway patrols in Southeast Asia, however, the HPP is a professionally equipped force. Radio facilities also are insufficient, although improvements in 1968 gave each patrol vehicle an instant communication capability with regional base stations.

4. The HPP conduct of escort duty for military convoys has been superior. It was believed initially that traffic volume would be too great for the HPP to handle, but the HPP has expanded with their load requirements. Some problems -- petty pilfering of cargoes and excessive speeding of convoy vehicles -- have developed. These have been minimized, however, by effective HPP action.

5. In late 1966, HPP officers arrested two ethnic Chinese smugglers; one bringing in a cargo from Hong Kong, and the other bringing it in from Communist China through Burma. Both of these successes were a result of

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routine searches. In 1967 several other large seizures were made from routine searches and advance information. In 1967 an intelligence system of informants was established and proved to be quite successful in anti-smuggling operations. In 1969 an Intelligence Section was scheduled to be organized under the Headquarters Division. Training for this unit is to be supplied by other police services.

6. The HPP has performed its mission satisfactorily during the past three years. As long as planned manpower and logistical increases are fulfilled, the HPP should improve both its manner of operation and geographical coverage. Should the insurgents target communication lines and sabotage roads and bridges, the HPP may require assistance from other police forces and military units. Meanwhile, the Highway Patrol Police workload is heavy. In February 1968, the HPP made 2,662 arrests, of which 1,450 were for speeding. The HPP provided 140 escorts, including 88 escorts for military convoys.

7. One problem which must be met is corruption. Shakedowns of truck drivers must be eliminated if the HPP is to develop a favorable national reputation.

(26) The Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, constructed in 1965, supports all operational elements of the Thai National Police Department. Its equipment is modern and most personnel have had extensive technical training in foreign countries. It is anticipated that regional laboratories will be constructed before 1971. The laboratory is comprised of 98 men, most of whom have received considerable training.

(27) The Licenses Division issues and controls all licenses issued by the Royal Thai Government, particularly for guns, autos, and drugs. The division has close liaison with the Immigration Police and the Border Patrol Police on matters dealing with traders operating between Laos and Thailand. The division has 214 personnel.

(28) Data on Forestry Police functions are not available, but it is assumed that normal duties parallel those of national park and forestry rangers in the United States.

(29) Air Division

(a) Mission: The Air Division is responsible for satisfying airlift, air supply, and other aspects of air support to all operational elements of the Thai National Police Department.

(b) Functions

1. The Air Division provides direct air support for TNP units operating in north and northeast Thailand on counterinsurgency operations. The Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit, the Border Patrol's Mobile Reserve

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Platoons, and the Provincial Police's Special Action Forces are organized, trained, and equipped with aerial mobility in mind. The Air Division is responsible for supporting these units when at all possible.

2. The Air Division coordinates future requirements for air support with the operations section of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) and with the component TNPd units.

3. The division maintains and repairs all rotary and fixed-wing aircraft available to the TNPd.

4. The Air Division plans, constructs, and maintains hangars and landing fields for use by the division in every police region.

5. The division coordinates out-of-country training for helicopter pilots and fixed-wing aircraft pilots, mechanics, and aviation engineers.

6. It supervises in-country training for TNPd helicopter pilots.

7. The Air Division conducts in-service training as required.

8. The division develops and implements plans for maintaining physical security of TNPd air assets.

(c) Organization: (See Figure 40 on page 186)

1. The Air Division traces its beginnings to 1950 when an aviation unit was established within the Metropolitan Police Bureau. Consisting of a helicopter, pilot, and mechanic, the unit was expanded in 1953 and called the Communications Aviation Division. By 1965 the Border Patrol Police and the Marine Police had their own separate aviation sections. In 1967 the unit was elevated to a division, responsible to the Director, Thai National Police Department. All former autonomous elements of the TNPd's operational units were incorporated into the Air Division.

2. The Commander, Air Division, is assisted by a Deputy Commander for Operations and a Deputy Commander for Support.

3. The Deputy Commander for Operations supervises the activities of two sections: Operations and Plans. The Operations Section handles all up-country detachments, as well as flight scheduling. It establishes and enforces safety procedures, and supervises pilot, navigation, and survival training. The Plans Section establishes and enforces intelligence and security procedures, maintains necessary communications, supplies required aerial photography, handles all liaison matters, and provides information on operations to the public as required.


4. The Deputy Commander for Support is in charge of three sections: Material, Maintenance, and Administration. The Administration Section handles all personnel and financial records, provides transportation for

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Figure 40



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Source: DOD/IRRs

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division personnel, maintains responsibility for unit property, and offers other support as required. The Maintenance Section handles all matters pertaining to aircraft maintenance; operates all unit ground equipment, shops, and supply rooms; and conducts all training for support personnel. The Material Section operates the division warehouse, receiving and issuing goods as needed; supervises purchase and use of all POL products; and implements stock control procedures established by the Administration Section.

5. In July 1968 the Air Division had the following aircraft available: 30 light observation helicopters, 23 utility helicopters (ten combat-equipped passenger capacity), two large short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft, two small STOL aircraft, two large transport aircraft, and two small transports, for a total of 61 aircraft. In addition, the division had 88 pilots, 13 engineer officers, 91 non-commissioned officer mechanics, and 51 clerical personnel, for a total of 243 personnel.

(d) Capabilities

1. The Air Division is experiencing serious problems, involving personnel, training, organization, and equipment. Much of this, however, is due to growing pains related to both increased size and an increased responsibility to support counterinsurgency operations. Other problems relate to transfer to the division of personnel and equipment from other Thai National Police Department components. At present, the Air Division is unable to meet all requests for air support from police counterinsurgency units. The support functions the division performs, however, are done well.

2. Technical competence of Air Division personnel is below standard. The training they receive outside Thailand is excellent. The division's in-service training is very poor, although it is expected to improve with time and experience. The division still does not have adequate in-country pilot training facilities. The Thai Civil Aviation Training Center is to perform this function and is expected to be producing 24 pilots per year.

3. In 1967 the Air Division disposed of obsolete and undesirable aircraft which had not been used effectively and which had been a maintenance burden. This action is expected to bring about a considerable alleviation in the overall problems of supporting and maintaining diverse types of aircraft.

4. The Air Division is expected to receive annual increases of assets and personnel; these will be related to a program of pilot and mechanic training. In 1969 the Air Division was scheduled to receive nine more utility helicopters (bringing the aircraft total to 70), 29 pilots, nine engineers, and 17 mechanics, for a total of 300 persons. The additional 29 pilots will complete the target 1.6 ratio of pilots to aircraft.

5. Despite the major problems identified above, the Air Division concept is proving successful. It is a far more functional organization than when each TNP operational element had its own air support section.


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AIR DIVISION BASES

Figure 41



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The new systems also permit the TNPD to provide maximum support to counter-insurgency operations when needed.

6. One of the more difficult problems the Air Division faces is the anticipated strain on its resources brought about by the intensity and location of the insurgency. As overt incidents occur in more sections of the area, the facilities of the Air Division have been strained considerably. Requirements on air support to field operations and counterinsurgency have increased in the northeast, north, and north-central regions. Location is also important. In the North, terrain features make helicopter operations even more necessary. Since most of the fighting is in the higher elevations, mobility without air support is restricted. Furthermore, insurgents are better able to shoot down aircraft hovering over isolated police posts in the hills. This strain on the Air Division involves all aspects of its operations, including training, personnel, and maintenance activities. This situation is likely to get far worse before it gets better.

(30) Special Counterinsurgency Command and Operations Staff (SCCOS)

(a) Mission: The Special Counterinsurgency Command and Operations Staff (SCCOS) is responsible for coordinating, planning, and directing all police counterinsurgency activities. The staff is expected to deal with high-level problems anticipated by various Thai National Police Department elements in planning counterinsurgency operations.

(b) Functions: The SCCOS is primarily concerned with planning, particularly in areas not under control of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate and the Royal Thai Army Second and Third Armies. In May 1968 the staff prepared a plan for preventing insurgent expansion into the Central Plains. It was generally agreed, however, that, since the TNPD has direct control over so little of the country, the plan would be ineffective. The TNPD's role as a counterinsurgency support element prevented the plan's implementation.

(c) Organization

1. The Special Counterinsurgency Command and Operations Staff was formed in mid-February 1968 on a direct order of Director General Prasert, partly in response to the Tet offensive by the Viet Cong in the Republic of Vietnam. General Prasert concluded that increased communist success in Vietnam would be followed by an increased effort against Thailand. The staff was organized in such a manner as to include all police elements and prevent personal and unit rivalries from interfering in police counterinsurgency operations.

2. The Chief, SCCOS, reports directly to the Director General. The Chief of Staff, SCCOS, handles most of the requirements and deals with the TNPD's elements directly.

(d) Capabilities: The SCCOS remains a paper organization. Until the TNPD is authorized independent action from the Royal Thai Army or the

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Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, there is little need for a staff of this type. Should there be a significant increase in communist subversion, the SCCOS would offer a valuable tool for direct TNP head-quarters supervision over counterinsurgency matters. Until that time, however, the SCCOS will remain a planning staff.

(31) Riot Control Command

(a) After more than a year of contingency planning, the TNP formed a Riot Control Command for use in the event of civil disturbance in the capital city. The impetus for this command was the serious civil disturbances which have taken place in the United States and Western Europe in the past few years. Difficulties in Malaysia probably added a sense of urgency to the problem, despite the apparent lack of a civil disturbance environment in Bangkok.

(b) The Director General, TNP, will act as commander of the Riot Control Command and officers of the Border Patrol Police will serve as senior staff officers. The Command will consist of one full-time element (one Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit [PARU] company); one Border Patrol Police (BPP) company in each of the eight BPP areas of the country; and seven companies of Special Action Force (SAF) to be stationed throughout the country. The BPP and SAF units will be trained in riot-control procedures by PARU officers, and assigned to regular duties in their area of operations. They will be called upon only in emergencies.

d. Capabilities

(1) The capability of the individual Thai National Police Department units to perform their assigned tasks are discussed with individual elements. As noted, their performance ranges from poor to excellent. Although the individual unit weaknesses are extensive, the TNP's overall capability is good. Its potential for improvement is very good, and its capacity, by Asian standards, is excellent.

(2) The TNP exhibits growing understanding of the nature of the insurgency threat and appreciates the extent of the effort required to combat it. The TNP, long organized, equipped, and trained for conventional law enforcement, is accomplishing the transition into a counterinsurgency force. Progress is gratifying, and it is anticipated that the sharpened focus by police upon the terrorist threat will continue. In August 1969 the TNP approved a new concept for training in counterinsurgency procedures and techniques. The objective is to institutionalize counterinsurgency training as an integral part of TNP over a two-year period. The concept envisages the development of a professional corps of training cadre and a system by which qualified instructors could be retained. The Border Patrol Police has primary responsibility for this effort. While the training curriculum has not yet been prepared, the TNP's realization of the need for counterinsurgency training is a significant step in its program for improvement.

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(3) Corruption continues as a major problem in the Thai National Police Department, beginning at the highest levels and continuing down to the villages. Despite the moral values placed on honesty and corruption in western society, graft in public office cannot be judged similarly in Thailand. The Thais call the process "*kin muang*" or "eating the country." In this way, the Thai official supplements his meager salary and satisfies a personal motive for becoming an official. A certain amount of graft is fully expected by the people, for they know that it has long been a part of the system and they would do the same were the positions reversed. The difficulty is determining what is a "reasonable" level of corruption and what form the corruption should take. In most areas of Thailand, police protection has been lacking. The people are willing to pay a greater amount for protection from bandits. Consequently, in areas affected by communist terrorism, the populace would be more willing to pay than in areas that are not. In both areas, however, police corruption must not be to the general detriment of the people. For example, a police tax on the transport of goods from one village to another results in increased prices for all villagers. Extortion of a local businessman, on the other hand, is the more acceptable of the two. Corruption, however, must not become associated with counterinsurgency at any time. There is some evidence that, in northeast Thailand, the Provincial Police are taking funds and food while pretending to search for insurgent supplies. In other instances, they arrest a man for insurgent activities and arrange for his release when given money. Both activities seriously impede future police operations. Although the corruption problem in the TNPD is serious, it is controllable. The Crime Suppression Division is responsible for monitoring this matter. Any restriction on this function by a higher authority might prove disastrous.

(4) Other police problems include inadequate personnel, training, and equipment. In most cases, however, improvements over the past three years are far more impressive than present deficiencies. Aggressive leadership by superiors is lacking in Thailand. As younger officers gain higher responsibilities, however, the problem eases somewhat. Adequate coverage of rural areas is lacking, but certainly improving. In general, the police have been able to win support of the people for their government more often than inequities, failures, and corruption has disaffected the citizens. The Thai villager wants more police protection, not less, and he would rather pay a little more for this protection than suffer from banditry and terrorism.

(u)
D. (S/NEO) EVALUATION

1. STABILITY OF THE REGIME

a. Political Stability: The present rulers of Thailand do not face any significant challenge to their authority. Power relationships are stable, despite some rivalries between military and civilian cliques within the ruling elite. The military is clearly predominant, but it has not abused this power. It has provided outlets for the talents of capable civilians in both the bureaucratic and ministerial levels. The King serves

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as a moderating influence over the regime. Although the country is technically a constitutional monarchy, the King is the popular symbol of national unity. No regime is likely to come to power if manifestly unacceptable to the King. While the ruling group is authoritarian and regards the use of public office for private gain as normal, it has provided enlightened leadership over the past ten years without imposing coercive political measures. The 1968 National Assembly election, the first in over ten years, marked a relaxation by the oligarchy. While no real opposition is likely to be permitted, national elections provide a channel for popular expression. Over the longer run, however, Thailand is likely to experience increased stress on its present political stability. The major axis for stability in the army and government is the mutually satisfactory arrangement that has developed between Premier Thanom and Deputy Premier Praphas. The smooth transition from Former Premier Sarit's rule was an exception to past Thai political change and may not survive the death of one of the two present leaders. Political stability will require continued careful balancing of power and authority between the cliques. In addition, the economic expansion of recent years is likely to have broad political and social consequences. As the Thai elite broadens, divisions within it may lead to political cleavages. Finally, the increasing communist subversion/insurgency, if left unchecked, may have serious repercussions. What could develop is the imposition of strict and repressive political controls on the population just at the time urban poor and rural peasantry are told by communist agitators that they (the people) deserve massive aid from the central government. While the regime has resisted coercive measures thus far (despite implementation of martial law in the provinces), present policies may change without some demonstrable successes against the subversives.

b. Subversion: Communism has had little appeal in Thailand and is mostly regarded by the Thais as a foreign movement. Nevertheless, by mid-1965 the communist subversive campaign had emerged as an active insurgent movement in the Northeast. Since then, insurgency and subversion have affected other parts of the country, including portions of the heavily populated Central Plain. The Northeast insurgency grew rapidly until mid-1968, when it expanded only into areas not protected by the government. While continued growth is expected, the process is likely to be more restricted in the future. Subversion in the midsouth, west-central, and central regions has expanded only slightly since 1966, but this is essentially a result of lower communist priority instead of Thai countersubversive campaigns or lack of issues. In the North and North-Central areas, the communists recently have increased their strength substantially and clearly enjoy the initiative in the hills of this region. For the most part, however, the northern insurgency is a tribal affair that has not yet affected the lowland Thai living in the valleys. Communist subversives in Thailand suffer from several basic weaknesses. First, there is generally no popular support for the movement in the Thai villages. The insurgent support structure consists of individuals, friends, and relatives of activists. It does not involve the "control" of a village by the insurgents, as in the Republic of Vietnam. Second; the Thai communist movement depends considerably on outside support for leadership, training, finance, and weapons. Its foreign character

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alienates large numbers of the population and restricts the movement's freedom of action. Other subversive movements in Thailand target the several ethnic minorities: the Chinese, Vietnamese, Malays, and Cambodians. None have real significance outside their ethnic or regional base. Subversion and insurgency are a two-edged sword in Thailand. On the one hand, they represents internal dissidence and an external effort to subvert the country. As such they pose a threat to Thailand's internal security, which eventually could lead to political instability. On the other hand, the subversion and insurgency serve to make the Thai government aware of problems within the body politic -- problems which are not likely to surface in an authoritarian regime. Northeast Thailand, for example, has been a hotbed of subversion and separatism for some time. The communists correctly chose this area as the most likely to provide initial support for their cause. After the initial communist success, however, the Thai government began major programs to improve the status of the Northeast. In 1968 the Northeast, which had always provided the majority of political opposition (whether on the left or right), voted for the government party. Thus, the subversion and insurgency do not pose a serious threat to the stability of the Thai government at present, and may, in fact, be encouraging political modernization. The Thai government, however, must not permit the communists to continue to expand with impunity. To do so would create the impression that power is shifting out of the government hands. Significant erosion of government support would likely follow.

c. Intelligence Threat: Soviet, Communist Chinese, and North Vietnamese intelligence services pose an external intelligence threat to Thailand. The extent of these operations, however, is not fully known. The Chinese and Vietnamese have ready-made targets with which to operate, but their scope is necessarily limited. Soviet intelligence operations, limited to the Bangkok area, primarily involve the foreign community. The internal intelligence threat is more serious. In southern Thailand, the Communist Terrorist Organization has successfully penetrated the civil administration and police. The Communist Party of Thailand is known to have sections in regional and provincial committees responsible for low-level intelligence collection. It also has a Thai government penetration section operating for the Central Committee. The latter has successfully recruited sources within military and police intelligence services in the past.

2. THAI COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY

a. General Evaluation: Thai counterinsurgency capabilities present a varied and somewhat confusing picture. On one hand, the Thais have responded satisfactorily to the threat in the northeastern region. While not successful in destroying the subversives, the Thais have slowed their development, damaged the subversive structure, and forced the Communist Party of Thailand to concentrate on areas outside of immediate government concern. The Thai forces also have caused hardship for subversive forces in the mid-south and the west-central region. On the other hand, Thai forces in the higher elevations of the north and the north-central regions have been forced by high casualty rates and aggressive insurgent units to abandon certain locations. There has been virtually no improvement in the government

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position, despite increasing commitments of resources. In the southern region, Thai operations against the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) have been marked by apathy and incompetence. Improvements in Thai forces, which have been considerable in the past few years, cannot be attributed to all units and in all locations. The single difficulty in Thai counterinsurgency is that the Thai military or the government as a whole are not yet convinced they have a problem of sufficient magnitude to require a major effort from military, police, or civil authorities. On the one hand, this fact supports the view that, if fully committed, the Thai government forces could eliminate insurgency. On the other hand, shocks to the Thai forces (as have occurred in the north and north-Central regions in 1969) may erode both the people's trust in the government and the government in itself to a far greater extent than is really warranted. Erosion of self-confidence may reflect itself in Thai perpetuation of myths about the insurgency. These include claims that the insurgency infects only ethnic minorities and not Thai; that it is sustained only by infiltration of foreigners; that it is externally directed, planned, and supported; and that it "can't happen here." Events in northern Thailand have convinced both the military and police of the magnitude of their problem. What is necessary now is to convince the rest of Thai officialdom, particularly the functional bureaucracies, that Thai counterinsurgency requires a concerted and unified effort. While government reluctance to withdraw funds from important nation-building projects (education, public health, roads, power, and irrigation) is understandable, it is also becoming increasingly necessary. Upgrading the defense establishment will be an expensive task. It involves the purchase of modern weapons, expansion of military and police manning projections, completion of general and specialized training in counterinsurgency and countersubversion, and procurement of modern aircraft. Unless considerable foreign support is forthcoming, these expenses (made necessary under an expanding insurgency situation) will bite deep into the Thai national budget.

b. Thai Police Operations: Thai police counterinsurgency capability is poor, but improving. Most police forces are static, and are unaccustomed to pursuing bandit or insurgent elements beyond the environs of their own bases. Police inadequacies are concentrated in the Provincial Police (PP) and, to a lesser extent, the Border Patrol Police (BPP). Until the *Tambon* Police Program was developed, the Provincial Police did not have assets in villages used by the insurgents. PP forces were unable and unwilling to pursue targets into the low mountains of the Northeast. Insurgent operations were often directed against police officials whose corrupt behavior had alienated local villagers. While police corruption has been reduced only slightly in recent years, the villagers' overwhelming support for the *Tambon* Police Program in the Northeast is indicative of popular sentiment for a police presence. The Provincial Police must be careful (as they expand the *Tambon* Police Program into other areas of Thailand) that corrupt police practices do not erode their reservoir of popular support. Police capability to pursue insurgent forces in isolated areas has improved considerably in the past two years as a result of the formation of PP Special Action Forces (SAF) and the BPP's Mobile Reserve Platoons.

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The key to their success has been improved training and leadership; their weakness is air and logistical support, despite improving performance by the Thai Police's Air Division and Quartermaster Division. The SAF provides provincial authorities with forces to deploy into areas of heightened insurgency. Considering the early state of the force deployment, SAF capability is good. Nevertheless, SAF has never reinforced a beleaguered police outpost. It is unlikely that SAF could reinforce two or more police bases under insurgent attack for several days. The Mobile Reserve Platoon (MRP) concept has been tested under fire in the North. It is performing satisfactorily, despite losses of several Border Patrol Police positions to insurgent attack. Again, however, the platoons would be unable to perform their mission should the Thais order them back into the northern hills. The Thai National Police Department's Education Bureau has improved considerably. Nevertheless, the police educational programs need improvement in counterinsurgency, countersubversion, and intelligence collection courses. A vastly increased effort in on-the-job training programs is also needed. Police liaison and coordination with other Thai agencies is vital. The Thai government and the insurgents are competing for an arena in which neither has had real experience -- the Thai village. The Thai policeman, as the lowest government official in the village, must have communications channels open through which he can funnel complaints of villagers to civil authorities. In addition, he must be able to call on army support in instances of insurgent activities which he or the Special Action Force is unable to handle. This liaison does not now exist.

c. Thai Military Operations: The Royal Thai Army (RTA), with the support of the air force and navy, is capable of defending all population centers and causing severe damage to communist insurgent forces operating outside of mountain base areas. The army is unable to reassert its presence in the higher elevations of north and north-central Thailand without sustaining serious casualties themselves. Furthermore, the army is not able to prevent infiltration of men and supplies from outside the country or to eliminate the insurgent support structure in rural Thai villages. In the Northeast, where operations are conducted in conjunction with police and civil authorities, the RTA has performed fairly well in large sweep operations. In smaller unit actions (company, platoon, and squad) it has had limited success. It is these actions which are more likely to cause real damage to the insurgent structure. The RTA's First Army, in the west-central region, has conducted successfully both large sweeps and small-unit actions under LTG Samran. Samran's transfer to the Third Army may mark some changes from this unit's failures in the North in 1968 and 1969. Third Army operations against Meo insurgents in the hills involved costly and fruitless military sweeps. Casualties were high, due both to the army's unfamiliarity with the terrain, its ill-planned operations, and the skill and tenacity of the insurgents. After these initial defeats, the army has given the insurgents a free hand in the hills and is deploying to defend lowland Thai villages from attack. The insurgents, however, cannot be defeated until the army is able to move back into the hills -- which it is presently incapable of doing. The Royal Thai Army's transformation from a garrison political

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apparatus to an effective counterinsurgency force has been slow. Like the police, personnel, training, and logistics are vital to the army's modernization. Short counterinsurgency courses presently being given to RTA units, while insufficient, have been of real operational value in the North and Northeast. A particularly serious problem is the severe lack of junior grade officers and counterinsurgency experience of its leaders. Thai army forces presently operating in Vietnam may provide a temporary expedient from both leadership and experience limitations, although the Vietnam terrain is not conducive to experience for operations in the northern hills.

d. Joint Operations: Government effort to coordinate counterinsurgency planning and operations has not been a success. The Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) -- and later the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) -- was designed to establish the civil administration as the primary instrument of counterinsurgency, with the military and police providing manpower and materiel. CSOC, however, was unable to mitigate bureaucratic rivalries between the several Royal Thai Government ministries engaged in counterinsurgency; neither was it able to alleviate the intense military/police mutual dislike. Furthermore, CSOC was staffed by the modern and progressive elements of the army whose view of the army's role was in sharp contrast to the army traditionalists. The latter element, in late 1967, successfully eliminated CSOC's operational responsibilities in counterinsurgency. While the army's failures in the north have increased the likelihood that the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) will resume some of CSOC's operational functions, the future of joint planning and operations will remain dim unless CSOD is able to mitigate the distrust, rivalries, and personalism among and between the services, police, and ministries. Unless more direct participation by the highest levels of the Thai government is forthcoming, improved cooperation between agencies engaged in counterinsurgency is likely to remain a paper dream. CSOD's greatest success has been in the intelligence coordination field, with the efforts of the Joint Security Centers (JSC) and the Civil-Police-Military (CPM). Since intelligence coordination and operation planning and control were generally kept under the same structure, the intelligence coordination functions of the JSC and CPM units experienced the same petty bickering and jealousy as did the operations side. Police, military, and civil contributions to the intelligence product increased in direct proportion to the number of men each placed in the JSC and CPM structure -- and in indirect proportion to the threat posed by another service. To be effective, the intelligence collection, collation, analysis, and coordination functions will have to be separated from counterinsurgency planning and operations.

e. Intelligence Support: Intelligence support to Thai forces has improved somewhat over the past three to four years. Intelligence coordination through the JSC and CPM units resulted in an improved product. Interrogation centers, manned for the most part by Special Branch personnel, began producing detailed reports. Exploitation of captured equipment and documents also improved. Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) files on the subversive structure have improved substantially.

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JSC and CPM intelligence reports include information from its own interrogations and, to a lesser degree, from data supplied by the civil authorities, police, and military. These reports are disseminated to all services engaged in counterinsurgency planning and operations. Intelligence summaries from the JSC, however, are often incomplete. Many individuals within a single service retain a portion of the intelligence they collect for personal use; Thai agencies do the same. No agency has full control over available information and each agency withholds much information from the others. Under these conditions, intelligence coordination becomes an almost impossible task. There is no neutral element which can circumscribe the petty individual and agency jealousies, just as there has been no real effort to channel rivalries into friendly competition. The Joint Security Centers and Civil-Police-Military units perform little analysis of the information they receive, and that which they do, often is outdated. The JSC's have developed comprehensive insurgent order-of-battle figures; most information supporting these estimates originates from interrogation reports and not agent reports. Military intelligence sources provide some of the worst intelligence products. When the Royal Thai Army took over control of operations from the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, it failed to use the JSC's properly. Instead, the RTA depended on its own Special Operations Centers (SOC's). When it became evident that the SOC's were unable to provide the information required, the army placed the JSC and CPM units under more direct supervision. Recent evidence suggests that the police now are dissatisfied with the way the JSC's are handled. During army operations in the north and north-central region, battalions were unable to develop the most basic intelligence on the enemy, despite the fact that the Border Patrol Police (BPP) had operated in these hills for years and had collected a good deal of information. It is difficult to determine whether the RTA was not interested in police intelligence, or whether the BPP was unwilling to provide what they had to the army. Recent experiences suggest that, even if this information were available, it would not have been put to good use by field commanders. Thai intelligence services also concentrate on operations yielding spectacular results instead of long-term gains. Efforts are directed against the armed insurgent units instead of the political structure which nurtures and directs the insurgency. Significant sources of information on the subversive structure are not exploited to capacity, specifically data from the Provincial Police Tambon Program, the Volunteer Defense Corps, the Village Protection Units, and the various ministries who have personnel operating in rural areas (including the Department of Local Administration). All of the services regard the counterinsurgency and countersubversion effort as secondary to their political reporting. It is clear that despite improvements in interrogation and collation procedures, the quality of intelligence on the insurgents and its exploitation in operations falls far short of Thai countersubversion requirements.

3. THAI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

a. The Problem: Thailand has one of the more effective intelligence and security systems in Southeast Asia and is generally capable of countering

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current threats to national security. Nevertheless, weaknesses do exist. These include failure to use all available sources of information on the communist insurgents, inability to organize a system capable of collating this information, failure to analyze existing data, and failure to provide accurate and timely finished intelligence to operational units on a regular basis. More basic to the problem is the apparent inability of the Thai intelligence services to plan and implement covert intelligence operations against the communist political structure. The present primary sources of information on the communists (captured documents, interrogation reports, and informants) have two weaknesses; first, they too often focus the collector's attention on the military unit or the lowest level food supplies; second, the gradual transformation of the insurgents into a well-trained, disciplined force could result in greatly diminished sources of information. The more overt sources need to be supplemented by covert intelligence agents regularly reporting from subversive areas of operation and by clandestine agents who have penetrated the subversive organizations in government-controlled areas. RTG failure in this area, (described below) has apparently embittered Thai counter-subversion officials toward the entire concept of clandestine agent operations.

b. Agent Operations: Thai intelligence services are comparatively unfamiliar with clandestine agent operation methodology. Most Border Patrol Police and Provincial Police agents are low-level informants. Most of these men operate quite openly and may use their status to support private deals or obtain a form of immunity. Others are used because of their official positions as village chiefs, abbots, or teachers. Both groups of agents are well known to their community and to the subversives. Agents and their police handlers usually disregard security precautions in reporting procedures and making personal contacts. Some informants are self-recruited, and attempt to gain security and power. Others, after serving terms in jail for minor, non-political offenses, are recruited under threat of returning to jail. Most of the information collected involves routine police matters; political information is mostly reported incidentally. Police constables rarely ask their informants to meet specific requirements and probably fail to recognize a considerable amount of valuable information on the subversives and their activities. Police officers operating in a heavy insurgent environment, however, are more sensitive than counterparts based, for example, in the Central Plain. The Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) and the Thai National Police Department Special Branch (SB) conduct somewhat more sophisticated covert agent operations. The SB, for example, successfully planned and implemented a four-year penetration at the highest levels of the Communist Party of Thailand. Despite this highly successful operation, few agents are recruited and directed from either SB or AFSC field elements; almost no subversives are doubled against their organization and few controlled sources are penetrated into the communist political or military apparatus. Like the Border Patrol Police, Provincial Police, and all other intelligence services, the SB and AFSC depend heavily on the low-level, uncontrolled informant. Some of SB's and AFSC's most well-planned and successful operations have involved anti-regime instead of subversive activities.

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c. Inhibiting Factors: Thai intelligence services' conduct of covert agent operations are inhibited by the following factors:

(1) Sociological/Psychological: Inter-personal relations in rural Thailand are based on traditional ties (usually familial, historical, or sectional), and there is a well-established system of superior-inferior relationships. In such an environment, a case officer's use of materialistic reward is limited when it involves an agent and his traditional loyalties. Likewise, ideology plays a minimal role in the individual's personal commitments. On the one hand, these factors make it difficult to teach the Thai intelligence officer means with which to control his sources. He cannot accept the concept that money and ideas are sufficient to hold a man's loyalty. Furthermore, he is likely to be both unable and unwilling to develop a source who may be his cultural superior. While he may successfully collect bits of information for money, he will look upon the association as fleeting. On the other hand, the majority of Thai subversives have associated themselves with one group or another for familial, tribal, or sectional reasons. The subversive -- and the case officer -- knows that no Thai is likely to betray his friends and relatives, although he may readily report on what he knows of other groups. Insurgents using the subversive organization to further their own personal gain outside of the system are not easily distinguishable, particularly by the military or police case officer who is pursuing personal prestige and advancement within the traditional system. Also, these more independent, materialistic, or ideological personalities often are the ones receiving foreign training, where they develop new loyalties. While none of these considerations prevents agent operations, knowledge of them is useful in operational planning and in training of Thai intelligence officers.

(2) Personnel: While manning levels in Thai intelligence services are universally low, the small percentage of officers engaged in covert operations is representative of their low priority. When there are insufficient police officers to cover the rural towns and villages in the country, however, it is understandable that the number of specialists targeted against a single foe be limited. Nevertheless, more Thai case officers are necessary. The high educational and intelligence requirements for personnel engaged in covert agent operations is another problem. The young officers best qualified are more likely to seek greater opportunities for advancement within the military, police, or political system. Intelligence activities in many services, particularly the civil administration, are secondary duties. Persons so engaged usually find their promotion is not contingent upon intelligence functions.

(3) Training: The Thai National Police Department's training courses are primarily concerned with teaching young police recruits the most basic characteristics of law enforcement. Course work also extends into reading, writing, and personal hygiene. Consequently, at that level, there is little effort to instruct recruits in covert intelligence operations. Most intelligence instruction deals with report writing, order-of-battle factors, and criminal activity. There is no central school responsible for training

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police personnel engaged in handling agent nets. In this environment, the Thai police are incapable of developing a professional intelligence unit; even the Special Branch does not have formal courses or on-the-job training for its case officers. Police personnel returning from overseas training in agent operations too often find it difficult to implement what they have been taught. In addition, personnel receiving foreign training usually have been selected for top command posts in which they have little direct responsibility for intelligence collection. The Armed Forces Security School (AFSS) has an excellent training capability. Its course material and instructors (when they remain at the school for any length of time) are superior. Its capacity, however, is insufficient for the massive educational task it faces. It is unlikely that the Thai police would accept an expanded AFSS as their intelligence training site; a police version of the AFSS is necessary. Besides formal training courses, the Thai intelligence community needs a formalized on-the-job training program in every service which directs counterintelligence operations and, to a lesser extent, for each service whose personnel obtain counterintelligence information as a by-product of their normal duties. Finally, a bipartisan intelligence committee composed of professional military, civilian, and police officers is necessary to correct deficiencies in all Thai agencies.

(4) Security: Security procedures are poor throughout the Thai intelligence and security structure. Police agents are assassinated in all parts of the country by the communists, to whom most agents are well-known. In the Midsouth, for example, the Special Branch now finds it difficult to recruit any villagers following a highly successful communist assassination program in that area. Intelligence officers pay lip service to the concept but apparently feel that security procedures are not worth their personal effort. While document and installation security standards are fair, the Thais do not believe it is necessary to discipline themselves. Most major counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast and South have been compromised, not by communist agent penetration, but from public discussion of planned operations by the officers involved. Each Thai officer belongs to a small, tight circle of friends and relatives to whom he feels no compunction in revealing all he knows. While his trust in this group usually is justified, the information often spreads to other groups which may be less loyal. Some officers reveal classified information to gain personal publicity. Training and discipline may provide the solution. When the Thais have felt the need to maintain strict security (as in the Vietnamese transfer case [Special Branch], the arrests of the top communist leaders [Special Branch] and their support to the Khmer Serei [Armed Forces Security Center]), they have performed well.

(5) Agency Rivalries: Cooperation within the Thai intelligence and security structure is negligible. For the most part, it reflects the carefully balanced political structure in Thailand which divides power between the military and police, the civil bureaucracy and military, and even between elements of the military itself. The primary function of most intelligence services is to detect anti-regime activity. As other services are the likely source for political plots, each agency's belief

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that another is spying on it often is fully justified. Rivalries also are strong for sources of corruption. In this environment, cooperation between agencies engaged in covert counterintelligence operations (especially in such matters as source-control, joint training, and joint operations) is hard to come by. The competition is destructive. There is a very real need for a neutral element within the structure to serve as a balancer between rival agencies. Each agency must be able to identify with individuals within the neutral element, and feel no threat from it. Any such program will require the strongest support from the top officials of the government and will need a common enemy on which to focus. The common enemy could be the communist subversives; increased concern in the government of subversion and of being left to fend for themselves on the international scene may provide the impetus for top-level concern. The neutral element within the present system, however, is not identifiable at this time. If the Thais are able to implement an effective program of forced cooperation, many of the weaknesses of the intelligence structure could be eliminated with little additional effort. Politics, corruption, and personalism will never leave the Thai intelligence services, but a combined force of individuals dedicated to the profession of intelligence can be organized to operate above the existing system.

d. During the past five years, the Thai intelligence and security system has faced a significant challenge from communist subversion. Despite many weaknesses which remain, the Thais have attempted to meet this challenge with increased personnel, revitalized organizations, and re-evaluated priorities. Although the subversive challenge is likely to increase in the next few years, the Thai intelligence system should continue to expand and improve.

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ANNEX 1

JOINT SECURITY CENTERS

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(u)
ANNEX 1. (S/NFD) JOINT SECURITY CENTERS (U)

(u)
A. (S/NFD) Mission: The Joint Security Centers (JSC's) are the intelligence regional centers for the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD). These centers are responsible for the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence to units engaged in countersubversion and suppression activities. The centers receive information reports from a wide variety of local collection agencies, most of which are identified elsewhere in this study. On the civil side these include the governor and his staff, the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC), People's Assistance Teams (PAT's), and unofficial local organizations at the district and *tambon* (village) level. From the military, the Royal Thai Army (RTA), the Special Operations Centers (SOC's), and the Mobile Development Units (MDU's) provide input to the JSC's. The Provincial Police (PP), Border Patrol Police (BPP), and Special Branch (SP) contribute the lion's share of information. Since the Royal Thai Army takeover of CSOC-planned operations in October 1967, the mission of the JSC's in areas not under martial law has changed considerably. In JSC 7 and JSC 8, for example, the units have developed into regional operational planning, coordination, and planning organizations for countersubversion and counterinsurgency. This is over and above their past intelligence collection, coordination, and production mission.

(u)
B. (S/NFD) Functions: The Joint Security Centers are assigned the following objectives and perform the following functions:

1. The centers gather, verify, and analyze all information received from both governmental and nongovernmental sources within respective assigned areas of responsibility.
2. They coordinate activities of government information centers within center areas.
3. They prepare summaries of verified and processed intelligence received by CSOC and distribute these summaries biweekly to concerned government offices.
4. The centers assist with the organization, planning, promotion, and operation of governmental countersubversion bodies and suppression units within their zones.
5. They maintain accurate and current records of terrorist activities and subversive actions.
6. They operate local interrogation facilities and intelligence analysis sections.
7. The JSC's organize special intelligence systems and structures to suppress developing terrorist threats within center zones. They do so by using personnel, structures, and tactics germane to individual areas and situations.

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8. The centers organize mobile reconnaissance patrols to search for terrorist camps and arms caches. These units are prepared to maintain surveillance of the terrorists until reinforcements arrive.

9. They recommend to CSOC headquarters in Bangkok what courses of action are needed to counter the communist threat.

10. The JSC's prepare studies on the subversive situation and on the capability of the subversive/insurgent units in the area. The centers are expected to provide regular updated information on suspected locations of communist base camps. They are also to determine the size and composition of enemy forces; the extent of enemy activities, plans, and capabilities; and any other relevant information.

11. The centers provide daily reports on activities via radio to CSOC headquarters and forward spot reports as needed.

12. The JSC's serve as a vehicle for forwarding copies of captured subversive documents from the provinces to CSOC headquarters in Bangkok. Such documents are designated either "routine" (which are kept at the JSC) or "of interest" (which are forwarded). All captured materiel is retained locally, although photos and detailed descriptions of certain items are forwarded.

13. In October 1967 Joint Security Center 4 (Udorn) had operational control over a Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) operations test. The test was conducted in the center's area of responsibility. This was probably not an extension of JSC 4's functions, since the local Border Patrol Police and the JSC commander were one and the same.

14. By January 1968 Joint Security Center 5 was losing operational control over counterinsurgency operations to the Royal Thai Army Third Army. At the same time, however, it retained responsibility for the Royal Thai Government's psychological warfare campaign targeted against hill tribesmen in the North. JSC 5 has organized psywar teams to conduct propaganda operations among villagers who fled into the jungle in fear of the RTA. Propaganda operations are also directed at persons who moved into refugee camps.

C. (S/NPD) Organization: (See Figures 1-1 and 1-2 on next page)

1. The Joint Security Centers are the regional organs of Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), and respond to its guidance in countersubversion and intelligence matters. The centers also receive support from CSOC headquarters. The Joint Security Centers were organized in June 1965 as a step in upgrading the intelligence organization for counterinsurgency in rural areas of Thailand. The objective was to centralize all available intelligence under one roof. Information could then be pooled at a regional level, turned into useful intelligence, and disseminated to regional military forces and the provincial CPM and CSC.

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
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Figure 1-1

JOINT SECURITY CENTERS OPERATIONS COMMAND



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
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Figure 1-2

TYPICAL JSC.



— = Chain of Command

- - - = Coordination

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Originally, the JSC were staffed with Thai National Police Department Special Branch (SB) personnel. Other services also provided personnel, so that the JSC's could coordinate intelligence dissemination. Since November 1967, however, operational command over the JSC's has shifted to the Royal Thai Army. RTA control over the JSC's may include determination of intelligence inputs, clearance of all written reports, and approval for all contact with outside agencies.

2. Five JSC's operate at present. JSC 3 (Korat) and JSC 4 (Udon) operate under the RTA Second Army. The RTA Third Army controls JSC 5 (Chiengmai), and the First Army controls JSC 7 (Nakhon Pathom). The Fifth Military Circle District JSC 8 (Nakhon Si Thammarat). JSC's control one or more Civil-Police-Military (CPM) organizations or Communist Suppression Committees (CSC). Plans are now being made for another JSC, at Phitsanuloke in Region VII, to handle increased intelligence coordination problems associated with the deteriorating security situation in that area.

3. Each JSC has a single commander and from one to three deputy commanders or directors. Headquarters are located in relatively modern buildings in downtown sections of the target city. Under normal circumstances, only the director and his small staff are based permanently in JSC headquarters, since the commanders and deputy commanders wear two hats. The JSC position is the junior of the two. Personnel strength of JSC range from 30 to 50 men, of whom ten to 20 are low-level clerks. Strengths vary according to mission and the subversive situation in respective areas of responsibility. Each JSC has the following elements:

a. The Registry Section serves as the JSC message center. It maintains JSC records, classifies all incoming and outgoing reports, and performs other functions under the responsibilities of general administration.

b. The Plans and Operations Section prepares official JSC estimates of the subversive situation within the area of operations. It proposes intelligence collection and/or countersubversive operations to component elements of the JSC (i.e. the Provincial Police, Border Patrol Police, Royal Thai Army, etc.). It also coordinates intelligence collection requirements with suppression teams in the field. The section may have two subsections: Detention and Interrogation. Detention is responsible for handling all personnel undergoing interrogation at the JSC. Interrogation performs the detailed debriefings. The subsections can also be separate sections, depending on the number of individuals being interrogated.

c. The Analysis Section maintains order-of-battle records on all known or suspected insurgent/subversive groups, determines their capabilities and likely courses of action, and identifies likely target areas and essential elements of information for the collection agencies.

d. The Intelligence Reports Section prepares final JSC reports for submission to CSOC headquarters. It controls the dissemination of intelligence to other Royal Thai Government intelligence and security

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services. This section prepares regional estimates and daily intelligence summaries based on information provided by the Plans and Operations Section and the Analysis Section.

(u)
D. ~~(S/NFD)~~ Capabilities

1. Before the JSC's were formed, coordination was virtually nonexistent between Thai intelligence and security services at the regional and provincial levels. This was not only true between the military and police, traditional rivals. Lack of coordination also existed within the services themselves, between civilian authorities and the police, and among component parts of the Thai National Police Department. Each representative reported to his immediate superior without advising his service counterpart of information which might be of value to that organization. Some intelligence information was exchanged at the highest level, but usually too late. The situation has been described as a ladder with only one rung -- at the top. The JSC's were designed to eliminate this problem. Although some problems remain, the JSC's have, for the first time, provided a regional vehicle for the mutual exchange of intelligence information. Since the police were placed in control of the JSC's, coordination between the several police agencies has improved considerably. Only slightly less significant is the improved association between provincial administrative personnel and police officials, perhaps because both were under control of the Ministry of the Interior. Jealousy and rivalry between police and military agencies and personnel continued in most areas, increased in some, and diminished in a few. Areas where military-police coordination improved invariably were the result of close individual ties between military and police personalities and not due to the JSC functions and organization. Few military officers were willing to accept a subservient role in the JSC.

2. The recent reorganization of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate has seriously damaged the JSC structure and value. The JSC's still retain some of their strengths, particularly the coordination between civil authorities and police and between the various police agencies. Relations among military officers and JSC personnel have deteriorated significantly. While the military assumes control over counterinsurgency operations, the JSC's are still controlled by police officers. The Royal Thai Army Supreme Command and its several staffs do not rely heavily on the JSC's for intelligence. They complain (and correctly so) that, prior to the shift, the JSC's rarely got finished intelligence to the army commands in time for use in counterinsurgency operations. Most prefer to use the Special Operations Centers and the Armed Forces Security Center. Consequently, considerable intelligence information which should be available to forces in the field is published for headquarters consumption only. This situation is not likely to change until military personnel are assigned to top JSC positions or the army commands are willing to acknowledge their own intelligence collection, collation, and analytical weaknesses.

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3. Some of the weaknesses of the Joint Security Centers mirror the inadequacies of the local security services. Most informants employed by these forces, for example, receive little formal training; some are only low-level village officials. Security is negligible, as illustrated by the ease with which the insurgents assassinate local informants. Some informants probably work for both civilian and police agencies simultaneously, receiving dual compensation. Most reports contain very little detail. Both of these problems should have been alleviated by the JSC's. They had the authority to demand detailed reporting from contributing agencies, and they could have instituted a regional source control program. Another serious problem is timeliness. Reports rarely reached user agencies in time for operations; intelligence summaries prepared by JSC's usually were long out-of-date by the time they were used in sweep operations. Again, much of the problem originates in the contributing services. Reports emanating from the field often are processed by lengthy administrative procedures before and during their use in the JSC. Reports finally reaching the counterinsurgency organization are several months outdated. Flow of documents between the several sections of each JSC is not oriented toward speed. Finally, JSC exploitation of captured documents and personnel is oriented toward production of detailed estimates and summaries instead of their use by operational units.

4. JSC-prepared estimates and assessments are a compilation of information received over a specific period of time. Despite weaknesses in collation and evaluation procedures, these documents are good products and serve as the only regional estimate of insurgent capability and likely courses of action. JSC reports tend to overestimate insurgent strengths and capability during the early stages of development; however, following CSOD-planned counterinsurgency operations, the JSC's are likely to overestimate the impact these operations have on the subversive apparatus. JSC reporting places considerable emphasis on order-of-battle (OB) information and neglects the organizational structure operating in the Thai villages. Although this weakness primarily is a result of inadequate reporting by contributing agencies, the JSC's have not yet attempted to establish characteristics of an incident subversive situation. JSC's require better qualified personnel and improved training procedures.

5. In February 1969 the RTG took initial steps to organize another JSC for the critical tri-border area. The unit was to be located in Phitsanloke. The fact that a JSC was considered necessary indicates their value to the intelligence structure dealing with internal subversion. This latest move may also suggest that RTA/JSC relations have improved in recent months. If the RTA field elements acknowledge the capability of the JSC's to provide detailed information on the subversive organization (and can work with the JSC to improve the quality and timeliness of products) existing problems of RTG intelligence support to counterinsurgency operations will be diminished considerably.

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ANNEX 2

CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY

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ANNEX 2. (S/NFD) CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY (U)

(u)
A. (S/NFD) Mission: The Civil-Police-Military units (CPM's) are the provincial intelligence and counterinsurgency coordinating centers for the CSOD in provinces experiencing extensive insurgent organizational activity and overt terrorism. The mission of the CPM's is to provide the Governor with the power and organization to coordinate intelligence collection, dissemination, analysis activities, and counterinsurgency operations of the several Royal Thai Government (RTG) agencies operating in each province.

(u)
B. (S/NFD) Functions: (See Figure 2-1)

1. The Province Governor establishes operational control over civilian, police, and military units engaged in intelligence collection or counterinsurgency operations against the Communist Party of Thailand. He subsequently coordinates these operations to assure central direction and to avoid duplication. The Governor retains authority over most low-level operations.

2. The CPM's also provide CSOC and the Royal Thai Army command with any intelligence information available at the provincial level. Intelligence reports are collated at the CPM, analyzed, and forwarded to higher headquarters.

3. In October 1967 all seven CPM's (Sakhon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Udorn, Ubon, Kalasin, and Loei) were placed under operational control of the Second Army Forward. In practice, the RTA has retained the Governor's significant role in counterinsurgency planning, except in cases involving large-scale army operations. District civil officials and police representatives still collect intelligence on insurgent organizations and they continue to investigate subversion in their areas.

4. CPM's prepare periodic summaries of insurgent incidents in their provinces and produce detailed estimates and assessments of insurgent organizations, strengths, and capabilities. These reports are forwarded to the Joint Security Centers, CSOC, and RTA units in the province.

5. CPM's in provinces along Thailand's borders with Laos (Ubon, Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, and Loei) have been designated as Provincial Boundary Control Headquarters. They will be responsible for implementing CSOD's Operational Plan 111, which is designed to prevent communist infiltration of men and supplies into Thailand. This plan also represents an effort by CSOD to retain direct control over some counterinsurgency activity in the North and Northeast. The mission of the CPM's will be to win the allegiance of local villagers along the border and to organize intelligence teams to report on infiltrating groups. These teams will operate inside a five-mile buffer zone along the border and will be made up of unofficial agents. The CPM's will also coordinate an improved

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
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Figure 2-1

CIVIL - POLICE - MILITARY (CPM)



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counterinfiltration program by local police, military, and civil agencies. Despite CSOD's anticipated expanded influence, the chain of command for this plan will go from CSOD, through the Second and Third Armies, to the CPM's (u)

C. (S/NFD) Capabilities

1. The Civil-Police-Military, like the Joint Security Centers, have performed their primary mission of coordinating intelligence operations adequately. Duplication of effort, rivalries, and poor chains of command are less a problem between civil and police agencies now than before the CPM's were formed. Problems between police and military have intensified, however, because of the national competition for control of counterinsurgency. Despite the military takeover of CPM operations, the regional army commanders generally have avoided interfering in CPM operations unless necessary for army operations in the provinces. The greatest single success of the CPM's was the drawing of counterinsurgency and intelligence operations into the hands of the province authorities. This success is threatened by the army's authority to direct province operations. RTA's present restraint permits retention of the CPM concept, and it presently is working quite well.

2. CPM estimates are good compilations of order-of-battle data on the insurgent organization. These reports place too much emphasis on the military apparatus, however, to the detriment of the administrative organization. A proposed CPM source control program never got off the ground. CPM's have radio-reporting capability, although it is rarely used for intelligence information reporting. Like the JSC's, CPM intelligence production section personnel need considerable more training.

3. Information originating from a single source often reaches the CPM (or JSC) from one or more channels. Information contained in these reports thereby confirms itself. Informants are untrained for the most part. Information provided by known sources usually is lumped with reports provided by "walk-ins" and other less reliable sources. Most information, therefore, is little more than police blotter reporting. Most information received by the CPM is accepted as true and rarely cross-checked. This is particularly dangerous in cases where insurgent personnel are identified by name, often by a casual informant who may or may not have an ax to grind.

4. There still is no evidence of any formally established channel for lateral communications or exchange of information between adjacent CPM's. Contacts between like agencies are conditioned to the personalities of the individuals concerned and their desire, or lack thereof, to communicate with each other. This is a traditional Thai trait, exceedingly difficult to break.

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ANNEX 3

COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION COMMITTEES

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(u)
ANNEX 3. (S/NFD) COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION COMMITTEES (U)

(u)
A. (S/NFD) The Communist Suppression Committees (CSC's) are under direct control of provincial governors. (See Figure 3-1 on the following page)

(u)
B. (S/NFD) Functions

1. Communist Suppression Committees act to integrate and structure the overall Royal Thai Government counterinsurgency and intelligence effort in their province. CSC's are expected to collect all available information on insurgent operations in the province; this information subsequently is collated by the Operations and Intelligence Subcommittee of the CSG. Sources include the Provincial Police, Border Patrol Police, Special Branch, Special Operations Centers, and the district officers. The Psychological Operations Subcommittee conducts its operations on the advice of the Governor, the Operations and Intelligence Subcommittee, and with the consent of local police officials. The Logistics and Personnel Subcommittee provides administrative support to the CSC and to special CSC-planned activities when necessary.

2. There are two types of CSC's, "Type A" and "Type B". They differ in the degree of authority granted to the Governor of the province as head of the CSC. In "Type A" CSC's, the Governor has been granted the power to investigate and arrest subversive elements. In "Type B" CSC's, this right is retained by police officials. While the "Type A" CSC's were formed to permit greater authority and coordination in counterinsurgency operations, it has had a similar impact in "Type B" CSC's. Local police know they could lose their authority almost immediately should coordination and communication become a problem. "Type A" CSC's are in areas experiencing considerable insurgent organizational activity, yet not serious enough to warrant formation of a CPM or JSC/CPM. "Type A" CSC's are found in eight provinces of the Northeast (Chaiyaphum, Nakhon Ratchasima, Sisaket, Surin, Maha Sarakham, Khon Kaen, Roi Et, and Buriram); two provinces in the North (Chiengrai and Nan); four provinces in the West (Prachuab Khiri Khan, Phetburi, Ratburi, and Kanchanaburi); eight provinces in the South (Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phattalung, Trang, Surat Thani, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun), and Phetchabun in the north-central region. The Phetchabun CSC may be shortly upgraded to a CPM or even a JSC/CPM, due to the drastic increase in subversive activity in recent months. There are 29 provinces with "Type B" CSC's, covering the remaining portion of the country not covered by either JSC's, CPM's, "Type A" CSC's, or the Regional Border Committee.

3. Following the reorganization of CSOD, "Type A" CSC's within the army commands were made subordinate to that army. The army has not interfered significantly in CSC activities to date, but could do so if it wished.

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
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Figure 3-1

COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION COMMITTEE (CSC)



—— = Chain of Command

----- = Coordination

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4. It is not known whether the CSC's have regularly scheduled reporting requirements on insurgent activity in their provinces. Nevertheless, such reports can be ordered by the CSOC, the JSC's, or the army commands.

C. (S) Capabilities

1. The CSC's can only handle routine situations. They are incapable of following through with investigations, intelligence analysis, and suppression action. Most CSC's merely report all information of developing subversion on to the next higher headquarters, thus effectively shifting responsibility.

2. Formation of the CSC's, however, has resulted in two improvements. First, the CSC serves as a vehicle for forwarding reports and intelligence which, under normal methodology, would have moved through individual agency lines of authority. Second, forced communication under the committee structure aids development of an environment of cooperation between district officials and police. No such cooperation exists between the police and the military at this level.

3. The Communist Suppression Operations Directorate is planning to organize advisory teams for operation at the CSC level to reduce serious CSC problems in personnel, technology, education, and experience. This would involve CSC's in preventative operations and collection of intelligence in areas not yet experiencing subversion, in order to circumscribe phase I insurgency at its base. This plan is only in the formulation stage. A test will be conducted in Surin Province, after which other CSC's will target potential areas of subversive activity. A secondary objective of this planned improvement of the CSC is to establish closer relations between the provincial and district officials and local villages. Should this occur, intelligence reporting from these villages is likely to increase in direct proportion.

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ANNEX 4

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE -- RTA (G2)

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(u)
ANNEX 4. (S/NFD) DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE -- RTA (G2)

(u)
A. (S/NFD) Mission: The Directorate of Intelligence, RTA serves as the G2, RTA and is responsible for all aspects of intelligence, except counter-intelligence, and provides advice concerning security, and directs the Army Attache System. The G2 provides combat intelligence support to subordinate RTA units.

(u)
B. (S/NFD) Functions

1. The G2 provides specialized assistance in interrogation, order of battle, imagery interpretation, exploitation of captured documents, and internal security to the RTA and its subordinates. It supplies additional specialized intelligence assistance as needed.
2. The G2 conducts some liaison with other intelligence and security services and prepares intelligence summaries for distribution to army units.
3. The G2 directs and mans the Army Attache program and conducts liaison with foreign attache personnel.
4. The G2 is responsible for maintaining physical security of all subordinate units and provides training personnel for use by all army units.
5. The G2 informs the Chief of Staff, RTA, on all matters relating to domestic and foreign intelligence and responds to specific requests for information from higher authorities.

(u)
C. (S/NFD) Organization: The Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army (RTA) (G2), is administratively controlled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, RTA. Technically, it is responsible to the J2, but usually reports directly to the Chief of Staff, RTA, or to the Supreme Commander, RTA. All divisions of the G2 are located within the Headquarters, RTA, with the exception of the Intelligence Division which is located with the Directorate of Operations at the Tactical Operations Center, RTA Forward. The G2 has 190 persons assigned of the more than 200 authorized. The divisions of the G2, RTA, are as follows: (See Figure 4-1 on next page)

1. Administrative Division: This division is responsible for the receipt, dispatch, and routing of reports, messages, and correspondence. It provides administrative assistance to G2 personnel, and handles the disbursement of unit funds.
2. Planning and Training Division: It is responsible for the following:
 - a. Presenting an annual four-week NCO Combat Intelligence Course.
 - b. Handling the activities of the G2 Mobile Intelligence Training Teams (MITT).
 - c. Convening the G2 annual Intelligence Officers' Seminar.

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
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Figure 4-1

G2 RTA



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— = Chain of Command

- - - = Coordination

Source: DOD/IRRs

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d. Updating and writing new lesson plans for use by the MITTs and for the NCO Combat Intelligence Course.

e. Producing and distributing intelligence material for use in unit intelligence training programs.

f. Producing a monthly G2 Information Digest distributed down to battalion level. (Articles cover new weapons, research and development, combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam, and information on other Southeast Asian nations.)

g. Coordinating and producing the annual G2 budget.

3. Military Intelligence Unit, Royal Thai Army (RTA) (See Figure 4-2 on next page)

a. Mission: The RTA Military Intelligence Unit performs specialized intelligence and security functions within the RTA under the organizational control of the Directorate of Intelligence (DOI), RTA, and under the operational control of the units to which MI detachments are assigned.

b. Functions

(1) The Military Intelligence Unit is to provide 15-man MI detachments for augmentation to G2 sections of the three armies and the 5th Military Circle. The detachments remain elements of the MI Unit and the DOI, but are under operational control of the tactical headquarters to which they are assigned. Tactical units provide administrative and logistical support to their attached MI detachments.

(2) The MI Unit furnishes technical supervision and assistance to the MI detachments.

(3) The MI detachments provide the RTA and its subordinate elements specialized assistance in the field of interrogation of prisoners, order of battle (OB), imagery interpretation, captured document exploitation, captured materiel exploitation, and security procedures.

(4) The MI Unit furnishes intelligence support below field army level as needed, particularly to subordinate RTA units involved in counterinsurgency operations.

c. Organization: The MI Unit is expected to have the following subordinate elements: Headquarters Section, Security Section, Interrogation Section, Imagery Interpretation Section, Order of Battle Section, Document and Material Section, and four MI detachments.

d. Capabilities

(1) The capabilities of the MI Unit are not known since it is still a very new organization. A permanent headquarters location has not

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
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Figure 4-2

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DOI, RTA



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Source: CIAD Analysis

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been selected; equipment has been programmed, but not received. Personnel are still being selected and assigned; many of these individuals have already received intelligence training, although their overall proficiency is not known. The MI Unit was at 75 per cent of its reduced authorized strength of 65 men by October 1967. As of January 1969, 55 persons were assigned. The MI Unit became operational sometime during calendar year 1968. It has produced some fairly reliable counter-intelligence information.

(2) The MI Unit probably is the heir of the directorate's two Mobile Intelligence Training Teams (MITT) which were operating in 1966 and early 1967. The MITTs were established to conduct intelligence training for most RTA units and were assigned to the Plans and Training Division. They conducted seven-hour courses on communism and communist techniques, aggression, activities in Thailand, Asia, and Africa, and the employment of intelligence and counterintelligence in a countersubversion situation. The course was given to staff officers, unit commanders down to platoon level, and NCOs down to squad level. A slightly modified course was given to civil officials in the provinces. Course content was good and gave particular emphasis to identification of potential sources of intelligence in areas affected by subversion. Most members of the two MITTs were either trained overseas or at the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC). The former chief of one of the teams, Colonel Ruengsakdi Choomsatool, now commands the MI Unit.

4. Security Division: The division performs the following functions:

- a. Promulgates and implements security regulations and procedures within the Royal Thai Army (RTA).
- b. Safeguards classified defense information within the Headquarters, RTA.
- c. Conducts complaint-type personnel investigations within the RTA in coordination with, and approval of, the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC).
- d. Provides an input of selected RTA security and counterintelligence reports to the Intelligence Division, G2.
- e. Provides instructors for the MITT's and NCO Combat Intelligence course.

5. Foreign Liaison Division: This division handles protocol matters for the RTA and maintains close relations with the RTA military attaches operating abroad. Attache reports are routed through this division and forwarded to the Intelligence Division, DOI, when deemed appropriate. This division may be conducting intelligence exchange programs with the Republic of China's Ministry of Defense.

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6. The G2 Air Division was formed in 1964 but did not become operational until October 1968 when a G2 Air was appointed. He and two assistants received training in 1969 and subsequently recommended activation of a Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance) for support of the Army. This has not yet been approved.

7. The Intelligence Division is responsible for the collection, processing, collation, and dissemination of information emanating from the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD). All CSOD reports are prepared by the Intelligence Division. Additional information is received from intelligence sections of subordinate RTA units. Although the Intelligence Division organizationally is a part of the DOI, direction and operational control rests with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, and the Director of Operations, RTA. This division may now be under the G2, Army Operations Center (AOC).

D. ~~(S/NFDD)~~ Capabilities

1. The Directorate of Intelligence (DOI), Royal Thai Army (RTA), continues to be eclipsed by other joint military intelligence units. These include the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC), the Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC), and various civil agencies. In the past, the Directorate of Intelligence, RTA, has not been able to operate clandestinely in an effective manner. This is due partially to Sangkhadis' experience in protocol and foreign liaison as opposed to basic intelligence collection and production. The DCI's function as a clearing house for information from overt sources and for reports from Special Operations Centers and CSOC has been performed satisfactorily. Elementary efforts to perform minimal intelligence analysis, however, are inadequate. The DOI does not coordinate its reports with other intelligence agencies. Consequently, it is unable to provide subordinate RTA units with adequate intelligence support.

2. On 24 February 1967, a Military Intelligence (MI) Unit was activated as a token step to alleviate the problems caused by the lack of an organic RTA intelligence support organization. The MI Unit was to provide specialized intelligence and security functions within the RTA. Although operational control of this unit remains with the tactical headquarters, it is subordinate to the DOI. As this MI unit is deployed, the DOI's responsibilities and capabilities will increase.

3. The counterintelligence mission within the RTARF remains with the AFSC, but it is apparent that some responsibility is dispersed to the DOI, RTA. In June 1967 General Praphas (with the concurrence of LTG Chairatana, AFSC) approved the positioning of personnel from the Security Division, RTA, to the northeastern and southern regions of Thailand. On 26 July 1967, MG Sangkhadis indicated that the DOI, with help from the AFSC, had trained ten or 12 teams for deployment to the Northeast. Other teams were also being trained. These teams are to be in provincial headquarters. They are to conduct personnel security investigations (PSI's), complaint-type investigations, security surveys,

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security lectures, and classified document security support to RTA units operating within their province. Their jurisdiction is limited to RTA unit installations, but their location at province headquarters will enable team members to conduct valuable liaison with other RTG intelligence agencies. Deployment of operational CI teams and improved liaison should improve the DOI's capability to provide intelligence support to RTA units. It should also enhance DOI's reputation within the Royal Thai Government (RTG) intelligence community.

4. Training of DOI personnel is adequate, but not superior. Technical training remains a serious problem and intelligence analysis training is weak. As with most Thai intelligence services, security procedures are good on paper, but poor in practice. Personnel strength is adequate, but deployment of Counterintelligence Corps teams from the Security Division and activation of the MI Unit may put a temporary strain on the DOI.

5. As the Royal Thai Army extends its responsibilities in RTG counter-insurgency programs, the DOI can be expected to play an increasingly important role in intelligence support for these programs. The close personal relationships which exist between MG Sanghadis, DOI; LTG Chairatana, AFSC; and General Praphas, Commander, RTA, will also play an important role in the gradual upgrading of the DOI.

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ANNEX 5

A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER

B. G2 SECTION, ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER

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ANNEX 5

(u)
A. (S/NFD) SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER (SOC)

1. Mission: The assigned missions of the Special Operations Centers (SOCs) include collection of intelligence information, performance of civic action operations among the populace of their assigned regions, and the conduct of psychological warfare operations.

2. Functions

a. SOC's provide a ready force to assist in guarding the Thai border.

b. SOC's collect intelligence information on terrain, population, communication, and subversion, using locally recruited informers in the villages in which the SOC's operate.

c. SOC's maintain a source list of all local informants and coordinate this list with other Royal Thai Government (RTG) intelligence and counter-subversion elements (particularly the Border Patrol Police [BPP], the Provincial Police (PP), and the Civil-Police-Military [CPM] authorities). SOC's also attempt to determine the reporting capability and veracity of their sources.

d. SOC's conduct psychological operations to promote faith and trust of the RTG among the local populace.

e. SOC officials advise village authorities on methods of improving village health, economy, and education.

f. SOC's perform medical and veterinary services in target villages, and maintain aid stations at each SOC headquarters for use by all local villagers.

g. SOC's are instructed to coordinate operations with other RTG elements.

h. SOC's give and receive assistance from other RTG elements as needed.

i. Special Operations Teams generally operate in one area for two to three weeks, up to 45 miles from respective center headquarters. They then return for one week at headquarters before moving on to another village.

j. SOC's publish a monthly intelligence summary which is disseminated to regional military elements and the RTA Operation Center (AOC). Copies usually go to local police and civil authorities as well, so long as there are no feuds between them. No effort is made to analyze or evaluate

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the information reported, despite the fact that source evaluation is a SOC function.

3. Organization: (See Figure 5-1 on next page)

a. The SOC's are under the operational control of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Operations Center, located in Army Hall in Bangkok. Logistical and other support comes from the RTA regional area commands. The SOC was first formed in October 1963 to replace border security units deployed along the Laotian border that year to counter a serious Pathet Lao threat. The SOC is purely a military organization, but it coordinates operations with provincial and district administrative officials, the Mobile Defense Units (MDU's), the Provincial Police (PP), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and other military units in their areas of operations.

b. In January 1968 eight SOC's were in operation, and seven more were projected. All are manned by RTA personnel, except for the newest SOC at Chanthaburi. It is operated by the Royal Thai Marine Corps. SOC's are located at:

- (1) Aranyaprathet District, Prachinburi Provinces (SOC 11)
- (2) Bungkan District, Nong Khai Province (SOC 21)
- (3) Nakhon Phanom Province (SOC 22)
- (4) Surin Province (SOC 23)
- (5) Chiangkhong District, Chiengrai Province (SOC 31)
- (6) Pua District, Nan Province (SOC 32)
- (7) Pattana Province (SOC 51)
- (8) Pong Namron District, Chanthaburi Province (SOC 61)

c. SOC's are planned for:

- (1) Yala Province (Malaysian border)
- (2) Narathiwat Province (Malaysian border)
- (3) Ubon Province (Laotian border)
- (4) Satun Province (Malaysian border)
- (5) Ranong Province (Burmese border)
- (6) Tak Province (Burmese border)
- (7) Chiangmai Province (Burmese border)

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
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SOC



— = Chain of Command
- - - = Coordination

Source: CIAD Analysis

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Figure 5-1

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d. Personnel for the Special Operations Centers are drawn from all units operating in respective assigned areas of operations. The normal tour of duty is from six months to a year, although some personnel are retained for longer periods when particular skills are needed. By 1970 the RTA plans to man and equip all SOC's on a permanent basis with personnel drawn from all military units. All SOC's have local language capabilities. (SOC's on the Malay border have Malay language capability; those in the North have tribal language capability). SOC personnel receive two weeks training prior to their assignment in the SOC.

e. Each SOC is composed of the following:

(1) A 40-man headquarters section consisting of a control group, a logistics section, a transportation section, a communications section, and a medical team.

(2) A four-man psychological warfare team from the RTA Psychological Warfare Company with loud speakers, movie projectors, and tape recorders.

(3) A 27-man security platoon consisting of a control group, a rifle squad, and an armored squad.

(4) Five nine-man special operations teams. The teams consist of one officer, one NCO deputy team leader, one NCO interpreter, one NCO corpsman, two radiomen, two drivers (often replaced by another corpsman), and one mechanic.

4. Capabilities

a. The Special Operations Center (SOC) concept is excellent. The centers are intended to provide Royal Thai Army (RTA) and Royal Thai Government (RTG) presence in areas not normally covered by other agencies. The primary mission of the SOC's is intelligence collection, but their psychological warfare operations and civic action missions serve a valuable function. SOC's provide coverage in areas where the Border Patrol Police (BPP) has primary responsibility, but minimal resources. The major weakness of the SOC's is that they are filler organizations. The BPP is responsible for most areas in which the SOC's operate. Mobile Development Units, often in the same general sector of responsibility, have a remarkably similar mission; consequently, problems of coordination and duplication of effort cause some difficulty. When subversive activity or insurgency of any magnitude is identified in a center area, the respective RTA operational command is given responsibility for counterinsurgency operations in that area. The SOC, however, remains in place to furnish routine combat intelligence to the RTA units. This system weakens the initial concept of operation; SOC's should be moved to new areas of operation when this occurs, with their intelligence resources turned over to the local RTA S2.

b. The present SOC procedure of rotating personnel every six months or so provides excellent training in combat intelligence and counterintelligence

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operations, as well as civic action, to as many RTA personnel as possible. The problems of continuity, however, probably offset the value of this procedure. In most Thai villages, trust is established between two individuals, not between a man and an impersonal organization like the RTA. This practice is to change shortly, but other problems are foreseen. For example, persons assigned to SOC's in the North have, in the past, come from the North. Under the new system, personnel from the Central Plain assigned to work in the North may practice and experience regional prejudice which will hinder substantially civic action projects.

c. SOC intelligence capability is marginal. SOC sources usually are of semiofficial status, such as village officials, Volunteer Defense Corpsmen, or former military personnel. Contact with these sources is overt; little effort is made to protect the Source's identity. This is a particularly dangerous practice in areas of incipient insurgency. Should the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) execute several of these sources -- as has happened in the Northeast and Mid-South -- SOC information channels could dry up. SOC personnel require additional training in security procedures and in the conduct of covert intelligence operations.

d. The takeover of counterinsurgency functions by the RTA should require a review of the SOC mission. Either the SOC should support operational RTA units actively engaged in counterinsurgency, or they should provide RTA coverage outside the active insurgent areas. The value of SOC is in providing intelligence and countersubversion coverage of isolated regions of the country.

e. SOC effectiveness often depends on the degree of identifiable subversive threat. SOC 32 at Pua, for example, had a sloppy performance record until subversion in the area became apparent. Since that time, SOC 32 regularly had its teams in the field, engaging in a wide variety of development, psychological operations, and civic action projects. When financial considerations have hindered SOC 32 operations (which is often) team members engage in several money-making schemes to finance their projects.

f. SOC's are too dependent on vehicular transportation. Most of the areas in which they operate have an extremely poor road net (particularly in the four-month-long rainy season). Most villages which will be likely targets for subversion are those along major roads, but without developed lines of communication. Only first echelon communications equipment is available. Vehicular maintenance is very poor.

g. SOC medical activities are limited by lack of trained personnel, medicines, and supplies. SOC's have one medical officer (not a trained physician) and two NCO's at each headquarters. Each civic action team has one poorly trained NCO medic. Weakness of the SOC medical civic action program, however, is not readily apparent to the local population.

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Most SOC's are located in quite isolated areas where there are no medical facilities of any kind.

B. (S/AFD) G2 SECTION, ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC)

1. Mission: The G2 Section, Army Operations Center (AOC) has three assigned responsibilities: the planning, implementing, and supervising of intelligence and counterintelligence through Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) and Royal Thai Army (RTA) policies; coordinating intelligence information with other government agencies; and disseminating intelligence information in a usable form to internal security forces.

2. Functions and Organization: (See Figure 5-2 on next page)

a. The Planning and Analysis element prepares policies and plans for collection of intelligence, and coordinates these plans with other agencies. It also has an evaluation function: studying and presenting recommendations on improvements to intelligence procedure.

b. The Administrative element exercises administrative management. It handles adjutant functions, personnel policies, preparation and distribution of equipment, and supervision of financial matters.

c. The Dissemination element processes all incoming intelligence information, prepares intelligence summaries on the current situation, and evaluates intelligence reports and sources. It further maintains current dossiers on -- and presents briefings on -- the current enemy situation. It also submits intelligence collection requirements to the Operations element.

d. The Operations element forwards intelligence collection requirements to RTA units operating in the field. It maintains biographical data on informants and agents, and supervises intelligence collection operations.

3. Capabilities

a. The Army Operations Center (AOC) G2 Section is undermanned, undertrained, and undercriticized. It is essentially a paper organization, operating as the personal vehicle adjunct of the Chief of Staff of the Royal Thai Army. Problems of coordination, which have resulted from the RTA's assumption of power from the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate, also exist in the G2 Section. While the AOC has produced some timely and reasonably accurate reports, it depends too heavily on RTA (particularly Special Operations Center) sources. The AOC has not properly used police and civil sources of information. Since the AOC was only upgraded to act as an authority between CSOC and its operational arms, the G2 Section may never be anything more than a paper organization.

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
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Figure 5-2

AOC G2



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Source: CIAD Analysis

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b. During the surge of subversion and insurgency in the tri-border area near Laos, the RTA was not able to generate even the most elementary combat intelligence. The G2 Section failed to perform any of its assigned missions, and has been the source of much ridicule among the highest RTA circles. The G2 Section probably has little influence upon the G2's of the area commands.

C. (S/NFD)



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
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ANNEX 6

A. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY

B. SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

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ANNEX 6

W
A. (S/NFD) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY, ROYAL THAI ARMY

1. Mission: The mission of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Company is to conduct psychological operations in support of the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate and RTA units. In addition, the RTA PSYOP Company is to provide command and control, administration and logistical support, and operational supervision over organic and attached units engaged in support of other units.

2. Functions

a. The PSYOP Company's Modular Audio Visual Units (MAVU's) support and man the RTA's Special Operations Centers (SOC's) and the Joint Security Centers and Civil-Police-Military elements of the CSOC.

b. The PSYOP Company conducts loudspeaker and propaganda leaflet operations in support of ongoing countersubversion and counterinsurgency operations.

c. The PSYOP Company produces printed material and radio scripts in support of defector inducement programs of the RTA area commands and CSOC. These functions are supported by the Light Mobile Printing Plant and the Radio Broadcast Studio.

d. The PSYOP Company develops psychological warfare campaigns and material from processed intelligence input provided by other government intelligence and security services and, to a limited extent, by its own MAVU's.

e. The PSYOP Company conducts formal classroom and field training for its assigned personnel and attached units. The following subjects are taught: supply procedures; maintenance programs; staff operations; intelligence collection, collation, and analysis; surveys; radio programming; loudspeaker operations; leaflet operations; printing plant operations; printed media processing; field operation procedures; and use of audio-visual aids.

f. The PSYOP Company assigns teams to the RTA Divisions, where they are reassigned to subordinate units. Each team is composed of one junior officer and two NCO's. These teams have not proved effective, due to improper training.

3. Organization: (See Figure 6-1 on next page)

a. The PSYOP Company was activated on 1 May 1966, after several PSYOP teams had been formed and assigned to work with the Special Operations Teams in the border regions beginning in 1963. Activation of

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
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Figure 6-1

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMPANY



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Source: DOD IRR's

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the company headquarters and subordinate elements provided for a command and control element, in addition to improving PSYOPs training. In January 1969, 209 persons were assigned out of an authorized 288. Two additional PSYOP platoons may have been authorized in early 1969.

b. The PSYOP Company Headquarters is at Camp Narai in Lopburi and is co-located with the PSYOP platoons. The Headquarters supervises the MAVU's through the platoons, and assists the Propaganda Platoon. The Propaganda Platoon is composed of a Radio Broadcast Sound Section, Propaganda Section, and Printing Section. It is located in Bangkok, and supports the CSOD Propaganda Division. Four operations platoon headquarters and 11 MAVU teams operate directly under RTA control at the Special Operations Centers. The remaining 13 MAVU teams, like the Propaganda Platoon, operate under the supervision of the PSYOP Division, CSOD. One operational platoon headquarters and the equivalent of two MAVU teams are assigned to support Thai troops in Vietnam.

4. Capabilities

a. Although the Propaganda Platoon and the 24 operational MAVU field teams can be considered combat effective (in that they are presently performing assigned PSYOP missions in support of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) communist suppression effort) the PSYOP Company's effectiveness is marginal. Personnel shortages, poor training instructors and courses, and weak equipment maintenance are major problems. Production deadlines, imposed by ambitious RTA and CSOD officers, often involve a sacrifice in quality in order to meet these deadlines.

b. The PSYOP Company is experiencing severe lack of coordination in the chain of command. Confusion by platoon commanders over their assigned duties and responsibilities damages the operations of the MAVU's. The four PSYOP platoons have not been assigned personnel as yet.

c. Intelligence collection, collation, and analysis instruction is needed to establish processes by which the intelligence processing section of the Propaganda Platoon could convert the gathered information into usable and effective propaganda. There apparently is little understanding of the close connection between intelligence input and the formulation of meaningful psychological warfare campaigns.

d. PSYOP Company systems of requisition and supply are totally lacking. Considerable training is necessary. Maintenance training and procedures, particularly routine preventative maintenance, are not maintained or encouraged.

B. (S/NED) SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (SFG)

1. Mission: The Royal Thai Army Special Forces Group (SFG) is responsible for conducting infiltration of operational areas by land, sea, and air; establishing guerrilla forces in enemy territory, and

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conducting special warfare operations in support of guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.

2. Functions

a. The Special Forces Group uses its 804 assigned personnel to man two "C" Detachments, six "B" Detachments, and 36 "A" Teams. In 1968 and 1969 the SFG supported Royal Thai Government communist suppression operations in the North and Northeast. The Commander is Special Colonel Tienchai Sirisumpan.

b. The Special Forces Group trains RTA infantry companies in counterinsurgency operations during a seven-week course. Two weeks of training are for company leaders. RTA companies trained by SFG are sent to the Northeast and South. Special Forces units also trained men belonging to a volunteer regiment serving in the Republic of Vietnam.

3. Capabilities: The shortage of trained personnel and equipment, coupled with the large training mission assigned to "A" Teams, severely limits the capability of the SFG to perform its mission.

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ANNEX 7

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE

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ANNEX 7. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE -- RTAF (U)

(U)
A. (S/NFD) Mission: The Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Air Force, plans, coordinates, directs, and conducts RTAF operations concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and liaison with foreign air attaches in Thailand, protocol matters, public information, and the training of RTAF intelligence personnel.

(U)
B. (S/NFD) Functions: The Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Air Force performs the following functions:

1. Conducts limited intelligence collection operations as directed by the Supreme Command.
2. Provides intelligence support, including photointerpretation and order of battle, to subordinate RTAF units.
3. Directs base security operations.
4. Conducts most intelligence training given to RTAF intelligence personnel. Some RTAF officers attend the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) school and others receive training in foreign countries.
5. Prepares tactical target folders.
6. Collates and disseminates RTAF air attache reports as received.
7. Handles all foreign liaison and protocol matters for the RTAF command, in addition to RTAF troop and public information programs.

(U)
C. (S/NFD) Organization: (See Figure 7-1 on next page)

1. The Administrative Branch is responsible to the Director of Intelligence for the administration of the Directorate.
2. (S/NFD) The Intelligence Division is charged with the responsibility of collecting, producing, and disseminating intelligence for the RTAF. The division also performs the planning and training functions for the Directorate as well as maintaining a small library for the RTAF. It has three sections: Collection, Production, and Target. The Intelligence Division is the only division in the Directorate directly involved in intelligence activities. The nature and scope of these activities are not known. On 29 July 1966, Air Vice Marshall Chalerm, the Director of Intelligence, RTAF, reported his sources revealed that the Chinese Communist Embassy in Laos had ordered their agents to conduct sabotage against RTAF bases in northeast Thailand. This information suggests the RTAF, and presumably the Intelligence Division, possesses a clandestine collection capability in northeast Thailand or in Laos. The information could have originated with other Royal Thai Government intelligence

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
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Figure 7-1

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (RTAF)



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services, however. Present strength of the Intelligence Division is 23 men assigned out of an authorized 48.

3. The Foreign Division, organized into the Foreign Liaison, Protocol, and Attache/Student Sections, is responsible for planning and coordinating RTAF protocol activities. These include the management of visits to the RTAF by foreign personnel as well as liaison with RTAF attaches and students stationed abroad. The Division has nine officers.

4. The Security Division exercises staff supervision over those activities within the RTAF associated with security. As such, the Security Division conducts investigations and inspections as well as supervising matters affecting RTAF security. The Division is organized into three sections: Security, Counterintelligence, and SEATO (which controls SEATO documents).

5. The Public Information Section executes the RTAF troop information program and releases information to public sources on RTAF activities.

6. Air Intelligence School

a. The Air Intelligence School was established in May 1967 to alleviate some of the serious problems of training in intelligence subjects. Located on Don Muang Air Base, near Bangkok, the school has a classroom, administrative office, and a mock air operations room. There is considerable room for expansion. Three courses are scheduled each year, two for officers and one for NCO's. Each class consists of about 20 students and usually has representatives from the army, navy, and Border Patrol Police (BPP). A Senior Officers Intelligence Course is scheduled for 1970.

b. The Officer Course runs 16 weeks and is divided into three sections:

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| (1) Section I: | Introduction to Intelligence (4 hours) |
| | Intelligence Cycle (4 hours) |
| | Intelligence Collection (4 hours) |
| | Intelligence Production (10 hours) |
| | Intelligence Dissemination (4 hours) |
| | Air Order of Battle (20 hours) |
| | Report Writing (4 hours) |
| | Intelligence Estimates (16 hours) |
| | RTAF Intelligence Capability (4 hours) |
| | Intelligence Library (4 hours) |
| | Air Operations Room (4 hours) |
| | Air Intelligence Briefing (24 hours) |
| | RTAF Intelligence Units (4 hours) |
| | Intelligence Officer Mission and Activities (8 hours) |
| | Radar Intelligence (10 hours) |
| | Signal and Electronic Intelligence (6 hours) |

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AAA Intelligence (4 hours)
Target Analysis (10 hours)
Air Technical Intelligence (4 hours)
Tactical Intelligence (6 hours)
Weapons Recognition (6 hours)
Interrogation of POW's (6 hours)
Security (8 hours)
Map Reading (10 hours)

(2) Section II:

Introduction (2 hours)
Army Intelligence (6 hours)
Navy Intelligence (4 hours)
Border Patrol Police Intelligence
(4 hours)
War Plans (2 hours)
Tactics of Air Strikes (4 hours)
Air Reconnaissance (4 hours)
Joint Combat Operations (8 hours)
RTAF Weaponry (4 hours)
Air Defense (8 hours)
Internal Threat to Thailand (8 hours)
World Situation (32 hours, with emphasis
on Southeast Asian countries)
Escape and Evasion (4 hours)
CBR Warfare (4 hours)
Counterintelligence (10 hours)
Psychological Warfare (12 hours)
Unconventional Warfare (4 hours)

(3) Section III:

Practical Exercise (36 hours)
Physical Training (24 hours)
Intelligence Administration (8 hours)

c. The NCO Course runs 12 weeks and is divided into four sections:

(1) Section I:

Thai Language Instruction (8 hours)
Basic Draftmanship (14 hours)
Intelligence Administration (8 hours)

(2) Section II:

History of Warfare (4 hours)
Air Power (8 hours)
Security (8 hours)
POW Interrogation (6 hours)
Communism (4 hours)
Psychological Warfare and Counter-
insurgency (8 hours)
Situation in Southeast Asia (14 hours)
Escape and Evasion (8 hours)

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(3) Section III:

Intelligence Introduction (6 hours)
Intelligence Cycle (6 hours)
Intelligence Collection (12 hours)
Intelligence Production (6 hours)
Intelligence Dissemination (12 hours)
Intelligence Library and Documents
(8 hours)
Order of Battle (6 hours)
Map Reading (20 hours)
Air Operational Room (20 hours)
Intelligence Briefing (24 hours)
Photo Interpretation (10 hours)
Counterintelligence (4 hours)
AAA Intelligence (4 hours)
Communications and Electronics Intel-
ligence (4 hours)
Army Intelligence (2 hours)
Navy Intelligence (2 hours)
Border Patrol Intelligence (2 hours)
Wing and Squadron Intelligence (6 hours)
Target Analysis (6 hours)
Photo Interpretation (30 hours)

(4) Section IV:

Practical Exercise (60 hours)
Examinations (20 hours)

D. (S/NFD) Capabilities

1. The Directorate of Intelligence, RTAF, is not capable of providing support in most functional areas of intelligence. Concentration of the intelligence functions of collection, production, dissemination, planning, and training in a single division (Intelligence) adversely affects RTAF intelligence efforts. The Directorate is aware of the problem and proposes to organize a Plans Division to assume RTAF intelligence planning and training responsibilities.

2. RTAF intelligence cannot perform effectively in the following areas: air targeting, target materials, enemy defense analysis, reconnaissance management, and weaponry. The Intelligence Division's capability to provide clandestine collection support is not known.

3. The directorate often fails to coordinate or exchange information with other Royal Thai Government intelligence services. As the RTAF becomes more heavily involved in counterinsurgency operations in North Thailand, it will have to establish good communications with the Royal Thai Army and Communist Suppression Operations Directorate. The impetus for this coordination may come from the Supreme Command, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF).

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4. Manpower and training are the most serious problems within the directorate. The few officers assigned to the directorate are not properly trained for their assignments. This does not mean, however, that the RTAF has no foreign-trained intelligence officers. The difficulty is that the RTAF considers these officers highly qualified and assigns them to positions usually not related to intelligence. This prevents them from imparting their knowledge and experience to intelligence trainees. The new Air Intelligence School should alleviate this problem in time.

5. The Air Intelligence School has not been in operation long enough to make a complete assessment of its operations. The curriculum is complete, but the staff (consisting of four officers) is overworked. Not only do they perform most of the instruction, but they also have to handle the administration of the school. The school relies on instructors from other RTG agencies to a great extent; too often this involves revising the schedule to meet the needs of the part-time instructors. RTAF officers, however, are undergoing extensive training in intelligence instruction. These men should be ready for assignment to the Air Intelligence School staff by 1970.

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ANNEX 8

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, ROYAL THAI NAVY

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ANNEX 8. (S/NFD) DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE -- RTN (U)

(u) A. (S/NFD) Mission: The Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Navy serves as the N2 of the Royal Thai Navy and is known in naval circles as the Naval Intelligence Department. Located at Thonburi, it is responsible for planning, coordinating, directing, and conducting operations concerning intelligence, security, naval attache affairs, liaison with foreign naval attaches in Thailand, protocol matters concerning the navy, and training of naval intelligence personnel.

(u) B. (S/NFD) Functions

1. The Directorate of Intelligence collects naval and political information from overt sources on foreign naval personnel, equipment, and capabilities.

2. It conducts clandestine collection missions against Cambodia. One operation in August 1963 involved a six-man Royal Thai Marine Corps patrol which made a shallow penetration into Cambodia from Trat Province. The patrol crossed the border in civilian clothes without the necessary documents. Results of that mission are not known, but other teams are believed to have crossed the border intermittently since then.

3. The Directorate maintains a maritime shipping reporting plan and monitors the activities of communist shipping in the port of Bangkok.

4. It collates information from naval and other intelligence sources for dissemination to subordinate RTN units.

5. It disseminates finished intelligence to subordinate RTN units.

6. It prepares intelligence estimates on neighboring countries at the direction of the Supreme Commander and the J2.

7. It conducts liaison with other RTG and foreign intelligence services.

8. It prepares personnel and installation security procedures.

9. It conducts personnel and physical security investigations.

10. It prepares briefings for high-level Thai naval officers and officers of the Supreme Command, Royal Thai Army, and Royal Thai Air Force. It performs the same function for visiting foreign dignitaries.

11. It conducts intelligence training classes for RTN personnel.

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12. It supervises the RTN Naval Attache system.

13. It handles all protocol affairs of the RTN.

14. In 1968 the Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Navy, set up an area source program in the Sattahip area. This program has two officers and 11 sources. Other plans call for similar programs in the Songkhla area, but actual operation requires prior approval by the army commander in this area. Another operation called for purchase of coastal fishing boats, which would perform coastal surveillance missions. In early 1969 this program was cancelled. Funds were not available to purchase the vessels. Paying local fisherman to perform these missions apparently was rejected as an expedient.

(u)
C. (S/NFD) Organization: The Directorate of Intelligence, RTN, is subordinate to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, RTN. Intelligence activities, however, are coordinated with the Directorate of Joint Intelligence, J2. The Director, DOI, RTN, bypasses the J2 and reports directly to the Supreme Commander or Deputy Supreme Commander when the need arises. The Director's office contains four persons, and in addition to command functions, handles the administrative and budgetary matters for the directorate. The Armed Forces Security Center detachment assists the Director in counterintelligence matters. Present strength is 47 per cent of the 122 personnel authorized. (See Figure 8-1 on the next page.)

1. The Planning and Training Division is responsible for the preparation of Naval Intelligence Plans, the operation of activities centers, and the training of naval intelligence personnel. It is organized into three sections: the Planning Section, the Activities Control Section, and the Training Section.

2. The Foreign Division maintains official liaison between the Royal Thai Navy and foreign naval attaches accredited to Thailand. It maintains liaison between the Naval Intelligence Department and Thai naval attaches and their staffs who reside abroad. It also handles matters of protocol, visits, and the reception of foreign officers and warships visiting Thailand. The Division's two sections are the Foreign Liaison Section and the Attaches Section.

3. The Office of Naval Attaches is responsible for naval attache affairs in countries to which they are accredited. With no assigned head of this division, the attaches report directly to the Director. The Directorate of Intelligence, RTN, divides its attache assigned countries into four categories, possibly in descending order of importance. Attaches are assigned to the following countries:

- a. Category One -- United States and Great Britain.
- b. Category Two -- France, Japan, and Germany.

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
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Figure 8-1

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, RTN



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c. Category Three -- China, Sweden, and Denmark.

d. Category Four -- Burma, India, and the Philippines.

4. The Security Division formulates regulations; supervises personnel, physical plant, and document security; and conducts security investigations. It also is responsible for the collection of information involving the mission and security of the RTN. It has two sections: the Investigation Section and the Security Control Section.

5. The Intelligence Division is responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of strategic and operational intelligence. The division also is responsible for conducting liaison and coordinating with other intelligence services. It is organized into three sections: the Collection, Processing, and Dissemination Section; the Air Section; and the Charts, Maps, and Photographs Section.

6. Proposed Reorganization: In September 1967 the Naval Intelligence Department recommended to the Royal Thai Navy that certain changes be made in the existing structure. Rationale for these proposed changes was based on an apparent increasing need by the RTN for an independent and expanded intelligence capability. The Royal Thai Navy has not acted upon these recommendations. The directorate is to add one new division, and fundamental changes will be made in existing divisions. A strength increase is projected from the present 122 to 175 men. (See Figure 8-2 on the next page)

a. Administration Division: Administration, logistical support, and general services functions will be taken out of the Director's office and made into a separate division. This will be necessary because of increased manpower brought about by changes in the other divisions. This new division will have three sections; an Administrative Section, a Personnel/Training Section, and Intelligence Reproduction Section.

b. Plans and Development Division: This division will be a renamed and revised Planning and Training Division. It will be responsible for policy, plans, and development. Three reorganized sections will include a Planning Section, a Research/Development Section, and a Intelligence Specialist Section.

c. The Intelligence Division will only be responsible for intelligence production and will include a Collection, Processing, and Dissemination Section; a Basic Intelligence Section; and an Operational Intelligence Section.

d. The Security Division will have two additional sections: a Sabotage/Espionage Section and Countersubversion/Censorship Section.

e. The Foreign Division will add one unit -- the Protocol Section -- to cope with an increased load of protocol matters.


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PROPOSED REORGANIZATION - DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, RTN



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Figure 8-2

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f. The Office of Naval Attaches will be unchanged.

D. (S/NFD) Capabilities

1. The intelligence capabilities of the Royal Thai Navy are poor. This is due to insufficient funds, insufficient personnel, poor training of personnel, organizational defects, and poor direction. Although approval of the directorate's proposed organizational changes should improve the directorate's ability to accomplish its mission, the most important need continues to be an increased interest in intelligence matters on the part of the naval command.

2. The Intelligence Division's primary interest is in political and naval information from other Southeast Asian countries. Since most of the information collected from these nations originates from newspapers, periodicals, and other overt sources, it is doubtful if any of this information is of any significant value to intelligence objectives. In addition, the DOI, RTN, makes little effort to collect technical information on modern naval warfare which might be of value to the RTN in a war situation. Information on mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, port and harbor facilities, landing beach surveys, merchant shipping, and coastal patrol intelligence is neither actively collected or disseminated to potential users.

3. The evaluation and analytical capability is also poor. Junior officers with negligible experience in economics and geopolitics are asked to evaluate detailed intelligence information and prepare comprehensive intelligence estimates of these countries. Very few officers with more than a few years experience in line warfare are ever assigned to the DOI. Consequently, experience necessary to determine the information required by the fleet is not available. In addition, the DOI is not oriented toward providing fleet operating units and naval bases with the kind of information they require to fulfill their mission.

4. The Intelligence Division has limited reproduction facilities and even less personnel to man what they do have. Consequently, the division produces few intelligence publications. Those that are printed are too narrowly distributed to be of value. It has no photographic facilities and no personnel trained in photography.

5. Despite these difficulties, there is evidence that the DOI, RTN, is attempting to upgrade its operational and production capability. The recently implemented maritime shipping reporting plan is highly accurate, and the new interest in communist shipping is long overdue. The proposed reorganization plan would be a giant step forward both for the organizational improvements it would bring and for the visible proof of the RTN's growing interest in navy intelligence.

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ANNEX 9

- A. ROYAL FLEET INTELLIGENCE STAFF
- B. ROYAL THAI MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE STAFF

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ANNEX 9

(u)
A. (S/NFD) ROYAL FLEET INTELLIGENCE STAFF

1. Mission: The Royal Fleet Intelligence Staff directs the intelligence collection efforts of the fleet and keeps the commander and the fleet informed of matters pertaining to intelligence.

2. Functions

a. The Royal Fleet Intelligence Staff consists of one lieutenant commander and one lieutenant. The staff reports directly to the Commander in Chief, Royal Fleet, on all matters concerning intelligence.

b. The staff coordinates with the Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Navy (RTN), on intelligence collection missions conducted by RTN vessels. The RTN maintains at least one ship on patrol in the Gulf of Siam near the Cambodian border at all times. The Intelligence Staff guides the intelligence missions of these patrols, although the Intelligence Division of the Directorate of Intelligence briefs and debriefs the ships' officers.

c. The staff disseminates reports received from the Directorate of Intelligence, RTN, and other intelligence services to various departments of the Royal Fleet as required.

d. The staff forwards all other intelligence collected by RTN ships on foreign navies and shore facilities to the Directorate of Intelligence, RTN and the J2, Supreme Command.

3. Capabilities

a. The value of the Royal Fleet Intelligence Staff to the intelligence community is minimal, although it cannot be expected that a two-man staff would have the time to conduct sophisticated intelligence collection operations. Furthermore, should the Supreme Command or J2, Supreme Command, direct that additional collection missions be initiated, the Directorate of Intelligence, RTN would most likely be responsible for implementing these missions.

b. Information collected by RTN ships is sporadic and generally inferior. Except for the single ship operating near Cambodia, no collection plans exist. The Gulf of Siam vessel does not even have photographic facilities.

(u)
B. (S/NFD) INTELLIGENCE STAFF, ROYAL THAI MARINE CORPS, ROYAL THAI NAVY

1. Mission: The Royal Thai Marine Corps Intelligence Staff is responsible for directing the intelligence collection efforts of the RTMC and keeping the Commandant, RTMC, informed on all matters pertaining to intelligence.

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2. Functions

a. The RTMC Intelligence Staff, which consists of one captain and one lieutenant commander, collates and forwards information provided by RTMC brigade and battalion S2's to the Directorate of Intelligence, RTN. In cases involving Cambodian operations, the staff reports directly to the Supreme Command.

b. The staff directs the intelligence mission of small RTMC patrols operating along the Cambodian border in Trat and Chanthaburi Provinces in southeast Thailand. Some guidance and Essential Elements of Information are provided by the Intelligence Division of the Directorate of Intelligence, RTN.

c. The staff directs the collection efforts of small boat patrols operating along the Cambodian border. These missions are designed in part to locate bases from which Cambodia harasses Thai fishing vessels. Information collected is passed to the Directorate of Intelligence, RTN.

d. In August 1963, the staff assisted the Intelligence Division, DOI, in a shallow border penetration of Cambodia. Six RTMC personnel performed this mission. Results are not available.

3. Capabilities

a. Much of the intelligence collection effort of the RTMC is planned and guided by the Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, RTN. If the anticipated reorganization of the DOI becomes reality, the RTMC probably will lose much of its operational capability to the revitalized Intelligence Division, DOI.

b. The RTMC Intelligence Staff has performed its mission satisfactorily. In the past several years, the RTMC has become increasingly "intelligence conscious." Much of this development is due to the proficiency and dedication of the G2, RTMC.

c. During an inspection of the Royal Thai Marine Corps Reconnaissance Company in September 1967, it was discovered that members had an inherent language capability, including Malay, Burmese, and Cambodian. Admiral Sanong of the DOI, RTN, is a former Commandant of the RTMC. He works closely with the RTMC Intelligence Staff in order to use this clandestine collection potential, particularly against Cambodia.

d. In June 1969 the Supreme Command ordered the RTMC to establish a Development Team to operate along the Thai/Cambodian border. The team consists of about 40 persons, including doctors, engineers, and agriculturalists. Its primary mission is civic action; this includes building roads, providing medical aid, and improving the agricultural methods used by the predominantly ethnic Cambodian residents of the border area. A second mission is to gather intelligence information and establish collection nets. The RTMC Intelligence Staff's role in the Development Teams's

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operations is not clear. If the staff is directing the operation, it would be a first. At the very least, the Intelligence Staff is coordinating the operation with the Armed Forces Security Center.

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ANNEX 10

TAMBON POLICE PROGRAM

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(U)
ANNEX 10. (S/NFD) TAMBON POLICE PROGRAM (U)

A. (U) Mission: The *Tambon* Police Stations of the *Tambon* Police Program are designed to provide routine law enforcement within village clusters (*tambons*).

B. (S/NFD) Functions

1. The *Tambon* Police perform routine police functions at their village sites. These include investigation of crimes and arrests of suspects.

2. The *Tambon* Police serve as the only permanent Royal Thai Government (RTG) representation in their villages. They coordinate RTG development projects with the village councils, attend village council meetings, and advise the councils on security matters.

3. The *Tambon* Police collect intelligence on subversive activities and attempt to identify subversive personalities in their assigned villages.

4. The *Tambon* Police stations serve as primary locales for recruitment of new police personnel in villages outside of routine recruitment areas.

C. (S/NFD) Organization: (See Figure 10-1 on the next page)

1. The *Tambon* Police Stations are an extension of the Provincial Police (PP) below the district and subdistrict level. The stations are controlled operationally by the districts. They are usually commanded by a senior NCO or junior officer, depending on the size of the station.

2. *Tambon* Police Stations are designed as 20-man forces, although almost all are understaffed at present. The present station organization calls for a five-man headquarters staff (including a radioman and medic) and three five-man patrols. (See figure 10-1.) Weaponry consists mostly of old US and NATO rifles.

3. Selection criteria used in determining *Tambon* Police Station locations take in the following considerations: 1) the existence or threat of communist terrorist activity; 2) a high crime rate; 3) high population density without benefit of police protection available from another source (i.e., a District Police Station); and 4) protection of vital installations (e.g., ammunition sites and commo facilities). The first *Tambon* stations were contracted for in early 1966, and 50 were completed in October of that year. Problems were varied. Initial bids by construction companies were far too high, which delayed construction until the beginning of the rainy season. This resulted in poor road conditions for construction equipment. Radios for the stations also were delayed and, in some instances, the TNPd and PP demonstrated little concern for speed. With completion of construction and staffing of 254 *tambon* stations by the end of fiscal year 1970, the original goal of 1,004 stations will be achieved.

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
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Figure 10-1

TAMBON POLICE STATION



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4. In 1964 there were about 4,888 *tambons* in Thailand, and these were increasing each year. The RTG has neither the funds nor the inclination to construct one station in each *tambon* over a two or three-year period. It has been necessary to select priority areas for these stations; they are usually selected on the basis of identified subversion or high incidence of crime. A numerical and geographical breakdown of these stations -- as of March 1968 -- is as follows:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Under Construction</u>	<u>Proposed</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	9	None	3	12
II	13	1	1	15
III	55	37	105	197
IV	77	41	126	244
V	25	8	25	58
VI	25	7	25	57
VII	9	7	16	32
VIII	14	15	49	78
<u>IX</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>57</u>
TOTAL	250	125	375	750

5. It is believed that by mid-1969 approximately 48 additional *tambon* stations were financed, bringing the total to 898, or 20 per cent coverage of Thailand's cluster villages (See Figure 10-2 on next page).

(u)
D. (S/NFD) Capabilities

1. The *Tambon* Police Program is one of the most valuable innovations in the Royal Thai Government (RTG) intelligence and security structure instituted in the past five years. As with all new programs, weaknesses are not immediately evident. Some generalizations concerning improvement, however, are possible. This program provides the first permanent RTG presence of any type in many of these villages. In the past, villagers have suffered from corrupt police patrols, bandits, and subversives. Nonexistent or negligible official coverage of large areas presented unlimited opportunities to subversives and insurgents. The PP's informants were the only really effective policemen in the *tambons*, and these have been eliminated quite easily by the insurgents. The *Tambon* Police Stations now provide a physical presence, a focal point of villager complaint procedures, and a limited defensive mechanism against armed insurgents.


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Figure 10-2



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2. There are some inherent dangers in the new system. Each station must have immediate communications with the higher headquarters, and each must be assured of immediate reinforcement in the event of an insurgent or bandit attack. The PP has provided the *tambon* units with a radio capability. It also has assured reinforcement from the Special Action Force (SAF). (See Annex 11.) Since no *tambon* station has yet been attacked, the system remains unproven. Should it fail, the insurgents could overrun these stations at will, thereby rearming themselves, demoralizing Provincial Police personnel, and, most important, lead to the loss of the population to the insurgents. Another problem is the possibility that the new program will merely replace one form of corruption with another.

3. Personnel assigned to the program to date have been highly motivated. About 1,200 of the 2,077 assigned personnel are volunteer non-commissioned officers from the Border Patrol Police and the Metropolitan Police Bureau. Volunteers for the program are being accepted from throughout the TNPD. The PP are also recruiting other personnel locally and giving them an accelerated three-month training course.

4. A striking example of the value of the *Tambon* Police Program is the highly favorable reaction the program has received from the villagers. In most instances, the villagers assist the PP in clearing the land around the station, building fences, and digging wells. The police commanders also are usually invited to attend council meetings and are gradually accepted as part of the village. Police civic action projects also are appreciated in the villages. Some villages have constructed bus stations and community centers next to the police station. In several instances, applications by *tambon* leaders for a police station have been rejected by the PP officials. The *tambon* has subsequently constructed its own facility (built to PP specifications) and then asked the PP to man the station. The PP usually has done so. Youth programs have had remarkable success, despite problems with land for playgrounds and funds for sports equipment.

5. The level of major crimes in village clusters with *Tambon* Police Stations can be affected significantly, as evidenced in *Tambon Na In*, Phichai District, Uttaradet Province, where major crimes have dropped 50 per cent.

6. The *Tambon* Police Program offers unlimited opportunity for intelligence coverage in villages where subversion and insurgency occur. The police may contact sources covertly and protect them from assassination. The large number of insurgent suppliers, who serve their masters less out of conviction than effective coercion, now can report to the police with comparative ease and safety. To date, however, no means exist within the Provincial Police for collecting this available intelligence in anything more than a rudimentary fashion. It is likely that much available information on one level is passed on to the next higher headquarters. Much intelligence certainly is lost this way. In September 1968 the PP in Region V organized a short intelligence course for *tambon* police personnel. If successful, the course will be extended to other regions.

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7. The greatest single success indicator of the *Tambon* Police Program is the fact that the *tambons* recently have become a high priority target of insurgents in Regions III and IV. So far, no *tambons* have been assaulted successfully. The time will come, however, when the Tambon Police Special Action Force coordinating capability will be tested.

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ANNEX 11

SPECIAL ACTION FORCE

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(u)
ANNEX 11. (S/NFD) SPECIAL ACTION FORCES (U)

(u)
A. (C) Mission: The Special Action Forces (SAF's) were formed in 1966 to provide a quick reaction force to counterinsurgency and bandit actions. These forces permit deployment of well-trained and well-equipped units to meet emergency situations without interrupting normal police assignments. The SAF provides direct assistance to all Provincial Police (PP) activities and operations.

(u)
B. (S/NFD) Functions

1. The Special Action Forces collect information on wanted bandits, insurgents, suspected communists, and other subversives. SAF personnel often operate undercover while on intelligence gathering missions.

2. SAF's are deployed in areas requiring immediate police or paramilitary assistance. Forces are airlifted when necessary.

3. The SAF's assist and conduct counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with the Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD), the Joint Security Centers (JSC's), the Civil-Police-Military units (CPM's), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the Royal Thai Army (RTA).

4. The SAF's perform routine patrols within their assigned regional and provincial boundaries.

5. The SAF's serve as a stand-by reserve at Provincial Police (PP) regional headquarters for use as the regional commanders desire -- often at the request of the provincial governors.

6. The SAF's personnel perform in-service training at regional and provincial headquarters for other PP personnel.

(u)
C. (S/NFD) Organization: (See Figure 11-1 on next page)

1. The Special Action Forces (SAF's) are subordinate to the Provincial Police (PP) regional headquarters. The initial PP concept called for a single SAF in each region, under direct control of the regional commander. After an initial trial period, the PP decided the concept should be expanded to include one SAF for each region and one for each province.

2. At present, each region has direct control over one SAF at all times. When this SAF is not needed by the region, however, its activities are supervised by the province in which region headquarters is located. (The single exception is Songkhla. It has two SAF's -- one for the province and one for the region headquarters.) All other SAF's are directed by the PP provincial commander in whose region they are physically located. All SAF's in a given region, however, can be called upon by the regional commander at any time to operate at his discretion -- even in support of operations


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SPECIAL ACTION FORCE (SAF)



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in other regions. Furthermore, any SAF can be drafted by CSOC for operations.

3. Each SAF consists of one platoon headquarters (ten men) and four operations squads (ten men each) for a total of 50 men. The platoon commander is a police captain. He has one assistant, a police lieutenant. The headquarters section has one administration sergeant, two radio operators, one driver, one quartermaster sergeant, one medic, and two runners. Each operations squad has one squad leader (police master sergeant), one assistant squad leader (police sergeant), and eight police constables. The operations squad can be broken down into two five-man teams with a balance of firepower.


4. In June 1969, 36 SAF were in full operation and two others are awaiting deployment. Fourteen additional SAF are programmed for FY 1970, of which four are in training. (See Figure 11-2 on next page) Current SAF dispositions are as follows:

<u>REGION</u>	<u>SAF LOCATION</u>
Region I	Ayuthya
Region II	Chachoengsao Chonburi Chanthaburi
Region III	Korat Surin Buriram Ubon Chaiyaphum
Region IV	Kalasin Udon Thani Khon Kaen Sakhon Nakon Nakhon Phanom Nong Khai
Region V	Lampang Mae Hong Son Chiengmai Chiengrai Nan
Region VI	Phitsanuloke Uttaradit Nakhon Sawan Phetchabun Tak Kamphaeng Phet

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○ Actual
⊗ Proposed

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Region VII

Nakhon Pathom
Ratchaburi
Prachuap Khiri Khan
Petchaburi

Region VIII

Nakhon Si Thammarat
Surat Thani
Chumphon

Region IX

Songkhla
Trang
Phattalung

(u)
D. (S/MFD) Capabilities

1. The Special Action Forces (SAF's) are a new concept in providing quick response to varied threats from bandits as well as subversives or insurgents. The value of a SAF has yet to be proven despite its limited success as a counterinsurgency force on combined sweep operations. Any well-trained military platoon could perform the same function (perhaps far better) due to the massive military support of operating units. The value of the SAF's will be proven when one of the *Tambon* Police Stations is attacked and requires immediate support. The SAF's, conducting operations in the north-central region, suffered relatively heavy casualties in 1969. The insurgents have not yet directed their efforts towards eliminating police bases in lowland villages. If the SAF's cannot react fast enough to save threatened outposts, the concept is worthless.
2. The SAF's are also expected to provide an intelligence collection capability to the Provincial Police (PP). Several units are performing this function in the field. There is not enough information available to evaluate SAF performance to date. It is known, however, that SAF training procedures place little emphasis on intelligence collection procedures.
3. The SAF's are considered elite elements of the PP. The forces have distinct organizational insignia and badges. Personnel, all volunteers, are carefully hand-picked. All have received basic and advanced police training prior to volunteering for the SAF, and most have long and good records with other PP elements. Intelligence and physical requirements are standard and comparatively rigid. SAF personnel are recruited, assembled, trained, and assigned together. This helps inspire the unit identity necessary for an elite unit. The PP does not reassign personnel once they belong to a SAF; new men join only as replacements.
4. Selected personnel receive additional training at the PP Chaiya Schools. Units first attend the PP's four-month Counterinsurgency Course at either the Chiangmai or Udon schools, and then successfully complete a separate 49-day SAF course at the Chiangmai school. The SAF course concentrates on small unit tactics, leadership, intensive counterinsurgency,

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jungle survival, and civic action. The training continues as the unit serves in operations. Most is in-service training, but personnel also learn much from Royal Thai Army units to which they are often attached.

5. SAF equipment and support facilities are adequate -- even superior. All SAF units have their own barracks, where all personnel live and eat together in their own mess halls. All SAF barracks, kitchens, and mess halls were built specifically for the SAF, which serves to build the unit's *esprit de corps*. SAF weapons are good. Personnel use carbines, submachine guns, pump shotguns, and M-79 grenade launchers. Each SAF platoon headquarters has a single side band 20-watt radio to receive PP regional headquarters signals, and two FM-5 radios. Each squad has two FM-5 radios for communicating with each other and the platoon headquarters, and two FM-1 radios for internal communication when the squad is organized into two fire teams.

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ANNEX 12



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ANNEX 13

BORDER PATROL POLICE STAFF AND OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

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(u) ANNEX 13. (S/NFD) BORDER PATROL POLICE STAFF AND OPERATIONAL UNITS (U)

(u) A. (S/NFD) Headquarters, Border Patrol Police: Located in Bangkok, the Headquarters has about 530 personnel. It consists of the following sections:

1. G1 (Administration) handles all official contacts on personnel matters with the Provincial Police (PP), and directs the activities of its subordinate sections at the Area Commands.

2. G2 (Intelligence) went through an extensive reorganization and upgrading in October 1966, which was not completed until March 1967. Personnel were added and fully trained in intelligence collection, collation, and analysis. Between 2 June and 23 June 1967, the G2 Section held a seminar in Bangkok in order to explain the new G2 organizational framework, procedures, forms, and systems. All eight area intelligence staff officers attended and, for the first time, the BPP G2 illustrated a potential for united efforts in BPP intelligence work. Four subsections now exist as a part of the G2: (See Figure 13-1 on next page)

- a. Administration and Files
 - b. Reports, Collation, and Dissemination
 - c. Intelligence Analysis
 - d. Operations
3. G3 (Operations)
 4. G4 (Logistics)

5. G5 (Civil Affairs) was formally organized in December 1966 after several years of operating without official status. This section is responsible for all BPP remote area security operations, particularly the development centers and the trading centers in Area V.

6. The Communications Section directs the activities of Area Command communications sections and advises the Commander and Chief of Staff, BPP, on modernization efforts in BPP communications.

7. The Quartermaster Section distributes supplies to Area Commands, and maintains direct liaison with the Quartermaster Division, Thai National Police Department (TNPD). The section is required to operate in accordance with TNPD regulations and procedures.

(u) B. (S/NFD) Border Patrol Police (BPP) Area Commands

1. The Border Patrol Police (BPP) Area Commands operate in the same way as do the PP Regional Commands. The BPP has no command in Region I, as

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
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Figure 13-1



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Source: CIAD Analysis

this area has no border with a foreign country. BPP Area VIII was formed in August 1966 to cover the short border with Burma in that area. (See Figure 13-2 on next page)

2. Each Area Command has the same support and staff structure as the BPP Headquarters. Radio communications stations, however, were the last major support function programmed. Radio Centers for Areas III, IV, and V were set in July 1966 and completed by February 1967. Other sites have since been completed in the remaining areas. Each station has four operating positions, six transmitting antennae, and three receiving antennae. (See Figure 13-3 on page A13-5)

3. BPP Area Commands operate at the following locations:

- a. Area II -- Aranyaprathet District, Prachinburi Province, on the Cambodian border.
- b. Area III -- Ubon City, Ubon Province, on the Laotian border.
- c. Area IV -- Udorn, Udon Thani Province, on the Laotian border.
- d. Area V -- Chiangmai City, Chiangmai Province, on the Laotian and Burmese borders.
- e. Area VI -- Mae Sot District, Tak Province, on the Burmese border.
- f. Area VII -- Kanchanaburi Province on the Burmese border.
- g. Area VIII -- Sai Yai, Tungsong District, Nakhon Si Thammarat Province, is on the Burmese border, but has additional counterinsurgency responsibilities in areas under official control of the Provincial Police. No explanation is available.
- h. Area IX -- Songkhla City, Songkhla Province, on the Malaysian border.

C. (u) Border Patrol Police (BPP) Company Headquarters, consisting of a 15-man staff, are organized and assigned as needed by the Area Commands to ensure operational flexibility in matters requiring command decisions. The number of company headquarters varies from each Area Command; most company headquarters control from three to seven operational line platoons. At present, there are 32 BPP companies; most are in Areas IV and V. Six companies will be organized in 1969.


D. (S/NED) Border Patrol Police (BPP) Operational Elements

1. Line Platoons

a. These 30-man units, which form the backbone of the BPP, are the primary border security elements. A large number of them are deployed along the border of Cambodia, Thailand's traditional enemy. The North,

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Figure 13-2



Source: USAID


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Figure 13-3

BORDER PATROL POLICE AREA COMMANDS



----- Administrative
----- Responsibility

----- Control

Source: CIAD Analysis

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although experiencing a greater subversive problem, is comparatively sparsely covered. The southern regions are restricted by political considerations involving the Malaysian government.

b. Each line platoon is composed of a six-man headquarters staff and three eight-man patrols. While the base is stationary, each patrol operates from the bases in a prescribed area. Bases usually are located in isolated villages. In some cases, however, the BPP will construct a base in totally uninhabited areas in order to monitor accurately border violations. Weaponry includes nine M-1 rifles, M-1 carbines, four M-2s, four M-16s, and four M-79 grenade launchers. It has a single Squadcall radio for upward communication and one P-33 and three FM-5s for internal communications.

c. In May 1969, 132 line platoons were in operation. This is an increase from 119 in 1968. Areas IV and IX have 26, Areas III and V have 23, Area II has 12, Areas VI and VII have eight, and Area VIII has six. Twenty-eight more line platoons are projected for FY 1970. (See Figures 13-4 and 13-5 on pages A13-7 and A13-8).

2. Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP)

a. The Mobile Reserve Platoon (MRP) concept was the central part of the BPP reorganization which occurred in 1966. At that time, the former 47-man Border Patrol Police (BPP) platoon was cut down to 30 men and the heavy weapons elements were separated. The MRP was conceived as a quick reaction force to support BPP, Provincial Police (PP), and other combat assignments. These units have light, modern weaponry, and are designed for helicopter transport. Each MRP consists of three eight-man squads and a six-man platoon headquarters section.

b. There are nine Mobile Reserve Companies comprised of three platoons each, for a total of 27 platoons. Each is held in reserve to back up line platoons as needed. They are located as indicated in Figure 13-6 on page A13-9.

3. Mobile Line Platoon (MLP)

a. The MLP is a new concept which is also a part of the recent BPP reorganization. The objective is to provide each 15-man BPP Company Headquarters with one MLP to increase BPP flexibility. This will permit a lower command echelon capability to reinforce line platoons for specific operations, conduct heavy patrolling, and perform other unconventional operations. Composition and equipment are identical to the Mobile Reserve Platoons.

b. Eleven MLP's were formed from manpower augmentation approved and funded in fiscal year 1968, 21 were completed in fiscal year 1969, and six are projected for fiscal year 1970. Two of these are deployed, for a total of 24 MLP's. Each headquarters will control and coordinate the operations of from three to seven line platoons.

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
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Figure 13-4



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
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Source: Various DOD and CIA documents

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Figure 13-6



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4. Special Weapons Platoon (SWP)

a. The Special Weapons Platoon (SWP) offers an alternative to the former BPP platoon organization. BPP officials decided in 1966 that the heavy weapons used by BPP platoons were not conducive to fast-moving counterinsurgency operations. When the line platoons and MRP's were cut to 30 men, the heavy weapons sections were dropped and formed into separate units. Each SWP also has 30 men, organized into three assault squads.

b. The SWP's are assigned to the Area Commands, and are designed to be attached as required to either line platoons or MRP. At present, there are ten Special Weapons Platoons, one for each Police Area Command, with two additional ones for Area III. Four more units are projected for fiscal year 1970.

c. Each SWP has a three-man headquarters section and three nine-man squads. Each squad operates a 3.5-inch rocket launcher, a 60mm mortar, and a .30 caliber light machine gun. Since each platoon is not always on operations, the SWP's have trained a single nine-man unit to conduct training in heavy weapons to regular BPP units on a rotating basis.

5. Border Patrol Centers (eight men each) are in strategic border village locations. They serve as listening posts along the Laos and Burmese borders in an area stretching from Uttaradit around the northern border to Tak. In 1968 there were 25 such centers, and five more are projected for fiscal year 1970. The Border Patrol Centers at Huai Khu in Chiang Rai and at Huai Fong in Nan were lost to the insurgents last year. Seven others were abandoned along the Laotian border when the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Third Army ordered the area abandoned to the insurgents.

6. Remote Area Security Program

a. The Border Patrol Police (BPP) performs civic action-type development projects in the border areas in conjunction with its responsibility to monitor activities of varied ethnic groups. These programs are intended to supplement BPP intelligence collection operations. Their total dependence on informers, instead of formation of an agent network, negates their effectiveness.

b. Development platoons are a combination civic action and construction team units. They function in concert with the line platoons on security and development projects. One platoon is located in each BPP region; each one is staffed with five officers and 30 enlisted men.

c. School Teacher Platoons staff the more than 250 BPP schools and have local intelligence gathering functions. There are 18 platoons: five in Region V; three in Region III; two each in Regions II, IV, VII, and IX; and one each in Regions VI and VIII. Organizational strength varies between regions.

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7. Border Security Volunteer Teams (BSVT)

a. In January 1968 General Praphas ordered the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and the Border Patrol Police (BPP) to formulate plans for recruiting and training hilltribesmen into special counterinsurgency teams. The BPP initiated a training program through the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) in July 1968, and small eight-man units had some initial success in late August 1968. After a period of conflict between the BPP and RTA, each agreed to recruit its own force.

b. In September 1968 the BPP formulated its plans for the hilltribe force. The plan calls for a total of twenty-three 30-man teams for deployment in village security and development in northern Thailand. The teams, called the Border Security Volunteer Teams (BSVT's), are supported by Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) funds. Each team is equipped, trained, and controlled by the BPP. Each consists of one six-man headquarters element and three eight-man teams armed with M-1s and M-3 submachine guns and each will have radio capability. CSOD pays each man the *bakt* equivalent of US\$.70 per day, which is roughly similar to that paid the RTA's hilltribe units.

c. The first three BSVT's were organized among the Meo and Yao in late 1968. They each received four weeks of training in squad tactics, weaponry, and village defense organization. Their performance has been good in the periphery of hilltribe resettlement camps. Ten other BSVT's were deployed in June 1969, and another five were undergoing training at that time. In June 1969 the BPP increased the recommended number of BSVT's to 57, spread out over three years (19 in 1969, 18 in 1970, and 20 in 1971). Budgetary problems, however, may cancel or delay these goals.

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APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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(u)
APPENDIX 1. (C) GLOSSARY OF TERMS (U)

AFIOC	Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center
AFIS	Armed Forces Intelligence School
AFSC	Armed Forces Security Center
AFSS	Armed Forces Security School
AOC	Army Operations Center
BPA	Bureau of Provincial Administration
BPP	Border Patrol Police
BSVT	Border Security Volunteer Team
Chaiya	Victory
CIB	Central Investigation Bureau
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps
CIH	Combined Intelligence Headquarters
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CPM	Civil-Police-Military
CPM	Communist Party of Malaysia
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CRO	Criminal Records Office
CSC	Communist Suppression Committee
CSCSDS	Communist Suppression Coordination Supervision Division of the South
CSD	Crime Suppression Division
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Command
CSOD	Communist Suppression Operations Directorate
CTO	Communist Terrorist Organization
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DCC	Direction and Coordination Center

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DCI	Department of Central Intelligence
DOI	Directorate of Intelligence
DOLA	Department of Local Administration
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAN	Forces Armes Neutralists, Laos
FAR	Forces Armes Royales, Laos
GBC	General Border Committee
HPP	Highway Patrol Police
IAB	Intelligence Advisory Board
JSC	Joint Security Centers
KS	Khmer Serei
MP	Marine Police
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAVU	Modular Audio Visual Units
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MDU	Mobile Development Unit
MITT	Mobile Intelligence Training Team
MPB	Metropolitan Police Bureau
MLP	Mobile Line Platoon
MRP	Mobile Reserve Platoon
Muban	Village
NSC	National Security Council
NSCC	National Security Command
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
PARU	Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit

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PAT	People's Assistance Teams
PP	Provincial Police
QM	Quartermaster
RP	Railroad Police
RBC	Regional Border Committee
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RTMC	Royal Thai Marine Corps
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
SAF	Special Action Force
SB	Special Branch
SCCOS	Special Counterinsurgency Command and Operations Staff
SCH	Supreme Command Headquarters
SEAL	Sea, Air, and Land
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SFG	Special Forces Group
SOC	Special Operations Center
SWP	Special Weapons Platoon
TAC	Tactical Air Command
Tambon	Village Cluster
TNPD	Thai National Police Department
UTPP	United Thai Peoples Party
VDC	Volunteer Defense Corps

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VPT Volunteer Protection Team
VPU Village Protection Unit
VSO Village Security Officer

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APPENDIX 2

LIST OF KEY PERSONALITIES

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APPENDIX 2

(U)
(C) LIST OF KEY PERSONALITIES (U)

LEGEND

* -- denotes Police rank
() -- date of information
M.R. -- denotes royal rank
M.L. -- denotes higher royal rank
M.C. -- denotes highest royal rank
SPEC COL -- Special Colonel
GC -- Group Captain
AVM -- Air Vice Marshal
ACM -- Air Chief Marshal

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
AMNAD, SPEC COL Damrigan	Director of Intelligence (Designate), Royal Thai Army (10-69)
ANGOON, MG Tattanont*	Chief of Staff, Border Patrol Police (3-68)
ANROONG, MG Skoonratana*	Deputy Commissioner, Education Bureau, Thai National Police (12-66)
ARAN, COL Somboonsuk*	Commander, Area VIII, Border Patrol Police (2-68)
ARI, COL Karibut*	Deputy Commander, Special Branch (6-69)
ARD, COL Chatinugrob	Chief, Intelligence Division, J2 (6-68)
BANDIT, COL Phimayothin*	Deputy Commander, Special Branch (6-69)
BOONCHAI, LTG Bamrungphong	Deputy Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Army; Chairman, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate Operations Committee (10-69)
BOONCHOO, ACM Chandrubeksa	Commander, Royal Thai Air Force (10-69)
BULSAK, LTG Wanamat	Assistant Under Secretary of Defense

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BUNDIT, COL Amatayakul	Chief, Policy and Plans Division, J2
BUNMARK, MG Thesabut	Director General, Department of Central Intelligence (6-69)
CHAI, SPEC COL Suwannasorn*	Deputy Commander, Special Branch (6-69)
CHAINARONG, COL Massamran*	Deputy Commander, Special Branch (6-69)
CHAIRATANA, LTG Intuputi	Commanding General, Armed Forces Security Center (6-69)
CHAIYONG, LTC Saowakapridi*	Chief, Division III, Special Branch
CHALAW, GEN Charuklut	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (6-68)
CHALERM, AVM Divaveja	Director of Intelligence, Royal Thai Air Force; Armed Forces Security Center Advisory Board
CHALOEI, SPEC COL Sanguansuk	Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army
CHAMLONG, MG Siwgha	Commander, Second Army, Royal Thai Army (9-69)
CHAMNIAN, MG Pongpairoj	Deputy Director, Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (3-69)
CHAM, SPEC COL Jansri	Chief, Administration Division, Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center
CHAMRAT, LTG Manthukanon*	Deputy Director General, Thai National Police; Deputy Chief of Staff, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (4-69)
CHANA, COL Holaputra	Chief, Security Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army (6-68)
CHANA, MG Wongchoom*	Deputy Commissioner, Provincial Police

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CHAROEY, MG M.L. Sudasna*

Deputy Commissioner, Metropolitan
Police Bureau, Thai National Police
(12-68)

CHAREON, LTG Pongpanich

Director of Joint Intelligence (J2)

CHARNYUT, LTC Nuchanarat

Chief, Unconventional Warfare Br.,
Special Warfare Center, RTA

CHAROEN, MG Saivichit

Director of Personnel, Royal Thai
Army (10-69)

CHAROENRIT, MG Chamratsomran*

Commander, Highway Patrol Police
Thai National Police

CHARUN, COL Kehacharoen*

Deputy Commander, Special Branch
(6-69)

CHAT, MG Chawangun*

Commander, Special Branch (6-69);
Chief, Research and Analysis Records
Division, Department of Central
Intelligence (6-69)

CHAVALIT, MG Tamthai*

Commander, Marine Police, Thai
National Police

CHAVENG, MG Yongcharoen

Commanding General, National
Security Command

CHEEP, MG Prapanetivut*

Deputy Commander, Border Patrol
Police (10-66)

CHERDCHAI, ADM Thomya

Commander in Chief, Royal Fleet,
Royal Thai Navy (10-69)

CHERM, MG Pruekwaychiwa

Commander, Fifth Military Circle,
Royal Thai Army (8-69)

CHET, COL Popsuk*

Chief, Division V, Special Branch
(6-69)

CHETCHANDRA, COL M.R. Pravitr*

Chief, Public Disaster Division,
Metropolitan Police Bureau, Thai
National Police

CHIT, SPEC COL Layeyuth*

Commander, Region IX, Provincial
Police (9-69)

CHIT, LTG Nakthon

Assistant Under Secretary of Defense
(6-68)

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CHUMNARN, GC, Patrayothin

Chief, Intelligence Division,
Directorate of Intelligence, RTAF

CHUMPHON, COL Kanchanapanang*

Deputy Commander, Special Branch
(6-69)

CHUMPHON, MG Lohachala*

Commander, Crime Suppression
Division, Thai National Police

CHUSAK, MG Wathanaronchai

Assistant Secretary General (Opera-
tions Coordination), National
Security Council

DAKELOW, GC Susilvorn

Deputy Director, Directorate of
Intelligence, Royal Thai Air Force

DAWEE, ACM Chulasap

Minister of Communications; Chief
of Staff, Supreme Command Headquar-
ters; Chairman, National Security
Command; Deputy Secretary General,
National Security Council; Deputy
Commander, Communist Suppression
Operations Directorate; Armed
Forces Security Center Advisory
Board (Chairman)

HARIN, ACM Hongskula

Deputy Commander, Royal Thai Air
Force (9-69)

HARM, COL Phongsidanan*

Chief, Intelligence Section, Direc-
tion and Coordination Center, Com-
munist Suppression Operations
Directorate (8-69)

JAK, SPEC COL Laksanaboonsorn

Deputy Commander, Marine Police,
Thai National Police (6-67)

JANYA, GC Sukhontasap

Deputy Director of Intelligence,
Royal Thai Air Force (9-69)

JITRAPOL, SPEC COL Na Lampang

Commandant, Armed Forces Security
School

JITRAYUTE, SPEC COL Kraisoraphong

Chief, Intelligence Division, Direc-
torate of Intelligence, Royal Thai
Army

JUDABONG, COL Chalernsak

Chief, Research and Development
Division, J2 (10-68)

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KAMOL, ACM Thejatunga	Chief of Air Staff, Royal Thai Air Force (9-69)
KAMTHORN, MG Tulyanon*	Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Bureau, Thai National Police
KANAY, SPEC COL Kriengsakpichit	Chief, Security Division, Armed Forces Security Center
KEMASAWAT, COL Monintaratep*	Deputy Commander, Special Branch
KLONGKANKIANM, COL Somkiat	Chief, Security and Technical Division, Armed Forces Security Center
KOBBOON, SPEC COL Patanatabutr	Chief, Operations Division, Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center
KOJBUNDIT, LTG Chotikajan	Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Royal Thai Army (10-69)
KRACHANG, MG Pholperm	Commander, Border Patrol Police (10-67)
KRIENGKRAI, MG Attanond	Commander, First Army, Royal Thai Army (10-69)
KRIENGSAK, LTG Chomanan	Deputy Chairman, National Security Command
KRIS, GEN Sivara	Deputy Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army (10-69)
LEK, MG Kamnertngarm*	Commander, Region VII, Provincial Police (9-69)
LOET, COL Kanitsathanakha	G2, Second Army, Royal Thai Army
LERTROB, MG Sitthabut	Assistant Chairman, National Security Command
LOP, COL Pechaichumphol	Chief, G2 Air Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army (5-68)
LUEN, MG Prantarantaka*	Assistant Commissioner, Provincial Police
MONCHAI, MG Punkongchuen*	Deputy Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Bureau, Thai National Police

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MONTHON, NAVY CAPT Taninpathomrut

NARINT, MG Narintsorarak*

NIPON, NAVY CAPT Siritorn

NIT, MG Sukum*

OUAB, GEN Arsanarong

PANAS, MG Chamsiri

PANYA, SPEC COL Kojangsai

PHAIROTE, LTC Pusayanawing*

PHINET, COL Ayuthaka*

PICHAI, SPEC COL Sameratsuta

PIYA, Chakkapak

PONGSAWET, MG M.L. Watchariwong

PRACHUAB, SPEC COL Nakapaksin*

PRAKARN, LTG Chatnilbandhu*

PRAKIT, NAVY CAPT Prachuabmoh

PRAKORB, MG Charumani

PRALAD, MG Prakarnanan*

G2, Royal Thai Marine Corps

Commander, Region VI, Provincial
Police

Chief, Operations and Intelligence,
Royal Fleet, Royal Thai Navy

Assistant Commissioner, Provincial
Police (12-68)

Under Secretary, Ministry of Defense

Deputy Director, Armed Forces
Security Center

Chief, Signal Division, Armed Forces
Security Center

Commander, Area V, Border Patrol
Police

Chief, Division I, Special Branch

Chief, Planning and Training Divi-
sion, Directorate of Intelligence,
Royal Thai Army (5-68)

Chief, Internal Affairs Division,
Department of Central Intelligence
(6-69)

Assistant Director, Armed Forces
Intelligence Operations Center

Deputy Commander, Marine Police,
Thai National Police

Commissioner, Provincial Police
(12-68)

Chief, Intelligence Division,
Directorate of Intelligence, Royal
Thai Navy

Deputy Director General, Department
of Central Intelligence (6-69)

Assistant Commissioner, Provincial
Police (6-68)

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PRAPHAS, GEN Charusathira

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Interior; Deputy Supreme Commander Royal Thai Armed Forces; Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army; Commander, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate; Deputy Commander, Armed Forces Security Center; Armed Forces Security Center Advisory Board

PRASARN, COL Worasat*

Chief, Division VII, Special Branch (6-69)

PRASERT, MG Mokasamit

Assistant Director General, Armed Forces Security Center (7-69)

PRASERT, GEN Rujirawong

Director General, Thai National Police; Deputy Commander, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate

PRASIT, COL Savetphanu

Chief, Administration Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army

PRAYOTE, NAVY CPT Chunlapinta

G2, Royal Thai Marine Corps

PRAYUDH, SPEC COL Charumani

Deputy Director, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army (5-68)

PRAYUN, COL Bunnark

Chief, Operations Section, Direction and Coordination Center, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate

PREECHA, COL Suwanajata

Chief, VIP Security Unit, Armed Forces Security Center

PUANG, Suwannarat

Assistant Minister of Interior; Deputy Chief of Staff, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate

ROENGRIT, COL Rumagama

Chief, Security Division, J2

RUENGSAK, COL Choomsatoon

Chief, Military Intelligence Unit, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army (6-68)

SAIYUD, LTG Kerdphol

Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Royal Thai Army; Director, Direction and Coordination Center, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate

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SALANG, MG Rurrudjana*

Commander, Railway Police, Thai
National Police

SAMRAN, LTG Patayukul

Commander, Third Army, Royal Thai
Army (7-69)

SAMRARN, SPEC COL Dheparap

Chief, Counterintelligence Division,
Armed Forces Security Center

SANGKHADIS, MG M.R. Diskul

Director of Intelligence, Royal Thai
Army; Member, Armed Forces Security
Center Advisory Board; Ambassador to
Malaysia (Designate) (10-69)

SANAN, COL Poonpat

Assistant Secretary General (Execu-
tive), National Security Council

SANAN, MG Sa-ardpark*

Commander, Region IV, Provincial
Police

SANGA, MG Kittikachorn

Secretary, Intelligence Advisory
Board

SANIT, Wilaichit

Director, Department of Local
Administration; Deputy Chief of
Staff, Communist Suppression
Operations Directorate

SANIT, COL Yamsorn*

Deputy Director General, Department
of Central Intelligence

SANONG, R/ADM Nisalak

Director of Intelligence, Royal
Thai Navy

SANTHAO, SPEC COL Tanapun*

Deputy Commander, Special Branch
(6-69)

SATHAPORN, COL Phansamrit*

Chief, Vietnamese Branch, Special
Branch (5-69)

SAVAD, R/ADM Pavanarit

Armed Forces Security Center
Advisory Board (10-66)

SAWAENG, COL Hongnakhon*

Commander, Region III, Provincial
Police (6-68)

SENEE, COL Chammainnai

Chief, Psychological Warfare Section,
Direction and Coordination Center,
Communist Suppression Operations
Directorate

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SERM, LTG Na Nakhon

Assistant Chief of Staff for
Operations, Royal Thai Army (10-69)

SIRI, ACM Muangmanee

Vice Commander, Royal Thai Air
Force (9-69)

SIRI, COL Thongkamwang*

Commander, Region VII, Provincial
Police

SITTHI, MG Chirarochana

Director of Operations, Royal
Thai Army (9-69)

SITTHI, AVM Savetsila

Assistant Secretary General (Policy),
National Security Council

SNGUAN, LTG Chittalan*

Assistant Director General, Thai
National Police

SOMBOON, COL Ayuyo*

Commander, Area VI, Border Patrol
Police

SOMKUAN, LTC Harikul*

Commander, Area IV, Border Patrol
Police (10-69)

SOPHON, SPEC COL Srisanan

Operations Officer, Counterintelli-
gence Division, Armed Forces
Security Center

SURAKIT, GEN Mayalarp

Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Army;
Chief of Staff, Communist Suppres-
sion Operations Directorate (10-69)

SURAPOL, SPEC COL Petrakul

Chief, Plans and Policies Division,
Armed Forces Intelligence Operations
Center

SURAPHON, MG Chulabrahm*

Deputy Commander, Border Patrol
Police

SURAPONG, MG Nagasthira*

Commander, Northern Bangkok Divi-
sion, Metropolitan Police Bureau,
Thai National Police

SURAPHONG, SPEC COL Srisanan

Chief, Support Division, Armed
Forces Intelligence Operations
Center

SUWAN, SPEC COL Rodphotong

Chief, Communications Division,
Armed Forces Intelligence
Operations Center

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SWASDI, ACM Ponchamni	Commander, Tactical Air Command, Royal Thai Air Force
TAWIL, MG Chanthasiharat*	Commander, Region II, Provincial Police
TEM, GEN Homsesthi	Assistant Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army; Chairman, Psycholo- gical Warfare Committee, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate
THANAPONG, LTC Kaeopraphan	Chief, Intelligence Section, Regional Border Committee
THANOM, FIELD MARSHALL Kittikachorn	Prime Minister; Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces; Minister of Defense; Commander, Armed Forces Security Center; Armed Forces Security Center Advisory Board
THARA, SPEC COL Tharavanij*	Commander, Thonburi Division, Metropolitan Police Bureau, Thai National Police
THEP, MG Suphas mit	Commander, Region V, Provincial Police
TIENCHAI, SPEC COL Sirisump'an	Commander, Special Forces Group, RTA
THIRIDET, LTG Mungthamthang	Chairman, Services and Support Committee, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate
THONG, LTC Tatayanon*	Chief, Division IV, Special Branch (6-69)
THONGCHERM, LTG Sangkhavanich	Assistant Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army (10-69)
THUANCHAI, GEN Kosinarond	Assistant Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army; Deputy Chief of Staff, Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (10-69)
TIRABUL, MG Chattaris*	Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Bureau, Thai National Police
TORSAK, LTG Yommark*	Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Bureau, Thai National Police
UDOM, SPEC COL Paisalvejakam	Chief of Staff, Armed Forces Security Center (12-68)

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UDOM, COL Rakpondej*	Commander, Area II, Border Patrol Police (10-66)
U-UA, MG Aempan*	Assistant Commissioner, Provincial Police (12-67)
VICHIT, MG Sonsomsook	Deputy Director of Joint Intelligence, J2, Supreme Command Headquarters
VINICH, NAVY CAPT Sripochnart	Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, J2, Supreme Command Headquarters (10-68)
WALLOP, LTG Rojanawisut	Director, Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center
WAN, COL Vanarat	Director, Project 311, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Army
WIBURRINARONG, SPEC COL Channarong	Chief, Research and Report Writing Division, Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (12-68)
WICHAI, COL Wichaithanapat*	Commander, Area IX, Border Patrol Police (9-69)
WICHIAN, COL Wichaiwatana	Commander, Regional Border Committee
WICHIE, LTC Kanchanaraj*	Commander, Area III, Border Patrol Police (2-69)
WICHIT, GEN Songkhram	Secretary General, National Security Council (11-69)
YONGSUK, COL Khamala*	Chief, Division VI, Special Branch; Chief, Security and Counterespionage Division, Department of Central Intelligence
YONGYUDT, NAVY CAPT Suhakalin	Chief, Foreign Liaison Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Royal Thai Navy
YONGYUDT, COL Yaimkitsphon*	Commander, Region I, Provincial Police (1-69)
YUTTHACHAI, COL Whiyuwut*	Chief, Division II, Special Branch (6-69)

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
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
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ASD (ISA) (1)
Deputy ASD (Scty Plcy) (1)
DASA (1)
DIAAP-10A2 (1)
DIACO-3 (2)
DIACI-4 (13)
NSA (5)
JCS (1)

UNIFIED/SPECIFIED

ALCOM (1)
CONAD (1)
LANTCOM (1)
PACOM (5)
USEUCOM (1)
USSOUTHCOM (1)
USSTRICOM (3)

DA STAFF AGENCIES

DUSA (IA) (1)
ASA (I&L) (1)
SGS (1)
DSCOPS (1)
ACSI (20)
CRD (1)
ACSFOR (1)

US ARMY COMMANDS

USARAL (1)
USAREUR (1)
USARSO (1)
USARFT (1)
USARHAW (2)
USARJ (2)
USARPAC (10)
USAINTC (1)
USARV (5)
USARYIS (5)
USASA (1)
USACDC (6)
USASCC (4)
USCONARC (1)
FIRST USA (1)
FOURTH USA (1)
FIFTH USA (1)
SIXTH USA (1)

XVIII Abn Corps (1)
8th US Army (1)
USARSUPTHAI (5)

SCHOOLS AND CENTERS

USMA (1)
USACGSC (1)
USAWC (1)
AFSC (1)
NWC (1)
ICAF (1)
USAINTS (5)
DIS (1)
USAJFKCENMA (3)
CONTIC (3)
USAFSTC (1)
USAIRR (1)

JOINT/ADVISORY COMMANDS

USMACV (2)
USMACTHAI (10)

OTHER SERVICES AND AGENCIES

CIA (PLANS) (10)
CIA (CRS/ADD/PUBS) (10)
FBI (5)
ACNO (3)
NAVINVSVSVC (2)
USAF (AFNINDE) (2)
USAF (AFNIAD-R&R) (1)
OSI (8)
USMC (AO2A) (4)
State (8)
USAID (2)
US Secret Service (1)
USIA (1)
NASA (1)
FMF Pacific (3)
Armed Forces Courier Service (1)

MISCELLANEOUS

Air Univ Lib (1)
1st Sp Forces Gp (2)
5th Sp Forces Gp (1)
USASRD (2)
USAFAC (1)
500th MI Gp (3)
17th MID (4)
441st MID (1)
526th MID (1)

704th MID (1)

710th MID (1)

DEFENSE ATTACHES

Thailand (1)

Republic of Vietnam (1)

Laos (1)

Burma (1)

Malaysia (1)

Indonesia (1)

Republic of the Philippines (1)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) DIA

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
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Page(s) 415-417



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-6,116/ISM-1(FOIA)

20 December 2002

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your request to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM) under the Freedom of Information Act, dated 29 March 2001. Therein you requested records concerning various foreign intelligence services. The USAINSCOM referred one document to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for our review and direct response to you.

Upon review, it has been determined that some portions of the document are not releasable. The portions withheld are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(2) and (b)(3), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency. Subsection (b)(3) applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statute is 10 U.S.C. Section 424. All reasonably segregable portions of the document are attached hereto.

You are advised that a requester may appeal, within 60 days, an initial decision to withhold a record or part thereof. Should you wish to exercise this right, you may do so by referring to case #0110-03 and addressing your appeal to:

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: ISM-1(FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Sincerely,

ROBERT P. RICHARDSON
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff

Enclosure a/s

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: THAILAND	8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]	(b)(2)
2. SUBJECT: (U) Military Intelligence Summary, Quarterly Report	9. DATE OF REPORT: 30 November 1972	
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 3	
	11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]	(b)(2)
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: November 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]	(b)(2)
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: [REDACTED]	13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]	(b)(3)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED] INFORMATION [REDACTED]	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]	(b)(3)
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]		

15. SUMMARY: ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ caveat is used to correspond with the classification of basic document. (Leave Blank)

(U) IR forwards the Military Intelligence Summary, THAILAND, Quarterly Report. Report updates the THAILAND portion pages 1-24. Paragraph and/or line changes as indicated.

PART I. GOVERNMENT

G. (U) Key Government Officials

Change to Read: (Line 4, 5, & 6).

Deputy Chairman, National Executive Council;
Director, National Security Division;
Director General of Police: — General PRAPHAT Charusathien

Delete: (Line 13)

Director General of Police — Police General PRASERT Ruchirawong

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED] DS-42 RECEIVED 204-50 3313038 15 1 22 PM '73	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] Subject to General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652 Automatically Downgraded at two year intervals Declassified on December 31, 1980	18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE # 58-72 COPY 1 of 2 pages
DD FORM 1396	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 3	(b)(2)

REPLACES DA FORM 1 AUG 60.
WHICH FORM 100 (Rev 12-63)
IF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

PLANS
PAGE 2 OF 3
ORIGINATOR

(Classification and Control Markings)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

PART II. MILITARY, GENERAL

A. (U) Key Military Officials

Delete: National Police, Director General PRASERT Ruchirawong

Add: National Police Director, General PRAPHAT Charusathien

PART III. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

A. ARMY

9. ~~(S)~~ Reserves and Mobilization

a. Reserves

Line 3: Change to read:

"Strength was approximately 500,000 as of November 1972. The Army reserve"....

B. NAVY

4. ~~(S)~~ Ships and Aircraft Strength

a. Ships

Change line 4 to read:

	TOTAL	OP*	NON-OP
River Patrol Craft	41	35	2

C. AIR FORCE

3. ~~(S)~~ Personnel Strength

Line 1: Change to read:

39,585 (4,925 officers and 34,660 enlisted)

4. ~~(S)~~ Aircraft Strength Change to read:

Total: 369 (65 jet, 17 turboprop, 217 prop, 70 heli)

In operational units: 305

(59 jet; 25 ftr; 4 recon; 30 trn;
17 turboprop; 1 trans; 16 recon;
180 prop; 34 trans; 49 lt bmr; 97 util
31 piston heli; all trans;
18 turbine heli; all util)

5. ~~(S)~~ Organization and Deployment

b. Summary of Units Change to read:

Aircraft Operationally Assigned

UNITS	TYPE	TOTAL	PRINCIPAL BASES
4 Ftr/Recon Sqdns	T-33	16	Bangkok, Takhli
	RT-33A	3	Korat
	F-5	8	
	RF-5	4	
4 Lt Bmr Sqdns	A-37	17	
	T-28	49	Chiang Mai, Ubon, Koke
			Kathien, Prachuap, Khiri
			Khan
2 Tac Bpt Sqdns	OV-10	16	Koke Kathien, Sattahip
	B-10	13	
	O-1	25	

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1 1 AUG 68
AND DA FORM 808 1 AUG 68 WHICH
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 69.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

(Classify Symbols and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

UNITS	TYPE	TOTAL	PRINCIPAL BASES
3 Trnsq Sqdns	C-123	12	Bangkok
	C-47	22	Sattahip
	T-41	12	
	HS-748	1	
2 Trnsq Heli Sqdns	CH-34	21	Korat
1 Util Heli Sqdn	UH-1H	18	Korat
Misc Eng and Util	CH-34D	10	Kamphaeng Saen
Units	T-37	11	
	IHC-1	22	
	T-6	25	
	CH-13	0	All in Depot

E. (S) Total Military Personnel Strength Change to read:

Army	129,000
Navy	24,175*
Air Force	39,585
Border Patrol Police	9,100
Special Action Forces	2,500
Police Aviation Division	254
Total	204,654

* Includes 8,300 Marines

5

~~SECRET~~

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DD FORM 1396c

(Classify Symbols and Control Markings)

REPLACES DA FORM 1396-1, 1 AUG 60
AND DA FORM 600, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.